Le Cateau 1914: Triumph or Disaster?

[Robert Dunlop]

Field Service Regulations (FSR)... (Section 114 in the 1909 edition):

"A commander may decide to offer battle without aiming at a decisive result, either in order to await the arrival of some other portion of the army, or to cover the concentration in rear, or to gain time for decisive action in some other part of the theatre of war.

The guiding principle in all delaying action must be that when an enemy has liberty to manoeuvre, the passive occupation of a position, however strong, can rarely be justified, and always involves the risk of crushing defeat; under these conditions a delaying force must manoeuvre, so as to force an enemy to deploy as often as possible, but should rarely accept battle."

Based on the Field Service Regulations, Smith-Dorrien could chose to engage in a delaying action 'without aiming at a decisive result'. From a British perspective, therefore, retention of the battlefield or destruction of the German forces did not have to constitute measures of a victory. Had the roles been reversed then the British would have claimed a victory because they ended up forcing the Germans from the field of battle. This was the basis for the German view.

Smith-Dorrien went against the guiding principle of the FSR in choosing to passively occupy a position when the Germans arguably (and indeed proved the case) had 'liberty to manoeuvre'. As noted before, Smith-Dorrien's decision raised the spectre of a 'crushing defeat' based on the FSR's predicted outcome. It is highly likely (but unproven) that Wilson and French's reactions to the decision were based on the same understanding as espoused in the FSR. The FSR does not provide a definition of 'crushing defeat' but French and Wilson appear to have regarded the definition as tantamount to annihilation of II Corps as a fighting force. I suspect the FSR description would have been congruent with that view. II Corps was not annihilated. Despite significant casualties, II Corps managed to disengage from the German forces. Other contributors have reinforced that this is a very difficult manoeuvre to accomplish. As significant as this achievement was, however, the disengagement of II Corps was not the most important aspect of the battle from a British perspective. It was the fact that II Corps avoided a 'crushing defeat'. It is little wonder that some commentators regarded this as a 'triumph'.

Despite the outcome, Smith-Dorrien was left in a somewhat vulnerable position as he went against a guiding principle. This opened him up to severe criticism, especially as his decision arguably could not be linked to the other reasons why a delaying action might be fought. The possible exception would be 'to await the arrival of some other portion of the army'. Perhaps a weak case could be made for 'to gain time for decisive action in some other part of the theatre of war' but there is no good evidence for this at the time that I can see FWIIW. Smith-Dorrien was entitled to make the decision as the commander on the spot. He did so on the basis that the perceived risk to II Corps was higher if he continued the retreat versus fighting a delaying action.

Next I want to examine the alternative to fighting a delaying action. This is not meant to be a criticism of Smith-Dorrien or his decision, just to be clear. Smith-Dorrien made the decision that he did and that is that. There was an alternative though.

Robert

[phil andrade]

Did SD himself actually allude to Le Cateau as a " delaying action " ?

I am still rather fixating on the meaning of the phrase " stopping blow".

Delaying is one thing ; stopping another.

Phil (PJA)

[Robert Dunlop]

Phil, I posted the map in the hope that it would illustrate the scale of what was perceived to be facing II Corps and its neighbours. 'Stopping blow' gives too strong an impression of what II Corps was up against, especially in relation to the relatively exposed flanks. The phrase has a nice ring to it no doubt. There is another reason why the expression doesn't cut it IMHO but I will come to that.

Robert

[phil andrade]

Robert,

" The phrase has a nice ring to it ".....yes !

The whole affair has a nice ring to it : at least, the way I was taught about it, and the way I chose to think about it, allowed me to dig myself deeper and deeper into the cherished mythology.

I'm woefully out of my depth when it comes to the detail of the battle : just a glance at what you and Martin have been posting leaves me in awe.

Whatever else it was - or might have been - it must qualify for being a " close run thing." The stakes were high enough to impart a special drama to the story.

What on earth possessed Sir John French to claim that the losses were roughly double the official total, especially since even that must be called into question ?

He doesn't do his reputation any favours by doing that.

Edit : Thanks for that map, by the way, Robert. Did SD actually envision that he was exposing his force to such a clear risk of envelopment as the map reveals ? Both flanks in the air . What is the extent of frontage occupied by II Corps ? Forgive me if I ask things that you and Martin have already clarified.

Further edit : The map makes me think that this was a desperate thing to do. Very much a case of a " compelled valour". I note that he has " refused " the right flank to some degree....but it looks as if the Germans could roll him up like a carpet from either side. Presumably, he excercised as much discernmet in choice of ground as circustances allowed. The Germans missed a great chance here, surely.

Phil (PJA)

[nigelcave]

My interpretation would be that the Marne was a stopping blow - with potential to be much more; Guise possibly fits into that description. Le Cateau, I think, at best could be described as a delaying action - and probably was intended as that.

