Le Cateau 1914: Triumph or Disaster?

[nigelcave]

I honestly think we are making far too much of Le Cateau as a battle; OK, for understandable reasons, the Brits get excited about Mons and the Retreat. But look around! What were the French going through? The Germans? The casualty lists are horrendous and medium sized actions, like Le C, were commonplace in those early weeks. What about poor Belgium? The huge losses sustained by them in a heroic defence of the Yser in October/November 1914.

I find it extraordinary that SD's staff were supposed to be in fear of him when he had only been in cmmand - by Le C for less than a week.

I repeat: he was one of the very, very few ACTIVE generals in the BEF who had had command of a corps in peacetime. Surely it would have been remiss not to emply such an individual who had a perfectly respectable military cv.

French's despatch, written in haste? Pull the other one.

I honestly do not see what I would have done differently if I had been SD in the context of the operation.

[Jonathan Saunders]

Edit. French famously retracted his earlier priase saying it was written in haste. Terraine had strong views on this volte face.

Apparently not officially retracted!

My copy of S-D's response, undated but I assume published in late 1919 or 1920, has the following comment immediately following sJF Despatches of 7 Sept 1914 and 8 Oct 1914:

"These official despatches HAVE NEVER BEEN OFFICIALLY REPUDIATED."

Italics and capitals as set out in General Sir Horace Smith-Domien’s statement with regard to the first edition of Lord French’s book "1914”.

[SteveMarsdin]

As a non-military man I don't feel able to comment on the tactical aspects of "what if ?" situations but I would just make three unrelated more general observations;

1. The effect of losing and having to replace your commander, on the way to war, shouldn't be minimalized; the fact that Smith-Dorrien took over and then had to lead II Corps through traumatic events so soon, and did so effectively is a great credit to him
2. The retreat of the BEF wasn't conducted in isolation, neither of the French units to the right and left, or the mass of humanity fleeing in front of the German advance. The further south you go, most of the roads (and rail) head towards Paris, which is south-west. 1.5 million evacuees passed through Paris in ten days at the end of August. The retreat was broadly south, contrary to the orientation of the road network and across and along the same roads the civilians were taking. Add to this the fact that the path of the BEF and French armies was slightly convergent, it must have been a logistical nightmare.
3. As Nigel points out, Le Cateau has to been seen in both the context of the retreat overall and all the action on the Western Front at that time. Don't forget also that this was mobile warfare and events were happening and situations changing remarkable quickly, there isn't even three weeks between the Battles of the Frontiers, Charleroi and Mons, and the Marne.

.....and a 4th point: when I look at my bookshelf and see "Le Cateau" by Cave and Sheldon it is a great privilege to be able to participate in a debate with Nigel, Jack and all the other knowledgeable contributors. Even where there have some personal comments it hasn't put all parties off from contributing further. A big thank you to Martin G for starting the thread too.

[MartH]

Doesn't Richaed Holmes cover the French - Smith-Dorrien events in the "The Little Field Marshall"

The German view is interesting,for example Der Weltkrieg, and I quote from the English translation, not the Spanish one page 264

"Without question the battle at Le Cateau was a success for the First Army. The British had narrowly escaped destruction with considerable losses. Covered by strong cavalry, they retired southwest in darkness, pouring rain, and disorder. Exhausted and unable to continue marching, many man lagged behind and were taken prisoner. However, the double-sided envelopment that First Army Headquarters had devised for the British at le Cateau, and that had seriously threatened them early in the day, had not materialized , and the chance for decisive blow on the right wing had disappeared."

They Germans had not done what they had wanted to do, and had failed at the strategic level.

[David Filsell]

Fascinating thread, which needs careful reading and evaluation. It has certainly made me think about the battle differently . A small point. The use of forward slopes has been mentioned and criticised. Although the topic has been little researched my own investigation has indicated that there was in fact considerable sentiment at divisional command level for the use of forward slopes. Not least for the range and field of fire advantages which they offered riflemen. Not least of those holding this view was Thompson Capper - who had seen it employed in the Russo-Japanese unpleasantness. He and Rawlinson were both criticised by Haig for positioning troops of 7th Inf Div at Ypres on forward slopes. When sent home to prepare 8th Div for its move the the front, Rawlinson specifically noted that the lesson had been learned not to position troops on forward slopes and warned senior officers of this practice. I can present little evidence,but I am sure that the use of forward slopes in defence was broadly accepted by British commanders until Ypres despite the Wellingtonian belief in its efficacy.

