Le Cateau 1914: Triumph or Disaster?

[phil andrade]

And if we accept the level of command and control issues suggested the achievement of those at the sharp end looks better and the German achievements less so.

Indeed, David, as you and I will have read about in The Great War Dawning.

Phil (PJA)

[Muerrisch]

One of the misconceptions about the BEF or the 'Old Contemptibles' is their age. They were not that 'Old' when they fought. The men who fought at Le Cateau had an average age of around 28 years. Over 20% of these would have been younger than 25.

The weighted average age of the British Infantryman in Aug 1914 was less than 25 years and 2 months. The weighted average age of the Section A and B Army Reservists was 30 years and one month. Assuming a 40/60 mix of Serving Regulars/Army Reservists we get a blended average of 28 years and 1 month. Most (all?) Line Infantry battalions had over 100% casualties (Battle Casualties and non-battle casualties) within the dates for the Mons star (4th Aug-22nd Nov).

The replacements would have been from the pools of Army Reservists with a heavy leaning towards the Section A and B men with smattering of Special Reservists (Average age 25 years and 10 months) Assuming 75% replacement with Section A & B men would give an approximate average age of men who fought in the BEF up to 22nd Nov 1914 around 28 years and 10 months.

MG

Data Source: General Annual Returns for the British Army.

Martin have you omitted Section D men, who would surely push up the average age? And the post-declaration time-expired men recruited under the emergency provisions of August 1914? These would all have been old boys.

[nigelcave]

I see also that deserters were welcomed back with open arms - or at least they were in the Life Guards.

[Muerrisch]

Yes there was an amnesty for deserters.

[Guest]

Martin have you omitted Section D men, who would surely push up the average age? And the post-declaration time-expired men recruited under the emergency provisions of August 1914? These would all have been old boys.

The men who fought at Le Cateau were the men who disembarked a few weeks earlier. None of the Battalions had yet to receive their first reinforcements who would arrive (almost universally in batches of one Officer and 93 ORs) on 5th Sep 1914 as a general rule. Assuming a 40/60 split the Reservists comprising the 60% (generally speaking) were predominantly Section B men. The range varied. The Regs/Reserve spilts ranged from 57/43 to 30/70. Aggregate was 41/59 for Line infantry with a variance of +/- 2.7%.

As you know, Section D men would already have served out their Reserve obligation and signed on again for another four years. The old and bold (average age 33 years and 5 months by the way) These men were the oldest and the men longest out of regular service. The diaries provide extremely strong evidence that the order of choice was Sections A and B (Section A was only 55 men per Battalion) then Special Reservists (average age 25 years and 9 months), then Section D. Additionally, there is strong evidence that battalion COs wanted the men who had most recently left the Army. There are a number of examples of COs sending hundreds of Reservists back to the Depot explicitly asking for them to be replaced with men who most recently had left i.e had not had another 7 years or 3 years in the Reserves. The tables in the GAR tell us how many left the Army and went into the Line Infantry Reserve each year. In short there were sufficient men recently left to fill the ranks. They did not need the time-expired men, who I suspect were used as Drill Instructors for the New Armies. (diary evidence again).

1st Bn East Surrey Regt War Diary:

6th Aug 1914. 2nd Day of Mobilization. 402 Reservists arrived from Depot about 4:00 pm. Posted to Coys and instructed in fitting equipment and Line Discipline at one began.

About half these men had left the Colours as long as 6 and 8 years, many having only done 3 years with the Colours. Programme for the day completed.

7th Aug 1914. 3rd Day of Mobilization. 242 Reservists arrived from Depot about 6:00 am. Most of these men having left the Colours more recently were better trained and as far as possible replaced the 3 years men posted to Coys the previous day.

8th Aug 1914. 4th Day of Mobilization. 50 Reservists arrived from Depot about 10:00 am. These men had only recently left the Colours and with the inclusion of them enabled the Battalion to mobilize with but few 3 years men in the ranks.

The 1st Reinforcements however which were formed today under Capt J K T WHISH with 99 other ranks were chiefly composed of these men.

Some diaries even give a breakdown of the categories of men they took (2n Bn Suffolk Regt who suffered so badly at Le Cateau), and they were particularly keen on lowering the number of 'Three year men' i.e men who did "3 and 9" - men who had been out for at least 9 years. The Section D would have had a higher proportion of these men. Also the Section D was only open for specific periods. Some number crunching is required but the basic story is that Section D were had been away from the Colours for longer, they were older, less fit and not particularly wanted by the COs on mobilisation. Also the diaries make note of the arrival of Section D men in late Nov-Dec and their lack of fitness. Some COs sending drafts back to base.

There were enough Section B and Special Reservists to supply most of the Infantry up to First Ypres, so strictly speaking most battalions would have received anywhere between 6th-8th Reinforcements totaling around 550 - 750 men on a base of 950 ORs so somewhere between 58%-78% of War Establishment. To this we need to add some 'recycled' (for want of a better word) wounded and sick.

