BBC2 'The Somme 1916: From Both Sides of the Wire'

[Old Tom]

David Filsell's point is valuable and, I might claim, adds to the point I was trying to make at 446. In mid 1916 we were scrapping the barrel and inclusion of guns like those museum pieces in totals is questionable. The more numerous 18 pdr had problems in that the first version was equipped with springs as part of their recoil system and were, I think, the majority at that time. The springs could not cope with sustained high rates of fire and frequently needed resetting or to be replaced on breakage. Later types had a pneumatic system. 

[Guest]

37 minutes ago, Old Tom said:

QGC  Many thanks for posting the VII corps maps. My limited understanding of the artillery plans in support of day one is that there was little common ground between Corp, and that while some had the beginnings of creeping barrages others were rather haphazard. The maps show, if I have understood them, a number of linear targets some roughly parallel to the front and others nearly at right angles. Surely these would be difficult to engage unless lengths were allocated to individual batteries. This, as you imply, would contribute to the failure on the left.

 

 I assume the length of each lift was allocated by battery and the Battery FOO would sort out the coverage. I assume there was plenty of shooting from the map having already registered in the prior days. One part of the VII Corps CRA diaries makes it clear that aer-photos were planned on Z minus 3 to monitor the effectiveness of the shooting. 

 

I think the interesting part of the maps is that some forms of artillery fire were more effective when the target was enfiladed (i.e fired at from the side). Given some parts of the targets were at right angles, it would be difficult (impossible?) to achieve similar effects from the same gun position on both parts (at right angles) of the target. 

 

It would be interesting to see a detailed modern analysis of these fire-plans. As has already been discussed the effectiveness of wire cutting relied on very narrow windows of range, trajectory and fuze setting. I suspect there are similar narrow windows when using HE. The History of the  Ministry of Munitions highlights the failure of some fuzes at low angles. In a previous life I used explosives and it is clear that they have some very unusual qualities. I am not convinced that HE would have been effective against wire. I note that the infantry patrols were using Bangalore Torpedoes which has the advantage of being placed in the middle of the wire with a long cutting edge. Improvised versions made from two steel pickets packed with explosives were very effective.

 

Separately, we have not discussed the design of German wire concertinas. Modern (British) barbed wire is designed in a way that is effectively connected in more than one place between loops, meaning if one part is cut, the remaining connections hold the coils together. I have no idea of the designs of German wire in 1916, but even if it was a simple continuous single coil, laying them in rows with the loops interlaced has a similar effect which is compounded when multiple coils are used. Added to this the longitudinal strands also help hold the wire coils together. I assume the concept of a low wire entanglement was known to the Germans, which would be significantly more difficult to clear. Cutting wire with shrapnel must have been a very inefficient process. The British expended 969,600 rounds in their attempts to do this before the first day of the Somme. To save the calculation that equates to 8,000 tons of 18 pdr ammunition.and nearly 40 million shrapnel balls. 

 

Lastly - attached is a single page of the VII Corps fire plan. there are five pages of this type of detail at Corps, HAG, and Div level. for the 5 days running into the 1st July 1916.

 

MG

Edited 21 August , 2016 by Guest

[Jack Sheldon]

Below is a schematic design for front line obstacles showing vee shaped higher belts interspersed with low wire entanglements, coupled with two methods of covering them with machine guns.  Precisely this design featured in the Hindenburg Line - no surprise because those details were derived from accumulated knowledge during the Battle of the Somme and the actual diagram is taken form the final 'Experiences of the Somme' paper produced by a First Army team under Lossberg. The principle difference is in the depth and the density. Prior to the Somme the rule was to wire each of the three trenches which formed the First Position separately to a depth of 10 - 20 metres, now the direction changed to: 'Before the front line trench, the obstacles must be as strong as humanly possible and be laid out in a regular pattern, covering large areas to a depth of 60 - 200 metres. This will force the enemy to expend huge amounts of ammunition to destroy them and will ensure that after days of bombardment, the enemy will still be confronted by an obstacle comprising a wild tangle of wood, wire and iron.' A different chequerboard design was recommended for depth positions, so as to allow manoeuvre room for counter-attacks; the gaps to be filled until needed with knife rests and other temporary obstacles - and none of it did them any good at Cambrai when the tanks crushed these obstacles like beds of nettles.

