Le Cateau 1914: Triumph or Disaster?

[Crunchy]

We may have to agree to disagree on whether the forward slopes had to be occupied and the artillery had to be that far forward.

Sorry Martin, I didn't make myself clear.

I don't think the guns should have been placed on the forward slopes. I was simply discussing Becke's quote - so we are heated agreement on that point.

The lack of ammunition I was referring to was the ability to maintain an unobserved continuous barrage over a point in the Selle valley - not that they didn't have enough for the battle as it was fought.

I agree, I think we have thrashed out our points.

Regards

Chris

[Guest]

Sorry Martin, I didn't make myself clear.

I don't think the guns should have been placed on the forward slopes. I was simply discussing Becke's quote - so we are heated agreement on that point.

The lack of ammunition I was referring to was the ability to maintain an unobserved continuous barrage over a point in the Selle valley - not that they didn't have enough for the battle as it was fought.

I agree, I think we have thrashed out our points.

Regards

Chris

Chris thanks. Noted. Duly thrashed to pieces. MG

[Guest]

Becke:

"The 18 pdrs [suporting 5th Div] would cooperate with the infantry in resisting to the last every German attack. The idea of holding on at all costs was very marked in this Division......... It is quite clear from the available evidence that subordinate commanders on this flank had no idea that only a delaying action was contemplated..........Nearly all the battery positions were exposed to view and also to enfilade fire and coming into action as they did on the forward slope there could hardly be any retirement. But quite undaunted by the outlook the Batteries proceeded to make every preparation for a fight to the finish."

 

Becke is paraphrasing first hand verbal and written accounts here. He gives a very strong impression of the mind-set in this Div and in the RA of 5th Div; one of no subsequent retirement and fighting to the last. He also mentions that they unlimbered all the first line ammunition. They clearly realised resupplying these forward positions would be extremely difficult.

 

I made an error with my calculations for the losses in the 18 pdrs engaged. They lost 56% not 50% in 5th Div and 89% not 69% on the Right Flank......120 Bty RFA was not on this part of the field having been sent to 3rd Div.

 

MG

Edited 4 March , 2017 by Guest

[Robert Dunlop]

The reason I raise this point - confusion about what the aim was - is that there are multiple sources that expose this from those very recipients. Not just a few.

MG, I agree. FWIIW I doubt this is directly related to Fergusson's gee-up. My earlier point with the Nimy-Obourg example shows the extreme danger of allowing battalions to make their own decisions about when to withdraw. This is potentially more serious than the alternative where everyone stands and fights 'to the death'. The Nimy-Obourg account relates to 3rd Division. The same phenomenon happened in 5th Division as the Battle of Mons wound down. Regimental accounts and war diaries suggest a piece-meal uncoordinated withdrawal, partly precipitated by the German advance past Jemappes and partly due, seemingly, to a lack of clear communication. In the event, the German attack had largely fought itself to a standstill across the whole of 5th Division's front by the time the withdrawals took place. The evidence was there, however, that in different circumstances a catastrophic collapse might have occurred. Given the informal network of comms that I referred to earlier, it is highly likely that reports got back to Fergusson that so-and-so regiment pulled back without telling us, etc, etc. Nothing formal, at least not that I have found recorded. Plus it was, perhaps, not the done thing to shop someone directly in front of colleagues. Based on this analysis (which is subject to criticism of course) then I am not surprised at the stronger and more generalised insistence on regiments staying in place at Le Cateau.

There is a further factor to take into account. There were several examples of last ditch stands in both I and II Corps in the lead up to Le Cateau. For the purpose of this discussion, the Cheshire's example at Elouges is pertinent. The regiment stood firm, fighting to the 'death' in a key rearguard action. It was not the intention, however, that the battalion should sacrifice itself in this way. Whatever the initial command was, the parent brigade attempted several times to get a message through to the Cheshires to disengage. This episode clearly shows that an order to 'fight to the death' really meant 'stay in place until ordered to do otherwise' as opposed to ' stay in place until you think it is right to retire (cf Mons) or 'stay in place until you all die', which is what you are alluding to I think (please correct me if I have this wrong). So here we see a second lesson being played out at Le Cateau, namely that the alternative to giving battalions more flexibility in decision-making was just as difficult to execute across an entire division because of the comms problems. As an aside, Smith-Dorrien referred to the problems of comms between divisions and II Corps in his notes on lessons learned, published in October 1914.

The Mons 'lessons' may have extended to field artillery too. In the few cases within 5th Division where the RFA was able to get 18 pounders into the defensive infantry line, the effect was helpful. Elsewhere there was criticism that the infantry regiments felt abandoned, my term for the concerns that were raised. By inference (and I have no direct evidence to support this) the lesson in 5th Division might have been to get more guns forward in direct support of the infantry.

In summary, we should not look at the issues at Le Cateau in isolation IMHO.

Robert

[phil andrade]

From Haig's Diary, August 27th, 1914 :

The 1st Division was in the rear and Maxse 1 ( Guards ) Brigade acted as rear guard. By some error of judgement, this rear guard remained too long in its position north of Etreux, and the greater part of the Munster Fusiliers was surrounded in a village and killed or captured.