[Gareth Davies]

The War Office in 1933 certainly thought it a was a delaying action. Their book Battle Of Le Cateau 26th August 1914 Tour of the Battlefield 31 December 1933 says:

"The battle of Le Cateau cannot, in itself, be considered as the defensive battle of the text books. Sir Horace Smith-Dorien considered that he was obliged to give battle where he stood and the fight was in the nature of a delaying action with further retirement, not a counterstroke in view."

[Robert Dunlop]

On p.57: "Following Smith-Dorrien's telegram indicating his decision to face the enemy, the next communication between GHQ and II Corps took place around 7 am when Smith-Dorrien contacted St. Quentin using the French railway telephone system. Henry Wilson took the call, and the II Corps commander summarised the situation facing his force. As Smith-Dorrien related in his diary: 'I explained the state of affairs, and that we should put up a real grand fight, but that as the men were too weary to march there was a real possibility, with both our flanks en l'air and a vastly superior number of the enemy against us, of our being surrounded.' [reference is to S-D's diary in CAB45 and to Scott's publication of Sir Charles Deedes diary]"

Phil, Smith-Dorrien understood full well as evidenced by the quote that I posted earlier. The line that I drew on the map accurately reflects the frontage of II Corps on the morning of 26th August. Both flanks were refused because of the perceived threats.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

And here is a map showing the actual locations of the German corps and divisions on the evening of the 25th August, with the movement arrows indicating direction of advance during the 26th:

Robert

[phil andrade]

These maps of yours are wonderful, Robert. They bring it to life for me , whereas before I've felt turned off....maps had been my problem, just as some are repelled by analysis of casualty statistics. Thanks.

In regard to those statistics, the striking feature of this camapign is the great preponderance of loss that was suffered by SD's command, even allowing for the fact that this was incurred mainly at Le Cateau. Would I guess corectly if I stated that II corps casualties outnumbered those of I corps by more than five to one ? Even without Le Cateau, the disparity is striking.

And as commander of the section of the force that was taking the burden of punishment, SD elected to offer battle in circumstances of extreme peril, even to the point of disobeying orders.

When Wilson commented that SD's voice was the only cheerful one he had heard, was he implying that there was a zeal for combat therein that had been lacking elsewhere ?

Phil (PJA)

[keithmroberts]

I suspect, no more than that, that once he had made his decision as a professional soldier to stand and fight, S-D was feeling more positive in that he was no longer just in the position of a retreating commander with much surrounding uncertainty, but had arrived at the point where he knew what he was intending, and what he was to ask of his subordinate commanders. He had a plan again, and something to work on. That would surely lift his own morale if that were needed, however challenging the circumstances.

Keith

[Robert Dunlop]

My next step is to update the last map further. Jack has already made the point that the German forces were not as strong as the map suggests. Only some elements of the divisions shown were actually engaged with II Corps. We must remember, however, that Smith-Dorrien was not party to these details. My first map must be borne in mind when thinking through the British perspective.

The actual movements of German forces illustrate that there was a significant degree of 'liberty to manoeuvre'.

Robert

[nigelcave]

Also bear in mind that it was II Corps that took the brunt of the fighting at Mons.

Once you get to the Aisne and from then on, it is rather a different story as regards casualties in I Corps.

[phil andrade]

Yes, of course, Nigel....I alluded to that in my post. I suppose that II corps had already taken four or five thousand casualties before Le Cateau : surely at least double the total that I corps was to sustain throughout the Mons campaign.

I like Keith's point : certainty of decision does impart a lift to morale.

Phil (PJA)

[Muerrisch]

And here is a map showing the actual locations of the German corps and divisions on the evening of the 25th August, with the movement arrows indicating direction of advance during the 26th:

Le Cateau German View.jpg

Robert

Robert: what is the authority for the map please?

Is it map 9 or 11 from the Official History folder of maps, which I have in front of me?

[nigelcave]

After this interesting thread has progressed for some time, I suppose one can look back at the original question, literary allusion or no.

I think all are agreed that it was neither a triumph nor a catastrophe?

That it was a delaying action and not a stopping blow?

That if the latter is the case it succeeded in its aim, though one can argue whether the tactical dispositions of II Corps were appropriate, the factors surrounding those decisions and so forth.

That as for all battles and campaigns, Clausewitz's concepts of 'friction' and the 'fog of war' were active participants, as it were, on both sides?

That SD and his staff did pretty well on balance; and that Sir JF and his staff were notable for being - for whatever reasons - rather divorced from proceedings; whilst Haig had his own issues to deal with?

[MartH]

For Mr Dunlop, who can work wonders with maps. the link to the German Official History map, Der Weltkrieg Volume 1 http://digi.landesbibliothek.at/viewer/image/AC01831210/748/LOG_0167/

[Robert Dunlop]

This map shows the German infantry regiments that were involved, bearing in mind that a German infantry regiment was approx. equivalent to a British infantry brigade. I have not shown the timings of the movements, so please bear in mind that the regiments did not all arrive at the same time. IR 66 and IR 72 were from the German 7th Infantry Division. The other 4 regiments were from 8th Infantry Division:

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Robert: what is the authority for the map please?

