Le Cateau 1914: Triumph or Disaster?

[Guest]

Martin,

It actually says In order to be prepared for a "fight to a finish" which suggests (to me at any rate) covering that eventuality rather than an unequivocal statement of intent.

Steve

Steve - the intention was never to fight to the finish. The aim was to fight a delaying action, in order to break free and fight another day. My personal view, having read Headlam's diary, Becke's notes and the RA publication on Le Cateau is that the CRA 5th Div believed there would be no subsequent retirement and that this was a fight to the finish. There is no doubt in my mind that this was conveyed to his subordinates and the Battalion COs within 5th Div. This belief was unique to 5th Div which suggests (to me at least) in Fergusson's zeal to inspire a fighting spirit he failed to communicate S-D's ultimate aim.

The CRA's diary provides the context as does Becke's book which used the diary as its primary source material. Ditto the diaries. The official RA account was written by Becke based on the war diaries, personal diaries and interviews with the surviving RA Officers. People can judge for themselves what the 'holding on at all costs' and 'no retirement' mean and how this resolves with a delaying action. Becke records:

page 24 "...the 18-pdrs would co-operate closely with the infantry in resisting to the last every German attack. The idea of holding on at all costs was very marked in throughout this Division"

page 27. "...It was at this moment, probably between 5:30 am and 5:45 am that Lieut Col Stevens received definite news from an ADC of the 5th Division that the Second Corps was to stand and fight on its present position. Immediately afterwards the BGC 14th Infantry Brigade informed him that there would be no retirement "[footnote]

A footnote records: "It is quite clear from the available evidence that the subordinate commanders on this flank had no idea that only a delaying action was contemplated"

page 28. "Actually the BC of 11 had unlimbered his Battery in a covered position about a quarter of a mile behind the one originally pointed out, however he received orders to move forward and the Battery then came into action in the position that had been detailed in the first instance. As his Brigade had to co-operate closely with the 14th Infantry Brigade in a fight to a finish, Lieut Col Stevens considered that all his Batteries must unlimber in the forward position originally indicated by the CRA"

page 29 " Whilst 52 was preparing for action Lieut Col Stevens issued orders to the BC that 'we would fight it out here and that there would be no retirement'. Major Nutt then went down into the Battery and explained this order to all ranks"

Page 30 " Thus the Right and Centre RFA Brigades of the Fifth Division had taken the injunction 'to co-operate closely with the infantry' in the most literal sense. Nearly all the battery positions were exposed to view and also to enfilade fire and coming into action as they did on the forward slope there could hardly be any retirement. But quite undaunted by the outlook the Batteries proceeded to make every preparation for a fight to a finish"

page 34 "...The 2/Suffolk Regt and XV RFA with 37 (How) all of whom had received orders to maintain their positions to the last

It is interesting that the rather emphatic 'at all costs'..'no retirement'.....'fight to a finish' etc is only associated with 5th Div. It is never mentioned in any of the unit diaries or personal accounts of the 3rd and 4th Divs. Becke covers all three Divisions RFA and RGA as well as the RHA and makes the point that that the local commanders 'had no idea a delaying action was being contemplated'. Becke goes into fine detail on British Army doctrine and training of delaying actions. For anyone familiar with the Field Service Regulations, Infantry and RA doctrine and training at the time, a delaying action does not include 'fighting to the last'. It is very specific. The aim is to break free.

This is where I see a large disconnect between S-D's aim of a delaying action and the understanding of the local commanders on the ground within 5th Division. The available evidence seems to indicate these commanders - both infantry and RA - thought they were fighting to the last rather than fighting a delaying action. MG

[SteveMarsdin]

Hi Martin,

That wealth of evidence is compelling, your assertion that that division appears to have applied its own interpretation of Smith-Dorrien's decision to "stand and fight" must have been compounded by the delay (as Salesie mentioned) in them receiving orders to withdraw.

