BBC2 'The Somme 1916: From Both Sides of the Wire'

[Bart150]

I’d like to return to a point from the first episode. Peter Barton said he found German documents that contained estimates of the percentage of British shells that were duds.

All right, I will believe that he found such documents.

But was he right to judge that the estimates in the documents were sufficiently reliable to be worthy of mention in the programme?

Surely he could only believe that if he knew that the Germans had some reasonably accurate method of making such estimates.

What would that method be? Can anybody suggest how an army subjected to a tremendous barrage of shells could estimate how many were duds?

[Jack Sheldon]

I'm with Jan on this. The Bavarian archives survived through benign neglect and sheer luck in that the barracks in whose attics they were stored between the wars and until the late 1940s was not bombed. When I began work there 15 years ago, hardly a thing had been consulted in sixty years and the bundles were thick with filthy black dust; but they were and are a treasure trove for a whole range of reasons. It is still possible to identify material from the reference books, but I, too, find the new numbering system to be unhelpful. During my last visit in December 2015 I managed to select 1,200 pages of Somme related material for the current book, the great bulk of which have certainly never been used or published before. Watch this space.

 

Jack

[MartH]

This discussion on the German documents it interesting. We know for example that majority of the Riecharchiv (Prussian Archive) at Postdam, was bombed and then looted by the Allies.The other armies Archives survived in various forms, but were very new compared to the Prussian ones.  The German General Staff had started unofficially during the Napoleonic wars and was tasked with the continuous study of all aspects of war, especially the lesson learned from previous campaigns, and did not have one military history department but two, one on new wars, and one on old wars pre 1815. They had for this for 100 years by the time of the GW, and had improved the systematic collection of war diaries, orders, etc, the British had only started this circa 1907 after the debacle of writing the Official History of the South African War. Therefore the German senior people understood the value of this, and it had been part of their training, where as the British model for learning the lesson of recent campaigns  was under 10 years, and the British senior people did not understand the value or research and learning. I still have to finish the list for the Robinson's on the output of the German wars recent department, currently 58 works. The British output is under 10 useful volumes and some of those are translations of the German Official Histories. The British system was just not a patch on the German one.

[Chris_Baker]

I finally got to view Episode 3 (having not yet seen the first two). It's all very nicely produced and all that, and it is entertaining viewing, but I can't say that I am totally convinced of the claims for the revelatory nature of the programme. Peter Barton is a good presenter, no doubt about it. Personally I found the images of him plodding across Somme fields to be a bit repetitive.

 

Turning to Peter's conclusions,

 

> the battle did not end in November 1916. That is clear to anyone who has ever studied the period November 1916 to March 1917. That the British Battles Nomenclature Committee decided to use November as the end date was a judgement made for their purposes. They begin again with the "Operations on the Ancre" on 11 January 1917, and to be fair to the Committee it seems to me that the fighting between 18 November and 11 January more resembled "normal" entrenched warfare than an offensive battle.

 

> the Germans learned and adapted, and by this the war was lengthened. Well they certainly did learn and adapt, as did the Allies. We cannot know if the war was lengthened by it, for that enters into "what if" territory. You could equally argue that the loss on the Somme of men and material, particularly to Germany which could least afford the loss, shortened the war regardless of any learning or adaptation.

 

> the German withdrawal from the Somme in 1917 was a major surprise to the Allies. This is clearly true.

 

> that the Somme was a German defensive victory. I believe that to be true, but in the sense that the outcome was not decisive I think it's a bit of a "so what". The same can be said of Arras and Third Ypres, possibly even Cambrai. I believe that after 1914 it is only in 1918 that the outcome of individual battles can begin to be considered as victories or defeats.

 

 

[Gareth Davies]

Seconded.  And thank you for putting my thoughts across so clearly Chris.  

[Old Tom]

Thanks for the remarks about the German archives 

[EastSurrey]

8 hours ago, SiegeGunner said:

 

In 'Archival Sources' at the back of his excellent book, Christopher Duffy only mentions the Kriegsarchiv in Munich.  In addition to Munich, Peter also visited and found new and revelatory material in the archives at Stuttgart, Karlsruhe and Freiburg.

Peter has certainly identified a number of important issues for consideration, and his conclusions cannot simply be dismissed if we don't like them. Yet, television programmes, however good the presenter, tend towards oversimplification and avoidance of  consideration of  conflicting evidence.  Having said that, history is not a science. It is perfectly possible for honest and competent  historians to arrive at different conclusions from the same evidence, particularly as , in this case, there is so much material that it has inevitably to be quoted selectively.

