BBC2 'The Somme 1916: From Both Sides of the Wire'

[brummell]

I think you have misunderstood me.  The Germans kept their machine guns and crews in shelters with multiple exits and were so deep that only our heaviest howitzers had a chance of collapsing them.  Using lighter guns and howitzers on these targets was a waste of resources - they could achieve very little against the enemy fortifications, but there would have been a much higher pay-off if they had engaged enemy batteries instead.

 

German accounts of how impervious their gun positions were to counter-battery fire should be read with the woeful inadequacy of the British counter-battery effort in mind.  Just 180 guns were dedicated to it across the whole front, over 30 of which were the terrible 4.7" howitzer.  Would the German gun pits have stood up quite so well if they had actually been effectively bombarded?

 

The fact is that no where near enough heavy howitzers were assembled to deal with the front attacked to the depth that Haig required.  If no more artillery resources were available, Fourth Army should have ensured that what was available was used in the most effective way, exactly as Rawlinson himself had identified after Loos.  He didn't, leaving it to the corps commanders, who with only one exception made it a low priority.  The exception was XIII Corps under the very experienced General Congreve, who made it a high priority and who dragooned French heavy howitzers into it as well.  There were other factors at work as well, but XIII Corps achieved its objectives on the day.

[Guest]

The British OH on the British inability to even reach the German Artillery...

 

 

Edited 20 August , 2016 by Guest

[Guest]

.

[brummell]

'...all of whose heavy batteries were beyond the range..' 

 

I am not talking about the heavy batteries, but about the field batteries which fired the barrages across no man's land during the attack.  These were generally within 1500 yards of the German front line.

 

(Edit:  My point is that discussion of some aspects of this matter would have been interesting in the programme and new to most watchers.  Instead we got more barbed wire and machine guns, which I doubt was new to anyone.)

 

Incidentally I note that the OH makes the error of thinking that dividing the length of front by the number of guns somehow gives one a meaningful figure.  It takes no account of the depth of the objectives, and all the additional yards of trench that that encompassed.

Edited 20 August , 2016 by brummell

[Guest]

17 minutes ago, brummell said:

'...all of whose heavy batteries were beyond the range..' 

 

I am not talking about the heavy batteries, but about the field batteries which fired the barrages across no man's land during the attack.  These were generally within 1500 yards of the German front line.

 

(Edit:  My point is that discussion of some aspects of this matter would have been interesting in the programme and new to most watchers.  Instead we got more barbed wire and machine guns, which I doubt was new to anyone.)

 

Incidentally I note that the OH makes the error of thinking that dividing the length of front by the number of guns somehow gives one a meaningful figure.  It takes no account of the depth of the objectives, and all the additional yards of trench that that encompassed.

 

I am not in disagreement, simply showing the the OH view on these matters. 

 

 

[Jack Sheldon]

It is not true that the 'German artillery were generally longer range weapons than the British'; not at the beginning of the battle at any rate, if at all. Generalmajor Maur, commanding 26 Reserve Field Artillery Brigade in support of 26th Reserve Division, had a total of 154 guns and howitzers disposed in five sub groups. However, this still meant that he was vastly outgunned by the British, especially when it came to heavy calibres. Almost all the modern heavies of the entire Second Army, such as the outstanding 210mm Grobe Gottlieb howitzers, had been sent down to Verdun months previously, so Maur had to make do with an odd assortment of obsolescent or even obsolete weapons. These included captured Belgian guns (57, 87 and 120mm), French guns (75 and 120mm), Russian heavy field howitzers and a super heavy howitzer (also Russian and very unreliable). The numbers were made up with 90mm and ancient Ringkanonen, with no recoil mechanisms. Some batteries had no horses and the whole affair must have been a logistician's nightmare when it came to resupply, servicing and repair.

