BBC2 'The Somme 1916: From Both Sides of the Wire'

[horrocks]

Thank you Brummel, finally I have clarity. Very, very interesting.

 

I have seen an aerial photo (again, I think in PB's book) showing the grazing effect of shrapnel on the ground in front of the wire belt, I think at Serre, and it is clearly in enfilade. Was the requisite skill and training in place across the RA on 1st July? My understanding is that the efficacy of the artillery improved throughout the campaign as training, the quality of ammunition and indeed scientific understanding gathered apace, but that none of the above were particularly good in the early stages.

[Guest]

Ref shrapnel and wire cutting. There are scores of British patrol reports that record wire being cut effectively by shrapnel. There is no doubt that it was effective when done correctly, however one of the challenges the British faced was the German's ability to replace wire when it had been cut. Wire cut today might be replaced or repaired overnight and so the process would start again. If one adds to this the possibility of wire being replaced during the night of 30th June, it is easy to see how alleged 'failure' of the RA to cut wire may in fact in some places have simply been the German's ability to replace it. 

 

The only way to police this effectively was to constantly send out patrols. These were done mostly under the cover of darkness when condition were sub-optimal for accurate observation. The number of these patrols and their efficiency varied very considerably across the front. Corps and Divisional commanders appear to have been given considerable leeway in the way they tackled these challenges. 

 

I have never seen any detailed analysis of how much wire facing the assaulting troops was in fact cut. Using the mass of reports in the diaries it might be possible to rebuild the picture. The theme of 'uncut wire' seems to dominate modern narratives so it would be interesting to establish the failure (or otherwise) of the RA's efforts. That most of the first objectives were taken might suggest the greater problems were further back with the second line objectives where observation of 'cut' wire would have been infinitely more difficult and the ability of the Germans to replace it infinitely more easy than the front line. Just a thought. MG

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Edited 19 August , 2016 by Guest

[brummell]

On RA training and ability, it's hard to say as there are a lot of other factors in play.  The technique is simple enough to understand but made difficult to achieve in practice.  Even the best and most experienced observers can achieve little from a poor OP. Even if you had a skilled observer and a disciplined gun-line, some shells would still be ineffective due to the fact that not every shell will go where you want, even if aimed correctly.  The guns could be laid onto an area of wire and begin engaging it; even an hour later they could be missing due to changes in conditions - even very small ones, considering how precise the point of burst had to be.  The target had to be observed constantly, really, and this wasn't always possible.  In 36 Div's area south of the Ancre down to Thiepval, wire cutting had been extremely effective - but then there was a wealth of excellent observation posts in the area.  On the Redan Ridge, ground observation was very difficult and so guns had to be concentrated on a couple of points to create lanes through the wire, rather than generalised destruction.  This of course resulted in choke points through the wire easily covered by fire by the enemy.  Conversely, the wire at Gommecourt was poorly treated in places despite relative ease of observation.

 

On MG's very good points, even patrols could get it wrong - on 30 June 1916, 12/Londons (Rangers) reported up to brigade, just hours before Zero, that patrols reported all the wire to their front - both British and German - was destroyed.  It was nothing of the sort, large areas were intact.  When they got across to it during the attack, they also found evidence that other areas had been repaired.  This most have been costly for the Germans, given that the bombardment went on ceaselessly (although with varying intensity) for a week.

 

In the depth positions, III Corps artillery reported up the chain during the bombardment that their efforts to cut the distant wire would not be successful, and that using ammunition to try and do it would necessarily reduce the amount available to use on the nearest wire, thus reducing their chances of doing that as well.  This does not appear to have been passed up to Fourth Army HQ. Prior and Wilson offer the explanation that nobody in III Corps expected to achieve their distant objectives anyway, so weren't too perturbed by the news.  The effect of this, if true, was commanders planning on one set of assumptions and a fire plan based on another.

 

 

- brummell

[PhilB]

1 hour ago, brummell said:

.  Irregularly-shaped bullets (more like shell fragments) would be impossible to pack into a shell regularly, resulting in an imbalanced and unstable shell.  So I think  a spherical bullet was the only practical option.

 

 

- brummell

 

 

There`s no reason why they should be irregular. Cubes or tetrahedra, for example, would pack just as well as spheres. Were any other shapes actually tested?

[Chris_Baker]

Speaking as a former production engineer who had to deal with the mass movement of small metal shapes, I'll throw in that irregularly shaped bits or even cubes etc may have been more prone to "nesting": that is, they would in effect lock together and either not come out of the shell at all, or come out in a lump!

 

 

Edited 19 August , 2016 by Chris_Baker

[PhilB]

That`s a possibility I hadn`t considered.. Can spheres nest? I suppose they could, in theory, as the balls are never quite perfectly spherical.

