BBC2 'The Somme 1916: From Both Sides of the Wire'

[Guest]

On a previous thread on the 'Triumph or Disaster' of Le Cateau it was pointed out (rightly) on a few occasions that one needs to qualify and quantify battles in the context of their ultimate consequences.

 

Surely the Battles of the Somme are some of the many dominoes that, when knocked over, ultimately knocked Germany over and ended the war. Analysis of the first day of the Battles of the Somme, or the whole series of the battles is meaningless without considering the long term (and ultimate) consequences. 

 

The BBC seems to be obsessed with positioning the British efforts as an endless list of failures while conveniently forgetting the undeniable fact that the British and their allies eventually succeeded. It is no wonder that the BBC insists on editorial control. I don't understand why any historian would want to be involved in their attempts to back-fit an imagined history. 

 

The idea that the Battles of the Somme, despite their enormous human cost were British 'failures' seems to ignore the fact that there were tectonic, positive consequences for the allies. Could it have been executed more efficiently?, undoubtedly 'yes', with the benefit of hindsight. The sacrifices of the tens of thousands of men, while compressed into a relatively short period of time were inevitable due to the technologies available. One only has to look at the other large scale concentrations of losses during the Great War such as Verdun to understand that the available technology was a limit factor that attack tactics could not overcome. 

 

I have now watched the programme twice (just to make sure my references are correct) and really fail to see anything that is new. I strongly disagree with most of the conclusions. The authors argue here that the BBC impacted the story they were attempting to tell; originally conceived as the story from the other side of the wire and quickly became a story on BOTH sides of the wire. 

 

 

MG

 

Edit. The 90% figure is complete nonsense and should have been researched in more detail. 

 

 

Edited 22 August , 2016 by Guest
Typos and clarity

[brummell]

On the 90% figure, it is impossible to suppose that this would not have been noticed by observers.  There are indeed places where it was not possible to observe some of the enemy positions, and that with the poor weather grounding air observers there would have been no way of observing whether fuzes were functioning or not.

 

However, if one sits at the spot known as Brock's Benefit, he is rewarded with a view of St Pierre Divion, the German line up to Thiepval (the village itself is mostly obscured), the Schwaben Redoubt, and the German line from the village to the Leipzig Redoubt.  This view encompasses the area of responsibility of two divisions.  The spot gained its name as the favoured OP of General Brock, the artillery commander of 36 Div.  Are we sure he wouldn't have noticed that he was only seeing 10% of what he expected to see?  Or even, given that the figure stated in the programme was admitted to be the highest of a range of values, even 50%?

 

I am prepared to consider that the failure rate of certain fuzes or types of shell may have been higher, even much higher, than usual - but not a blanket figure much in excess of 30%.

 

 

- brummell

Edited 15 August , 2016 by brummell

[Guest]

6 minutes ago, brummell said:

On the 90% figure, it is impossible to suppose that this would not have been noticed by observers.  There are indeed places where it was not possible to observe some of the enemy positions, and that with the poor weather grounding air observers there would have been no way of observing whether fuzes were functioning or not.

 

However, if one sits at the spot known as Brock's Benefit, he is rewarded with a view of St Pierre Divion, the German line up to the village (the village itself is mostly obscured), the Schwaben Redoubt, and the German line from the village to the Leipzig Redoubt.  This view encompasses the area of responsibility of two divisions.  The spot gained its name as the favoured OP of General Brock, the artillery commander of 36 Div.  Are we sure he wouldn't have noticed that he was only seeing 10% of what he expected to see?  Or even, given that the figure stated in the programme was admitted to be the highest of a range of values, even 50%?

 

I am prepared to consider that the failure rate of certain fuzes or types of shell may have been higher, even much higher, than usual - but not a blanket figure much in excess of 30%.

 

 

- brummell

 

The history of the Ministry of Munitions (13 volumes) covers the level of quality-control in mind-boggling detail. The war diaries corroborate this. Their observations were that 'prematures' were by far the greater risk during this period. The idea that the British could take over a million shells and have no idea of their reliability is at best naive and at worst rather ill informed.  It is a curiosity how this ridiculous stat managed to be aired on the BBC by professional researchers without any challenge. MG

[seaJane]

I rephrase what I have said before on this thread - at no point did PB imply that the dud rate was at all times 90% - just that at some point (when, and for how long, unspecified) it did reach 90%.