 

Despite these problems, Maur's centralised fire control wrought havoc around Thiepval throughout 1 July, but the guns were also assisted greatly  by small arms fire. At least five heavy MG 08 were placed to fire across the front of Thiepval Wood, one of which, Gun IX, particularly well sited in the so-called 'Brewery Position', fired 18,000 rounds that day effectively denying No Man's Land to the British all day long. Even the riflemen in Res Inf Regt 99 averaged 350 rounds per man.

 

The main issue with counter-battery fire is target acquisition. Maur had kept a high proportion of his guns and howitzers silent during the bombardment so when they opened with defensive fire on 1 July, they did  so from unlocated positions and I have no idea how much British effort went into acquiring targets on 1 July.

 

One of the main reasons so much 18 pdr shrapnel was fired during the bombardment was that that was mainly what the British Army had at the time. It did a reasonable job on the barbed wire obstacles, but was about as much use as dried peas on a corrugated iron roof when it came to causing casualties to men with seven metres of overhead cover in hard chalk. Despite all the British effort with artillery and gas, at the end of the week, 26th Res Div had only suffered a total of 900 KIA, wounded and missing, numbers which, after some reinforcement, influenced its ability to defend not one iota.

 

Jack

[sjustice]

2 minutes ago, Jack Sheldon said:

<snip>...Despite all the British effort with artillery and gas, at the end of the week, 26th Res Div had only suffered a total of 900 KIA, wounded and missing, numbers which, after some reinforcement, influenced its ability to defend not one iota.

 

Jack

 

There. You have it. The achievements of the 36th Division can be measured against this scenario. Were the German circumstances along the other parts of the line significantly different?

 

Thanks, Jack.

 

Cheers,

SMJ

[Jack Sheldon]

They were between Mametz and Maricourt where the positions were less well developed and where Bavarian RIR 8 actually had to attempt a relief in the line during the night 30 June/1 July because of it. French artillery played a part here as well. It was better handled than the British and the calibre of weapons was more appropriate. South of the river, the French bombardment pretty well obliterated the (very thinly manned) German lines and annihilated much of the feeble quantity of artillery deployed there. There were cases of single four gun batteries being engaged with 2,500 or more accurately placed heavy shells.

Jack

[sjustice]

Great stuff.

 

Do you have publication details for 'Fighting the Somme'?

 

Cheers,

SMJ

[Steven Broomfield]

2 hours ago, sjustice said:

Great stuff.

 

Do you have publication details for 'Fighting the Somme'?

 

Cheers,

SMJ

I think we'd all like to know that ... and cost is probably not the main question we're asking! (Will it be out in time for the Winterval Festival?)

[paulgranger]

30 November, according to Amazon.

[Guest]

5 hours ago, Jack Sheldon said:

It is not true that the 'German artillery were generally longer range weapons than the British'; not at the beginning of the battle at any rate, if at all.

 

Jack

 

Jack - thanks. A very interesting point. The British OH France and Belgium 1916 Vol 1 alludes to this a couple of times. Clearly being beyond range does not exactly equate to having a shorter range, but the British OH seems to be emphatic in its view on the relative ranges of British and German artillery. See below for the footnote in the munitions section. This may of course simply be another error in the OH.

 

The British guns and howitzers available for the preliminary bombardment are recorded in fine detail (type and number, number of rounds fired etc). The HAGs appear to have been given the task of counter-battery work. Again according to the OH the HAGs used their 'medium guns' for this part of the operations (whatever 'medium guns' means). The howitzers were generally reserved for bombarding trenches. The OH provides a list of guns and howitzers available to the HAGs and alos provides an example for VII Corps' four HAGs:

 

Gun/Howitzer..................................max range.......................................................No within VII Corps HAGs*

QF 4.7 inch Guns.........................10,000 yards..............................................................12

BL 60 pdr Guns............................12,300 yards..............................................................12

BL 6 inch Guns..............................6,500 yards (note obsolete marks).............................2

BL 9.2 inch Guns.........................22,600 yards ...............................................................2

BL 6" siege Howiters......................7,000 yards..............................................................28

BL 9.2 inch Sige Howitzers...........13,935 yards..............................................................24

BL 12 inch Siege Howitzers..........15,000 yards................................................................2

BL 15 inch Siege Howitzers..........10,795 yards................................................................2

 

Which suggests their main efforts in counter-battery works appears to have been executed with 4.7 guns, 6 inch guns or 60 pdrs whose max range was (i think) 12,300 yards.....again the types of guns is consistent with Edmonds' comments on page 460. 

