Le Cateau 1914: Triumph or Disaster?

[Guest]

Bitte, was ist der "Gott Mit Uns" moment. Ich kann das nicht verstehen.

MG

[Muerrisch]

Gott, der Herr war offenbar auf der Seite der SD, nicht wahr?

[with apologies to my German masters of many years ago, Scruff Romer and Jumbo Griffiths]

[Guest]

Peter Harts' book "Fire and Movement: The British Expeditionary Force and the Campaign of 1914" has some super first hand accounts of this battle. Well worth buying the book for the chapter on Le Cateau alone. MG

[Muerrisch]

Peter Harts' book "Fire and Movement: The British Expeditionary Force and the Campaign of 1914" has some super first hand accounts of this battle. Well worth buying the book for the chapter on Le Cateau alone. MG

I am well into it but have a feeling that he is letting DH off rather lightly so far.

[Guest]

I am well into it but have a feeling that he is letting DH off rather lightly so far.

Don't get me started. The sacred cows of the BEF (or the EF as you prefer) are treated too kindly. nonetheless another objective book with some forthright views.

MG

[Muerrisch]

Martin, I think the best one-liner on command and control in the early days is [this may be a misquote, I am away from home]

"Band of brothers?" ...... "Cain and Abel!"

Not only that, but epically ugly!

[Guest]

I am gathering first hand accounts of the Right Flank, particularly critics of Headlam's tactics. Worth a book in its own right.

[lostinspace]

I seem to be reviving old threads today; came across a two-part article from the archives of the (U.S.) Artillery Journal (May-June and July-August, 1934) with an assessment of Le Cateau. The author didn't think that Smith-Dorrien made a wise decision to stand and fight and actually gave von Kluck exactly what he wanted - the B.E.F. staying in place long enough for a German envelopment. According to Major Williams all that prevented at least a single envelopment of the British left flank was the appearance of Sordet's cavalry corps. Can't say I buy all of what he wrote but there is quite a lot of information on the movements of both the French and Germans that I wasn't aware of, such as F.M. French not only asking for help from II Corps to assist Haig at Landrecies but also asking Lanrezac "Elements of two Reserve Divisions of General Valabregue, attached to the French Fifth Army, came up and assisted General Sir Douglas Haig in effecting the successful extrication of his I Corps".
For anyone interested the Artillery Journal is here http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin/archives/#1930

Dave

[David Filsell]

Take a serious look at how Haig managed to get troops up after the German breakthrough at Zanvoorde and plug the gaps Oct 30th. That day many present considered as important in saving Ypres as the next Gheluvelt.No need for any one to exaggerate his ability as a corps commander that day. Sadly PH, like most other authors, skims over it. It's a great tale.

[lostinspace]

David,

I'm not sure which post you're responding to, if mine I would say that the article was written in 1934 and about Le Cateau not 1st Ypres; the point of adding the quote wasn't to slander Haig but to indicate that I had never heard that French had asked Lanrezac for help on 25/26 Aug.

Dave

[nigelcave]

I seem to be reviving old threads today; came across a two-part article from the archives of the (U.S.) Artillery Journal (May-June and July-August, 1934) with an assessment of Le Cateau. The author didn't think that Smith-Dorrien made a wise decision to stand and fight and actually gave von Kluck exactly what he wanted - the B.E.F. staying in place long enough for a German envelopment. According to Major Williams all that prevented at least a single envelopment of the British left flank was the appearance of Sordet's cavalry corps. Can't say I buy all of what he wrote but there is quite a lot of information on the movements of both the French and Germans that I wasn't aware of, such as F.M. French not only asking for help from II Corps to assist Haig at Landrecies but also asking Lanrezac "Elements of two Reserve Divisions of General Valabregue, attached to the French Fifth Army, came up and assisted General Sir Douglas Haig in effecting the successful extrication of his I Corps".

