BBC2 'The Somme 1916: From Both Sides of the Wire'

[MikeMeech]

1 hour ago, ilkley remembers said:

I watched all three of these episodes back to back to back in 'i player' yesterday.  Well what else is there to between the showers on a dreary afternoon in Yorkshire? My reaction to the first programme was not encouraging as I found Peter Barton's style  unduly hesitant and almost overwhelmed by the attempt to describe the first day of the battle . However, I was grateful that I overcame my initial reluctance to view the 2nd and 3rd programmes where Peter Barton's schoolmasterish and forensic manner where more suited. Anyway I was just grateful it wasn't being presented by the ubiquitous and lightweight Dan Snow.

Barton used the information from the German archives wisely to make a compelling argument about the reasons for British tactical failure during the battle. I am not sure where I stand about the use of the little white gloves to inspect documents, but frankly given the amount of dust they generated I would have thought that a face mask would be of more use. His assertion that the German Army was prepared to critically assess its performance whilst the battle was still ongoing, was for me, the most important revelation of his research. Haig would barely allow his army commanders to voice concerns never mind listen to the views of the men actually fighting the battle. Barton was right to imply deep unease with the performance of both Haig and Rawlinson during the battle. If it was a learning curve then clearly they were at the bottom.

Correctly, Peter Barton, challenged the  statistical count which some historians indulge in. The real tragedy of the battle was its human cost and the effects this had across the whole of the UK. Perhaps the BBC should consider a programme which explores this aspect of the Somme. Sadly, I do not anticipate that there will be much more from the Corporation about WW1. The Somme still resonates with the viewing public which other battles do not and as such unlikely to interest editors.

By way of comparison I rewatched a BBC documentary about the Somme from 1976 and presented by Leo McKern. There was a man who could tramp across a battlefield. Even though it is 40 years old and in many ways shows it, the delivery was superb. If you want to see then it is on 'youtube'. 

Hi

Just to repeat my posts #128 and #130, the British did undertake 'After Action' reports during the Somme and they were distributed.  Please note two of the examples:

 

There were changes to tactics, techniques and equipment throughout the battle.  Much was incorporated in new or revised edition documents during the winter of 1916/17 as it was in the French and German armies.

  In the British Army this was undertaken under the control of GHQ and Haig.

 

Mike

[KJames]

23 hours ago, Dai Bach y Sowldiwr said:

I've always thought the Somme perfectly illustrated the old saying:

"In war, there are no winners..."

Agreed, this seems to be very much the case with the Somme.

 

Thought provoking series and one of the most interesting so far, I thought.

 

 

 

 

[SiegeGunner]

3 hours ago, Skipman said:

Mick, while translating the documents, (I take it you saw more than was used in the program) did you get a feel of the overall German level of moral etc, and do you agree with Peter Barton's interpretation of the battle and his claim that it was a victory for them?  I understand if you don't want to answer that, but I would be interested in your own thoughts on this.

 

In sporting terms, Mike, I think it was what I believe is called a 'dirty win'.  The Germans survived the onslaught, there was no breakthrough, and they inflicted massive casualties on their enemies.  Like Jutland, it was a tactical victory 'on the day', but with major longer-term strategic consequences.  It was not as bad as a Pyrrhic victory, but the experienced troops lost on the Somme were sorely missed in 1917.  The Siegfried-Stellung (Hindenburg Line) was being planned and constructed during the latter stages of the battle, and I have often wondered whether the German infantry would have fought as doggedly for every yard of ground if they had known that they were going to walk away from it (if they were lucky) in a few months' time.  But their morale and discipline were good and I think that they would still have stood their ground. 

[phil andrade]

In the 1960s a book was published : WITH A MACHINE GUN TO CAMBRAI.

 

The author was George Coppard, if memory serves me.

 

It was immediately extolled as a first rate memoir from the " other ranks".

 

His verdict on the Somme " A points win to Gerry."

 

Peter Barton would agree, I think.

 

Phil

 

[ilkley remembers]

3 hours ago, MikeMeech said:

Hi

Just to repeat my posts #128 and #130, the British did undertake 'After Action' reports during the Somme and they were distributed.  Please note two of the examples:

 

There were changes to tactics, techniques and equipment throughout the battle.  Much was incorporated in new or revised edition documents during the winter of 1916/17 as it was in the French and German armies.

  In the British Army this was undertaken under the control of GHQ and Haig.