 

None of the Orbats I have seen provide sufficient detail on the German artillery to make any comparison. Is it possible that Edmonds simply did not understand the improvisation within the German artillery facing the British? 

 

MG

 

* see below - footnote 2 to page 460 of Vol I  - 19, 32, 35 and 48 HAG of which the latter two were dedicated to counter-battery work.

 

 

 

 

 

Edited 20 August , 2016 by Guest

[Jack Sheldon]

First of all the book. I am afraid that there have been several hold ups, so I think that it will not appear until the early new year now. Second, artillery. Here we are back to the concept of the Schwerpunkt [point of main effort] which I know I keep harping on about. Every level of command from highest to lowest; every arm and service had a Schwerpunkt and it took priority over all else. Very often considerable risks would be run elsewhere to boost the Schwerpunkt and 1916 was no exception. Falkenhayn placed it on Verdun and the remainder of the Western Front was stripped of modern heavy artillery to support it. BOH 1916 Vol 1 appeared in 1932, but Vol X of the German OH not until 1936 and this is the one which features the detailed artillery breakdown, so unless the BOH team asked some specific questions of the Reichsarchiv, there must have been some guesswork. Perhaps certain modern German types had the edge over some British artillery pieces, but they were down in Verdun, not on the Somme at all, so like was not being compared with like, I suspect.

 

Certainly the German chain of command was concerned about the decisions. Here is an example from Sixth Army, dated 7 Jan 16. 'The new high angle batteries which have been allocated to replace the army artillery batteries [taken for Verdun] are not equipped with captured modern equipment. Instead they are old German heavy howitzers. That is a great disappointment. They are Landsturm batteries, so from that viewpoint as well they cannot be spoken of as replacements of the same value. According to a report by the commander, the 200 mm Russian guns are neither manned nor equipped sufficiently to enable them to be deployed at the front. That will be all right as long as heavy fighting does not break out.'

 

Now, as a result, if we take a snapshot of heavy artillery deployment at Verdun and the Somme when the bombardment opened at the end of June - and despite clear evidence of the forthcoming offensive astride the Somme - the German figures for weapons over 200mm are: Verdun 220, Somme 18, 8 of which were Russian 200 mm howitzers and only 4 were the first class 210mm Grobe Gottlieb howitzers. If we consider calibres 150 - 199 mm the corresponding figures are: Verdun 503 (of which 307 were high angle), Somme 166 (of which 96 were high angle) and so it goes on.

 

On the Somme, ratios of guns up to 99 mm were Allies 1,655, Germans 454; 100 - 149 mm (flat trajectory) Allies 300, Germans 62; high angle Allies 210, Germans 144; 150-199 m (flat trajectory) Allies 191, Germans 50, high angle Allies 232, Germans 116; Calibres above 200 mm (flat trajectory) Allies 60, Germans 0, high angle Allies 363, Germans 18.

 

The figures and mix of weapons I gave for 26 Res Fd Arty Bde are for the priority formation operating in support of the tactical Schwerpunkt, the 26th Res Div sector and the Schwaben Redoubt in particular. The remainder of the front, therefore, would have been less well supported by artillery because, here again, the priority went to the Schwerpunkt.

 

Jack

[Guest]

Jack. Many thanks for the detail.

 

I am interested in better understanding the artillery on both sides. Trawling the many published histories on the Somme, it is interesting to see how different authors focus on radically different aspects of the artillery. Trying to rebuild the number and type of guns and the ammunition allotted and expended by gun type is difficult. Even the OH numbers are incomplete (despite some fine detail in certain areas) and the running totals fall short of the headline figures.