Edited 19 August , 2016 by PhilB

[brummell]

Cuboid bullets would be regularly shaped and easy to pack - but as they have flat sides and edges they would suffer greater air resistance, lose velocity sooner and thus be less effective at cutting wire. If you increase the number of sides to improve the ballistics, you may as well make it a sphere.  Other shapes may well cut wire better, but due to their ballistic performance would make it even more difficult to get them to the right place.

 

Plus, on a separate issue, you would be complicating ammunition supply by having wire-cutting shrapnel and anti-personnel shrapnel.

 

Edited 19 August , 2016 by brummell

[PhilB]

1 hour ago, brummell said:

Cuboid bullets would be regularly shaped and easy to pack - but as they have flat sides and edges they would suffer greater air resistance, lose velocity sooner and thus be less effective at cutting wire.

 But it maybe that what they lose in velocity they more than make up for in cutting power. Is there any evidence of tests to determine the best shape?

[Guest]

"Slaughter on the Somme: 1 July 1916 - The Complete War Diaries of the British Army's Worst Day" by Martin Mace and John Grehan includes all the surviving unit diaries and reports at battalion and Brigade level. The kindle edition enables one to search by key terms. Interestingly, and perhaps surprisingly the term 'uncut' only appears 17 times across all the diaries and reports. While uncut wire may well be described in other ways ..." the wire was intact...the wire was not cut... etc"....a further trawl based on the words 'wire' and 'cut' seems to indicate that where the wire was mentioned in the narratives it was in the main successfully cut. It is not a water-tight argument, however it is worth investigating further. Trawling through the volumes a few things become clear:

 

1. The wire cutting in front of the first line objectives was reasonably successful. While incomplete the accounts of casualties are largely attributed to two things:

a. Unharmed Germans emerging from their trenches from the moment the barrage lifted to the second objectives

b. German 'barrage' artillery fire.

 

2. Many of the killing zones appear to have been the work of the British. In order to afford quick passage across no-mans' land, lanes were cut into the British wire. As the German machine gunners manned their own parapets, these openings channeled the British troops into narrow death traps which also became easy targets for German artillery.

 

Clearly the latter factor has nothing to do with British dud rates or the RA's ability to cut German wire with shrapnel. It did however result in considerable numbers of casualties. 

 

There is a risk that where the wire was uncut and resulted in massive casualties, these episodes became more significant in the minds of historians seeking an explanation for the enormous losses. Whether the wire was cut or uncut, the ability of sufficient numbers of Germans to emerge unscathed from their bunkers as the attack started seems to have been a very significant factor. 

 

MG

Edited 19 August , 2016 by Guest

[Guest]

On 8/19/2016 at 16:18, PhilB said:

 But it maybe that what they lose in velocity they more than make up for in cutting power. Is there any evidence of tests to determine the best shape?

 

Kinetic energy is a function of mass and velocity squared:  1/2mv²   a small change in velocity has an exponential impact on the kinetic energy....which is why velocity is far more important. At risk of stating the obvious, given the mass of the projectile is a constant, the changing kinetic energy is a function of its (declining) velocity squared.

 

As the bursting charge added very little to the forward velocity (it simply forced the case backwards relative to the shrapnel), the velocity of the shell when bursting was critical. This is why the efficiency of shrapnel is optimal at certain ranges as the shell itself was decelerating from the instant it left the barrel. AT very long ranges sharpnel becomes significantly less efficient due to the enormous drop in velocity.

 

Howitzers capable of firing longer distances had the disadvantage of high trajectories , or 'plunging' fire to use the contemporary term, and lower velocities which made shrapnel less efficient when delivered by some Howitzers. MG  

 

 

Edited 22 August , 2016 by Guest
Additional info

[PhilB]

But, as I said, it might gain more in cutting power. You wouldn`t know without testing. If you were asked to break a strung up wire with a hammer blow, would you choose a round headed or flat headed hammer?

[squirrel]

This has been on the Forum before some years ago - testing of shells for wire cutting.

 

1) Calais November 1915  72 battery RFA - using timed shrapnel range was found to be critical, maximum effective range 2,700 yards - 3,000 yards + not effective.

 

2) June 1916 GHQ Artillery notes - best wire cutting achieved with 2" mortar using the Newton fuze - but vulnerable front line weapon.

Using 18 pdr timed shrapnel best results achieved between 1,800 and 2,400 yards - shell needed to burst on the front edge of the wire, 4 feet off the ground. 5 yards error totally ineffective. Needed careful observation by FOO's and regular overhauling and calibration of guns required to ensure consistent accuracy. I should think that well trained and experienced gun detachments would also be a requirement.