For anyone interested the Artillery Journal is here http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin/archives/#1930

Dave

The problem with that view was that Smith Dorrien was all too aware that Sordet was on his left - the French cavalry had been cutting across the BEF's line of retreat all day (they did not come up from anywhere - they were retreating south and then moved to the left flank). This is in no way to denigrate Sordet - he played a bllnder - but the point is that S-D knew he was in the Cambrai area and on his left flank (IIRC I think there were some French territorials around as well). As regards Lanrezac, maybe so - but French by that stage would have put absolutely no trust in a word that Lanrezac said - in so far as French had much grasp of what was going on on the ground at that time; or, indeed, for much of the Retreat. Now, having said all that I must go and read the article - but first download it before my power gets cut for line maintenance.

[David Filsell]

No it was a general comment/corrective following the anti Haigist tone creeping in. Of course the BEF was not "a perfect thing apart", but we need to be careful in the use and application of the retrospectoscope. Not least one of the points I wanted to make was how differently we view things now. At the time October 30th was seen to be as crucial as the next day. Now even PH barely mentions Haig's highly effective command of his corps on October 30th to plug a gapand prevent an approach on Ypres potentially even more dangerous than that which would have occured at Gheluvelt.the next day had the line broken.

[Guest]

Not least one of the points I wanted to make was how differently we view things now. At the time October 30th was seen to be as crucial as the next day.

... and how Haig viewed things differently at the time and after the events...... I understand that there are two versions of his war diary. The one he wrote and the one he revised years after the events. The handwriting of the amendments and additions is apparently quite distinct from the original handwriting. The amended diary was the one that was published I believe. It is possible that the additional information simply added correct information, however from what little I have read on this aspect some authors suggest Haig embellished the diaries to show him in better light. I am not quite sure how one can make any objective analysis on what he may have been thinking at the time when the primary source material has been altered so much.

With regards to Le Cateau (the subject of the OP) his action at Landrecies and his inability to join up with SD were significant factors. It would be interesting to see the two versions of his diary for those dates. MG

[paulgranger]

Robert Blake's version of Haig's diary, published in the early 50s is based on a 'massaged' original, I believe. Sheffield and Bourne's version, published in 2006 is more warts and all. A comparison of the two would be interesting.

[David Filsell]

My detailed analysis of the of the fighting on October 30th is not drawn from Haig's writing in anyway but from that of others; personal accounts,books by participants and war diaries at battalion, brigade and corps level. As such it will of course contain errors. Equally my view of the fighting on the 30th as being as crucial as the 31st was not taken from Haig either. As for the rewriting by Haig, from my reading although there were amendments, I do not think there is any evidence of Haig being small minded enough to fudge issues as you seem to suggest. He was a man confident to let his record speak for itself, right or wrong.

[lostinspace]

Nigel,

I will be interested to see what you think of the article, apparently French and his staff knew Sordet would have to cut across their line of retreat and made "arrangements" for him to do so, and yes there was a territorial division at Cambrai which also played a part in holding up the German advance on the left flank.. I think F.M. French was probably grasping at any straw that might help him out, but I was surprised that he asked Lanrezac and that Lanrezac apparently responded by moving some elements of his reserve divisions toward Landrecies, I haven't read about that in any other account and wonder where it might have come from, my guess would be the French history but that's all it is, a guess.

Dave

[Guest]

I do not think there is any evidence of Haig being small minded enough to fudge issues as you seem to suggest. He was a man confident to let his record speak for itself, right or wrong.

David - for the sake of clarity and in the interests of accuracy, I did not suggest he fudged it, I said "...It is possible that the additional information simply added correct information.." and then highlighted what some authors believe.

I have not seen the two versions side by side and therefore have no personal opinion on this. Others who have seen both versions have questioned why there are two versions - published authors and a professor of military history who might have an informed opinion. MG

[nigelcave]

Nigel,

I will be interested to see what you think of the article, apparently French and his staff knew Sordet would have to cut across their line of retreat and made "arrangements" for him to do so, and yes there was a territorial division at Cambrai which also played a part in holding up the German advance on the left flank.. I think F.M. French was probably grasping at any straw that might help him out, but I was surprised that he asked Lanrezac and that Lanrezac apparently responded by moving some elements of his reserve divisions toward Landrecies, I haven't read about that in any other account and wonder where it might have come from, my guess would be the French history but that's all it is, a guess.