[Guest]

There's an interesting account of Le Cateau in Lord Edward Gleichen's "The Doings of the Fifteenth Infantry Brigade August 1914 to March 1915"

25/8/1914 " We had received orders on the road to occupy part of an entrenched position to the west of Le Cateau, and Weatherby and I rode ahead to look at it and apportion it off as the battalions came up. The trenches, we considered, were quite well sited. They were about 3 feet deep, and had been dug by the inhabitants under, I think, French supervision; but, judging by our subsequent experience, they were nothing like deep enough and placed on much too exposed ground; and the artillery pits were far too close up--though correct according to the then text-books. "

Mike

[phil andrade]

Anthony Bird takes a very different view of the battle's casualty list from Jack and Nigel, and his assertions differ markedly from those implicit in Martin G's excellent graph of CWGC data.

If memory serves me, he insists that CWGC records indicate in excess of 1,200 British dead from August 26th and 27th 1914, and he endorses the official total of 7,812 casualties. He takes exception to Jack's analysis of German casualties.

I discovered on a Wiki foray that the German accounts of the battle state that the 2,600 British POWs included the wounded.

This is indeed a small affair by comparison with the Franco - German experience ; but it looms very large in British accounts of 1914, and it's very disconcerting to see that there is so much divergence of opinion from writers regarding the actual extent of the battle's cost.

Phil (PJA)

[Jonathan Saunders]

He takes exception to Jack's analysis of German casualties.

Havent we been here before or am I missing something:

" All of which suggests that Jack Sheldon's figure of 2,000 German casualties is not so exaggerated, even if it still leaves an unaccountable shortfall."

http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=113670

[nigelcave]

I freely admit that much of the work done on the British casualties figure that I used was done by Jack Horsfall, in the days when this was a laborious procss in the extreme. I have pages of his research (somewhere!). Raw figures, such as the CWGC database total, are not always particularly helpful, once you take out the not insignificant number of home deaths, those who died in British India, in West Africa, South Africa and elsewhere; then those who died of wounds as a consequence of the the fighting at Mons and the subsequent day or so after of retreat (eg Audregnies, Elouges etc); then I Corps. casualties, both on the 26th and thereafter: the numbers at Landrecies, Maroilles, Le Grand Feyt and Etreux are not insignificant. On the other hand, some defnitely killed at Le Cateau turn up on the La Ferte memorial as killed on 5 September. As I said, Jack did a lot of work on this and I found it prety convincing. I am sure that the OH figure for Le C is wrong, probably overstated by about a third.

But then, heartless though it sounds, the casualties are really not the point.

Some simple thinking should indicate that Jack Sheldon's figures sound as though they hit the right ball park figure; there would have been very few prsioners and most of the German casualties therefore would have been killed or wounded. They might have had the same problem as the British about keeping up their returns on a daily basis in this phase of the war. But I find nothing particularly surprising by the figures that Jack has produced.

[phil andrade]

Yes, you convince me.

It's that over stating of the British figure that intrigues me.

I have a notion that one third of that BOH number might have been stragglers that were rounded up in the day or two after the battle ; according to the anecdotes cited in THE CHALLENGE OF BATTLE there were exhausted, demoralised British soldiers milling around who were, in effect, almost hoping to be found by the Germans. Then there was the notorious episode of the battalions who surrendered at St Quentin.

Gilbert is anxious to emphasise how uncomfortable truths have been covered up in the official account. Perhaps an embarrassingly large number of men who were too willing to surrender have been incorporated into the standardised casualty figure for the battle.

The five thousand figure does seem more plausible when we take into account the normal ratios of dead to wounded, and the twenty six hundred POWS that the Germans claimed on the day of battle.

Phil (PJA)

[Jack Sheldon]

Just to be clear about this. I continued to work on the German cas figures after Nigel and I published the guidebook and the closest I can get to a figure is just a shade under 3,000. All the German armies had far worse days than that in 1914 and the point to bear in mind is that the regiments which were engaged absorbed their losses and were ready to continue the advance once they were so ordered.

Jack

[phil andrade]

That is very clear, Jack, and in my opinion, thoroughly convincing.

What is unclear, and, to my mind, not very convincing, is the attempt by the BOH to attribute to the Battle of Le Cateau a Waterloo type grandeur that did not exist.

AJP Taylor made a comment that the Battle of Le Cateau engaged the same number of British troops as Waterloo, and cost the same number of British casualties.

Understandable, in view of the supposed eight thousand casualties out of a notional thirty two thousand engaged.