 

Jack

 

 

[brummell]

In terms of analysing fire plans, the prime criterion is, does the fire plan support the manoeuvre plan effectively?  Nowadays, one writes a fire plan fully expecting the manoeuvre plan to go awry and is ready to modify the fire plan accordingly.  In 1916, the communication technology simply didn't exist to a) inform commanders when things were going wrong and b), to rapidly inform the artillery how the situation had changed and what was now required of them.

 

Any analysis must take this into account, otherwise fire plans of that time will be (and have been) criticised for being rigid, mechanistic and unresponsive, when the army lacked the means to make them otherwise.

 

The improvements we see in this matters later in the war are down to more experienced planners making more sensible projections about the likely rate of advance.  The fire plans were still mechanistic, but the mechanism was better synchronised with the infantry.   Furthermore, the increased number of guns later in the war allowed for sufficient batteries to be left out of the plan and held in reserve as needed.

 

 

- brummell

[Guest]

8 hours ago, MartH said:

 

MG earlier on in this thread alluded to the British Official Histories using Official German material and staff.

 

This is correct that Edmonds consulted and corresponded with Potsdam frequently, and also the other archives. The French did not till 1937. The US had 2 people in Potsdam for some time and the Australians visited Potsdam and were in contact due/via to Edmonds. I think that Edmonds was the major player in ensuring discussion between the country departments. 

 

It is worth reading the sources and bibliography in each volume of Edmonds they are extensive. For Volume I,  He was in correspondence with Major-General A. Forbes until he died, when he was working on his History of the Ordnance Services, the French Official History was not yet published but he got a sections and maps from the French. For the Germans side he used the Green Some-Nord, and he had substantial correspondence with the Reichsarchiv for additional information. He also lists the Wuttemberg and Bavarian Official History and the series which covers the sections of the Wuttemberg Divisions. Volume II 1916 the revised edition was published after the German Official Histories, For the 1st edition he had regular correspondence with the Reicharchiv. he also issued drafts to some countries OH departments for comments. 

 

For volume I IRC he sent out 1,500 or 500 draft copies for comments to those who;d served, but can't find the reference at the moment either way a substantial number.

 

There where over 500 German regimental in the Historical section in the early 30's by 38 I think it was over 800 which where used and quoted. 

 

Finally relations were so good during the war that Edmonds got one of the restricted copies of Volume 13 via the German Embassy in Switzerland. Volume 14 was not published in 1944 regardless of what the bibliographies say, and I think he never one of the 4 photographic copies produced from a burnt proof copy recovered in Potsdam by Col H M Cole. I will check. 

 

Schlachten des Weltkriege Vols 20-21 Somme Nord [Reichsarchiv, Oldenburg] covering the Somme 1916 appear to have been published in 1927, a few years before the BOH. It is referred to in footnotes in the BOH at least five times. It is referred to simply as Somme Nord. MG

Edited 21 August , 2016 by Guest

[MartH]

3 hours ago, QGE said:

 

Schlachten des Weltkriege Vols 20-21 Somme Nord [Reichsarchiv, Oldenburg] covering the Somme 1916 appear to have been published in 1927, a few years before the BOH. It is referred to in footnotes in the BOH at least five times. It is referred to simply as Somme Nord. MG

 

Hi Martin both volumes of Somme Nord was published in 1927

 

Volume X of Der Weltkrieg was published in 1936

Volume XI of Der Wetkrieg was published in 1938

 

1916 Volume 1 1932

1916 Volume 2 1938

 

I made a mistake there was not a revised edition for  Volume 2, apologies I miss-read the preface and did not check my bibliography. 