Dave

Up to my eyeballs at the moment - not least trying to house 178 boxes of books which are due to arrive in my new home on Friday. However, I have had a quick look at the second part of the article and it is interesting. As an observation, S-D's divisions and 4th Div (as you will have seen) were all arriving on the future battlefield during the night and into the early morning right up to the time, practically, that the action commenced. Haig's men, by and large, got in considerably earlier; though he faced more problems with the lines of retreat of the French (considerably over and above Sordet's cavalry) leading to bottlenecks. S-D had already fought a battle and Haig had not and so his troops were really pretty disorganised, not to mention 4th Div lacking vital components of its ORBAT. The major part of the German cavalry (not well handled) were on S-D's front. I shall need some convincing but will be very interested to see what he has to say.

This is an interesting resource. Do you know of other articles in it relating to the Great War? - bound to be plenty on the USA side, of course - which would also be of interest. Given that it is a gunners' journal there might be some different insights into the use of artillery during the war.

[lostinspace]

Nigel,

I understand completely. Yes, there are quite a lot of articles from the beginning of the war through the thirties; as an example here is the contents page from the July-September (1914) number: http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin/archives/1914/JUL_SEP_1914/JUL_SEP_1914_FULL_EDITION.pdf From siege artillery to hay and oats.

Dave

edit - Forgot to mention the acting editor of the Artillery Journal: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marlborough_Churchill

[David Filsell]

Martin,

Noted. I was not accusing you, my apologies if I gave that impression. But there have been accusations of 'massaging' and worse. Do not misunderstand I do not think that Haig himself was, to repeat myself, 'a perfect thing apart' either'. He was no more ready for war than anyone else in the British army, he made many mistakes of course, but I am unaware of any accusations being made during his life time of genuinely dishonourable behaviour.

Davis

[salesie]

Nigel is quite right, Smith Dorrien was well aware of Sordet's position and actually requested that Sordet should guard his left flank - seems to me that Smith Dorrien made his own luck at Le Cateau, not the implication made by Major Williams that Sordet's cavalry (unexpectantly and luckily) appeared . Relevant extract from Smith Dorrien's memoirs:-

"...However, some of the fog was cleared away by the arrival of General Allenby, accompanied by his G.S.O.I, Colonel J. Vaughan (now Major-General, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.) at my head-quarters at 2 a.m. Allenby told me his troops were much scattered, two and a half brigades being about Catillon, five miles east, and the other one and a half brigades at Viesly, six miles north-west of Le Cateau, that his men and horses were pretty well played out, and that he could not get into touch with General Head-quarters. He wanted to know what I was going to do, saying that unless I could move at once and get away in the dark, the enemy were so close that I should be forced to fight at daylight. I then sent for Major-General Hubert Hamilton, the Commander of the 3rd Division, whose head-quarters were close by, and asked him whether his troops could move off at once or at any rate before daylight, and his reply was very definite that the 3rd Division could not move before 9 a.m. The 5th Division were if possible in a worse plight, being more scattered, whilst of the 4th Division, which, though not under me, I could not possibly leave in the lurch, there was no news, except that they had last been seen after dark still in their positions south of Solesmes, covering the retirement of masses of transport and fugitives jammed up in the roads.


The following arguments passed through my mind:

{a) It must be a long time after daylight before the whole force covered by rear-guards can get on the move.


{ The enemy are in force close to our billets (for such Allenby had impressed on me).


© To turn our backs on them in broad daylight with worn-out men suffering from sore feet will leave us a prey to hostile cavalry supported by infantry in motors.


(d) The roads are encumbered with military transport and civilian fugitives and carts, some still on the enemy side of our position, and time to allow them to clear off is essential.


(e) The I Corps is reported to be engaged some miles northeast of us and to retire would expose their flank to the full brunt of Von Kluck's troops.


(/) The Cavalry Division can be of little help in covering our retreat, for this Allenby had told me.


{g) Our infantry have proved their staunchness and astounding accuracy with the rifle, our gunners are a marvel, and if Allenby and Snow will act under me, and Sordet will guard my left flank, we should be successful in giving the enemy a stopping blow, under cover of which we could retire.