Apologies for not posting the reference. The map is LE CATEAU 26.8.14 Lage der 1. u 2. Armee am 27.8.1914 abds. I used the version that Jack and Nigel included in Battleground 'Le Cateau'.

Robert

[keithmroberts]

After this interesting thread has progressed for some time, I suppose one can look back at the original question, literary allusion or no.

I think all are agreed that it was neither a triumph nor a catastrophe?

That it was a delaying action and not a stopping blow?

That if the latter is the case it succeeded in its aim, though one can argue whether the tactical dispositions of II Corps were appropriate, the factors surrounding those decisions and so forth.

That as for all battles and campaigns, Clausewitz's concepts of 'friction' and the 'fog of war' were active participants, as it were, on both sides?

That SD and his staff did pretty well on balance; and that Sir JF and his staff were notable for being - for whatever reasons - rather divorced from proceedings; whilst Haig had his own issues to deal with?

Absolutely. I think that is an excellent summary.

Keith

[phil andrade]

There is one more thing that I would like to add to Nigel's summary .

The Battle of Le Cateau is one of the best examples of the susceptibility of British people to the appeal of their cherished Great War mythology. The Band of Brothers syndrome combined with Their Finest Hour. A bit of 1415, combined with 1815 , with some 1940 thrown in ; 1914 looks very appealing in that light.

Phil (PJA)

[David Filsell]

Appealing only in the way the story has been told and the image which hold. But we are only talking of details in reality, important though they are. The facts remain that following Mons, machine guns or not, the retreat and 'delaying action' ensured that neither devision of a small army was destroyed. That is not I itself a cherished myth but a fact of which the entire army could feel proud as could the nation. What that army then did after the arrival of 7th inf. Div. and the move to the left of two divisions without which, whatever the huge French contribution, and. Belgians opening the flood gates, Ypres would probably not been held is no myth either. Let's keep a. Sense of proportion. The army was not beaten. That actually looks vey appealing to me.

The micro examination has been fascinating, the re-evaluation of Le Cateau valuable,but in essence the big picture remains largely unchanged and the myth largely fact,

[nigelcave]

Le Cateau is only one - admittedly a big one - of the series of actions that the BEF fought in 1914. It was a small but far from insignificant force. On balance it performed quite well, errors and all. Its finest moment (and not to forget the elements of the Indian Corps that fought there, as well as the vital contributon of tte French and the Belgians), in my opinion, was in the villages, ridges and fields that lay around Ypres in October and November 1914: in that ferocious battle I think all ranks come out of it as having performed professionally, effectively and with great tenacity.

Taking the sum of the actions of those four months or so, I think that the BEF well deserves the generally held popuar view, though doubtless particular instances, engagements and decisions bear critical examination.

Those who fought in it could justifiably feel proud of the job done; and the principal architect of that force, Haldane, deserves wider recognition. The soldiers certainly knew this - IIRC Haig made a point of personally delivering a dedicated copy of his final despatch to him in which, effectively, he made just this point.

[phil andrade]

Appealing only in the way the story has been told and the image which hold.

And they are not insignificant things.

I was weaned on Tim Carew & Co.

I grew up believing that the bewhiskered Old Contemptibles exhibited a superior man for man prowess that saved the Entente powers from the Kaiser's hordes.

Now things look different.

But, in a sense, the revelations of Zuber and Sheldon have enhanced my appreciation of what those soldiers achieved.

Phil (PJA)

[Guest]

One of the misconceptions about the BEF or the 'Old Contemptibles' is their age. They were not that 'Old' when they fought. The men who fought at Le Cateau had an average age of around 28 years. Over 20% of these would have been younger than 25.

The weighted average age of the British Infantryman in Aug 1914 was less than 25 years and 2 months. The weighted average age of the Section A and B Army Reservists was 30 years and one month. Assuming a 40/60 mix of Serving Regulars/Army Reservists we get a blended average of 28 years and 1 month. Most (all?) Line Infantry battalions had over 100% casualties (Battle Casualties and non-battle casualties) within the dates for the Mons star (4th Aug-22nd Nov).

The replacements would have been from the pools of Army Reservists with a heavy leaning towards the Section A and B men with smattering of Special Reservists (Average age 25 years and 10 months) Assuming 75% replacement with Section A & B men would give an approximate average age of men who fought in the BEF up to 22nd Nov 1914 around 28 years and 10 months.

MG

Data Source: General Annual Returns for the British Army.

[David Filsell]

And if we accept the level of command and control issues suggested the achievement of those at the sharp end looks better and the German achievements less so.