Michael

[NigelS]

4 hours ago, Hedley Malloch said:

The ground conditions are one of the very few bits of the soldiers' Somme experience which can be felt today.  Go walking on the Somme on a wet day, leave the footpaths and metalled roads. Tramp up the side of a ploughed field and after five minutes your boots will be like toffee apples.  I don't mean that literally - they will taste nothing like toffee apples, but ... .

 

The 'Digger' soldier summed it up well (I wondered, when a warning about bad language was given at the programme's beginning, how it would feature)

 

21 hours ago, Skipman said:

" Mile after mile of ****-coloured ****-all. "

 

A thought provoking series, and certainly if not the best, likely to be one of the best produced for the centenary.  Trouble is it's left me yearning for a similar treatment for 3rd Ypres, or, for that matter, all the other major campaigns of the war as well, but sadly I know this is unlikely to happen.

NigelS

 

 

 

 

[SiegeGunner]

8 hours ago, Don said:

One thing that puzzled me was the array of files and important documents strew around the room with just string tying them up.

I record and handle files as part of my work and there seemed to be a lack of order and indexing.

In fairness Peter handle them with cotton gloves.

Another point how did he know which ones to retrieve and why.   

 

Firstly the gloves  ...  Peter was asked by the curators at the Kriegsarchiv (Munich) to wear them on camera.  They actually make documents difficult to handle and are not required during ordinary research.

 

Jack and Jan have already commented on the classification scheme and 'packaging' of the document bundles, which are indeed simply tied up with string  ...  which in many cases has never been unknotted since the day the bundle was made up.  Files are progressively being transferred into acid-free boxes, but it is a costly and time-consuming process, so the grubby string-bound bundles will be around for some time yet.  The documents within are generally in very good condition, though, not least because many of them have never been handled since they were deposited in the archive.  The files and documents shown on camera  were all labelled so that they could be returned to their correct places in the storage system.

 

As regards how files and documents were selected, there are few finding aids and the curatorial staff are not familiar with the content of the material, so it is up to the researcher to explore the collection, using their own criteria  ...  in Peter's case key date ranges, sectors, units, operations, etc, seeking German narratives to contrast and compare with corresponding British/French records.  Any and every possibly relevant document was examined and evaluated and key documents selected for further analysis and translation.  As described in an earlier post, Peter was assisted in this process by a German archive research specialist who has worked with him for many years on various major projects (not least Fromelles).  Selected documents were then copied or scanned (according to the practice of the particular archive) and documents of greatest interest were sent to me in an order of priority for translation. 

 

Mick

[SiegeGunner]

7 hours ago, MartH said:

This discussion on the German documents it interesting. We know for example that majority of the Riecharchiv (Prussian Archive) at Postdam, was bombed and then looted by the Allies.The other armies Archives survived in various forms, but were very new compared to the Prussian ones.

 

The destruction and looting of the Potsdam archive was undoubtedly a catastrophic loss.  However, large amounts of material were copied, by the Americans and others, in the inter-war years, and the Russians have recently released or returned some of the material they seized in 1945.  At the operational level, 'lessons learned' and other information/intelligence was circulated throughout the German armies, so copies of documents originated by Prussian units can be found in the archives of the other armies.  At divisional level and below, where Prussian units served alongside units from the other kingdoms, documentation was exchanged reciprocally between the 'neighbours' and once again Prussian documents turn up in the other armies' archives.  And who knows what else is still out there waiting to be discovered ...

[SiegeGunner]

5 hours ago, EastSurrey said:

... in this case, there is so much material that it has inevitably to be quoted selectively.

 

As Jeremy Banning explained earlier in this thread, Peter did not have editorial control and was therefore unable to focus on all of the most critical documents that he hoped to reveal.  Some key documents did appear, but their vital importance remained undeveloped.  I translated all of the German documents derived from Peter's archival research, so I know how much wonderful material remained unused. 

 

Mick

[johnboy]

Out of curiosity Mick, are you allowed to talk about documents that you translated and were not used in the program? Or are all translations under a confidentiallity clause?

[phil andrade]

Was there any collusion between Peter Barton and Hugh Sebag Montefiore during the making of the programme  ?

 

This probably seems a strange question to ask ; but I have just finished reading HSM's book and there are striking similarities between some of the things that Peter Barton says ( or implies ) in his narration, and the themes in the book.

 

This could of course be coincidental, but I got the impression of echoes throughout.