Well do I remember the dead silence in the little room at Bertry when I was rapidly considering these points and the sigh of relief when, on my asking Allenby if he would accept orders from me, and he replied in the affirmative, I remarked : " Very well, gentlemen, we will fight, and I will ask General Snow to act under me as well." The die was cast, and it is lucky it was, for it appeared afterwards that the 4th Division did not commence moving back from opposite Solesmes until long after dark, the rear Brigade not until midnight, and only reached the fighting positions allotted to them on the west of the II Corps from Fontaine-au-Pire to Wambaix (a front of three miles) after daylight on the 26th. They were very weary, having journeyed straight from England, detrained at Le Cateau on the 24th, and marched thence at I a.m. on the 25th eight or nine miles to Solesmes, been in action there all day, and marched back over ten miles in the dark to their position, which was reached after dawn on the 26th. The unfortunate part about this Division was that it lacked the very essentials for a modern battle. It had none of the following: Divisional Cavalry, Divisional Cyclists, Signal Company, Field Ambulances, Field Companies R.E., Train and Divisional Ammunition Column, or Heavy Artillery. Let the reader think what that means—no troops to give warning, neither rapidly moving orderlies nor cables for communication, no means of getting away wounded, no engineers, who are the handy men of an army, no reserve ammunition, and no long-range heavy shell fire—and yet the Division was handled and fought magnificently, but at the expense of losses far greater than, if they had been fully mobilised.

Having decided to fight, there was a good deal for my Staff to do. General Head-quarters had to be informed, a message had to be sent to General Sordet to tell him and ask him to guard my west flank, and Snow had to be asked if he would fight under me, and last, but not least, carefully detailed orders for the battle had to be drawn up and circulated. Forestier-Walker, who was a very clear thinker and rapid worker, soon got all this done. To make certain that General Sordet should get the request, in addition to my message to him, a wire was sent to General Headquarters asking them too to invoke his assistance.

General Snow received my message about 5 a.m. just as he was issuing orders to retire, and readily consented to remain and fight vnder my orders.

Snow wrote to me subsequently as follows : " When you sent to me the morning of the 26th to ask if I would stand and fight, I ought to have answered: ' I have no other choice, as my troops are already engaged in a battle of encounter, and it must be some hours before I can extricate them " The message informing General Head-quarters is referred, to in the Official History) p. 136, as follows :

" A lengthy message was dispatched by II Corps at 3.30 a.m. to General Head-quarters St. Quentin by motor-car, which was received there about 5 a.m., informing Sir John French in detail of the decision taken."

It was acknowledged by a reply, sent off from General Head-quarters at 5 a.m., which, after giving the latest information, concluded:

" If you can hold your ground the situation appears likely to improve. Fourth Division must co-operate. French troops are taking offensive on right of I Corps. Although you are given a free hand as to method this telegram is not intended to convey the impression that I am not as anxious for you to carry out the retirement, and you must make every endeavour to do so."

This reply cheered me up, for it showed that the Chief did not altogether disapprove of the decision I had taken, but on the contrary considered it might improve the situation.

Consciousness that I was acting entirely without G.H.Q. approval would not have lightened my burden, especially as I had another master to consider, namely. Field Service Regulations, which direct (sub-para. iii. of para. 13 of Section 12 of Part I) :

" If a subordinate, in the absence of a superior, neglects to depart from the letter of his order, when such departure is clearly demanded by circumstances, and failure ensues, he will be held responsible for such failure.""

Cheers-salesie

[Guest]

One of the critical factors at Le Cateau that has always troubled me is why some troops thought they were fighting to the last and not going to continue the withdrawal.. The CO of 2nd Bn KOYLI, Lt Col Bond was to record on 26th Aug 1914 "Before 6:00 am, an order was received in the Brigadier General’s handwriting as follows: “Orders have now been changed. There will be no retirement for the fighting troops. Fill up your trenches as far as possible with water, food and ammunition.” The 2nd KOYLI would lose 600 men that day.