 

1,500 draft  copies of Volume 2 where distributed for comments.

 

[Norrette]

Playing catch-up, I've seen 2 of 3 episodes. As someone who's taken little interest in the Somme until now, I found them illuminating and well produced. I didn't take the 90% duds as a given,  PB clearly mentioned the 40% lower level. I can understand how coverage of both French & German successes would not go down well with a British audience,  hence the omission of the French story. I think it would be good to pass on our congrats to the Beeb for commissioning this prog, if only to encourage them to do more of the same. 

 

I hope that PB is busy writing  as I want that book!

 

 

 

 

[David Filsell]

Today’s Daily Telegraph contains and interesting reprint of an article by Sir Phillip Gibbs published by the paper on August 22^nd 1916. I thought it would be worthwhile to flag it up on this thread since it covers events at and around Guillemont and Pozieres at that time “... where we have joined hands with the French after their own brilliant capture of the whole village of Maurepas.” It makes some pertinent points on artillery, German ‘deep dugouts’, German prisoners of war and their regiments with comments about the quality of these troops.  It is viewable on telegraph.co.uk/news/ww-archive.

Although now largely forgotten, and overlooked as a source, and lest it be thought the piece is simply full of pr puff, it’s worth knowing that Gibbs was a strong opponent of censorship and constantly fought it - although his articles were published only after they were censored by C E Montague . It was a constraint of which he strongly disapproved and fought but was forced to accept. Only after could after the war he wrote rather more openly to express his views.

[Guest]

Episode Two. 19 minutes in, we are told that;

 

         "For the first time in history, aircraft were being used as offensive weapons in themselves"

 

I am pretty sure aeroplanes had been used to attack ground troops before this period, particularly with bombs dropped by hand. Again it is this kind of statement that I found challenging because it is something that is fairly easy to research.  

 

The RNAS raids on Zeppelin sheds in Sep 1914 and Louis Strange's experiments and success in bombing Courtrai Railway Station in March 1915 might be strong counters to this 'revelation'. MG

 

 

Edited 23 August , 2016 by Guest
Examples

[David Filsell]

The splendid new two volume History of the Scots Guards offers a couple of snippets relevant to this thread which may be of interest.

30^th March 1916

After a long and heavy German bombardment:

“On 30^th the gunners estimate with the curious usual diversity of opinion the number of enemy shells vary from 4,000 to 10,000!”. It adds “In any case considering the number sent over , it is extraordinary how few casularties we had the (Guards) Divn.” (p5270

Not least a clear contemporary indication of the inaccuracy likely when estimating shell explosions during an “intensive bombardment”.  

17^th April 1917

“On 17 April novel piece of captured equipment was put on display at Headquarters Guards division a ‘German instrument for picking up signals’ .” (p532)

There is also a reference to dud shells at this time - they are estimated to be 30 per cent of shells fired  - by both sides.)

 

 

[squirrel]

Going back over the German reports from Jack Sheldon, some mention shells falling in to soft ground or muddy areas and not exploding, so perhaps unexploded rather than dud would be a better description. But how would you tell the difference?

Edited 24 August , 2016 by squirrel

[Guest]

I wonder what percentage of the 'Iron Harvest' are duds?

 

Mike

[David Filsell]

I'll go for unexploded - but I think the term used in the book is actually 'duds'. Nevertheless interesting figures.

[paulgranger]

When you think about it, I would assume that all unexploded shells would have been called 'duds'. After all, if it didn't go off, the man at the receiving end wouldn't have been trying to find out exactly why, and the sender wouldn't know why. So, all 'duds'

[phil andrade]

A PHD thesis beckons .... THE SOMME'S DUD DIVIDEND  How the Germans held their ground

 

Phil

 

 

 

[Guest]

Regardless of the alleged dud ratio, the German bunkers appear to have been dug deeper that the British understood and sufficient number survived the British HE, including the HE that miraculously managed to explode. 