Perhaps one problem is that stirring orders at army/corps level are for different objectives and construed differently than when they are applied at a smaller unit level (e.g. strategic-operational-tactical). Joffre famously ordered his 3rd and 4th armies:

“L’ennemi sera attaqué partout où on le rencontrera”

in August 1914 and was later blamed when the smallest units did just that, In reality he issued those words as part of his order to Langle de Cary and Ruffey to advance on 22 August 1914. The problem was that they then repeated the words verbatim in their orders to their Army Corps, who repeated them in their divisional orders etc. etc. He wasn't instructing the battalion commander to launch an unsupported frontal attack (and to keep doing so) whenever they met the Germans but many did just that. (Simon House "The Battle of the Ardennes 22 August 1914").

Steve

[Guest]

Smith-Dorrien wrote an introduction to Chapter III of the History of the Suffolk Regt 1914-1927 which covered the 2nd Bn action at Le Cateau. He wrote:

"Some-one, certainly not I, ordered that on no account were the Suffolks to retire. Such an order was enough for the Suffolks. For nine hours they fought with desperate losses, their CO Lieut Col Brett being killed comparatively early in the day; but no thought or retirement entered their heads, for had they not been told to fought to the last?......it was never my intention that any troops should have be called on to fight to the last. My intention was to fight a serious rear-guard action and when the pressure became too great to order a general retirement by divisions and this I actually did about 2 pm"

So it seems pretty clear what SD intended and pretty clear that the Suffolks at least thought they were not to retire. It would be interesting to see if Fegusson left any memoirs. MG

[SteveMarsdin]

Martin,

In the 15th Brigade (5th Div) War Diary on 26 August it says:

"At about 5.00am orders received that if the 3rd Division were attacked the brigade would hold its ground and not retire as by previous night's orders. Battalions were informed and began to strengthen their positions"

Steve

[Guest]

Martin,

In the 15th Brigade (5th Div) War Diary on 26 August it says:

"At about 5.00am orders received that if the 3rd Division were attacked the brigade would hold its ground and not retire as by previous night's orders. Battalions were informed and began to strengthen their positions"

Steve

15th Brigade was commanded by Brig Gen Count Gleichen whose diaries were published. The sense of 'fighting to the end' does not seem to have permeated this Brigade in the way it didthe 13th and 14th Infantry Brigades. Interestingly the Battalion diaries describe the situation in a rather matter-of-fact way with not emphasis on holding out at all costs etc. Only one of the battalions (1st Dorsetshires) records being addressed by Fergusson on the 20th.

I find this interesting. Both Gleichen and Fergusson were Grenadier Guardsmen and may well have known each other for many years. One wonders why Rolt and Gleichen had such different interpretations of the orders.It goes on to records that Lt Col Kincaid Smith from II Corps HQ reiterated the 'no retirement'.

MG

The KOYLI diaries largely based on Bond's later recollections have 'there will be no retirement for fighting troops' In the original 'no' is double underlined.

[salesie]

My point, Martin, is not that confusion didn't abound on the battlefield of Le Cateau on the 26th (the big surprise would be if it hadn't). My point is that the inevitable battlefield confusion could not have come from Fergusson's series of "speeches" on the 20th - simply because Mons happened 3/4 days later and Le Cateau 2 days after that.

Lt Col Bond (CO of 2 Koyli) in his history of the regiment in WW1 tells us on page722 that "At about 2.35am (on the 26th) came orders for a renewed retirement. The KOSB & KOYLI were to be rearguard. It was calculated that the divisional transport would not be clear before 11am, until which hour the rearguard troops must hold their positions" .

​Then, on page 724 "About 6am new orders from brigade arrived saying that 'Orders have been changed. There will now be NO retirement for the fighting troops, fill up your trenches with water, food and ammunition as far as you can.'......"The order for no retirement was confirmed by Col Romer of the II Corps Headquarters staff who rode up to 2KOYLI Headquarters and repeated it."