According to the History of the Suffolk Regiment, Lt Col Brett, CO of the 2nd Battalion on the extreme right, immediately adjacent to 2nd Bn KOYLI was told by Brig Gen Rolt commanding 14th Inf Bde "You understand there is to be no retirement" Officers from the 1st Bn Dorsetshire Regt were present. The Suffolk's history records later "in discussing this state of affairs with his company commanders, [Lt Col Brett] explained that he had nothing to do whatever with the selection of the position; they were committed to it and everyone must do the best he could. He then impressed up on them there was to be no retirement." The 2nd Bn Suffolks would lose 720 men that day. Bond was wounded and became a POW, Brett would be killed. The 2nd Bn Manchesters in immediate support would lose 400 men. Adjacent 2nd Bn DCLI received no orders to retire. the 1st Bn Bn East Surrey Regt were told shortly after 05:30 that "there was to be no retirement and that the 5th Div was to stand and fight"... Maj MacLeod of the 2nd Bn DOWR records being to 'hang on to the position' at 07:00.

The confusion over Smith Dorrien's intentions was largely centred on the 5th Div on the extreme right flank which incurred the highest casualties as battalions were cut off. The source of confusion might be rooted in a speech made by its GOC Maj Gen Sir Charles Fergusson CB, on 20th Aug 1914 (my emphasis):

Lt Col Bond 2nd Bn KOYLI Personal Diary 20th Aug 1914. Only the infantry of the Division had so far been assembled; the first signs of artillery were observable in the afternoon. Sir CHARLES FERGUSSON, commanding the 5th DIV, addressed each Battalion in turn, in a stirring speech. He said that any day now, tomorrow for instance, we might be in actual contact with the enemy forces. That there must be no surrendering and that men must fight to the last, with their fists if their rifles were useless. That he would be found with them in the last ditch. Confidential orders for a march tomorrow were received in the evening.

Lt Col Gibbs 2nd Bn DOWR Personal Diary. 20th Aug 1914. On Thursday 20th Aug, Sir Charles Fergusson our Divisional Commander visited each Battalion in its own area (in our case at 3:00 pm) and addressed the men in a stirring speech in which he reminded all that on leaving the present billets we never knew what we should knock up against, or when, adding he knew well the 5th DIV would play the game and be ready even for self sacrifice if necessary. The General told us that nothing was yet known about the situation of the enemy or our allies, nor had he yet received news of arrival of other troops or Artillery, further, that no orders for the forward march had been issued yet to him. Three hearty cheers were given for the General as he left us. The orders to advance did not arrive at Brigade HQ till 11:30 pm that night.

1st Bn Queen's Royal West Kent Regt 20th Aug 1914. Coys, the MG and transport paraded independently at about 9:00 am for route marching combined with fire control, extended order drill, it is fine and hot.

3:45 pm The Battalion in common with the Battalions of the Brigade was addressed by Maj Gen Sir C Fergusson Commander 5th INF DIV, the pitch of his remarks was:

1. Necessity for discipline

2. Realisation of the fact that we are now "up against it"

3. Characteristics of the enemy

4. To fight to the last.

2nd Bn KOSB. 20th Aug 1914. Rest and exercise of men. 3:30 pm 20th, addressed by Maj Gen Sir C FERGUSSON, Comd 5th INF DIV with inspiriting speech.

History of the Cheshire Regt in the Great War "The GOC [Fergusson] made a short speech to the men in which he emphasised the gravity of the situation they were likely to have to face and the necessity for fighting to the last man and the last round"

Fergusson's 'stirring speech' was mentioned in at least three other battalion diaries (2 KOSB, 2/East Surreys, 1/Dorsets) and clearly had a strong impact. One might reasonably wonder if the spirit of his message to 'fight to the last' and 'be ready even for self sacrifice' had any impact on how the confused orders of the 26th were interpreted. Interestingly Fergusson somehow didn't end up next to the 2nd Bn KOYLI and the 2nd Bn Suffolks 'in the last ditch', which perhaps suggest he knew the intention was to break free and continue the retreat.

There is doubtless more that explains the dislocation between Smith-Dorrien's intentions and what the local battalion commanding officers believed were the aims. It is possible that in Fergusson's zeal to ensure 5th Div retained a fighting spirit he inadvertently closed down any idea of a continued retreat after the next contact with the enemy "He said [on 20th Aug] that any day now, tomorrow for instance, we might be in actual contact with the enemy forces. That there must be no surrendering and that men must fight to the last..." No-one appears to have sought clarification on his orders. Local commanding officers accepted their orders with a grim expectation that this was a last stand.