 

The scores of accounts of smashed up German first line trenches suggest that British HE was exploding in sufficient quantity and accuracy. By contrast, theconstruction and survival of the bunkers attracted the deep admiration of the British. 

 

It it is distinctly possible that even if 90% of British HE had actually exploded some bunkers may well have been impervious; sufficient numbers of German bunkers and their inhabitants might still have survived, emerged and still have wreaked havoc among the advancing British. If a bunker is dug deep enough with multiple exits they just might have been immune to even the heaviest British HE. 

 

The dud argument is a 'dud' argument in my view. 

 

Separately the British counter-battery efforts were woefully inadequate even by their own admission in terms of dedicated batteries and scales of ammunition. The VII Corps HAG fireplans show as little as 15 rounds per gun per day and average not much more than 25 for some batteries. One Corps had only two batteries partially allocated 'when required'. This, along with the difficulty of locating them in the first place (Jack's point) might be an equally significant factor that enabled the German artillery to deny no man's land to the Britsh as a route for reinforcement.  It would be interesting to establish in the German archives exactly how many German batteries actually came under counter battery fire in the week before 1st July 1916. 

 

MG

Edited 24 August , 2016 by Guest

[Liz in Eastbourne]

2 hours ago, QGE said:

The dud argument is a 'dud' argument in my view. 

 

Don't you mean the 'dud' argument is a dud argument?

 

Liz

[Guest]

54 minutes ago, Liz in Eastbourne said:

 

Don't you mean the 'dud' argument is a dud argument?

 

Liz

 

Boom boom! Or not, as the case may be.

 

Mike

[Steven Broomfield]

ironic that a chap called Peter is in the middle of an argument about Dud(s).

[Guest]

Dudley More (sic) please

Edited 24 August , 2016 by Guest

[Guest]

2 hours ago, Liz in Eastbourne said:

 

Don't you mean the 'dud' argument is a dud argument?

 

Liz

 

No, but it might con'fuze' some. 

[brummell]

4 hours ago, QGE said:

The scores of accounts of smashed up German first line trenches suggest that British HE was exploding in sufficient quantity and accuracy. By contrast, theconstruction and survival of the bunkers attracted the deep admiration of the British. 

 

It it is distinctly possible that even if 90% of British HE had actually exploded some bunkers may well have been impervious; sufficient numbers of German bunkers and their inhabitants might still have survived, emerged and still have wreaked havoc among the advancing British. If a bunker is dug deep enough with multiple exits they just might have been immune to even the heaviest British HE. 

 

This reminds me of a point I made a while back to the effect that all the medium guns busily bombarding empty trenches were wasting time and ammunition.  Empty trenches kill nobody, and at the moment of the attack when the friendly bombardment moved on to depth positions, enemy infantry did not need a well-constructed trench to bring in devastating small arms fire - a smashed up line of shell holes and crumbling trench provided ample cover.  In fact, we know that in some places the German infantry did not feel that they needed any cover, viz. those opposing 32 Div on the Leipzig Spur, some of whom were seen to stand on their parapets to get a better shot at the approaching British infantry.  Much better to have used these guns against things which could have an effect, i.e. uncut wire or even better, enemy guns.

 

On the second point, a great many German bunkers were impervious to all but 9.2" or above direct hits.  There were pitifully few howitzers of this calibre available.  The scarcity was compounded by the fuze then in use, an instantaneous fuze which did not allow the shell to penetrate the ground enough for the explosion to cause shelter-collapsing shockwaves - hence the need for a direct hit.  The most vulnerable part of the shelter (arguably the only vulnerable part in most cases) was the exit.  The Germans were aware of this and either built more than one, joined shelters by tunnels, and in all cases revetted and braced the exits extremely strongly.

