BBC2 'The Somme 1916: From Both Sides of the Wire'

[David Filsell]

Philpott also covers the French actions on the Somme in greater detail than most authors - a fact which some British Sommistas have used unfairly as a stick to beat him with.

[SteveMarsdin]

Philpott's "Bloody Victory: The Sacrifice on the Somme" is a vary balanced book with very good introductory chapters placing the battle in the context of the war so far, the geography of the Somme and the coalition politics of the time.

 

Steve

[sjustice]

Important pointers from Chris, David and Steve.

 

Any members who have read Philpott's 'Bloody Victory' and compared it with Jack's 'The German Army on the Somme 1914-16' will be plugging in to excellent scholarship on what was what and why and when and how as far as the Somme battles of 1916 are concerned.

 

Cheers,

SMJ

 

3 hours ago, Chris_Baker said:

William Philpott comes to a somewhat different conclusion to that proposed in the TV series: "... Moreover, the reverence of that opening day and for its victims obscures the real story of the Somme offensive, which may have begun terribly, but ended eight months later in weary triumph when the German army ceded the field rather than face another such battle. Some might argue that the human sacrifice, some 1.2 million men of all armies, renders such outcomes irrelevant. At the time, however, everyone was aware that the Somme had turned the course of the war, and that its result was decided. ..."

From http://beyondthetrenches.co.uk/first-world-war-centenaries-are-we-commemorating-things-the-right-way/

 

26 minutes ago, David Filsell said:

Philpott also covers the French actions on the Somme in greater detail than most authors - a fact which some British Sommistas have used unfairly as a stick to beat him with.

 

13 minutes ago, SteveMarsdin said:

Philpott's "Bloody Victory: The Sacrifice on the Somme" is a vary balanced book with very good introductory chapters placing the battle in the context of the war so far, the geography of the Somme and the coalition politics of the time.

 

Steve

 

[Ancre1917]

It was Prof. Philpott's Bloody Victory: The Sacrifice on the Somme that first alerted me to the significance of their successes in the campaign. From it I bought the recent Michelin guide (in French) on the area, which gives a fair summary of the French part here and points you to some of the best sites. I used it, with advice from Sly on the GWF, to visit some of the best bits close to the Somme. Places like Frise, Faÿ, Belloy-en-Santerre and  Soyécourt are well worth a visit, even to those like me who are new to the French army's part. I have a brief outline of the visit we made there.  If anyone is interested, please send me a PM and I'll email it to you. 

Richard

[nigelcave]

On 8 August 2016 at 13:47, Longton1971 said:

What an interesting and informative site. Prof. Philpott's conclusions hit the mark for me and I look forward to reading new material on the French army's successes in the future. Does anyone know when we can expect an in-depth look at the French on the Somme?

Richard

Not on television, but I have commissioned the first of what I hope shall be five books on the French on the Somme 1914-16 for the Battleground Europe series, obviously with particular reference to the battle(s) of 1916 but also some coverage of the first two years or so of the war in the area.

 

The new Michelin guide on the Somme is now also available in English; it is useful. Actually, the most recent Holts book on the Somme does give considerable space to the French sector, notably in Tours 3 and 4.

 

The area is definitely worth a couple of days of anyone's time when visiting the Somme; not least because it will be easy to appreciate why the French attack south of the river and its initial success might not have unduly alarmed the Germans; the course of the Somme would have brought an advance to a halt south of the river - which in turn explains the ferocity of the French efforts north of the river in the latter weeks of the campaign - well, from mid September - as they attempted to get at Peronne from the north.

[Ancre1917]

That's good news, Nigel. Do you have an idea of a publication date for the first of these books? 

Richard

 

[nigelcave]

With luck the draft will be 'in' for December; allow six months or so from then, so probably, with a following wind, summer 2017, possibly July.

[Steven Broomfield]

I caught up with the final part of the series last night and thoroughly enjoyed it, as I enjoyed the first two parts. As with any good production there were things with which to agree, and things with which to disagree, and much about which to think. And (although no expert on the Somme ... or anything else) I learned a lot.

 

One thing, though, jarred. Peter Barton referred, several times, to the Earl of Cavan, pronouncing the name with emphasis on the second syllable (k'VAN), rather than as I had always imagined, on the first (KAvan). I checked with an Irish vet at work this morning, and she pronounced it with emphasis on the first syllable so I can only assume this is correct. Now, earlier on someone commented that it was good to learn the proper pronunciations of French place-names, but are we sure they were correct or am I wrong about Cavan?

[PhilB]

Pronunciation:

k AV an pronounced like cavern, but with a shorter 'an' on the end than the longer 'ern'; or similar to the boy's name Gavin but as Gavan.   However, I suppose the correct way might be the way the Earl himself pronounced it, whatever that is?

[Ancre1917]

Nigel

Thanks for the information on a likely publication for your first book on the French army's part in the Somme campaign. I'll put it in the diary now. 