It is unclear where the confusion started in the chain of command between SD, Fergusson, Rolt and the Battalion COs. Interestingly Count Gliechen (15th Inf Bde) appears to have perfectly understood what the intention was. MG

[salesie]

Why would Fergusson's Battalion COs be confused? There were 6 days between the 20th and the stand at Le Cateau, during which a withdrawal from Mons had been carried out instead of a fight to the last man - if they were initially confused then the retreat from Mons would surely have given great clarification i.e. follow your orders?

As for 2 Koyli, they received their orders not to retire before 6am on the 26th, but their orders to recommence the retirement did not reach them at all; lost in the fog of war. Orders to stand but no orders to retire, they did as ordered. Where's the confusion (in context to Fergusson's "speech") - they withdrew when ordered from Mons and stood when ordered at Le Cateau.

The fog of war makes communication somewhat haphazard - indeed, the orders to stand in the morning of Le Cateau were not received by every single unit just as it's perfectly clear that the order to recommence the retirement in the afternoon was not received by all. The fog of war makes for confusion & break downs in communication inevitable.

An extract from Smith-Dorrien's memoirs:

"The order to stand and fight drawn up by Forestier-Walker was clear and to the point, but the difficulty was to get it to the troops in time. It was fairly easy for Corps Headquarters, as they had simply to send copies of the order to the four Divisional head-quarters and the 19th Brigade, but the difficulties increased in mathematical progression when it came to informing the smaller units, many of whose positions were only very roughly known. Captain Walcot took the order to the 4th Division and I went myself to Fergusson (5th Division) about 4 a.m. to explain matters to him, and to learn all I could about the positions and state of the troops of his Division. Whilst I was talking to him the rearguard of the 3rd Division passed, having been out all night. Fergusson pointed to them as another indication of the impossibility of continuing the retirement at once. He added that the men of his own Division were exhausted, and that, although they might continue their rearward march in a fashion, it would be a slow and risky business; he further remarked he was relieved by my decision to stand and fight. There is no doubt but that there was the greatest difficulty in getting the orders round—in fact some few units never got them, but conformed to the movements of the troops which had......

......Fergusson's order to his Division to retire naturally took some time to reach his troops, and it was well after 3 p.m. before the rearward move of the 5th Division commenced. The troops were so hopelessly mixed up, and so many leaders had gone under, that a regular retirement was almost impossible, especially too as the enemy was close up and pressing hard. Thanks, however, to the determined action of Major Yate of the Yorkshire Light Infantry, who sacrificed himself and his men in holding the Germans off, the troops of the 5th Division got back on to the road. Luckily the 15th Infantry Brigade was intact, and they about Troisvilles, the 19th Brigade about Maurois, and the R.H.A. guns of the cavalry farther to the east and south kept the enemy off and prevented the envelopment of our flank and enabled the troops to get away. When the 3rd Division saw the 5th retiring they took it up, and finally the 4th Division. Both these two last-named Divisions, less heavily assailed than the 5th, and with their flanks better guarded, could have remained where they were certainly until after dark and had little difficulty in retiring, in comparatively good order, the 9th Brigade in perfect order taking all their wounded with them. If the 4th Division were slightly more mixed up and irregular in their formations, it was due to the fact that they were immensely handicapped by their shortage of the necessities for fighting a battle (already described), largely in consequence of which their losses had been so heavy, amounting to about 25 per cent. of their war strength.