 

The chances of this sort of accuracy being constantly achieved with the guns and gun detachments, and the weather conditions, as they were in July 1916? Minimal I should think...

 

Edited 19 August , 2016 by squirrel

[Guest]

18 hours ago, PhilB said:

But, as I said, it might gain more in cutting power. You wouldn`t know without testing. If you were asked to break a strung up wire with a hammer blow, would you choose a round headed or flat headed hammer?

 

1. Round shrapnel is more aerodynamic and retains its velocity (and therefore its kinetic energy) better than cuboid shrapnel of the same mass. 

2. The 'cutting' effect is a function of that kinetic energy and the cross-section of the projectile (concentration of energy). In theory if all the shrapnel were disc-shaped and the same mass as round shrapnel  and the thin edge hit the wire, it would be more effective as all the energy is concentrated in a smaller cross-section  - rather like a knife. The problem is that it is impossible to keep the cutting edge of a disc in the same plane as turbulence will make them spin in every direction. This would also make them decelerate more quickly. 

 

Maintaining velocity is far more important (to preserve kinetic energy) and is why shrapnel balls were spherical.

 

MG

 

 

Edited 20 August , 2016 by Guest
typo

[Guest]

3 minutes ago, squirrel said:

 

The chances of this sort of accuracy being constantly achieved with the guns and gun detachments, and the weather conditions, as they were in July 1916? Minimal I should think...

 

 

Given 25% of the RA's assets at the Somme were allegedly out of action due to wear (barrel wear) and tear and faulty manufacturing (broken springs etc) I suspect the chances of maintaining consistency were extremely difficult. Add to this the lack of experience of some units. 

 

I have always assumed 1.5 million shells were fired specifically to compensate for this lack of consistency in accuracy and the high dud rate. 

[squirrel]

Point taken  - I forgot to add that the Germans started to use thicker barbed wire from 1915 onwards, after the their experience at Neuve Chapelle, Aubers Ridge, Festubert and Loos, which wouldn't have helped the British Artillery's wire cutting efforts on the Somme. Given that even a well maintained, regularly calibrated gun used by a well trained, experienced gun detachment using an experienced FOO in ideal weather conditions would not expect to achieve 100% accuracy, the chances of this being achieved on the Somme were fairly minimal, even with the vast number of shells fired.

[Guest]

Much of what is being discussed is touched on by Brig Edmonds in the British OH France and Belgium 1916 Vol 1. I have highlighted the relevant parts which might indicate that in 1933 (date of publication) the official view was fairly critical of the failure. Note the acknowledgment of the intercepted messages, poor or faulty artillery and faulty ammunition, Although none are quantified the fact that the OH mentions these suggests that they were not in denial. 

 

I am not sure that I would call the British OH version of events, with all its faults 'self serving'. 

 

Martin G

 

.

Edited 19 August , 2016 by Guest

[Guest]

..

[Jack Sheldon]

Not only did the Germans deduce that the attack was coming astride the Somme, they knew precisely what the limits of the offensive were going to be. I discuss this at some length in my forthcoming 'Fighting the Somme' book. The problem was the obstinacy of Falkenhayn, his misreading of the threat and his refusal to allocate sufficient  - or indeed any - reserves in the correct places to counter what was coming.

 

Jack

[Guest]

1 hour ago, Jack Sheldon said:

Not only did the Germans deduce that the attack was coming astride the Somme, they knew precisely what the limits of the offensive were going to be. I discuss this at some length in my forthcoming 'Fighting the Somme' book. The problem was the obstinacy of Falkenhayn, his misreading of the threat and his refusal to allocate sufficient  - or indeed any - reserves in the correct places to counter what was coming.

 

Jack

 

A quote from "Slaughter on the Somme"

 

"When, four days before the assault, Sir Douglas Haig asked General Snow how he was getting on, the commander of VII Corps was able to reply, “They know we are coming all right”."

 

Grehan, John; Mace, Martin. Slaughter on the Somme (Kindle Locations 656-658). Pen and Sword. Kindle Edition. 

 

 

[brummell]

What I was hoping would come up in the first episode of the programme was the criminal inadequacy of the counter-battery programme for the Somme bombardment.  I think there is a sound argument for prioritising counter-battery over trench destruction.  Every account of 1 July I have read speaks of the impassability of no man's land throughout the day due to the German barrage, preventing reinforcement, resupply and communication in those areas where there had been initial success.  What if (!) 36 Div had been able to reinforce success and hold the Schwaben Redoubt on 1 July? Effective CB fire may well have enabled just that.