Then, on page 727​ "Meanwhile, the divisional baggage trains having been successfully got away, the covering troops were withdrawn as far as possible. At about 3pm the brigade reserve battalion was seen to be retiring to a position in the rear, covering the retirement of the other troops. There was no question of retirement for the (KOYLI) companies in the firing line. Even if it had been possible to communicate an order to retire, had such an order been intended, very few men could have got away owing to the proximity of the enemy and the nature of the ground. Some of the occupants of the lines of supports, however, did receive the signal to retire direct from Brigade HQ, and thus a portion of the battalion was saved and conformed to the movements of the brigade.”

No mention here of an inevitable “fighting to the last man no matter what” mind-set. No mention of such an order being received from Fergusson on the day. Lt Col Bond knew that as rearguard he had to hold until at least 11am, then new orders meant he had to hold indefinitely, or, as is the way of these things, until new orders arrived. In the event, the new orders to retire were only received by a portion of the battalion; it being impossible to communicate them by this time to the men in the front line.

I’m at a loss to understand what point you’re trying to make – if it’s to point out that sometimes confusion reigns in the chain of command during a battle/wartime, then all I can say is that you need to tell us something new, something we don’t already know.

Cheers-salesie

​

Edited 16 December , 2015 by Keith Roberts
GWF Rules.

[SteveMarsdin]

Hi Martin, Salesie,

In the 13^th Brigade War Diary (the KOYLI and KOSB having already being ordered to take up a rearguard position on 25^th August) it states:

“7.30am. Orders were received that the proposed further retirement of the division towards ESTREES would not be carried out and that the force would fight in its present position”

In the 14^th Brigade War Diary it states:

“6.30am. ADC 5^th Division informed General Rolt that retirement was cancelled and division would fight it out in its position”

It would seem that none of the three brigade war diaries uses the “fight to the finish” rhetoric that the memoires and histories recount, the 14^th Brigade comes closest but “fight it out” still doesn’t convey the same fatality.

Steve

[Guest]

My point, Martin, is not that confusion didn't abound on the battlefield of Le Cateau on the 26th (the big surprise would be if it hadn't). My point is that the inevitable battlefield confusion could not have come from Fergusson's series of "speeches" on the 20th - simply because Mons happened 3/4 days later and Le Cateau 2 days after that.

Lt Col Bond (CO of 2 Koyli) in his history of the regiment in WW1 tells us on page722 that "At about 2.35am (on the 26th) came orders for a renewed retirement. The KOSB & KOYLI were to be rearguard. It was calculated that the divisional transport would not be clear before 11am, until which hour the rearguard troops must hold their positions" .

​Then, on page 724 "About 6am new orders from brigade arrived saying that 'Orders have been changed. There will now be NO retirement for the fighting troops, fill up your trenches with water, food and ammunition as far as you can.'......"The order for no retirement was confirmed by Col Romer of the II Corps Headquarters staff who rode up to 2KOYLI Headquarters and repeated it."

Then, on page 727​ "Meanwhile, the divisional baggage trains having been successfully got away, the covering troops were withdrawn as far as possible. At about 3pm the brigade reserve battalion was seen to be retiring to a position in the rear, covering the retirement of the other troops. There was no question of retirement for the (KOYLI) companies in the firing line. Even if it had been possible to communicate an order to retire, had such an order been intended, very few men could have got away owing to the proximity of the enemy and the nature of the ground. Some of the occupants of the lines of supports, however, did receive the signal to retire direct from Brigade HQ, and thus a portion of the battalion was saved and conformed to the movements of the brigade.”

No mention here of an inevitable “fighting to the last man no matter what” mind-set. No mention of such an order being received from Fergusson on the day. Lt Col Bond knew that as rearguard he had to hold until at least 11am, then new orders meant he had to hold indefinitely, or, as is the way of these things, until new orders arrived. In the event, the new orders to retire were only received by a portion of the battalion; it being impossible to communicate them by this time to the men in the front line.