Richard

[Len Trim]

14 hours ago, nigelcave said:

With luck the draft will be 'in' for December; allow six months or so from then, so probably, with a following wind, summer 2017, possibly July.

Just when I was running out of excuses to go back to the Somme. Perfect. Now to explore the French area.

Len

[17107BM]

Mile after mile of sh*t coloured F*cc all....The Somme.

 

Lets hope Peter gets a chance to put the  Messines Battle in to the public eye! 

 

And yes, Paschendaele. 

 

Fingers crossed. Its the first time young work colleagues have asked me about further broadcasts on the subject.

 

Look forward to more.

 

GTK.

[Guest]

Finally got around to watching the programme.

 

They left me with the strong impression that there is still much to be discovered in the German archives (and this would likely happen faster if the white gloves were abandoned). I suspect we will be seeing new perspectives for many years as their contents are analysed and published. 

 

I found myself self questioning a number of broad brush statements made in the programme. Almost too many to mention.

 

One example that particularly stuck in my mind as being unlikely was the claim that 90% of British shells were duds. While I don't doubt for a minute that the German archives have a report that makes this claim (probably from one small sector) the authors give the impression it was taken as accurate without any challenge. This report suddenly gets extrapolated; The implication being that this dubious stat applied to the whole British Front. This seems highly unlikely. The 90% figure is the focus; it is repeated, followed by a dramatic pause ....... The emphasis might be a consequence of a BBC agenda to 'prove' how the British Army 'failed' and why the British 'lost' and the Germans 'won'...... or possibly the result of BBC editors, but it seems a factor that was screaming out to be challenged. Where is the reality check?

 

There seems to be a mountain of evidence that this alleged failure rate of British munitions was highly unlikely. One wonders why a few minutes later we are listening to German first hand accounts of men in bunkers becoming hysterical due to the relentless bombardments. Does anyone, particularly the authors, really think that 90% of British artillery ammunition on the first day of the Battles of the Somme could have been defective? I don't think this was remotely possible. 

 

We appear to have shifted from the received wisdom that the British artillery failed to cut much of the wire to a new view that 90% of the ammunition was defective. I would be curious to understand the supporting evidence for this on the British side of the wire. I can't find any. 

 

MG

 

 

Edited 17 August , 2016 by Guest
Typos

[David Filsell]

I'm totally convinced the 'facts,' will not support the 90 percent figer for all the reasons stated in this thread. A list of Somme myths would be fun. For starters that "Every British battalion advanced slowly in lines parallel to the German lines" ( And trigger interesting debate.)

Edited 14 August , 2016 by David Filsell

[brummell]

50 minutes ago, David Filsell said:

I'm totally convinced the 'facts,' will not support the 90 percent finger for all the reasons stated in this thread. A list of Somme myths would be fun. For starters that "Every British battalion advanced slowly in lines parallel to the German lines" ( And trigger interesting debate.)

 

What fascinates me about this particular myth is how it became so, er, entrenched despite the amount of evidence to the contrary, not the least of which is Malin's footage of 2/Royal Fusiliers on the Hawthorne Ridge - actual footage from the battle itself of a battalion running, in dispersed formation, and appearing to use the scant cover.

 

Moreover, it seems to have caught on at a time when there were plenty of veterans of the battle still around who would have remembered things differently (and I am well aware of the different ways in which that last phrase might be understood!).

 

 

- brummell

[Old Tom]

The discussion of who won? is rather tedious and pointless until the purpose of the operation is clear. At the back of my mind is the subject 'The Principles of War'. I think the title is later than WW1 but in essence they must apply. Number one was 'The selection and maintenance of the aim'. If the C in Cs aim was a breakthrough we lost, if is was attrition then it a possibly a draw. I have the impression that Haig rather changed his mind and having failed to breakthrough spoke of attrition and the 'wearing out' of the enemy. Of course the operation was not his choice. Joffre's aim was to divert German forces from Verdun and in that respect the operation was successful.  

[brummell]

Old Tom - I can't really tell your view on Haig changing his mind, but personally I think he was within his rights to do so.  In an offensive many weeks in duration, a commander may well decide to continue operations in the same area, but with a different aim because he seeks to achieve a different object.  The opposite would be an inflexibility even more ferrous than that of which he is normally accused.

 

The question is, did he get the selection part right in the first place?  And this of course has been gone into many hundreds of times before.

 

- brummell

[Medaler]

9 minutes ago, Old Tom said:

The discussion of who won? is rather tedious and pointless until the purpose of the operation is clear. At the back of my mind is the subject 'The Principles of War'. I think the title is later than WW1 but in essence they must apply. Number one was 'The selection and maintenance of the aim'. If the C in Cs aim was a breakthrough we lost, if is was attrition then it a possibly a draw. I have the impression that Haig rather changed his mind and having failed to breakthrough spoke of attrition and the 'wearing out' of the enemy. Of course the operation was not his choice. Joffre's aim was to divert German forces from Verdun and in that respect the operation was successful.  