 

I asked the question 'for how long?' then, and haven't seen an answer, though there may have been one that I missed. The level of anathema being thrown at the figure now suggests that people think PB said it was 90% all the time.

[Guest]

On 8/14/2016 at 19:10, seaJane said:

at no point did PB imply that the dud rate was at all times 90% - just that at some point (when, and for how long, unspecified) it did reach 90%.

 

I think they did. If it was irrelevant why mention it. Twice. With emphasis. And a creative pause. 

 

A measured, balanced view would be to put the stat up and then offer some corroboration. ... some other supporting evidence. The high proportion of duds and the 90% figure was offered as one reason why the British failed. It was offered to create dramatic effect regardless of relevance. This is how the media works and why most respected Great War historians shun the meeja. Rightly so. 

 

Edited.

 

This is is only one of many 'facts' proffered in this BBC production that I find very hard to accept. MG

 

 

Edited 22 August , 2016 by Guest

[Perth Digger]

Not having seen the series, I cannot comment on the 90% dud statistic. But assuming that the proportion of dud shells was often high, who was responsible? The Americans? Female factory workers in Britain? Lloyd-George and his Ministry of Munitions? Haig?!

 

Mike

[David Filsell]

Clearly some on this thread considered the 90 percent figure as a statemement, and began responding to it very quickly. And of course there has been no corroboration - not least because the figure defies belief.

[Old Tom]

May I suggest a more forgiving idea, or explanation of the 90%. Two matters are not subjects of doubt.  The BEF went to war armed with shrapnel and although the need for HE was recognised at an early stage the production  time for the quantities needed meant that only about 33% of shells fired in bombardments prior to day one,  were HE, the others were shrapnel which while able to cut wire had no effect on dug outs. The other, equally well known, is that the increased production involved using factories making shells for the first time and without the inspection service of the ordnance factories. A failure rate of about 30% of these added to the 66% of unsuitable ones might well wield some 90%.  I now put my tongue in my cheek, and further suggest that the BBC felt its intended audience would not understand that shells are of different natures and pressed historians to ridiculously oversimplify.    

[brummell]

Old Tom - In the programme, the problem is very specifically described as 'faulty ammunition' and 'dud shells', and that the reports from the German archives describe a dud rate of between 40 and 90%.  Furthermore, the implication is that this knowledge has only come to light from the German archives.  In reality, of course, it was well known even at the time that there were ammunition problems.  So I don't think the unsuitability of shrapnel for destruction of fortifications was a factor in the argument presented, although of course only Messrs. Barton or Banning could say for sure.

 

As an aside, unless the German unit making the report knew the total number of rounds fired in a given period, and could differentiate shells fired within that period from shells fired outside that period (which surely they couldn't know or even accurately estimate?) how could they possibly arrive at an accurate and robust figure?

 

 

- brummell

[Guest]

The programme highlights in the introduction that 1.5 million shells were fired in the five day bombardment. 38 minutes into Episode One we are told the at the German archives reveal;

 

" ...The minimum percentage of [British] duds is 40%, the maximum is 90% and what that means is one shell out of ten exploding on impact. So the shelling could not produce the annihilating fire storm that had been promised."

 

Note the emphasis on the 90% figure immediately followed by the consequences. The last sentence implies the alleged high failure rate was causal. A 40% failure rate would mean 600,000 duds. A 90% would mean 1.35 million duds spread over the five days. One wonders what the observation officers were reporting or the scores of patrols were reporting if there were hundreds of thousands of duds. 

 

If one focuses on the "minimum" 40% figure, I am trying to imagine how more than half a million shells fail to explode and how this could not be noticed by the British observers over a frontage of many miles? Large parts of the target areas could be observed and the signature flashes from exploding shells at night could be observed. Added to this, if the dud ratio was so high, one might expect these to appear when guns were registering.... Observation from the air might also be an interesting area to explore. The only other explanation would suggest a deliberate cover-up on an unprecedented scale that involved weeding out every report on duds from the diaries across the whole British force.  The British OH for this period seems to be fairly frank and critical, so it is a wonder how and why dud rates of this order of magnitude were not mentioned. 

 

Martin G

 

 

Edit. Separately, a small amount of research reveals that the British were acutely aware of the Moritz listening posts in March 1916 some three months before the Somme battles. It is therefore possible that some of the mass of intercepted messages may have been part of the British deception plan, similar to those made on 11th July. 