Cheers-salesie

​

The example of his speech - which was noted by 8 of the 12 battalions - simply illustrates the type of rhetoric that Fergusson used at the time. Given the period it must have been a fairly 'stirring speech' (their words) for all these units to have bothered to record it. The Brigade Commanders and Staff would of course have had more time in the presence of Fergusson and were presumably exposed to this type of fighting talk. If my assumption is correct, then there would be little surprise that the some commanders may have believed it was a fight to the last - something that Fergusson specifically told his men they might expect. It seems odd that the battalions in 5th Div was the only group that misunderstood S-D's aims - something that Becke even implies.

"NO retirement" (double underlined in the diary written by Bond and used as the basis for his History of the KOYLI) seems to make an emphatic statement. My reading of the diaries and histories is that Bond did not expect any subsequent order to retire. Neither did the Suffolks according to the 2IC or the RFA. In fact when Lt Col Stevens was verbally ordered to withdraw he didn't as he didn't believe that was the intention. He and most of his surviving Battery Commanders and staff were captured and made POWs.

This is where I think our pespectives differ.I guess this simply centres on one's subjective interpretation of what "NO retirement" means. In extremis this could mean 'last stand..fight to the end etc... others might interpret it as no retirement at this stage. I am speculating that the mood of Fergusson's earlier speech is indicative of a man determined that his troops fight to the last and that this impacted the way his orders were interpreted. Given the context and the diary evidence it seems very clear to me that a number of key players did not expect any subsequent orders to retire. This is not simply my view. Smith-Dorrien effectively says it in his intro to Chapter II of the Suffolks' history: "Some-one, certainly not I, ordered that on no account were the Suffolks to retire" and Becke makes it clear that "...subordinate commanders on this flank had no idea that only a delaying action was contemplated"

To my mind it is very clear there was confusion and I would argue this confusion was avoidable. It is not 'the confusion in the chain of command' rather the confusion created by the lack of clear orders. Put simply, Fergusson had a choice in how he conveyed S-D's orders and aims:

1. No retreat (something that is rather vague. No retreat ever? No retreat until when? etc..)

2. Delaying action (something that was part of British Army training and doctrine with very specific aims etc)

I suspect that if Fergusson had explained this was a delaying action, things might have been different. All the subsequent literature talks of a delaying action (S-D's very own words) or rearguard action (Becke) or stopping blow (various authors). None of these expressions were used in the orders. Put simply there was a conflict between the verbal orders and the aims. If commanders can not clearly communicate their aims confusion reigns. For the 1,300 casualties of the Suffolks and KOYLI this 'confusion in the chain of command' had fairly dire consequences. Similarly it left a Division with a significantly smaller proportion of its artillery. Guns lost that were not replaced until after the crossing of the Aisne. These are simply the facts. I am trying to better understand how they came about. MG

Edited 16 December , 2015 by Guest
quote amended for consistenct with other action. GWF Rules.

[Guest]

Hi Martin, Salesie,

In the 13^th Brigade War Diary (the KOYLI and KOSB having already being ordered to take up a rearguard position on 25^th August) it states:

“7.30am. Orders were received that the proposed further retirement of the division towards ESTREES would not be carried out and that the force would fight in its present position”

In the 14^th Brigade War Diary it states:

“6.30am. ADC 5^th Division informed General Rolt that retirement was cancelled and division would fight it out in its position”

It would seem that none of the three brigade war diaries uses the “fight to the finish” rhetoric that the memoires and histories recount, the 14^th Brigade comes closest but “fight it out” still doesn’t convey the same fatality.

Steve

Steve Thanks.

I have transcribed every Battalion and Brigade diary for 1914 so I am very familiar with the body of evidence. I also have (nearly) every published unit history (Leinsters still eludes me). Much has already been discussed in this thread.