If it transpires that one third of those eight thousand were actually men who were captured in the battle's aftermath - I must not state that as fact, but as suspicion on my part - then the affair begins to look very different.

The implication here is that there might have been a crisis of morale so serious that the disaster was already occurring and that SD did a superb job in holding things together. Murray had a breakdown. Another senior officer shot himself . Even Haig, afflicted with a form of intestinal illness, lost equanimity at one point. The situation must have been horrendous.

When salesie challenged " What would YOU have done ? " my reply was that I would have burst into tears and fouled my underwear.

No armchair judgement type of censure, I assure you.

Phil (PJA)

[nigelcave]

Actually I don't think so: many of those prisoners were as a result of poor communications in getting the orders through to withdraw - thus, for example, the number of Gordons put into the bag. Some units from II Corps were cut off and made their own way back to their units, which in some cases took days - some got incorporated into I Corps (parts of units on the right) and thus would not be accounted again within thir unit figures until they got to the Marne. A number of those left behind became a severe irritant to the Gemans as they continued to defend their positions and forced the Germans to deploy to deal with them - a tiresome business, even if the scattering of British soldiers might have been dealt with quite quickly. Again, a high prisoner number does not particularly surprise me, given all the considerations.

[MartH]

What is unclear, and, to my mind, not very convincing, is the attempt by the BOH to attribute to the Battle of Le Cateau a Waterloo type grandeur that did not exist.

Maybe because it was because Edmonds was there, and in the next few days after the battle he had his breakdown. I will see what his memoirs have to say and post later.

[phil andrade]

Again, a high prisoner number does not particularly surprise me, given all the considerations.

The number did surprise me, because I had not realised that , of the fourteen thousand battle casualties tabulated for August 1914, more than eight thousand - approaching sixty per cent - were prisoners.

Many of these were wounded, surely.

The Germans claimed 2,600 at Le Cateau, including the wounded.

They also alluded to more being picked up after the battle.

Is it reasonable to suppose that, judging by the figures presented for the August fighting, at least half the eight thousand attributed to Le Cateau were POWS ? If so, then it suggests that a couple of thousand others- perhaps more -went into the bag after the battle.

Editing here : if we accept the frequently cited 7,800 British casualty figure with the statement that this included 2,600 prisoners, the conclusion must be that only one third of the loss was represented by men who were captured. Moreover, if these included the wounded, the implication is that the British army fought with a resolve and determination not to surrender that sets it apart from the rest of the August fighting. Hence my suspicion that there is an attempt to impart to the engagement an epic, heroic quality that is a form of distortion.

Phil (PJA)

[Crunchy]

, heartless though it sounds, the casualties are really not the point.

I heartily agree Nigel.

Casualties are not a measure of success or otherwise of a battle, or necessarily of the competence of a commander - they simply remind us that battles are very bloody affairs.

Many factors contribute to casualties incurred, and any inference that the British casualties at Le Cateau are somehow a factor in assessing S-D’s competence as a commander is naive.

According to Nigel, in his introduction of his and Jack Sheldon’s excellent Le Cateau, he has calculated II Corps’ casualties were about 10% of the force. At Waterloo, having time to make his dispositions well before battle commenced on ground of his own choosing, that included holding fortified farms and withdrawing part of his line during the battle into a reverse slope position, Wellington’s casualties were almost 22% of his allied army (not including Blucher’s Prussians). Yet I see no comparable debate attempting to denigrate him based on this level of loss. So why is it an issue here?

Martin may be correct in saying that occupying the forward slopes added to the British casualties, however, I am not convinced that his dispositions as related on post #139 would have resulted in fewer casualties. In fact, I am inclined to think they could have ultimately resulted in the loss of the whole force. As mentioned earlier, uncovering the principal line of retreat, and allowing the Germans to advance uncontested up the Selle valley (in dead ground to Martin’s proposed line, but under fire from the British right flank during the battle) has the very real danger of outflanking the position, cutting off further retreat to the south, and driving II Corps away from the rest of the allied armies, thereby exposing it to defeat in detail, and considerably more casualties. Of course such a debate is irrelevant, as II Corps needed the Roman Road as a line of retreat in order to maintain some semblance of contact with I Corps, and the rest of the allied armies. Giving it up at the commencement of the battle would be folly.

Regards

Chris

[phil andrade]

You miss my point.

The figure is not a yardstick to measure generalship by.

It is a historiographical " issue" : an attempt to impart to the action a quality that needs circumspection.