 

When you consider that two-thirds of the 1500 guns did nothing but cut wire and only 233 of the total stood even a chance of destroying the deep shelters and their garrisons, you begin to see what the RA was up against.  All in all, the overarching fire plan - the great pre-battle bombardment - signally failed in the prime principle of fire-planning, which is concentration of force.  Already scarce resources,  handicapped by some unreliable guns, some unreliable ammunition and sub-optimal fuzes, were further diluted by the requirement to bombard targets out to the Germans' second position due to the depth of objectives insisted upon by Haig. 

 

The really interesting question is to what extent were the artillery commanders aware of this, and how forcefully did they argue their cases to their corps commanders/Rawlinson?  Infantry commanders usually expect 'magic' artillery to be in all places at all times in sufficient force to achieve what they want; even now it is very difficult to get them to accept there are limits to what can be achieved, and that concentration of force is the key to success with it.

 

 

- brummell

[Ralph J. Whitehead]

What most do not realize was that the Plum Pudding trench mortar shell did more to damage or destroy deep dugouts than any of the shelling. That is, if they went off as many did not.

[Guest]

8 hours ago, brummell said:

 

When you consider that two-thirds of the 1500 guns did nothing but cut wire and only 233 of the total stood even a chance of destroying the deep shelters and their garrisons, you begin to see what the RA was up against.  

- brummell

 

If the anecdotal evidence is any guide, the 9.2" guns seemed to be the least mechanically reliable and have the highest dud rate. One account from a British infantry officer in the 1/5th Bn Sherwood Foresters TF who was made a POW describes one German trenchbeing littered with unexplored 9.2" shells. He speculated on how things might have been different had they exploded. Incidentally he estimated the German bunker he was taken to as being 40 feet deep. 

 

One one other aspect that needs to be considered is the trajectory. In order to penetrate deep bunkers and the entrances/exits a high trajectory is required. At Gallipoli in April 1915 the massive guns of the Royal Navy largely failed to make an impact on the Turkish defences due to their low, flat trajectory. The 29th Div in particular would have understood this as they were the assaulting Division at the Gallipoli landings and suffered again at the Somme.  

 

One might also deduct the guns from the remaining totals for the numbers that would be effective against the deep bunkers. 

 

MG

Edited 25 August , 2016 by Guest

[J Banning]

Back from holiday to see this still seems to be rumbling on.

 

For those in the North East, Peter is speaking at Durham University's 'Somme 1916 Talks Programme' on 5 September at 1800hrs. Why not go and speak to him there? I spoke at Durham Uni back in July about our archaeological work at La Boisselle and it was a great venue with a knowledgeable audience - highly recommended. The museum exhibition is excellent.

 

Full details here: https://www.dur.ac.uk/whatson/lectures_seminars/?eventno=30647

 

And info from the page below.

Somme 1916: Talks Programme

5th September 2016, 18:00 to 19:30, Palace Green Library

Peter Barton, Military Historian and Presenter of the 2016 BBC documentary The Other Side Of The Somme will speak about Challenging History – The Somme from Both Sides of the Wire

Based upon his three-part BBC 2 Somme Centenary series which will be broadcast from 1 July this year, this lecture will include additional material that was not able to be included the films, but will appear in a later book.

The subject matter is often controversial, not least because even after 100 years a study of the battle through German primary sources has never previously been undertaken; too monumental a task! The German records are colossal in scale and forensic in detail, and contain revelations that radically change one’s perceptions, not just of the Somme but the entire war.
Entry to the talk (GBP 12.50) - also includes exclusive after-hours access to the Somme 1916 exhibition between 5pm and 6pm, plus a glass of wine.

For further information on this talk please contact Dr Kirsty McCarrison, 0191 334 2993, k.e.mccarrison@dur.ac.uk

Contact pg.library@durham.ac.uk for more information about this event.