 

There is a lot more to it than that..........

 

Did Haig (and the French) achieve their objective of a breakthrough? No

Did the Germans achieve their aim of holding their ground? No

Which side lost ground? - An old but accepted measure of defeat - Germany.

Do casualties matter? - No, otherwise there would be no such thing as a pyrrhic victory.

Did the outcome favour one side or the other in their ultimate objective of winning the war?

Did the Battle play any factor in saving the French ( and therefore all of the Allies) from defeat at Verdun?

 

On balance my view is a decided British victory. They don't all have to be as obvious and clear cut as Waterloo.

 

Regards,

Mike

[Guest]

Phone monitoring.  Another puzzling aspect in Episode One that causes some confusion (for me at least) is the 'revelation' from German archive material that the Germans were monitoring the British phone system and knew key timings. There is a tacit implication that the British were unaware of this German monitoring. ...then a few minutes later in the programme we are told that the British deliberately made bogus phone calls as a deception plan ahead of the attacks on 11th July,  knowing that the Germans would be monitoring the calls. The implication being that the British suddenly became aware of the monitoring within the first 10 days.

 

Again I would be interested to find anything that supports this idea. Surely phone monitoring predates 1st July 1916?

 

Separately we are told early on in Episode One that 'surprise was not part of the plan' (or words to that effect)..... Only later to be shown secret tunnels or Russian saps that were used on the British right flank to surprise the Germans. One might reasonably assume that when the British had been shelling the Germans for five days (presumably with 10% effectiveness due to the 90% dud rate) the Germans would have expected a major attack and leave limited options for surprise, forcing the British to look at mines and tunnels. The rather large elephants mines might suggest surprise was part of the plan, albeit poorly executed. 

 

I found some some of the points to be slightly contradictory to later 'revelations' and wonder if poor BBC editing was the cause.

 

Martin G

Edited 13 August , 2016 by Guest

[Old Tom]

And that was a 'close run thing', or words to that effect.

[Medaler]

27 minutes ago, Old Tom said:

And that was a 'close run thing', or words to that effect.

 

Indeed so, but nobody ever thinks of it as a French victory.

 

That is perhaps part of the problem. That WW1 generation were all brought up to expect another Waterloo or, at sea, another Trafalgar. When neither failed to materialise the disappointment entered the British psyche to the extent that victories that lacked their convincing elements somehow came to be regarded as defeats.

 

The words of Churchill after Dunkirk still ring in my ears . "We must be very careful not to assign to this deliverance the attributes of a victory. Wars are not won by evacuations. ". The withdrawal of the German army to the Hindenburg line surely represents a kind of evacuation?

 

I understand that there are other interpretations, but I have yet to find anything compelling in them.

 

Regards,

Mike

[PhilB]

17 hours ago, Medaler said:

 

". The withdrawal of the German army to the Hindenburg line surely represents a kind of evacuation?

 

 

Certainly an evacuation and can be seen by the Allies as an acknowledgement of defeat but can`t it also be seen, from the German point of view, as eminently sensible in strategic terms irrespective of the outcome of the Somme battles? After all, it did considerably shorten their line and give much stronger defences. I believe similar arguments have been proposed for the British abandonment of the Ypres Salient.

[David Filsell]

I understand the arguement, and concept, "eminently sensible in short strategic terms". But in this case was it really more situation, an inevitability,  forced by awareness of the already worrying erosion of Germany's strength - in men, material and growing industrial problems?

Edited 14 August , 2016 by David Filsell

[Medaler]

39 minutes ago, PhilB said:

Certainly an evacuation and can be seen by the Allies as an acknowledgement of defeat but can`t it also be seen, from the German point of view, as eminently sensible in strategic terms irrespective of the outcome of the Somme battles? After all, it did considerably shorten their line and give much stronger defences. I believe similar arguments have been proposed for the British abandonment of the Ypres Salient.

 

The burning question then is, if the Germans would have withdrawn to the Hindenburg Line had the Somme not been fought. So far as I understand it, they were "pushed" into that withdrawal by the Somme - In other words, by their defeat. The battle, up to its conclusion, did not seem to "ebb and flow", but is more a story of continuing Allied gains which the Germans found themselves unable to reverse. To their credit however, having such a detailed and effective "back up" plan was an excellent piece of strategy. It does not however turn the Somme into any kind of victory for them.

 

Of course, all of the above is just my view - and I am here to learn!

 

Warmest regards,

Mike

 

 

[Old Tom]

As I said it is all a matter of what was the 'aim'. From the German viewpoint, in strategic terms, having failed to defeat the French in 1914, it was to hold on in the west until the Russians were defeated. It might be argued that their loss of ground, which was of little value, did not mean they had been defeated. Equally they certainly had not won.