 

Mike

Mike, thank you for posting these two documents in response to my post and I am sorry that you have had to do so for a second time. My impression from the programme was that Peter Barton was comparing and contrasting the differing attitudes and philosophies of the German and British armies to the question of self criticism. Peter Barton would, no doubt, explain his position better than I can, but my impression is that there was evidence to show that the German army used a system considerably in advance of anything employed by the British. In effect the Germans were keen to engage with a system which emphasised the experiences and opinions of relatively junior ranks; a bottom up approach compared to one which was essentially top down. The documentary evidence which you provide here is of a sort familiar to anyone who has worked in a large hierarchical organisation where the views and opinions of those lower down the heap are often disregarded or blatantly ignored. Brigadier General so and so may believe that his assessment shows an appetite for critical assessment but there is no indication of whose opinions he has sought in preparing his instructions.

There is no doubt, as you say, that the British Army went though its process of introspection, but my impression admittedly based on this one TV programme was that the Germans were far more sophisticated than the apparently amateurish efforts of their foe during the Somme battles

[MikeMeech]

20 minutes ago, ilkley remembers said:

Mike, thank you for posting these two documents in response to my post and I am sorry that you have had to do so for a second time. My impression from the programme was that Peter Barton was comparing and contrasting the differing attitudes and philosophies of the German and British armies to the question of self criticism. Peter Barton would, no doubt, explain his position better than I can, but my impression is that there was evidence to show that the German army used a system considerably in advance of anything employed by the British. In effect the Germans were keen to engage with a system which emphasised the experiences and opinions of relatively junior ranks; a bottom up approach compared to one which was essentially top down. The documentary evidence which you provide here is of a sort familiar to anyone who has worked in a large hierarchical organisation where the views and opinions of those lower down the heap are often disregarded or blatantly ignored. Brigadier General so and so may believe that his assessment shows an appetite for critical assessment but there is no indication of whose opinions he has sought in preparing his instructions.

There is no doubt, as you say, that the British Army went though its process of introspection, but my impression admittedly based on this one TV programme was that the Germans were far more sophisticated than the apparently amateurish efforts of their foe during the Somme battles

Hi

Just an example of 'suggestions' moving up the chain of command in the BEF, here is one of the responses to a GHQ request, reference solving problems with the contact patrol procedures during 1917.  This is from VIII Corps:

 

 

So down to Battalion level for suggestions.

 

Mike

[MikeMeech]

Hi

Here is an original battalion response to the GHQ request (via the relevant Army, Corps, Division and Brigade), this is from the 4th Middlesex and is hand written so maybe not totally clear to read.  But it does show that 'suggestions' were coming from quite low down the command structure, although this is 1917.

 

Mike

[ilkley remembers]

Hi Mike,

 

Thanks for 255 and 256, interesting documents, although, not sure what a 'Watson fan' is. Looks like by 1917 we were beginning to learn the lessons that the Germans had appreciated the previous year. Thanks.

 

Edward

[David Filsell]

In my experience - non military - a large number of top down decisions in organisations and the advices issued were the result of bottom up information being received and acted upon, although I doubt that evidence was ever kept on file long term. It really is nothing new to be told that this happened in the British Army in Great War from 1914 has been has been long acknowledged. Of course, obviously, it is instructive to learn that, as ever, the German Army always did it longer, bigger and better - as it sometime seems they always did.

[paulgranger]

12 minutes ago, ilkley remembers said:

Hi Mike,

 

Thanks for 255 and 256, interesting documents, although, not sure what a 'Watson fan' is. Looks like by 1917 we were beginning to learn the lessons that the Germans had appreciated the previous year. Thanks.

 

Edward

I think it's an Ayrton fan, used to disperse gas.

[MikeMeech]

3 minutes ago, paulgranger said:

I think it's an Ayrton fan, used to disperse gas.

Hi

No, the Watson Fan was for a totally different purpose, to indicate the location of troops to Contact aeroplanes.  It was a circular pleated canvas disc, white on one side and a 'neutral tint' on the other, probably about 18 inches in diameter when unfolded, it could be shown when in the bottom of a trench or shell hole being rapidly turned to attract the attention of the aircraft.  Used during 1917, including at Messines where (n an after action report) it was reported to show up as a 'ripple of white' in the trench.

An example of a suggestion by a Captain RFA attached RFC going up the chain of command in April 1915 is below.

 

Mike

[paulgranger]

Mike

Thanks, hadn't come across the Watson Fan before, (as you could tell )

[MartH]

These documents are really good and evidence that both sides did it. The real question is whether the German Army or British Army did it better. I am lucky because I discussed some of this with a person who's initial militarily service was in the 27th Jaeger Battalion who went on to achieve high rank in the Second World War. He had as a young Jaeger had been part of the assault on Riga in 1917. The unit had been chosen and trained to assess the use of tactics in the assault and defensive. He and his German trained colleagues where the majority of the senior officers who commanded Finnish Forces against the Russian's and their massive attacks in 1944. The Finns where very good at rapid learning  and implementing new tactics in response to Russian onslaught, partly I believe because they had adopted Prussian Army doctrine in the GW.

