BBC2 'The Somme 1916: From Both Sides of the Wire'

[PhilB]

6 hours ago, QGE said:

 

One account from a British infantry officer in the 1/5th Bn Sherwood Foresters TF who was made a POW describes one German trenchbeing littered with unexplored 9.2" shells.

MG

Wouldn`t a non-exploding 9.2 ins shell finish up well underground rather than "littering the trench"?

[David_Blanchard]

On 05/08/2016 at 12:06, Jack Sheldon said:

OK. Well how about the Aisne to the Marne in four days 27 May - 1 June 1918. Up to a fifty kilometre advance on a thirty kilometre frontage?

 

Jack

 

 

Just wondering if you are now working on the German side of the Aisne battle of 1918?

[Guest]

1 hour ago, PhilB said:

Wouldn`t a non-exploding 9.2 ins shell finish up well underground rather than "littering the trench"?

 

Possibly both. I think it would rely on too many factors (such as range, trajectory, hardness of the ground etc) to be able to make a general comment. 

 

The British had 9.2" guns and 9.2" howitzers. The high trajectory howitzer shells might well have buried themselves deeper than the shells fired from the guns. That said the British Army only had a few 9.2" guns' so statistically speaking there would be far more shells fired from the 9.2" howitzers*. Elsewhere I have recently read a snippet claiming that the fuzes from a batch of 9.2" howitzer shells actually separated from the shells in mid flight. If true I think this would create significant turbulence mid flight as well as decelerating the shell significantly .... and reduce the possibility of the shell penetrating the ground. 

 

With a small amount of research it should be possible to work backwards and establish which batteries were firing 9.2" ammunition at the trench. This occurred on the extreme left flank near Gommecourt if memory serves. Edit. Part of 46th Div's attack on the NW of Gommecourt on a series of trenches with names starting with the letter F. The 1/5th Sherwood Foresters TF attacked close to the centre against Fool trench.  The account was written in 1918, presumably as part of his post POW report. Quoted in Slaughter on the Somme. 

 

With such a high alleged failure rate one might reasonably expect someone in the RA to have made some record or comment. So far I have failed to find any reference  in the Corps or Divisional or CRA diaries. The battery diaries might yield something. 

 

How anyone discovered the separating fuze problem is a mystery. Trials or quality control checks possibly? Unless they separated as they left the barrels... MG

 

* BOH page 300 records Fourth Army had only one 9.2" gun and sixty 9.2" howitzers. 

Edited 25 August , 2016 by Guest

[Jack Sheldon]

David.  Not yet, but it is on the list!

 

Jack

[David_Blanchard]

Keep me in the loop- as they say! Looking forward to it- I would especially like to see if you manage to unearth anything on the poor state of German logistics by mid summer 1918.

 

David 

[brummell]

Chalk is very permeable and a stable shell coming down at a high angle of descent, but which failed to explode, would easily push through several metres of chalk before stopping.  A shell which had lost its fuze would be very unstable, probably tumbling, and I would expect it to break up on impact with the ground.

 

 

- brummell

[phil andrade]

20 hours ago, Jack Sheldon said:

David.  Not yet, but it is on the list!

 

Jack

 

Anyone who doubts that the Germans retained their offensive skills might do well to consider the taking of Mt Kemmel in late April 1918.

 

Now, there's a story !

 

It's got the lot ...Anglo French recrimination being high on the list of priorities, and, maybe, a dramatic example of German tactical accomplishment going hand in hand with strategic incoherence.

 

Phil

[Chris_Baker]

16 hours ago, phil andrade said:

... Anglo French recrimination being high on the list of priorities ...

 

Much muttering and annoyance, certainly, but recrimination? I couldn't find any when I researched this action for the Kemmelberg chapter in my book on the battle. I'd be interested in any evidence.

[Dai Bach y Sowldiwr]

On 25/08/2016 at 15:04, QGE said:

The British had 9.2" guns and 9.2" howitzers. The high trajectory howitzer shells might well have buried themselves deeper than the shells fired from the guns. That said the British Army only had a few 9.2" guns' so statistically speaking there would be far more shells fired from the 9.2" howitzers*.