The quotes are interesting examples of open-ended statements. When a commander states that the retirement is cancelled and provides no additional information it does two things

1. Everyone knows the retirement is cancelled with immediate effect

2. No-one knows what the subsequent aims are

This is an example of an extremely poor set of verbal orders because it provides clear guidance in one respect but has the binary effect of creating room for substantial mis-interpretation. I know the British Army instructed Oficers on how to deliver clear and concise orders in the modern era (RMAS and JDSC). I would be fascinated to understand what level of training influenced Big Generals in August 1914.

According to the May 1915 Army List Fergusson was not psc.

[salesie]

It is clear that it was impossible for the order to retire to be communicated to every single unit & sub unit (just as it was to reach every single unit with the order to stand) - are you suggesting that without Fergusson's "speech" on the 20th, and the way he conveyed the order not retire on the 26th, that Lt Col Bond et al would have deployed men differently and then, of their own volition, withdrawn them without orders?

If so, I would point out that the other two divisions of II corps were nowhere near as hard pressed as 5 Div was, and would suggest that if the fighting had been as fierce all along the line as on 5 Div's front then some units of 3 & 4 Divs would have suffered the same fate as the "last stand" units of 5 Div did. Indeed, it was Smith-Dorrien's initial intention to retire from Le Cateau after dark, it was only the dire threat to 5 Divs front that forced him to effect an earlier withdrawal. Perhaps, if Fergusson had been less gung-ho then said order to withdraw may have been forced much earlier i.e. if 5 Divs units hadn't fought so hard if believing that a stopping blow was all that was needed?

The answer to that, of course, is impossible to fathom -

Cheers-salesie

Edited 16 December , 2015 by Keith Roberts
Amended. GWF Rules respect for other members.

[Guest]

It is clear that it was impossible for the order to retire to be communicated to every single unit & sub unit (just as it was to reach every single unit with the order to stand) - are you suggesting that without Fergusson's "speech" on the 20th, and the way he conveyed the order not retire on the 26th, that Lt Col Bond et al would have deployed men differently and then, of their own volition, withdrawn them without orders?

If so, I would point out that the other two divisions of II corps were nowhere near as hard pressed as 5 Div was, and would suggest that if the fighting had been as fierce all along the line as on 5 Div's front then some units of 3 & 4 Divs would have suffered the same fate as the "last stand" units of 5 Div did. Indeed, it was Smith-Dorrien's initial intention to retire from Le Cateau after dark, it was only the dire threat to 5 Divs front that forced him to effect an earlier withdrawal. Perhaps, if Fergusson had been less gung-ho then said order to withdraw may have been forced much earlier i.e. if 5 Divs units hadn't fought so hard if believing that a stopping blow was all that was needed?

The answer to that, of course, is impossible to fathom - but I don't see any merit at all in armchair generals spouting their theories to criticise a real general for being too aggressive when maximum aggression was needed in the dire situation that was Le Cateau.

Cheers-salesie

Salesie

Thank you for your thoughts.

I am suggesting that if one already understands through years of experience that communicating across a battlefield is difficult, these difficulties are compounded by poorly constructed orders.

In the example of Le Cateau and Fergusson, if the local commanders were aware that the the subsequent retirement was part of the plan, if the orders did not reach them, a local commander would act on his own initiative. This didn't happen. Local commanders had no idea that it was a delaying action (Becke). Consequently none of them were even thinking about retiring. When the orders didn't reach them, they had no reference point to make their own plans as the men on the ground (ref FSR).

Had they known that continued retirement was the subsequent plan, they could have planned accordingly. I think they were expecting Fergusson to be fighting next to them in the last ditch (his words). Unsurprisingly he wasn't, which suggests that he understood the aims but his subordinates didn't and a significant number became casualties. QED.

Becke disagrees with your claims on how hard pressed the Divisions were. 5th Div did not have the highest casualties; 3rd Div did according to Becke.. I have not checked his figures as I don't think it is particularly relevant, but if fatal casualties are any measure of the intensity of a battle, your assumptions are at odds with Becke. You may want to check the data.