 

However I cannot resolve this conundrum, however good the Germans were at learning, at the end of the GW the troops with the superior tactical training where the British and Empire forces, they clearly had learnt more and implemented it better.

 

I once saw Martin Middleton give a wonderful presentation on the Somme battles and then John Terraine in the audience summed it up neatly at the end saying that in the 3 months the German Army did around 320 major counter attacks that would have been classed as Battles in the Second World War, they would not give up an inch without fighting. Often wondered if the number is true.

[phil andrade]

The number is probably true...but my guess is that they were carried out by relatively small numbers in most cases.

 

A British division would attack.  The counter attack might be by a German regiment.

 

I know that there were big German counter attacks involving divisions - Delville Wood comes to mind - but I reckon the greater part consisted of reflexive action by much smaller contingents.

 

Terraine was determined to endorse the British Official Historian's view that Germans bled and died on the Somme in equal or greater numbers than the British and French, and cited the number of counter attacks as the reason.

 

Phil

[Chris_B]

PB may have had access to material that others have not, but his conclusions are not necessarily in disagreement with those who have gone before him:

 

"Along with all armies that fought in the battle of the Somme, the German army suffered greatly. As each army calculated casualties by different means, estimates of the numbers of dead, wounded and missing have been a matter of great debate since the war itself. Estimates of the German losses vary from 420,000 to 630,000.

 

However, despite these heavy losses, the battle of the Somme can be seen as a German victory. The Entente forces were unable to break through the German defence and were unable to achieve the victory for which they hoped in July. Further, as the British army had, the German army learned valuable lessons from the experience. By the end of the battle, they had developed a more flexible defence in depth that was not dependent on holding forward positions at all costs.

 

This defensive system allowed them to absorb the continued Anglo-French attacks both during the battle of the Somme and in the battles of 1917. Additionally, the battle forced the German high command to face up to at least some of their deficiencies in the technical realm. Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff, the team that took command of the German army after the Romanian entry into the war forced Falkenhayn’s resignation, developed an ambitious building program that re-equipped the German army with modern artillery and aircraft. Thus, despite the horrific casualties, the German army emerged from the battle of the Somme an even more formidable foe than before the battle."   The Somme: The German perspective  -  Dr Robert T. Foley  2006

 

http://www.open.edu/openlearn/history-the-arts/history/the-german-perspective

 

"Battlefield Geniuses" v  "Lions led by Donkeys" is of course a gross caricature, but there seems to have been plenty to have been critical about our side of the wire. Having spent time looking at the lives of many individuals who fought and died on the Somme ( at  mitchamwarmemorial.wordpress.com & summerstown182.wordpress.com )  I can only echo PB's comments about the tragic and horrific scale of the waste of life.

 

Just to add a small point.  In epsiode 1, PB talked about the Newfoundlanders oppoiste Y-ravine in 1st July and made reference to Welsh and Cumbrian (or did he say Northumbrian?) troops.  These were the 2nd SWB and 1st Borderers.  25% of the SWB casualties were Londoners, and there were many lads from Surrey and Kent amongst 1st Borderers killed and wounded that day. 

 

[Don]

22 hours ago, SiegeGunner said:

 

Firstly the gloves  ...  Peter was asked by the curators at the Kriegsarchiv (Munich) to wear them on camera.  They actually make documents difficult to handle and are not required during ordinary research.

 

Jack and Jan have already commented on the classification scheme and 'packaging' of the document bundles, which are indeed simply tied up with string  ...  which in many cases has never been unknotted since the day the bundle was made up.  Files are progressively being transferred into acid-free boxes, but it is a costly and time-consuming process, so the grubby string-bound bundles will be around for some time yet.  The documents within are generally in very good condition, though, not least because many of them have never been handled since they were deposited in the archive.  The files and documents shown on camera  were all labelled so that they could be returned to their correct places in the storage system.

 

As regards how files and documents were selected, there are few finding aids and the curatorial staff are not familiar with the content of the material, so it is up to the researcher to explore the collection, using their own criteria  ...  in Peter's case key date ranges, sectors, units, operations, etc, seeking German narratives to contrast and compare with corresponding British/French records.  Any and every possibly relevant document was examined and evaluated and key documents selected for further analysis and translation.  As described in an earlier post, Peter was assisted in this process by a German archive research specialist who has worked with him for many years on various major projects (not least Fromelles).  Selected documents were then copied or scanned (according to the practice of the particular archive) and documents of greatest interest were sent to me in an order of priority for translation. 