 

* BOH page 300 records Fourth Army had only one 9.2" gun and sixty 9.2" howitzers. 

 

Were the 9.2"guns (not the howitzers) all railway mounted?

This trustworthy source puts the total of such guns for all the British Armies at the Armistice as only 16.

Between them in the years 1915-1918 they had fired only 45,000 shells.

By my reckoning, that works out at around 2 shells a day per gun for the whole period.

At the same time, a 9.2" howitzer would be firing anywhere from many tens, to hundreds of shells a day.

 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BL_9.2-inch_railway_gun#Combat_service

[Guest]

A quote from the summary on Episode Two

 

"Whilst British tactics were unvarying, that of their German enemy evolved using the changing landscape of the battlefield."

 

I am not sure I would describe the night attack of 14th July or the use of Tanks in September as unvarying tactics. The presenter even describes the appearance of the Tanks in Episode Three as "something unworldly" which were met with "terror and disbelief" perhaps suggestingthey were rather a surprise and that British tactics did indeed vary; in quite radical ways. Just another part of the programme that seems to make general sweeping statements that were later contradicted. MG

Edited 30 August , 2016 by Guest

[Guest]

07:33 into Episode One, Peter Barton tells us

 

 "Perhaps the C-in-C [Haig] would have been less buoyant had he known that for months the Germans had been intercepting British telephone conversations and knew a great deal about his Army and their intentions. 

 

My research in the German Archives provides the stunning revelation that they did this by using a machine called the Moritz."

 

Contrast this revelation with Michal Occleshaw's "Armour Against Fate: British Military Intelligence in the First World War" Page 120:

 

"...the success of 'Moritz' handed the Germans the all-important information they needed about the Allies' main effort on the Somme in 1916 - the date  when the troops would go over the top. A great part of the carnage on that disastrous first day of the campaign stemmed directly from bad telephone discipline. One harassed Staff Officer of the 34th Division opposite La Boiselle feared that the Order of the Day would not reach the infantry in the trenches in time. He decided to take a chance and relay the message by field telephone. It was a disastrous gamble and one taken in defiance of orders forbidding the use of telephones for important messages."

 

To be absolutely clear, Barton's 'revelation' is nothing of the sort. The only 'stunning revelation' is that Occleshaw's book was published in 1989 some 27 years ago. The reason of course for the orders forbidding the use of telephones for important messages was that the British knew that the Germans had the technology to listen in. Occleshaw goes further:

 

"As early as Feb 1916 British Military Intelligence saw the need to emulate 'Moritz'.

 

The failure was not one of Haig being 'unaware', it was a failure of discipline by the British in not obeying standing orders. MG

Edited 1 September , 2016 by Guest

[Stoppage Drill]

3 hours ago, QGE said:

07:33 into Episode One, Peter Barton tells us

 

 "Perhaps the C-in-C [Haig] would have been less buoyant had he known that for months the Germans had been intercepting British telephone conversations and knew a great deal about his Army and their intentions. 

 

My research in the German Archives provides the stunning revelation that they did this by using a machine called the Moritz."

 

Contrast this revelation with Michal Occleshaw's "Armour Against Fate: British Military Intelligence in the First World War" Page 120:

 

"...the success of 'Moritz' handed the Germans the all-important information they needed about the Allies' main effort on the Somme in 1916 - the date  when the troops would go over the top. A great part of the carnage on that disastrous first day of the campaign stemmed directly from bad telephone discipline. One harassed Staff Officer of the 34th Division opposite La Boiselle feared that the Order of the Day would not reach the infantry in the trenches in time. He decided to take a chance and relay the message by field telephone. It was a disastrous gamble and one taken in defiance of orders forbidding the use of telephones for important messages."

 

To be absolutely clear, Barton's 'revelation' is nothing of the sort. The only 'stunning revelation' is that Occleshaw's book was published in 1989 some 27 years ago. The reason of course for the orders forbidding the use of telephones for important messages was that the British knew that the Germans had the technology to listen in. Occleshaw goes further:

 

"As early as Feb 1916 British Military Intelligence saw the need to emulate 'Moritz'.