 

What does become apparent is the relatively low number of guns allocated to counter-battery work across the various British Corps and the quite low levels of ammunition allocated to this task. There was little consistency across Corps, which may well simply indicate differences in the perceived opposition. The numbers are fairly rough but the general impression is that around 12% of the British guns and howitzers were allocated to the task and significantly less than 10% of the allocated ammunition. This number might prove to be too high with some additional research*. Added to this, some of the allocated gun types had higher incidences of prematures or mechanical failures (sub-standard metallurgy, particularly with recoil springs) as well as higher levels of ammunition failures (duds). The OH was keen to compare levels of artillery and ammunition with Loos (1915) and Messines (1917) in order to put the Somme into a broader context of how scales of both changed. 

 

The unpublished History of the Royal Artillery by Antsey, quoted in Prior and Wilson's tome seems to have a few gems and may have some hard data on ammunition failure.There is a reference to a whole batch of fuzes being defective (the most common cause for duds). It is unclear whether these reached the front.

 

Separately, the History of the Ministry of Munitions has some rather fascinating detail on the changes to ammunition design in late 1915 and early 1916. Some critical changes to fuze design happened just prior to the Somme. One interesting aspect is that earlier fuze designs for some HE shells (for which there were still large stockpiles) had a tendency to fail at low angle trajectories. This might explain some of the high levels of duds. Low trajectory suggests guns rather than howitzers. Given the wire cutting was almost exclusively shrapnel fired from 18 pdrs, the remaining guns (not howitzers) were largely engaged in counter-battery work.... so it is possible that the combination of difficult target location, low allocation levels of guns and ammunition and faulty fuze design may have compounded to severely diminish the counter-battery efforts. My speculation. 

 

The Somme battles took place at a fairly important stage in (British) fuze design. It perhaps illustrates how battles might have been won on the factory floor rather than in the trenches. One interesting aspect is how the events on the Somme spurred the Ministry of Munitions to make radical improvements in its ammunition and gun design and manufacture. MG

 

* For example, the 18 pdrs accounted for 54% of the artillery by number but fired 65% of the ammunition. Implicitly this means that the other calibre guns fired relatively fewer rounds. Source: BOH 

Edited 20 August , 2016 by Guest

[squirrel]

From Artillery in The Great War by Paul Strong and Sanders Marble-Pen & Sword- ISBN 978 1 84415 949 9- 2011-page 99:

"Major General Noel "Curley" Birch, the Major General Royal Artillery at GHQ drew four lessons from the campaign. First, the artillery plan had to come from Army level in order to co-ordinate matters. Secondly, there needed to be as much counter battery fire as possible. Thirdly, the British needed more accuracy; although the Germans certainly felt the British were hitting their targets, Birch wanted them hit sooner so that more shells could be fired at other targets. Fourthly, the Royal Artillery needed better intelligence.

Haig had instituted a "lessons learned" organisation to improve the BEF between campaigns, and for 1917 the BEF would have new manuals (with a new doctrine) that would not only include what artillery should do but how to co-ordinate infantry and artillery - some of the ideas were modelled on French practices. But Birch's emphasis on counter battery fire would be the main difference between 1916 and 1917: not only would there be more experience of what to do, there would be a new organisation (headed by a Counter Battery Staff Officer or CBSO) and new technologies in the shape of sound ranging and flash spotting."

 

 

[Steven Broomfield]

3 hours ago, Jack Sheldon said:

First of all the book. I am afraid that there have been several hold ups, so I think that it will not appear until the early new year now.

 

Book tokens or Amazon vouchers, then.

 

Thanks.

[brummell]

8 hours ago, Jack Sheldon said:

Now, as a result, if we take a snapshot of heavy artillery deployment at Verdun and the Somme when the bombardment opened at the end of June - and despite clear evidence of the forthcoming offensive astride the Somme - the German figures for weapons over 200mm are: Verdun 220, Somme 18, 8 of which were Russian 200 mm howitzers and only 4 were the first class 210mm Grobe Gottlieb howitzers. If we consider calibres 150 - 199 mm the corresponding figures are: Verdun 503 (of which 307 were high angle), Somme 166 (of which 96 were high angle) and so it goes on.