Phil (PJA)

[Guest]

Could this be the answer to the 1st Gordon Highlanders disaster at Le Cateau

British Newspaper Archives Aberdeen Evening Express - Thursday 29 October 1914

...they (1st Gordon Highlanders) retreated to Andencourt on a line with Cambrai and Le Cateau which they reached on August 26. It was there that the disaster happened-All That Was Left- " We were told to hold this village as well as we possibly could, " said L/Sgt Sweek (Stobhill Glasgow) " and we took up our positions in the prepared trenches early in the morning. We held on until about 5 o'clock in the evening when we got the order to retire, and it was at this point that our serious losses commenced. Apparently the brigade-major, after giving us -B Company- the order to retire, rode on to carry the word to the others, but I understand he was shot dead before he reached the remainder of the battalion, who evidently on that account did not receive the order to withdraw from the trenches. B Company retired in the dusk, and we got safely away from the village. When we called the roll there were only about 170 of us, and naturally we wished to know what had become of the remainder of the battalion. Next morning we were joined by Lt Turnbull and 40 men, which brought our numbers up to about 210. We marched all day fighting a rearguard action, and we lay in the trenches at night until the cavalry brigade had come in. Our curiosity regarding our comrades was still unsatisfied, but after the cavalry had found shelter we observed a solitary horseman coming over the brow of an adjacent hill. He rode straight towards us, and we found he was Captain Marshall, of our own regiment. He told us that the battalion had been led astray by a civilian, and that it had been captured. He had also been made a prisoner, but had managed to escape. Possibly others had done so, but Captain Marshall told us nothing regarding them. The disaster was all the more saddening considering that we had got off comparatively lightly at Mons. In the trenches there the only man in our company who lost his life was Lieutenant Richmond, and only about four of us were wounded, including myself, although the wound was not so serious as to prevent me continuing with the battalion. In the following three days, up till the Wednesday, when 624 men were made prisoner, I don't think the battalion as a whole lost more than 20 officers and men killed.

Mike

[Crunchy]

You miss my point. Perhaps, but the comment was not directed at anyone in particular.

The figure is not a yardstick to measure generalship by. I agree, but there has been an attempt to do so in this thread.

It is a historiographical " issue" : an attempt to impart to the action a quality that needs circumspection. What quality?

Phil (PJA)

Regards

Chris

[neverforget]

It`s good to see S.D. being defended for his actions by people considerably more knowledgeable than I.

He made a courageous decision when faced with a situation that was unprecedented, and he had to think and act on the spot. I have piped in before on this thread to protest at the impeccably researched, but rather one-sided analysis presented before us, when there are so many mitigating circumstances that were not also presented . I`m sure that if the O.P. had decided to represent S.D. as a defence lawyer rather than a prosecutor, then we would be hearing a totally different story.

At the end of the day, he succeeded in his objectives. Maybe not ten out of ten, but I wonder how Haig, and his battles,( conducted with the benefit of so much hindsight on Haig`s part ) would stand up to Martin`s forensic investigations.

No offence meant to anyone. It`s absolutely right to thoroughly investigate these things. Just my honest opinion of how I see this thread.

[phil andrade]

Chris,

The quality I allude to is that of the " epic" ; the one big battle that transcends everything else and has about it a feature of stern resolve that the other engagements lack.

Not seeking to downplay the event. Clearly a nasty big scrap.

But it's more a question of the " story of the story" ; almost as if the BOH is telling us what we want to hear.

It fits that agenda better if the numbers for the fight are bigger than they really were.

I don't know enough about the details to qualify me for worthwhile commentary ; except to point out that the irreconcilable statistics reinforce my suspicion.

As for SD's handling of the business, from what little I know he wins profound admiration from me.

People all around him losing their nerve ; it's going to Hell in a handcart ; he makes a good account of himself, IMHO. Kipling would love it !

Phil (PJA)

[nigelcave]

What I have found about the BEF, culminating in a good period of time looking at First Ypres, is how pretty flexible the BEF was: frequently units are subdivided as certainly was the case at Le Cateau (and almost the order of business at Ypres); senior commanders are wounded or incapacitated in large numbers - from divisoinal commanders down(well, come to think of it, corps commanders too, if one bears in mind the unexpected death of Grierson); yet there seems to be an almost seamless replacement of such men, with captains running battalions, with half colonels running brigades and so on up the line. At the sharp end the same applies o the quality of the NCOs and to the generally very solid performance by the reservists, who fomed the bulk of the BEF in 1914, by the territorials taht fought and by the Indian army battalions involved. Yet it was all a close run thing, with adverse comments being made by observers (those I am thinking of had been out there more or less from the beginning and cover all ranks and diverse types of appointments) of the quality of many of the men at the end of First Ypres. Mind you I would certainly have been fed up, miserable, traumatised, hungry, thoroughly p***ed off; so this is not meant as a judgement, just an observation.