 

The failure was not one of Haig being 'unaware', it was a failure of discipline by the British in not obeying standing orders. MG

 

[Stoppage Drill]

Me old boss mentioned Moritz in 1954.

 

(The Somme, Anthony Farrar-Hockley, Batsford 1954)

[Guest]

10 hours ago, Stoppage Drill said:

Me old boss mentioned Moritz in 1954.

 

(The Somme, Anthony Farrar-Hockley, Batsford 1954)

 

He does indeed. Thank you for flagging this. It pushes acknowledgement of the Moritz in published works back to 62 years ago. It doesn't say that the British had prior knowledge of Moritz though. Importantly Farrar Hockley's book was written before the war diaries were declassified in the late 1960s, so it is an impressive piece of research. 

 

I note in Hugh Sebag Montefiore's book on the Somme there is an endnote claiming Rawlinson at 4th Army was aware of the Moritz prior to the battle and cites documents now held in the IWM dated 3rd and 28th April 1916 and 15th and 28th May 1916. This corroborates other primary sources. This is precisely why there were standing orders against the use of telephones to transmit sensitive material. 

 

MG

Edited 2 September , 2016 by Guest

[StephenJohnRoberts1958]

I found the programme to be profoundly moving and even disturbing (in a constructive historiographical sense). I had never really considered the battle from the German perspective before and found the accounts of the talkative British prisoners rather surprising. This was because even though I pride myself in being an "objective" historian, I clearly had a degree of residual patriotism colouring my perception of the battle, in my assumption that "our brave British Lads" (to quote corporal Jones) just would not do such a thing. Of course I was reminded of the frailty and vulnerability of all people. None of us know how we would behave in these circumstances. I thought Peter presented the programme very well indeed. He does not draw attention to himself; he emphasises the facts, the evidence and the arguments and makes balanced dispassionate judgements. His voice is gentle and his whole demeanour humble and respectful. Overall, the series was exceptionally good - beautiful to watch, pleasing to listen to and deeply unsettling  - moving me out of the neat little box I had made for myself in my understanding of the Somme. Thank you very much to Peter, Jeremy and everyone else who was involved in the programmes.

[Guest]

The Official History France and Belgium 1916 Vol I also mentions the Moritz apparatus and the fact that the British were aware of German listening to British phones prior to the Somme. Unfortunately it is not indexed under 'Moritz', but under the unlikely heading of 'Overhearing'. 

 

Page 71

" One further most important matter with regard to telephony requires mention. The question of the enemy overhearing telephone conversations in the forward area arose in June 1915. Intelligence reports, deductions and experiments all combined to show that the leakage of information to the enemy which was known to have taken place was connected with the extension of the telephone system to the front"

 

Page 82 footnote. 

"Although by overhearing a telephone conversation the Germans had some idea that a mine explosion might take place, no precautions had been observed, except to withdraw some of the garrison, the 18th Reserve Jager Battalion from the front to the support line. See the German account in Note which follows."

 

Page 376

" In one of them [deep dugouts] an overhearing station had remained in action to the last. At 2:45 AM it had picked up part of a telephoned British order which pointed to an assault in the morning (see note at end of Chapter)"

 

Page 391-392

"The assault did not come as a surprise:- "[German account in italics] At 2:45 AM the 56th Reserve Brigade from its battle Headquarters at Contalmaison reported to the 28th Reserve Division a fragment of an order of the 34th Division picked up by the 'Moritz' overhearing post on the southern point of La Boiselle. It ran: "The infantry must hold on obstinately to every yard of ground that is gained. Behind it is an excellent artillery". This order apparently the conclusion to an order of the Fourth Army, pointing to the beginning of the general enemy offensive in the morning" 

 

A further footnote:

"In the monograph the message is given in German. It has been translated back into English. The actual message sent out by the Fourth ARmy to the Corps, Reserve Army and IV Brigade RFC at 10:17 PM on the 30th June ran:-

"In wishing all ranks good luck the Army commander desires to impress on all infantry units the supreme importance of helping on another and holding tight to every yard of ground gained. The accurate and sustained fire of the artillery during the bombardment should greatly assist the task of the infantry""

 

All of the above was published in 1932 some 84 years ago, which again rather stretches the idea that any of this is new information. 