 

On the Somme, ratios of guns up to 99 mm were Allies 1,655, Germans 454; 100 - 149 mm (flat trajectory) Allies 300, Germans 62; high angle Allies 210, Germans 144; 150-199 m (flat trajectory) Allies 191, Germans 50, high angle Allies 232, Germans 116; Calibres above 200 mm (flat trajectory) Allies 60, Germans 0, high angle Allies 363, Germans 18.

 

I think we need to be careful of becoming memorised by numbers, ratios and calibres, and just relate them to the context.  In the Somme sector, the Germans stood on the defensive; consequently their heavy howitzers would be (and were) best employed in harassing lines of communication and counter-battery fire - what nowadays would be termed 'the deep battle'. The British and French were on the offensive, and so needed heavy howitzers for the destruction of small and specific targets, i.e. the enemy's identified shelters.  Given the inherent inaccuracy of the artillery system, this required more guns and more ammunition.

 

Field guns were of far more use to the Germans than their heavy guns in this context, as it was primarily the field guns that would fire the defensive barrages on which they would rely to isolate break-ins and fix them until counter-attacks could be launched to destroy them.

 

Of course, more guns of any calibre would have benefitted the Germans on the Somme, but one should bear in mind that it was the field guns which would contribute most to the aim of their operation.  Whilst the British desperately needed more heavies to destroy the deep shelters, the Germans correctly identified that it was field guns of which they would require more to repel the imminent offensive, and duly received reinforcements of 17 light howitzer and 8 field gun batteries.

 

The corollary was true at Verdun, as Jack points out.  It was there that Germans needed their heaviest howitzers, and it was there that they were sent.  All I am saying is that we should be careful not to draw too many conclusions from the Allied numerical superiority in artillery when the guns on each respective side were trying to achieve very different things.  In the event, despite being numerically superior, the Allied artillery was still hugely inadequate; however, the out-numbered German artillery evidentally had enough for its purpose.  If break-ins had been achieved in more areas and on wider fronts than was the case, maybe then the Germans would not have been able to concentrate their artillery fire to such an extent and the numbers would have proved to be inadequate.

 

But at the danger of repeating myself like an old cucumber sandwich, wouldn't it have been interesting to have some consideration and discussing of this in Mr Barton's programme?

 

 

- brummell

Edited 21 August , 2016 by brummell

[phil andrade]

Am I right if I cite Jack's analysis of the artillery ratios as evidence that the French deployed as many guns as the British....about fifteen hundred each ?  I added up the sums quickly in my head, and that's the impression I got.

 

If so, then the huge disparity between the weight and effect of firepower deployed per division and per yard of frontage attacked is very markedly in favour of the French : especially if they also disposed of a significantly greater proportion of heavy stuff.

 

I'm wondering if this was alluded to in the programme.

 

Phil

[Jack Sheldon]

Phil is broadly correct. The French employed a formula to determine how many guns and howitzers of particular calibre were required per kilometre of front to be assaulted. They then worked out how many guns, especially heavies, that they could spare for the Somme and it was that calculation which determined the length of their sector - not the availability of infantry.

 

Jack

[sjustice]

11 hours ago, Steven Broomfield said:

 

Book tokens or Amazon vouchers, then.

 

Thanks.

 

Aye.

 

Cheers,

SMJ

[Old Tom]

My thanks to members who have added so much detailed information on the artillery equipment on both sides. Their analysis of such detail gives a better appreciation of the battle, but adds to the many factors which bear of the relative success of both sides. I suggest that the essential point is the ability to put the right sort of round on the selected target. This depend on a host of factors including the skill of the gunners involved, the availability of guns and ammunition and the reliability of both and the identification and location of targets. All these have been considered individually in this interesting thread but, of course, they all act together. One may suggest that their totality and improvement may be thought of as a learning process. That's a term often used in relation to the BEF. In mid 1916 the BEF were, through no fault of their own, behind the French and the Germans.