Edited 16 August , 2016 by Guest

[David Filsell]

Was not the figure of 90 repeated later with the presenter while kneeling over a number of'duds' or has my memory failed me?

[Terry_Reeves]

I pointed all this out near the beginning of the thread along with a host of other problems, but all was waved waved a way.  With regard to the March 1916 Moritz intercepts, it is unlikely they were part of any deception plan, however GHQ was aware that information was being intercepted and issued a warning about  security. I have a copy of a captured German document that was based on a Morirz intercept, warning that the British  were practising with flame throwers in March 1916 and instructions were issued in how to deal with this threat.  The equipment in question was almost certainly the large flammenwerfers of the Vincent and Liven's type used on 1.7.16. One of these positions was shelled putting it out of action,just after the first shot  when the Germans realised its location, which was per the instructions issued. Peter Barton fronted a  programme about this, but no mention was made of any prior German knowledge.

 

TR

 

Edited 15 August , 2016 by Terry_Reeves

[Jack Sheldon]

Anecdotally, there is plenty of evidence in the German literature that the percentage of duds was very high. Here are some examples.

 

This is a statement, dated 1 Sep 16 by Unteroffizier Bertram of Grenadier Guard Regiment 3. 'Heavy and super-heavy artillery began to bring down destructive fire on our position. It seemed as though a gun of 285 or 305mm, directed by an aerial observer, was concentrating on our sector. The light artillery on the other hand performed poorly. Most of the rounds were overs that landed in the swampy ground without exploding ... One heavy shell landed to our left blowing a large crater and blocking the trench. Now it was our turn! We each heard the well known sound of firing. There was a great thud - dud! The second round was the same - another dud! The aerial observation must have been good, because another three rounds came down around us - all duds. The nerves of the three of us were stretched to the limit, We all knew what the next round might mean to us. The sixth shell exploded right by us. Neu and I found ourselves lying on the edge of the crater without a scratch. There was no sign of Alberding.'

 

Gefreiter Fritsche, IR 179 operating near Warlencourt in October remembered, 'Suddenly there was a flash of light directly overhead as a shrapnel burst, followed by shrieks of pain. Duds thudded down alongside, showering us with mud ... Two comrades, who have been occupying a place which has been sprayed constantly with shrapnel and duds, join me in my hole.'

 

Reserve Leutnant Enemark RIR 91, deployed near Grandcourt, wrote, 'It was, however, a piece of good fortune that at least half of all shells fired were duds.'

 

Leutnant Schicketanz an observer with RIR 106 remembered, 'It was very welcome to us that the British ammunition included so many duds. For example, on 11 November, during one half hour period, I counted thirty five duds which landed about one hundred metres to the right of the observation post.'

 

Jack

 

 

Edited 16 August , 2016 by Jack Sheldon

[PhilB]

Many members will have experienced sitting in the butts while a rifle or machine gun bullet hits the bank behind them. All this talk of duds makes me wonder what it`s like to be on the receiving end of a dud shell. Still a fairly uncomfortable happening?

[Don Regiano]

Anecdotally, the Germans appeared to have a few duds of their own:

 

http://www.lancs-fusiliers.co.uk/feature/Capt_John_Tattersall.htm

 

Letter No III, Dec 1915

[Perth Digger]

Given that most of the ground hit by these duds in July was taken in August and September, would it be reasonable to expect that those clearing the battlefields noticed them? Is there any evidence from British records that the army queried the problem with the politicians (or with the Ministry of Munitions)? At the very least, one would expect GHQ to factor in duds when working out the number of shells required for, say, 15 September. Or did these duds just disappear into the ground?

 

Mike

[Perth Digger]

This is a quotation from Bidwell and Graham's Fire-Power, p.98-99.

 

'Naturally the men in the field were handicapped by the shortage of heavy guns and ammunition, by the lack of an instantaneous fuze, by periodical epidemics of prematures in 1915 and 1916 and by the high proportion of duds in those years. On the Somme 25 per cent of guns were out of action due to design faults, inferior materials and the relative incompetence of unit artificers and officers who had been civilians only a few months before'.