 

Mick

Thank you Mick for giving me a better understanding of how the documents were handled and retrived

I would persume that all the docs are archived in special archive boxes to protect them

[Guest]

I'm finally back online. Thanks Mick, and Steven-no, that's not my last name, it's not quite that posh.

 

Mike Haig?

[phil andrade]

Peter Barton recoiled from delving deeply into the casualty statistics, protesting that to attempt to assess the outcome by such a statistical analysis is " a detestable excercise ".....but he did, you will note, stress more than once that apologists for the British conduct of the battle sought refuge in " massaged " German casualty figures.  He used that word massaged again when he alluded to the estimate of 680,000 German casualties , and countered it with a seeming endorsement of recent research which estimated the figure at about 430,000.

 

The argument that this figure should be inflated because different criteria were used by the Germans in compiling their returns has been thoroughly discredited.

 

Phil

[Chris_Baker]

1 hour ago, phil andrade said:

... to attempt to assess the outcome by such a statistical analysis is " a detestable excercise ".....

 

There have been quite a few of those on this forum.

[SiegeGunner]

I also recoil from delving deeply into aggregated casualty statistics, but surely what really mattered, at the time (if not now, when it can be a subject of academic interest), was the numbers of trained fighting troops killed and wounded to the point of being unfit for further service  ...  so permanent losses to the sharp end of the war effort ... and the number of units so battered and severely depleted that they had to be withdrawn from front-line service for a period of time.  In military terms, intact men belonging to exhausted and ravaged units were also a loss to the fighting effort until such time as their unit returned to operational status.

[sjustice]

1 minute ago, SiegeGunner said:

I also recoil from delving deeply into aggregated casualty statistics, but surely what really mattered, at the time (if not now, when it can be a subject of academic interest), was the numbers of trained fighting troops killed and wounded to the point of being unfit for further service  ...  so permanent losses to the sharp end of the war effort ... and the number of units so battered and severely depleted that they had to be withdrawn from front-line service for a period of time.  In military terms, intact men belonging to exhausted and ravaged units were also a loss to the fighting effort until such time as their unit returned to operational status.

 

This is precisely a point.

 

Casualties are a valid criteria when assessing the fighting capability of units and formations. But by no means the only criteria and entirely irrelevant in many cases. The level of casualties sustained cannot be taken as an accurate gauge of how effective a force has been, is or will be.

 

Cheers,

SMJ

[SiegeGunner]

When describing 'permanent losses', I forgot to include men taken prisoner.  My point is that 'casualties' and 'losses' are often used interchangeably, but they are not the same thing.  Depending on the definition used, a man with slight or superficial wounds who is treated by medics in the forward area and quickly returned to duty may be a 'casualty', but he is not a 'loss', except in the very short term.  Likewise, a man who is unwounded but whose unit is unfit for further front-line service is not a casualty, but he is a loss in the short to medium term.

[phil andrade]

The German losses in the 1916  Somme battle included an unprecedented proportion of men taken prisoner : approaching one fifth of their total casualties were POWs.

 

This, of course, represented a permanent loss.

 

On reflection, I reckon the programme could -and should - have made more of this.

 

There was a lot of emphasis on the high standard of German morale ; there were allusions to declining British morale in the autumn.

 

The implications of eighty thousand or so prisoners being yielded to the Entente were serious as regards the condition of German morale.

 

This needs to be cited more : the Germans contained the Allies and gained the defensive victory, inflicting nearly fifty per cent more casualties than they received , but their own losses were rendered more unbearable by virtue of losing so many prisoners.

 

Phil

 

 

[KevinBattle]

Jack Sheldon hits upon a point in his Post #215 (on p9) that the Germans called up the class of '17 in July 1916 and the class of '18 only 4 months later in the November.

Whilst showing that the Germans had excessive losses through the Somme attrition, it also reminded me that the major difference between Great Britain and the Continental Armies was that most were set up to have formal military service, before becoming civilians.

That meant that most French, German etc youths were already conditioned to a military lifestyle and the use of arms and understanding tactics.

 

The British man off the street in 1916 had no such military training or background, so naturally would need more time to acquire such "skills" (time which the WW1 battlefront could quickly curtail). So it's small wonder that unit for unit, the British Army might be considered to "underperform" when compared to German or French troops.

 

Nonetheless, time and again they rose out of their trenches to resume the pressure to force the Germans from holding territory, not their own, but of an ally.

[PhilB]

2 hours ago, KevinBattle said:

 

That meant that most French, German etc youths were already conditioned to a military lifestyle and the use of arms and understanding tactics.

 

 

Exactly how much "military lifestyle" would these continental youths have experienced pre-war? As it was in peacetime conditions, I can`t see how they were much better prepared than, say, a British TF part timer or a New Army volunteer after a few months` service.