[Guest]

The VII Corps CRA Diary is a mine of data and maps. As one might expect there are many pages of fireplans for the bombardments leading up to the 1st July showing targets and the number of allotted rounds per gun or howitzer. There is an interesting series of maps that show the lifts by Corps and  Divisional Artillery which might be of interest. this was on the extreme left of the British assault near Gommecourt where things went very badly wrong.

 

The targeted areas seem to closely conform to known roads, tracks and features (presumably mostly entrenched), and the areas in between seem to have been largely ignored. Note the concentrated rings in Gommecourt. 

 

MG

.

Edited 21 August , 2016 by Guest

[MartH]

On 8/17/2016 at 14:40, QGE said:

 

Which makes the claim in the programme that German sources have been 'practically ignored' even more strange. If memory serves the British Official History used German material and consulted German archivists during the preparation of the OH. 

 

 

 

MG earlier on in this thread alluded to the British Official Histories using Official German material and staff.

 

This is correct that Edmonds consulted and corresponded with Potsdam frequently, and also the other archives. The French did not till 1937. The US had 2 people in Potsdam for some time and the Australians visited Potsdam and were in contact due/via to Edmonds. I think that Edmonds was the major player in ensuring discussion between the country departments. 

 

It is worth reading the sources and bibliography in each volume of Edmonds they are extensive. For Volume I,  He was in correspondence with Major-General A. Forbes until he died, when he was working on his History of the Ordnance Services, the French Official History was not yet published but he got a sections and maps from the French. For the Germans side he used the Green Some-Nord, and he had substantial correspondence with the Reichsarchiv for additional information. He also lists the Wuttemberg and Bavarian Official History and the series which covers the sections of the Wuttemberg Divisions. Volume II 1916 the revised edition was published after the German Official Histories, For the 1st edition he had regular correspondence with the Reicharchiv. he also issued drafts to some countries OH departments for comments. 

 

For volume I IRC he sent out 1,500 or 500 draft copies for comments to those who;d served, but can't find the reference at the moment either way a substantial number.

 

There where over 500 German regimental in the Historical section in the early 30's by 38 I think it was over 800 which where used and quoted. 

 

Finally relations were so good during the war that Edmonds got one of the restricted copies of Volume 13 via the German Embassy in Switzerland. Volume 14 was not published in 1944 regardless of what the bibliographies say, and I think he never one of the 4 photographic copies produced from a burnt proof copy recovered in Potsdam by Col H M Cole. I will check. 

[David Filsell]

A small issue, but it is of note that the 4.7 inch guns still in use on the Somme - essentially a naval tube which had been first mounted on wooden carriages - and later more efficient carriages in the Boer war - were already considered obsolescent before the war, and relegated to Territoral units.

The 7th infantry Divisionwas the first to be equipped with them simply because there was nothing better in the inventory after despatch of the first six division. In South Africa the were drawn by Oxen an dubbed cow guns (some have said because they were cows to operate).

The OH notes that they were dubbed "strictly neutral" because they landed rounds on friend and foe alike. One account by a 7th Division gunner (who was p.s.c.) said that the guns were in poor condition when they were issued in 1914' worn out and hopelessly inaccurate by the end of 1st Ypres? That, although despised, that the 4.7 was were still in service on the Somme (although withdrawn some time later - I have not been able to find when) seems to indicates that the problem of British artillery manufacturing capacity remained inadequate in 1916.

[Old Tom]

QGC  Many thanks for posting the VII corps maps. My limited understanding of the artillery plans in support of day one is that there was little common ground between Corp, and that while some had the beginnings of creeping barrages others were rather haphazard. The maps show, if I have understood them, a number of linear targets some roughly parallel to the front and others nearly at right angles. Surely these would be difficult to engage unless lengths were allocated to individual batteries. This, as you imply, would contribute to the failure on the left.