 

MG

Edited 2 September , 2016 by Guest

[SteveMarsdin]

On ‎01‎/‎09‎/‎2016 at 20:39, QGE said:

The failure was not one of Haig being 'unaware', it was a failure of discipline by the British in not obeying standing orders. MG

 

I think that what the British were unaware of was the extent of the German phone interceptions, having only a handful of such machines themselves. As late as 1992 in the introduction to British Army Records Society Vol 8 "The British Army and Signals Intelligence in the First World War" (drawing on both primary and secondary sources, including Occleshaw) it states that the extent of the German's knowledge wouldn't be known without full access to their records, most of which have been destroyed. it also says that the lack of British telephone discipline prior to the Somme was probably the worst error of its kind that century. [I'm paraphrasing this from memory as the book is at home]. "Revelation" may be for TV impact but Peter Barton has helped reveal the extent of the German knowledge that even at the time of Occleshaw's and the BARS books was not evident.

 

I do think the programme was very good as it took the ordinary viewer beyond the stereotypical view of the Somme, highlighting the difficulties the British faced and introducing points they may not have been aware of such as topography, fortified positions constructed over years, Russian saps, high proportion of Duds (as perceived by the Germans) etc.

 

Steve

[MikeMeech]

23 hours ago, QGE said:

The Official History France and Belgium 1916 Vol I also mentions the Moritz apparatus and the fact that the British were aware of German listening to British phones prior to the Somme. Unfortunately it is not indexed under 'Moritz', but under the unlikely heading of 'Overhearing'. 

 

Page 71

" One further most important matter with regard to telephony requires mention. The question of the enemy overhearing telephone conversations in the forward area arose in June 1915. Intelligence reports, deductions and experiments all combined to show that the leakage of information to the enemy which was known to have taken place was connected with the extension of the telephone system to the front"

 

Page 82 footnote. 

"Although by overhearing a telephone conversation the Germans had some idea that a mine explosion might take place, no precautions had been observed, except to withdraw some of the garrison, the 18th Reserve Jager Battalion from the front to the support line. See the German account in Note which follows."

 

Page 376

" In one of them [deep dugouts] an overhearing station had remained in action to the last. At 2:45 AM it had picked up part of a telephoned British order which pointed to an assault in the morning (see note at end of Chapter)"

 

Page 391-392

"The assault did not come as a surprise:- "[German account in italics] At 2:45 AM the 56th Reserve Brigade from its battle Headquarters at Contalmaison reported to the 28th Reserve Division a fragment of an order of the 34th Division picked up by the 'Moritz' overhearing post on the southern point of La Boiselle. It ran: "The infantry must hold on obstinately to every yard of ground that is gained. Behind it is an excellent artillery". This order apparently the conclusion to an order of the Fourth Army, pointing to the beginning of the general enemy offensive in the morning" 

 

A further footnote:

"In the monograph the message is given in German. It has been translated back into English. The actual message sent out by the Fourth ARmy to the Corps, Reserve Army and IV Brigade RFC at 10:17 PM on the 30th June ran:-

"In wishing all ranks good luck the Army commander desires to impress on all infantry units the supreme importance of helping on another and holding tight to every yard of ground gained. The accurate and sustained fire of the artillery during the bombardment should greatly assist the task of the infantry""

 

All of the above was published in 1932 some 84 years ago, which again rather stretches the idea that any of this is new information. 

 

MG

Hi

 

Also the book 'The Signal Service in the European War of 1914 to 1918 (France)' by R. E. Priestly covers the discovery of German listening in to the phone system in Chapter VI.  The leakage of information had been noted and there was a bit of 'spy mania', but information from the French and experiments by British signallers at what information could be gained and found that:

 

"Here was an explanation sufficient to account for the knowledge the enemy had obtained in the past; equally staggering was it to contemplate what he was overhearing  every moment in the present, and what he might overhear in the future unless precautions were promptly taken."

 

This is on page 101 and relates to experiments during June/July 1915, the book was published in 1921!

I have attached page 102 below which covers some of the measures to reduce the leakage of information and the problem the signallers and GHQ had to get officers to obey the instructions.