I would agree that the hard fight by 5th Div had a significant impact. I am not convinced that so many men had to be sacrificed to achieve that aim. By the standards of 1914 and the Great War the battle was very small in terms of casualties/numbers engaged but arguably disproportionately significant in terms of potential consequences.

MG

[Guest]

Salesie

Ref your now repeated veiled insult of 'armchair general'; You appear to believe that any reasoned reassessment of generalship requires some form of qualification. I am pretty sure there is no-one alive who was a general in that Great War. If this is a necessary qualification for debate the GWF would have died some time ago. Does anyone believe all generals in the Great War made perfect decisions? If one doesn't, which ones didn't...and why? If you (Salesie) can answer these questions does it make you an 'armchair general' simply because you have an informed view?

It is an invidious remark and adds nothing to the debate. If you don't like the debate then leave it alone. Please. Simply desist if you can. You seem to be determined to try and wreck any form of debate. It is possible to politely disagree and have healthy debate without the need for such vitriol. I hope I have been polite enough to deal with your arguments without descending to veiled insults.

On topic: Your sole reliance on S-D's self-serving memoirs are interesting. If you care to cast your net wider I think you will find a number of conflicting views. I think you are in danger of relying too much on a single line of evidence. It is worth stress-testing S-D's views against the opinions of others who served that day. Just a thought. MG

Edited 16 December , 2015 by Guest

[phil andrade]

Judging by a graph based on CWGC data that you posted on another thread, Martin, it appears that the number of British fatalities at Le Cateau was surprisngly small given the commonly accepted figure of 7,812 casualties.

My suggestion is that the figure incudes a very large proportion of prisoners - very much more than the frequently cited figure of 2,600 - of whom many were taken in the day or two following the action of 26th August.

Men reported missing ascribed " by default" to the big day, in reality gathered up as prisoners in the fall out of battle and retirement.

This stands in contrast with the admonishment that men must not surrender, as emphasised in one or two of the orders that have been quoted.

Phil (PJA)

[phil andrade]

So much fighting talk...no retirement, fight to the finish, hold at all costs, no surrendering etc ; and yet the number of deaths that day suggests that there was plenty of retirement and rather too much surrendering for the comfort of posterity.

Phil (PJA)

[Guest]

The 1st Gordon Highlanders never received the order to retire. There's also a story I came across (if find again will post) that at least some of the Gordons were betrayed by a guide. Had my grandfather been a 1st Gordon Highlander at Le Cateau, I would be more than happy to forgive him. Live to fight another day, I say?

Mike

[phil andrade]

The 1st Gordon Highlanders never received the order to retire. There's also a story I came across (if find again will post) that at least some of the Gordons were betrayed by a guide. Had my grandfather been a 1st Gordon Highlander at Le Cateau, I would be more than happy to forgive him. Live to fight another day, I say?

Mike

Forgive him for what, Mike ?

Phil (PJA)

[Guest]

Forgive him for what, Mike ?

Phil (PJA)

For " rather too much surrendering for the comfort of posterity. " If your officer tells you to retreat, or surrender, then you do just that. I just mean there's no real shame in doing the right thing at the right time.

Mike

[phil andrade]

Thanks for explaining, Mike.

By for the comfort of posterity I allude to the way historians have served it up to us.

We were led to believe that two thirds of all the casualties at Le Cateau were killed or wounded, and one third taken prisoner.

In light of the graph of CWGC data for 1914 BEF deaths that Martin posted, it's very apparent that either the commonly cited figure of just under eight thousand casualties for the battle is greatly exaggerated, or the proportion of prisoners therein is much higher than one third.

On no account imagine that I would blame those soldiers for surrendering.

I am struck, though, by the disparity between the gung ho fight to the death tone of the rhetoric and the outcome of the fighting as exemplified by the large haul of prisoners taken by the Germans.