I have no doubt that some good Section D men went before 22nd Nov, but equally some young SR men went too. I should really crunch the average age of BEF who died in 1914 as a cross check - will revert on this - but either way the Men who fought at Le Cateau were 40/60 Regular serving/Army Reservists and we know their weighted average ages from the GARs.

The Not so Old Contemptibles.

MG

I see also that deserters were welcomed back with open arms - or at least they were in the Life Guards.

The numbers were extremely small in the great scheme of things. MG

[Jonathan Saunders]

Martin have you omitted Section D men, who would surely push up the average age?

David,

My understanding from research of the Royal West Kent's, is that a lot of Section D men went to the Service battalions to offer a level of tuition and experience during instruction. 9 to 12 months later when most of the Service battalions went Overseas, the wishes of the old soldiers to enter war theatre with their Units was often granted.

With regards to the Royal West Kent's some sadly did not live beyond Loos - I seem to recall one may have been an old NCO from 2/RWF that we corresponded on years ago.

Regards,

Jonathan S

[Guest]

Reservists available to the BEF in 1914:

Army Reservists Sections A and B...109,919.....56.8%

Army Reservists Section D.................35,771.....18.5%

Special Reservists.............................47,635......24.6%

Total................................................193,325.....100.0%

Gives a rough Idea. BEF that initially deployed was roughy speaking 100,000 men and assuming 60% Reservists would need approximately 60,000 of the 109,000 Section A and B men...still leaving 40,000 are reinforcements before the SR and Section D men were required. This is very rough but gives some idea of the orders of magnitude.

The SR men would have a decent proportion under 19 years of age (roughly 15% of their numbers) which would reduce the eligible SR men to around 40,000. All categories would have unfit men.

The Cavalry had significantly lower requirements for Reservists than the Infantry.

MG

[Robert Dunlop]

Here are a couple of 3D renditions of the terrain around Le Cateau. The focus is on the area where Feldartillerie-Regiment (FAR) 40 set up its field guns. This is on the main Montay-Reumont road. The view is to the southwest, looking towards Reumont in the distance. Le Cateau is off to the left (east) and Inchy to the right (west). The approximate BEF line is marked with a khaki-coloured dotted line. The view is taken as if from a Taube so as to make orientation easier:

This next view is taken from ground level. Montay can be seen in the valley in the foreground. I have marked the intermediate ridge line behind which the Le Cateau-Cambrai road passes into defilade. The British positions near the scissor cross roads cannot be seen.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Here is the view that the German Infanterie-Regiment (IR) 66 would have had from Montay looking along the road towards the scissors cross roads, which are not visible.

Here is the more telling view. It is taken from the position reached by IR 72, i.e. next to the railway station on the outskirts of Le Cateau. I marked the British right flank trenches in blue on the original 2D map and you can just make them out on the far slope. Montay can be seen off to the right of this view.

Robert

[Muerrisch]

Martin I was reacting to: .

The replacements would have been from the pools of Army Reservists with a heavy leaning towards the Section A and B men with smattering of Special Reservists (Average age 25 years and 10 months) Assuming 75% replacement with Section A & B men would give an approximate average age of men who fought in the BEF up to 22nd Nov 1914 around 28 years and 10 months

and not reacting only to August men. The Section D men were well into theatre by the time that qualification for the Mons Star lapsed. Therefore if you do not take account of them your average age must surely be too low.

THE SOMEWHAT OLDER CONTEMPTIBLES !

[Robert Dunlop]

This view is taken from the BEF positions back towards the positions taken up by IR 72.

This is the view that would have greeted IR 66 as they crested the rise:

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Here is a view from the east, looking towards the British right flank positions. The line taken up by the RFA is now marked on this map, with a 'flag' marker at the extreme right of the position from the British perspective. The red dotted line indicates the approximate advance of IR 26. This was an infantry regiment from the German 8th Division that made its way via Montay to the British right flank. IR 72, from the German 7th Division, was further east. IR 66 is marked as well. All three regiments were applying converging pressure against the exposed British right flank positions, with the MG companies playing a prominent role. I will post the battle map of FAR 40, whose field guns operated in support of the German attack.

Robert

[Jack Sheldon]

Robert

It is important not to leave out of consideration elements of FAR 75, firing in support of 8th Infantry Division from excellent locations near Rambourlieux Farm, a mere 3,000 metres from Sussex Hill. There may not have been many guns deployed there, but if you go and look at the area, you will see how significant it was.

Jack

[Robert Dunlop]

Thanks Jack. Here is the view from that angle:

You will recognise this map of FAR 40's dispositions, showing the initial set up in mid-morning progressing through the move forwards in the mid- to late afternoon:

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

A better view from the farm. The approximate line of the British guns and infantry trenches on the right flank is marked in blue:

Robert

[Jack Sheldon]

Many thanks. Most interesting and I had not previously seen the FAR 40 map - or it would probably have found its way into the guidebook.