 

- brummell 

[Ken Lees]

21 minutes ago, brummell said:

What I was hoping would come up in the first episode of the programme was the criminal inadequacy of the counter-battery programme for the Somme bombardment.  I think there is a sound argument for prioritising counter-battery over trench destruction.  Every account of 1 July I have read speaks of the impassability of no man's land throughout the day due to the German barrage, preventing reinforcement, resupply and communication in those areas where there had been initial success.  What if (!) 36 Div had been able to reinforce success and hold the Schwaben Redoubt on 1 July? Effective CB fire may well have enabled just that.

 

- brummell 

 

But wasn't the major hindrance to the provision of reinforcements and ammunition across no mans' land in front of the 36th Division's line the enfilade fire of the machine guns from Thiepval village and from across the Ancre? The Ulstermen tried to dig communication trenches across no mans' land but it was the machine guns in the unthreatened village above them that caused enough casualties amongst the diggers to stop further efforts.

 

Ken

[brummell]

Ken, I would certainly agree the flanking fire from Thiepval and Beaucourt were important factors in isolating the successful central part of 36 Div's attack north of the river, but not necessarily the *major* hindrance.  Only the very heaviest guns stood a chance of destroying the deep dug-outs where the machine guns were sheltered.  These machine-guns, of course, could really be fired from any cover and didn't require an intact trench.  If the medium calibre guns with sufficient range had been used in counter-battery rather than trench destruction, the Germans' significant artillery threat could have been mitigated.  As it was, those guns and ammunition were wasted bombarding empty trenches - extremely difficult to hit and not essential to the enemy anyway.  This of course applies across the attack front and not just in the Thiepval area.

 

Importantly, this is not just hindsight.  It was known how deep the Germans were burrowing, and what the effectiveness of our shells were against shelters at that depth.  The words 'the success of an operation depends largely upon keeping down the fire of the hostile artillery' had flowed from Rawlinson's own pen after Loos.  And yet the matter was utterly neglected during the bombardment before 1 July.

 

 

- brummell

[Ken Lees]

8 hours ago, brummell said:

Ken, I would certainly agree the flanking fire from Thiepval and Beaucourt were important factors in isolating the successful central part of 36 Div's attack north of the river, but not necessarily the *major* hindrance.  Only the very heaviest guns stood a chance of destroying the deep dug-outs where the machine guns were sheltered.  These machine-guns, of course, could really be fired from any cover and didn't require an intact trench.  If the medium calibre guns with sufficient range had been used in counter-battery rather than trench destruction, the Germans' significant artillery threat could have been mitigated.  As it was, those guns and ammunition were wasted bombarding empty trenches - extremely difficult to hit and not essential to the enemy anyway.  This of course applies across the attack front and not just in the Thiepval area.

 

Importantly, this is not just hindsight.  It was known how deep the Germans were burrowing, and what the effectiveness of our shells were against shelters at that depth.  The words 'the success of an operation depends largely upon keeping down the fire of the hostile artillery' had flowed from Rawlinson's own pen after Loos.  And yet the matter was utterly neglected during the bombardment before 1 July.

 

 

- brummell

 

But surely, if some of the artillery dedicated to subduing the machine gun threat had been reallocated to counter-battery work, there would have been even more machine guns enfilading the advancing infantry, regardless of the success or failure of the counter-battery work.

 

The Germans, if I remember correctly, had made counter-battery work more difficult, prior to 1st July, by keeping their artillery inactive and so avoiding detection on the run-up to the battle. They had also dug extra gun positions so that they could move to previously unidentified positions if/when the original positions were targeted.

[phil andrade]

The programme we're discussing conforms very much to the recent literature : I've just completed Allan Mallinson's book TOO IMPORTANT FOR THE GENERALS, and, just before that , HSM's book about the Somme, and there is an unmistakable theme apparent in all of them : the insistence on pursuing official military doctrine prevailed, rather than the proper appreciation of the situation on the ground.

 

The TV programme makes it apparent that the Germans were more adept at reversing this syndrome....the more adaptable approach reflecting the need to husband resources against the material and manpower preponderance enjoyed by the Entente.

 

Phil

 

 

[Guest]

If memory serves, the British OH argues that British counter-battery efforts were limited by the simple fact that German artillery were generally longer range weapons than the British. This allowed the Germans to place a significant amount of their long range weapons beyond the range of all but a few British guns/howitzers. *

 

If true this seems to have been a critical factor as the German artillery effectively isolated the initial waves by denying no-mans land as a route for reinforcement and resupply. 

 

* Page 460 of the British OH France and Belgium 1916 Vol 1

Edited 20 August , 2016 by Guest
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