 

Mike

[horrocks]

On 13/08/2016 at 16:09, QGE said:

Phone monitoring.  Another puzzling aspect in Episode One that causes some confusion (for me at least) is the 'revelation' from German archive material that the Germans were monitoring the British phone system and knew key timings. There is a tacit implication that the British were unaware of this German monitoring. ...then a few minutes later in the programme we are told that the British deliberately made bogus phone calls as a deception plan ahead of the attacks on 11th July,  knowing that the Germans would be monitoring the calls. The implication being that the British suddenly became aware of the monitoring within the first 10 days.

 

Again I would be interested to find anything that supports this idea. Surely phone monitoring predates 1st July 1916?

 

Martin G

Did the British not find and survey the Moritz listening station at La Boisselle when that village fell? That discovery would surely have given them time to devise deception-tactics in time for 11th.

[Guest]

1 hour ago, horrocks said:

Did the British not find and survey the Moritz listening station at La Boisselle when that village fell? That discovery would surely have given them time to devise deception-tactics in time for 11th.

 

The British appear to have gained detailed information on the Moritz technology in March and April 1916 from POWs*. The point here is that the existence of Moritz listening posts was known by the British prior to the start of the Somme and is not a "stunning revelation". 

 

It is difficult to imagine that the British did nothing for three months or didn't  try to exploit this by seeding the traffic with false messages. We know they did this on 11th July and it would be no surprise that it started earlier. It is therefore also possible that the German reports immediately prior to the battle may have included some false British messages designed by them as part of their deception efforts. 

 

I highlight this as the prgramme's views on British intelligence in the run up to the Somme seem to be rather negative and slightly at odds with other sources including primary source material (see below).

 

07:33 into Episode One, Peter Barton tells us

 

 "Perhaps the C-in-C [Haig] would have been less buoyant had he known that for months the Germans had been intercepting British telephone conversations and knew a great deal about his Army and their intentions. 

 

My research in the German Archives provides the stunning revelation that they did this by using a machine called the Moritz."

 

My underlining/emphasis. GHQ intelligence discussed the possibility of telephone intercepts at least six months before the start of the Somme and according to files held at NAUK had their suspicions confirmed in March and April*. The facts don't really support the idea that the British had no idea. 

 

Just one of the few reasons why I found the programme rather challenging. MG

 

*Ref British GHQ Intelligence Reports in WO 157 held at NAUK.

 

Edited 16 August , 2016 by Guest
Added quote

[David Filsell]

Jack,

I think we are all generally agreed on a percentage of duds. That fact is pretty fully documented. Even a high percentage is acceptable as a statement, it's the question of 90 percent and  the probability of accurate German observation that I and others find impossible to accept.  Reserve Leutnant Enemark RIR 91 reckons over 50 per Cent. In my book, Scottish legal terms it seems at best 'Unproven'. Trouble is some numpty of the Snowballs variety will cast it in TV or book 'stone' amongst the other Myths of the Somme. Much more work needed on it I think.

[Jack Sheldon]

I am certainly not trying to defend the very high figure, but am merely suggesting that there were clearly times when the failure rate was extraordinarily high and that, regardless of any problems British observers may have had, those on the receiving end were widely aware of the fact and thankful for it. Somewhere or other I have a document where the Germans recorded the shell markings from various US manufacturers which they recovered from the Somme battlefield.  Given the complexity of fuze manufacture and exceedingly poor quality control over there as production was cranked up, I am willing to accept that there may have been times when virtually entire batches failed to explode. I cannot really comment on what Peter found out about this at Munich because I have never looked out for that sort of material. As for recording the arrival of shells, this was done routinely at sub-unit level and reported up the chain of command daily until huge drumfire bombardments just prior to attacks made it impossible. I quoted the odd example in my Vimy Ridge book. On 29 Mar 17, 79th Res Div reported 'Approximate number of incoming artillery shells and mortar bombs: [Sector] Fischer 2,510 shells, 800 mortar bombs; Zollern 1,100 shells, 140 mortar bombs; Arnulf 7,850 shells, 400 mortar bombs.' The following day the figures were:  Fischer 1,802 shells, 775 mortar bombs; Zollern 4,900 shells, 540 mortar bombs; Arnulf (northern sub-sector only) 20,000 shells estimated, coupled with heavy mortar concentrations. Rear areas: 5,000 heavy and super heavy shells.'  So somebody had the job of counting. It probably helped to take their minds off the proximity of death.

 

Jack

[MikeMeech]

1 hour ago, QGE said:

 

The British appear to have gained detailed information on the Moritz technology in March and April 1916 from POWs*. The point here is that the existence of Moritz listening posts was known by the British prior to the start of the Somme and is not a "stunning revelation". 