 

Mike

 

[SteveMarsdin]

Mike, Martin,

 

Although prompted by the TV programme I think signals intelligence, and particularly telephony, warrants a thread of its own. It is fascinating to read that the British were aware of the problem, albeit perhaps not the full extent, for well over six months before their first great offensive on the Somme yet despite the issue of orders and instructions could not get their armies to follow basic procedures. One wonders if a similar inability to get the message across in a timely fashion extended to other key learning points ?

 

Steve

[brummell]

2 minutes ago, SteveMarsdin said:

It is fascinating to read that the British were aware of the problem, albeit perhaps not the full extent, for well over six months before their first great offensive on the Somme yet despite the issue of orders and instructions could not get their armies to follow basic procedures.

 

Any rule which relies for its enforcement on the self-discipline of men will inevitably be broken.  This is so obvious, from our own experience, that it hardly needs stating; it surprises me that military authorities, usually so cynical, were and still are so naïve as to believe otherwise. 

 

 

- brummell

[Guest]

On 9/3/2016 at 09:50, MikeMeech said:

Hi

 

Also the book 'The Signal Service in the European War of 1914 to 1918 (France)' by R. E. Priestly covers the discovery of German listening in to the phone system in Chapter VI.  The leakage of information had been noted and there was a bit of 'spy mania', but information from the French and experiments by British signallers at what information could be gained and found that:

 

"Here was an explanation sufficient to account for the knowledge the enemy had obtained in the past; equally staggering was it to contemplate what he was overhearing  every moment in the present, and what he might overhear in the future unless precautions were promptly taken."

 

This is on page 101 and relates to experiments during June/July 1915, the book was published in 1921!

I have attached page 102 below which covers some of the measures to reduce the leakage of information and the problem the signallers and GHQ had to get officers to obey the instructions.

 

Mike

 

 

 Mike.

 

Excellent stuff. Many thanks. At SteveMarsdin's suggestion I am going to start a new thread on Surveillance. If you are able to re-post on it at your convenience, that would be great. I will consolidate all my refeneces and findings into an opening post....

 

MG

On 9/3/2016 at 10:46, SteveMarsdin said:

Mike, Martin,

 

Although prompted by the TV programme I think signals intelligence, and particularly telephony, warrants a thread of its own. It is fascinating to read that the British were aware of the problem, albeit perhaps not the full extent, for well over six months before their first great offensive on the Somme yet despite the issue of orders and instructions could not get their armies to follow basic procedures. One wonders if a similar inability to get the message across in a timely fashion extended to other key learning points ?

 

Steve

 As above. I will start a new thread.

Edited 23 September , 2016 by Guest
typo

[Guest]

1 hour ago, brummell said:

 

Any rule which relies for its enforcement on the self-discipline of men will inevitably be broken.  This is so obvious, from our own experience, that it hardly needs stating; it surprises me that military authorities, usually so cynical, were and still are so naïve as to believe otherwise. 

 

 

- brummell

 I quite agree. We had the problem in the 1980s using BATCO, a particularly cumbersome encoding table...trying to stop people talking in very clumsy coded language was a major problem only compounded by the rubbish equipment we had. 

 

I reacall one of the ways the Enigma was cracked was through poor operator discipline. 

[sjustice]

Contrast all this with summer two years later, when an entire (Canadian) corps was moved from the front at Ypres, to the Somme, under a cloud of deliberate misinformation, misdirection and secrecy.

 

Cheers,

SMJ

[Chris_Baker]

60% of German high explosive shells were duds!

 

 

Well, they were between 11am and 12 noon on 3 February 1916.

 

Edited 23 September , 2016 by Chris_Baker

[armourersergeant]

On 21/07/2016 at 21:07, squirrel said:

Bite and hold was Rawlinson's descriptive phrase (he added the "bite", Forestier-Walker first described "taking a bite out of the enemy's line") for a  limited advance.

 

 

 

Hi Squirrel,

Could I ask where the above quote about Forestier-Walker comes from? I have some evidence that FW in late 14 and early 15 was advocating BAH but its ambiguous to say the least and would be grateful of any other evidence. 

 

Rgds

Arm