Phil ( PJA )

[Muerrisch]

Surrendering is known to be a very dangerous act, only slightly less dangerous than fighting to the finish.

If one is to surrender, it is better done early than late, before too many enemy are too angry.

The act arouses huge emotions, both in the surrenderer, and in the armchair historian contemplating it 100 years later.

However justified, it carries shame and stigma, particularly if ordered by an officer, who has to justify the surrender post-war in a formal process.

Regarding "my" regiment, the performance of the 1st RWF at the end of October 1914, whereby a very large number went unwounded into captivity, still provokes unease and regret.

Outflanked, shelled to pieces at close range, exhausted, with the CO and the Adjt dead, and yet, and yet ...................

I, we, are in no position to judge.

[Guest]

Surrendering is known to be a very dangerous act, only slightly less dangerous than fighting to the finish.

If one is to surrender, it is better done early than late, before too many enemy are too angry.

The act arouses huge emotions, both in the surrenderer, and in the armchair historian contemplating it 100 years later.

However justified, it carries shame and stigma, particularly if ordered by an officer, who has to justify the surrender post-war in a formal process.

Regarding "my" regiment, the performance of the 1st RWF at the end of October 1914, whereby a very large number went unwounded into captivity, still provokes unease and regret.

Outflanked, shelled to pieces at close range, exhausted, with the CO and the Adjt dead, and yet, and yet ...................

I, we, are in no position to judge.

Fergusson was encouraging his men to fight with their fists if necessary and claimed he would be in the last ditch alongside them. Neither appear to have happened and perhaps demonstrates that fighting rhetoric and the reality of battlefields are some distance apart.Self preservation kicks in at some point.

If the OH numbers are to be believed and the CWGC number of around 800 fatalities that day are reliable and we assume most of the wounded were left on the battlefield, it would imply a few thousand POWs (wounded and unwounded). The only data I have seen suggests around half of the POWs were wounded, meaning somewhere in the region of a thousand and maybe as many as two thousand[?] unwounded POWs. I suspect most men who had fired their last rounds and who were isolated and surrounded faced with a choice of certain death in a last ditch bayonet charge or risking being taken as a POW, they would take the latter option.

Yate's famous VC charge with the KOYLI very probably didn't happen. I have no doubt he would have charged but it seems to have had very little support. Elsewhere on the battlefield an A&SH soldier recorded that his Officer was bayonetted in the chest while surrendering at the end of Le Cateau (A&SH were near KOYLI and Suffolks). Reports from survivors generally indicate that the Germans took a rather civilised approach, although many wounded were left in agony on the battlefiled for hours, even days until the British were allowed to search for their own wounded.

When the dramatic narratives are compared to the casualties they almost seem to be at odds. How can all this ordnance be thrown around yet fatalities be so low. Given the intensity of the battle there were remarkably low fatal casualties when measured as a per cent of numbers engaged. There are around eight or nine British battalions that were reduced to Company size yet appear to have less than 50 fatalities (on average). The ratio of fatal casualties to non-fatal casualties is at one extreme and implies that this type of battle might have had unique characteristics. The 2nd Suffolks were reduced to 111 ORs saw just 69 fatalities that day. It seems Le Cateau was not particularly fatal.

MG

[phil andrade]

" Fix bayonets and die like British soldiers ! " : so the legend has it, before the Zulus closed in for the kill.

Isandlhwana generated folklore as did Le Cateau...how remarkable that Smith Dorrien was personally involved in both !

Were German shells, bullets and bayonets any less fatal at Le Cateau than they were elsewhere ? It's very hard to imagine how.

I would contend that the figure of about eight thousand casualties is overstated by about one third ; the actual total probably included about half who were unwounded prisoners.

The surplus - two and a half thousand, more or less - were, I reckon, men who went hors de combat in the following days and were ascribed by default as casualties of August 26th.