It was after 4 p.m., when my head-quarters were retiring from Bertry, that I rode with my Staff to watch the 5th Division pass along the road south of Maurois. I likened it at the time to a crowd coming away from a race meeting, and I see the same simile in the Official History. It was a wonderful sight—men smoking their pipes, apparently quite unconcerned, and walking steadily down the road—no formation of any sort, and men of all units mixed together. The curious thing was that the enemy were making no attempt to follow. They respectfully kept their distance behind the rear-guards, and later allowed the latter to retire without pressing them. The 3rd and 4th Divisions were, as the plan of retirement provided for, considerably later in taking up the movement to the rear. But what undoubtedly decided the Germans not to follow up was the fact that several detachments did not receive the order to retire, but went on fighting, some of them far into the night, and we have to thank them largely for holding off the enemy, thus preventing his being aware that a general retirement had taken place. These detachments had marvellous and varied experiences which it is not in my province to relate here, for I did not hear of them until after, but I see the Official History describes them as less than 1,000 strong all told, a wonderful illustration of how a few resolute men can hold up an army. We had plenty of experience of that in the Boer War, for our enemies there were real experts at rear-guard fighting."

Cheers-sale​sie

​

[Guest]

Why would Fergusson's Battalion COs be confused? There were 6 days between the 20th and the stand at Le Cateau, during which a withdrawal from Mons had been carried out instead of a fight to the last man - if they were initially confused then the retreat from Mons would surely have given great clarification i.e. follow your orders?

As for 2 Koyli, they received their orders not to retire before 6am on the 26th, but their orders to recommence the retirement did not reach them at all; lost in the fog of war. Orders to stand but no orders to retire, they did as ordered. Where's the confusion (in context to Fergusson's "speech") - they withdrew when ordered from Mons and stood when ordered at Le Cateau.

The fog of war makes communication somewhat haphazard - indeed, the orders to stand in the morning of Le Cateau were not received by every single unit just as it's perfectly clear that the order to recommence the retirement in the afternoon was not received by all. The fog of war makes for confusion & break downs in communication inevitable.

Cheers-sale​sie

​

The confusion (as I see it) comes from the fact that a significant number of COs believed they were fighting to the last at Le Cateau and that there was no intention of any subsequent retreat. It was not S-D's intention to 'fight to the last' at Le Cateau. The seeds of this appear to have been planted in the minds by Fergusson's "stirring speech" on the 20th - mentioned by at least eight of the twelve battalions and all of those that were annihilated. If, on the 26th they are verbally ordered that this would be a fight to the last, there would be little surprise given the context. The orders within 5th Div did not include any indication that the retreat would be resumed. When the order to retire filtered through later in the day, some COs were very surprised. Those that did not receive the order were equally surprised to see units to their flanks retiring. In one case (East Surreys) it prompted the CO to question the retirement of the adjacent unit (KOYLI). This is particularly interesting as most of the KOYLI did not receive the order to retire and did fight it out to the last, so within the KOYLI there was confusion. This is very clear in the surviving war diaries, personal diaries and later published unit histories.

Headlam, CRA 5th Div left long narratives of the retreat from Mons with many pages devoted to the disposition of the RA at Le Cateau. There are two versions, one written in 1914 and one written in 1918. The Historical Section under C T Atkinson and A F Becke had both copies and dissected them. They formed the basis of Becke's book in the RA at Le Cateau published by the RA Institution. The original narrative runs for 30 pages. Becke's notes and cross-referencing run for another 10 pages.

The manuscript very clearly shows that Headlam's plans were predicated on a 'fight to the finish' (see below). I don't believe this was Smith Dorrien's intention. Somewhere down the chain of command Smith Dorrien's intentions became mis-interpreted. The post war literature talks of a 'stopping blow' - something that does not appear in any training manual or doctrine of the period. As you know there are no surviving written orders and everything was communicated verbally within 5th Div. What we do know for sure is that Headlam, and many of the the Battalion COs in 5th Div believed this was a last stand and that there would be no subsequent retreat. Headlam goes into some detail on this 'fight to a finish'.

My interest is trying to discover how and why SD's intentions became a 'fight to a finish' in the minds of some commanders. This confusion does not appear across the other units under S-D's command. Given so many of the 5th Div's unit commanders believed this, including at least one Brigade commander (Rolt) and the CRA (Headlam), one can only conclude that the distortion happened at Divisional level. i.e. with Fergusson.

[SteveMarsdin]

Martin,

It actually says In order to be prepared for a "fight to a finish" which suggests (to me at any rate) covering that eventuality rather than an unequivocal statement of intent.

Steve