 

Phil

[MartH]

8 hours ago, SiegeGunner said:

 

The destruction and looting of the Potsdam archive was undoubtedly a catastrophic loss.  However, large amounts of material were copied, by the Americans and others, in the inter-war years, and the Russians have recently released or returned some of the material they seized in 1945.  At the operational level, 'lessons learned' and other information/intelligence was circulated throughout the German armies, so copies of documents originated by Prussian units can be found in the archives of the other armies.  At divisional level and below, where Prussian units served alongside units from the other kingdoms, documentation was exchanged reciprocally between the 'neighbours' and once again Prussian documents turn up in the other armies' archives.  And who knows what else is still out there waiting to be discovered ...

 

For those interested there has been a previous topic here discussing the vast Potsdam archive:

 There are rumors that the Russians still have warehouses with crates still packed as they where from 1945, 

 

Perhaps there is a book here where somebody actually documents the chronology and explains the various  " lesson learned" documents produced for all the armies.

[sjustice]

Overall, the series was most enjoyable. I sat with extended family, gathered for the purpose, and was stimulated and heartened by the extent to which they debated the evidence, information and conclusions, and identified the tensions contained therein. I think 'that' is a magnificent achievement in itself.

 

I don't have the language to study the German archives, but Jack's 'German Army on the Somme' - a visceral and frank study from 'the other side of the wire' - together with Ralph's tomes, give some form of 'balanced' view of the struggle, and fit the BBC's aims more securely. This is no fault of Peter and Jeremy et al. They never intended it to be a balanced view; rather, a view from the other side as a much more legitimate and needed addition to current knowledge. However, I do think there are some conclusions worthy of a raised eyebrow.

 

I do have the language to study anglophone archives and, for the last seven years have researched the development and execution of defensive strategy and tactics of the British (and Dominion), French and American armies during the Great War. I'd just like to draw attention to a couple of my own conclusions.

 

First, it is a fallacy to determine that the elastic defence in depth is a wholly German invention. British divisions, for example, were employing a highly detailed and specific form of a defence in depth, with lightly manned front lines together with a policy of specific and selective counter-attack under the direction of 'the man on the spot', as early as the autumn of 1915.

 

Second, the British and French were immediately aware of, and widely reporting, the Somme 1916 second-third-phase 'switch' to a non-linear norm and the evolution of German defensive tactics. This allowed the Allies to mitigate any reduction in German manpower loss, which was the pressing goal of the German defensive shift. The change was forced on both sides and both made the best of it.

 

Third, there were many iterations of German defensive tactics flowing between linear and rigid - zonal and elastic - anything in-between, from 1916 to 1918. The bottom line is that none of them worked as regards the preservation of manpower. As long as the Allies in the west were prepared to maintain an aggressive, churned-earth, all-costs offensive strategy, the Germans were bound to be reduced to a policy of hold and retreat; to shorten the line and maintain a workable force density. Without the release of divisions from the Eastern Front on the capitulation of Russia this status quo should have ended the war at least six months earlier.

 

I applaud the ability, tenacity and dedication of Peter and Jeremy in bringing the German material to a wider audience, in the face of an establishment insurgency! I hope that audience will now go and pick up Jack's books in particular (and Peter's in good time) and use them as a springboard for more research...auf beiden seiten

 

Cheers, with thanks to Peter and Jeremy, and everyone entering into the debate,

SMJ

 

[SiegeGunner]

35 minutes ago, MartH said:

 

Perhaps there is a book here where somebody actually documents the chronology and explains the various "lessons learned" documents produced for all the armies.

 

Good luck with that project, Mart!  'Various' hardly seems an adequate word for the innumerable 'Erfahrungen' reports written and circulated at all levels by the Germans.  There are doubtless high-level distillations of the major principles learned on the battlefield, but by far the best and most interesting are the (usually, but not always, short) reports put in by front-line officers, sharing pearls of simple but hard-won wisdom such as 'emergency rations stored in the front-line positions for use when under heavy fire and defending against hostile attacks should not include salty, thirst-inducing foodstuffs, as water will also be in short supply' or 'machine guns should be fitted with a long tether to assist in finding and recovering the gun if it becomes buried'.

[phil andrade]

34 minutes ago, sjustice said:

 

 

Third, there were many iterations of German defensive tactics flowing between linear and rigid - zonal and elastic - anything in-between, from 1916 to 1918. The bottom line is that none of them worked as regards the preservation of manpower.,

SMJ

 

 

A statement well attested by the huge losses the Germans suffered in the Somme fighting during the month of September - despite their change of command, and these supposedly flexible and dispersed zonal defensive methods, they suffered more casualties ( c.140,000 ) than in any other month of the battle.