This is all speculation on my part, I confess, and I mustn't assume a trenchant approach....it's the only way I can make sense of the disparity between the official toll of the battle and the number of deaths as revealed by the CWGC.

It also begs the question of how much the battle has been " hyped up ". It has a dramatic reputation, and this might account for a degree of distortion, not least in the whys and wherefores of orders being misinterpreted and the controversies that ensued.

Phil ( PJA )

[seaforth78]

Thanks for all of this Martin; must say I've enjoyed every word of your 'armchair' discussion unlike a certain Yorkshireman who revels in torpedoing any thread that dares to cast aspersions on his cherished views real or imagined on the Great War. For the life of me can't make out what makes this man tick. Christ!

Poor Yate as discussed in a previous thread elsewhere along with my namesake and Trajan, didn't even get a chance for a counter attack. Jumped from behind and overwhelmed quickly. No doubt his German helped him from being bayoneted. From all our researched never understood why he got the VC. As much as I like my subject, he didn't deserve it and besides as our research has demonstrated, his VC citation was completely off. Never happened.

Perhaps illustrative of the confusion you mentioned many a time in this battle.

[Guest]

It seems that the VC citation bears little resemblance to other eyewitness accounts, particularly Bond's and Wynne's. I am sure his conduct that day was deserving. None of his contemporaries seem to have suggested it was undeserved. While an interesting part of a much bigger picture, I would rather avoid debating whether he deserved the award. From what I have read about Yate and his time in Japan and his writings, he seems to have been just the type of Officer who would have fought to the last. I vaguely recall one account describes him as demanding to be shot by his captors. He apparently believed surrender was not an option. I suspect that he rather appreciated Fergusson speech on the 20th and fighting to the last etc

Staying on core topic, Headlam (CRA 5th Div) in his diary for 26th Aug:

" [the RFA Brigades] were informed...that their primary duty was to assist the infantry in resisting the infantry attack up to the last"

Clearly 'up to the last' might be interpreted in different ways; last round? last moment? last what? Some survivor's accounts describe the position as 'suicidal' and the subsequent refusal of all the RFA commanders to withdraw without written orders and to eventually end up as POWs with the infantry might suggest they interpreted this as fighting to the end as per Becke's inference. Headlam's first account was written on October 1914 some months after the events. This seems to at least show the line of continuity of the verbal orders from the CRA down to the Batteries and the immediate source of their expectation to 'fight to the last.' Headlam and Fergusson would of course have spent considerable time together and we know that Smith-Dorrien went to 5th Div personally to give the orders to stand and fight. It is highly likely that S-D, Fergusson and Headlam were all in the same 'conference'. We know that the orders were passed to the infantry by staff officers (KOYLI and Suffolks) so there were a number of Officers present.

Separately - Buried in the 5th Div CRA diary is a long essay on the role of the Royal Artillery. It reads like a lecture notes and covers the debate regarding how the artillery should be used in conjunction with the Artillery. It is typewritten and probably Headlam's given it is in 5th Div CRA diary, however there is no signature so we don't know for sure. The paper largely focuses on the role of the RA during offensive rather than defensive phases, so it doesn't really provide much, however it does highlight some debate over RA doctrine and the belief in some quarters that the RA should be alongside the infantry.

The Boer War and the battle of Colenso in particular forced some re-thinking of RA doctrine and debates continued to rage in the inter-war years. One modern author specialising in the Artillery was quite critical of the RA's dispositions and noted that after Le Cateau guns were never again deployed on forward slopes. I have no idea if this is true. The opportunity for this type of delaying action seemed rare in the subsequent years although I suspect if one dug deep enough one might find something.

MG

[paulgranger]

Martin

I think you are toying with us

[ianw]

Paul

I closed it for reasons that should be blindingly obvious. I have only reopened it because I had a number of requests to do so from people who I respect. I will not be participating anymore. Regards MG

Thanks Martin. I quite understand your stance having had similar experiences in the past.