 

It is difficult to imagine that the British did nothing for three months or didn't  try to exploit this by seeding the traffic with false messages. We know they did this on 11th July and it would be no surprise that it started earlier. It is therefore also possible that the German reports immediately prior to the battle may have included some false British messages designed by them as part of their deception efforts. 

 

I highlight this as the prgramme's views on British intelligence in the run up to the Somme seem to be rather negative and slightly at odds with other sources including primary source material (see below).

 

07:33 into Episode One, Peter Barton tells us

 

 "Perhaps the C-in-C [Haig] would have been less buoyant had he known that for months the Germans had been intercepting British telephone conversations and knew a great deal about his Army and their intentions. 

 

My research in the German Archives provides the stunning revelation that they did this by using a machine called the Moritz."

 

My underlining/emphasis. GHQ intelligence discussed the possibility of telephone intercepts at least six months before the start of the Somme and according to files held at NAUK had their suspicions confirmed in March and April*. The facts don't really support the idea that the British had no idea. 

 

Just one of the few reasons why I found the programme rather challenging. MG

 

*Ref British GHQ Intelligence Reports in WO 157 held at NAUK.

 

Hi

 

It is interesting to note that the question of German Telephone interception was covered in 'Haig's Intelligence' by Jim Beach, p.157-159 and 'The British Army and Signals Intelligence During the First World War', edited by John Ferris, p.25-52.  Beach also mentions that the British captured  a "cache of German intelligence materials including copies of British messages" which was incorporated in a GHQ intelligence summary of 7 July 1916.  So along with the suspicion and the POW information Haig and GHQ certainly knew the German capabilities very quickly.

I wonder if this is a problem of the 'one man show' type of presentation as it does not include the work of others who may have already covered the subject, maybe in greater detail?

 

Mike 

[Guest]

17 hours ago, MikeMeech said:

Hi

 

It is interesting to note that the question of German Telephone interception was covered in 'Haig's Intelligence' by Jim Beach, p.157-159 and 'The British Army and Signals Intelligence During the First World War', edited by John Ferris, p.25-52.  Beach also mentions that the British captured  a "cache of German intelligence materials including copies of British messages" which was incorporated in a GHQ intelligence summary of 7 July 1916.  So along with the suspicion and the POW information Haig and GHQ certainly knew the German capabilities very quickly.

I wonder if this is a problem of the 'one man show' type of presentation as it does not include the work of others who may have already covered the subject, maybe in greater detail?

 

Mike 

 

It is possible to download hundreds of pages of GHQ Army level diaries. The 1st Army papers for example show a number of Minutes from Army Conferences where all the Corps Commanders attended. The details include numerous reminders of the risks of phone messages being monitored by the German listening posts. There are also examples of the British counter-measures. Here is one example where false messages were sent down the lines in the 2nd Div, IV Corps area. Note this predates the Somme battles. 

 

 

Edited 17 August , 2016 by Guest

[brummell]

Peter Barton himself writes in his 'The Somme - A New Panoramic Perspective', p.147, 'It is today suspected that this method of eavesdropping gave the Germans far more information than that obtained from prisoners, deserters, local spies, information recovered from the dead or from captured documents and equipment... It has not yet been ascertained how many other [than the Rawlinson 'good luck' message on 30 June] British communications has been intercepted, how long the practice had been going on, nor how many other Moritz systems were employed.'  The book was published in 2006.

 

By the sounds of it, Mr Barton's research presented in the programme does bring new information to light which touches on the relative amount and value of information received from Moritz versus other sources, on the number of communications intercepted and on how many systems were in use in the Somme area - but to present the fact of Moritz's use as a great revelation could be misleading.

 

Having that said, the majority watching the programme would never had heard of Moritz at all, so to those viewers its existence would indeed have been a revelation.

 

 

- brummell

[David Filsell]

Jack,

Thanks for that. I'm not all sure, but are not High Explosive  shells adesigned to go 'bang, when they land and make big hole. Shrapnel shells go 'bang' in the air and the empty casing digs in. Would anyone on the ground have actually heard the bang from a Shrapnel round? Equally I am unaware of the balance between the number of guns firing HE and those firing Shrapnel. The point then becomes if the percentage given on the programme includes both HE and Shrapnel.