 

Phil

[MartH]

1 hour ago, SiegeGunner said:

 

Good luck with that project, Mart!  'Various' hardly seems an adequate word for the innumerable 'Erfahrungen' reports written and circulated at all levels by the Germans.  There are doubtless high-level distillations of the major principles learned on the battlefield, but by far the best and most interesting are the (usually, but not always, short) reports put in by front-line officers, sharing pearls of simple but hard-won wisdom such as 'emergency rations stored in the front-line positions for use when under heavy fire and defending against hostile attacks should not include salty, thirst-inducing foodstuffs, as water will also be in short supply' or 'machine guns should be fitted with a long tether to assist in finding and recovering the gun if it becomes buried'.

 

It's not my project Mick, I have another. To add to your 'Erfahrungen' reports written there are "pamphlets" produced by the staff of the Riecharchiv in the 20's and 30' which hampered the production of the Der Weltkrieg. I love the  'machine guns should be fitted with a long tether to assist in finding and recovering the gun if it becomes buried'. Will avoid using the words various in future, Mart

[SiegeGunner]

During one particularly hot period, Mart, a front-line company commander recorded that he had asked for ... and been supplied with ... hundreds of small bottles of mineral water.  Ice cream seems to have been beyond the ingenuity of even the Germans!

[Guest]

Mick, while translating the documents, (I take it you saw more than was used in the program) did you get a feel of the overall German level of moral etc, and do you agree with Peter Barton's interpretation of the battle and his claim that it was a victory for them?  I understand if you don't want to answer that, but I would be interested in your own thoughts on this.

 

Mike

[ilkley remembers]

I watched all three of these episodes back to back to back in 'i player' yesterday.  Well what else is there to between the showers on a dreary afternoon in Yorkshire? My reaction to the first programme was not encouraging as I found Peter Barton's style  unduly hesitant and almost overwhelmed by the attempt to describe the first day of the battle . However, I was grateful that I overcame my initial reluctance to view the 2nd and 3rd programmes where Peter Barton's schoolmasterish and forensic manner where more suited. Anyway I was just grateful it wasn't being presented by the ubiquitous and lightweight Dan Snow.

Barton used the information from the German archives wisely to make a compelling argument about the reasons for British tactical failure during the battle. I am not sure where I stand about the use of the little white gloves to inspect documents, but frankly given the amount of dust they generated I would have thought that a face mask would be of more use. His assertion that the German Army was prepared to critically assess its performance whilst the battle was still ongoing, was for me, the most important revelation of his research. Haig would barely allow his army commanders to voice concerns never mind listen to the views of the men actually fighting the battle. Barton was right to imply deep unease with the performance of both Haig and Rawlinson during the battle. If it was a learning curve then clearly they were at the bottom.

Correctly, Peter Barton, challenged the  statistical count which some historians indulge in. The real tragedy of the battle was its human cost and the effects this had across the whole of the UK. Perhaps the BBC should consider a programme which explores this aspect of the Somme. Sadly, I do not anticipate that there will be much more from the Corporation about WW1. The Somme still resonates with the viewing public which other battles do not and as such unlikely to interest editors.

By way of comparison I rewatched a BBC documentary about the Somme from 1976 and presented by Leo McKern. There was a man who could tramp across a battlefield. Even though it is 40 years old and in many ways shows it, the delivery was superb. If you want to see then it is on 'youtube'. 

[Guest]

2 minutes ago, ilkley remembers said:

Haigh?

 

I have been meaning to watch the McKern video for a long time. Thanks for reminding me.

 

Mike (you'll never guess what my last name is)

 

 

[SiegeGunner]

11 hours ago, johnboy said:

Out of curiosity Mick, are you allowed to talk about documents that you translated and were not used in the program? 

 

The unused material will be incorporated into Peter's upcoming book, Johnboy, so no, I cannot share it now.  I am always happy, however, to discuss the mechanics of translating German WW1 material in general. 

[ilkley remembers]

4 minutes ago, Skipman said:

 

I have been meaning to watch the McKern video for a long time. Thanks for reminding me.

 

Mike (you'll never guess what my last name is)

 

 

Thanks....Haig...have edited

[Steven Broomfield]

57 minutes ago, Skipman said:

 

 

Mike (you'll never guess what my last name is)

 

 

 

Cholmondley-Warner?