[nigelcave]

Re the number of casualties in those early months and the proportion who were made prisoner, I would direct your attention to the BEF casualty figures during the German spring offensives - the great majority were made prisoner then in eye wateringly large numbers. But, if you are outflanked, often surrounded, with very few options left for any form of effective action, then it is not too surprising that very large numbers were taken. A succesful, fast moving attack tends to have this consequence and the Germans suffered just as badly in the Hundred Days when the allies were heading off in the opposite direction. It is the nature of that type of offensive, for with defensive lines breached in multiple areas, fixed defences become very vulnerable indeed.

[phil andrade]

You beat me to it, there, Nigel !

I was wondering about comparisons.

From what I've seen in the Statistics of the Military Effort, the proportion made prisoner in March April 1918 was very markedly lower than it had been in August 1914.

I suspect, though, that this might reflect a more reliable counting mechanism that had been established.

Editing...from the Military Effort, battle casualties, August 1914 : 14,409, of whom 9,765 were missing ( including dead as well as POWs) ; for March, 1918 : 173,721 casualties, with 65,762 missing. An enormous difference in the ratio, from more than two thirds in August 1914 posted as missing, compared with fewer than forty per cent in March 1918. To my annoyance, I failed to record the actual number confirmed as POW in March 1918, but it's apparent already that things were a lot more chaotic in the the first battles.

Phil (PJA)

[josquin]

Chris,

The quality I allude to is that of the " epic" ; the one big battle that transcends everything else and has about it a feature of stern resolve that the other engagements lack.

Not seeking to downplay the event. Clearly a nasty big scrap.

But it's more a question of the " story of the story" ; almost as if the BOH is telling us what we want to hear.

It fits that agenda better if the numbers for the fight are bigger than they really were.

I don't know enough about the details to qualify me for worthwhile commentary ; except to point out that the irreconcilable statistics reinforce my suspicion.

As for SD's handling of the business, from what little I know he wins profound admiration from me.

People all around him losing their nerve ; it's going to Hell in a handcart ; he makes a good account of himself, IMHO. Kipling would love it !

Phil (PJA)

Phil,

The search for more verifiable evidence clarifying what actually occurred during Great War engagements engages us all, but discernment is necesessary, as well. Crunchy's comments are examples, not only his pragmatic counsel that Martin's deployment was less than favourable

but also that numbers are not the crucial factor here. Numbers are a factor of importance, yes, to better gauge the cost of a battle and, by

implication, its impact on subsequent decisions and events. But I dissent from your view that an "epic" quality has been attributed to the

events of Le Cateau that is unsupported by the numbers of combatants engaged--as if an "epic" battle requires a cast of hundreds of

thousands. Some of the "epic" battles of the past were epic precisely because small numbers of brave men stood their ground against

much larger numbers of adversaries--Rorke's Drift, Camerone, and Agincourt are exemplars of this. You are quite right that we need to know

the specifics of an engagement's outcome (number of killed, wounded, missing, taken prisoner, and so on) to better appreciate its cost

and its effect on operations and strategy, but such specific knowledge in this instance does not raise any serious questions about SD's leadership

on this occasion. SD was renowned for his temper and his impolitic behavior; he was a man of action and a sportsman rather than a

"courtier" and intriguer (the opposite of Henry Wilson, who stood among his adversaries). His command at Le Cateau was, I believe,

the best that one could have done under the circumstances of no time for preparation and the absence of any coordination at corps

level due to John French's inaccessibility (to phrase this charitably). Was Le Cateau "epic?" A Thermopylae? Perhaps not; but SD's

command lived to fight another day, unlike Leonidas's 300 Spartans, and the Germans admitted that they did not fulfill their tactical objectives at Le Cateau.

Does Le Cateau deserve to be included in the same sentence with Rorke's Drift , Waterloo, and Agincourt? I believe that it does, but

I am not claiming that what transpired on the field on those days was "epic" so much as brave men doing their duty and saving an

Empire for soldier's pay (as Housman and Kipling realized so well). For those who served, from SD to every soldier in his command, that was reason enough.

Regards,

Trelawney