Jack

[Robert Dunlop]

Jack, I have updated the earlier view from the East to show the location of FAR 75 and to show the more advanced firing positions for FAR 40. I am uncertain of FAR 4's location but IR 26 had to quickly get in touch with this regiment when the German infantry came under fire.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

I have taken things as far as I can for the moment. Work beckons and I will be away for the next 3 weeks or so. Hopefully the 3D maps will have illustrated the terrible situation that faced 5th Division, especially on the far fight flank.

Robert

[Guest]

There is an interesting article on Le Cateau written by Adrian Gilbert in the latest edition of Stand To! - the journal of the WFA.

[Guest]

I stumbled on this today whilst trawling the CRA 5th Div war diary...

"There was however one serious failure - both the 60 pdr and 4.5" Howitzer ammunition left by the ammunition column was short of fuzes (sic) and therefore practically useless, although late in the afternoon a bag of fuzes was obtained by motor cyclist. This raises the important question of packing all ammunition intended for use in the filed in complete rounds.

After the South African war it was strongly recommended that this should be done, owing to similar accounts occurring especially in the L of C. As long as the different components are packed separately such incidents will inevitably occur."

[lostinspace]

Martin,

Some interesting information on the early battles here: http://www.da.mod.uk/wwi/from-the-archives/staff-ride/view , also some information that I hadn't seen previously on Landrecies: http://www.casematepublishing.com/dlc/9781906033767/9781906033767.pdf - seems that 4th Guards Brigade could have been in a really tight spot if the Germans had found a way through the hedges.

Dave

[Muerrisch]

Guess on Salesie's viewpoint we have no need for after battle reports, sandhurst, etc...

Congratulations: you understand Salesies viewpoint.I don't, I just think he wants an argument rather than consensus.

[joerookery]

My two cents worth on this wonderful thread. It seems as if it is frequently done in isolation and definitely through a British lens. I don't think most contributors have a real appreciation for how really bad the German recce was. It was screwed up at the Strategic level, the operational level, and really the tactical level. Robert's map that shows HKK 2 while fantastic gives the impression that it was bigger than reality. 2 KD was in some contact but this organization was in bad shape. May want to look more at the Germans than previously. Keep up this fine discussion!

[Guest]

I am going to attempt to resuscitate this thread.

Having read a bit more since originally posting, my conviction that the right flank was terribly organised has been reinforced. Somewhere between the Commander 5th Div (Fergusson) and CRA 5th Div there was a criminal level of incompetence or negligence...or a suicidal RA doctrine that I have yet to discover. I have dug quite deeply on RA doctrine of the era and have yet to find anything that explains the actions of the CRA 5th Div. His subordinates were simply appalled at his actions that day which at least suggests there was a difference of opinion within the RFA on the ground.

Edit. I am simply astounded that they did what they did. I have read a reasonable amounts of of Great War History and this day is pretty extreme. The RFA must surely must have all expected to die. It is an example of extreme commitment to duty that I think exceeds that of Nery on a colossal scale. The RFA right flank was hard done by in my view. I wonder if the more extreme actions of the few who rescued the remaining guns overshadowed the grim heroics of the men who died at their posts in (arguably) suicidal positions. Suicide is not the right word as the person who delineated the positions (CRA 5th Div) rather conveniently for him didn't have to stand and die there. It is easy to understand why the infantry on the subsequent retreat stepped out of the ranks to touch the surviving guns as a mark of respect.

Separately, I think the actions of the extreme right flank, particularly that of the 1st Bn DCLI retiring from Le Cateau seem to be under-appreciated. A small amount of firepower appears to have deterred a disproportionately large number of Germans. The popular belief is that 13th and (core) 14th Bde's (and RFA) suicidal positions saved the day. I suspect that a more careful analysis of the retirement of the extreme right flank outposts from Le Cateau had a far greater impact in the stopping blow' that Smith-Dorrien envisaged.

I have become far more sympathetic towards Smith-Dorrien but equally far more disillusioned with the apparently dysfunctional general staff of GHQ and I and II Corps. It seems that professional military expediency was subordinated to personal acrimony between key leaders. Something that needs to be explored more beyond the boundaries of the personal (potentially biased) memoirs of the key players.

MG

[Muerrisch]

I am reading Catastrophe by Max Hastings.

He notes that the "Band of Brothers" that the senior officers belonged to was that of Cain and Abel! The Venn diagram of who detested who, and who sucked up to who, would be a marvellous construct.

2014 has brought forth a massive amount of new insight regarding the month of August 1914 [such as KGV urging Grey to find a reason to declare war 2nd August].

I am not sure where we are on revisionist/ post-revisionist/ post-post-revisionist, but there seems little doubt that the British Army had their Gott mit Uns moment at Le Cateau.