Phil (PJA)

[Guest]

Garry Sheffield's book on Haig provides further insight into the relationships between the Generals. There is certainly some difference of opinion between Smith-Dorrien and Haig as to what was said over this period.

Edit: The issue of I and II Corps not joining up at Le Cateau seems fairly critical. I have just re-read the relevant pages In Gary Sheffield's book. He states;

"At 6 am [26th Aug 1914] ...Dawnay passed on orders [to Haig] from GHQ that I Corps was to 'fall back southeast with French and rejoin later by rail, or move on to St Quentin'...... having already set in motion [at 12:30] a retreat south to Guise Haig decided to let his orders stand.... whichever instructions had been followed, French or Haig's , they had the same effect of dividing the BEF and ensuring that the two Corps would be operating as independent commands."

Which suggests that by 06:00 French had abandoned any plans for I Corps to join II Corps at Le Cateau. More importantly Haig had made this decision even earlier - effectively invoking the 'man on the ground' principle. This puts a very different angle on events as it means Smith-Dorrien was left 'in the air'. I am trying to understand why these decisions took so long to reach Smith-Dorrien as they seem absolutely critical to his part of the plan. French's decision - allowing time for his orders to be written - appear to have been made immediately after Smith-Dorrien's decision to stand and fight. There seems to be strong evidence in the timings of these orders that French did abandon Smith-Dorrien but did not communicate this immediately. Wilson made no mention during he telephone conversation with Smith-Dorrien

MG

[phil andrade]

That " error of judgement" that Haig cited : is that an example of orders misconstrued, or too open to differing interpretation ?

Was this another " fight to the last" episode resulting in isolation and surrender ?

Phil (PJA)

[Guest]

That " error of judgement" that Haig cited : is that an example of orders misconstrued, or too open to differing interpretation ?

Was this another " fight to the last" episode resulting in isolation and surrender ?

Phil (PJA)

Having read a bit about the Royal Munster Fusilier's stand, I think it is simply another example of the unit not getting the message in time rather than Charrier intending on 'fighting to the last'. Part of the Battalion did escape, but the Companies with Charrier were cut off. It is fairly painful reading and if one wants to see an isolated example of the spirit of the BEF and its grim determination against the odds, this action is quite a good example. The RMF had more fatalities in August than the other 23 battalions in I Corps combined.

My sense is that command and control in 1914 was particularly Chaotic - in the mathematical sense derived from Chaos Theory - very small changes in initial states can have extremely large differentials in possible outcomes. A message to 'retire immediately' failing to get through could have catastrophice consequences. Decisions on when to blow a reserve demolition etc... One of the reasons why it is important for the local commanders to understand what the intentions of the higher command are - so that he can exercise his initiative (as SD did) when circumstances rapidly change. In the case of Charrier he certainly knew that he was a rear-guard and what his aims are.

The point has been made many times that breaking contact with the enemy during a rear-guard is possibly one of the most difficult military operations. There are a number of Battalions during the Retreat from Mons that saw similar fates to the RMF.

[phil andrade]

Given the perilous circumstances of the BEF in this campaign - the peril being amplified by the very chaos of command and control that you allude to, Martin - it is more and more apparent ( in my view) that the aversion of disaster at Le Cateau represents a certain kind of triumph.

Phil (PJA)

[Guest]

Trial by Fire by Nikolas Gardner certainly has changed my view on timings. It seems that French made a decision to abandon II Corps sometime around 05:00 - when he received Smith-Dorrien's notice of his intention to stand. French then appears to have focused on 'saving' I Corps but - critically - did not communicate this to Smith-Dorrien. Wilson when speaking to Smith-Dorrien by telephone shortly after 06:00 at 07:00 also did not mention that I Corps would not be arriving on his right.

Before reading Gardner's book I was under the impression that Smith-Dorrien knew much earlier that I Corps was not coming. Effectively Smith-Dorrien's decision to stand and fight was (unknowingly to him) the catalyst for French to abandon II Corps. In this context (assuming Gardner is correct in his timings and analysis) that French's actions were nothing short of criminal.

I would reiterate my view that there would have been time to do something on the Right Flank, but I would say that the opportunity was denied Smith-Dorrien by French (and Haig's) actions. Had Smith-Dorrien known that early (06:00), he would have realised that the line of retreat for 5th Div was completely exposed ... and maybe..just maybe....in the ensuing hours have been able to partially mitigate the precarious position. We shall never know.

MG

[Robert Dunlop]

I would urge significant caution in accepting Gardner's conclusions. He had a particular agenda IIRC. We need to examine all of his references in the original if possible.

With respect, I have to disagree with your conclusion about the opportunity to address the right flank being denied to Smith-Dorrien by French and Haig. Smith-Dorrien knew the night before that I Corps was experiencing difficulties. As the GOC II Corps, Smith-Dorrien and his staff had to:

1. Determine the overall tactical response of II Corps. The precise definition of this has been debated above but the decision lay between continuing to retreat or making a stand. This decision was Smith-Dorrien's.

2. Ensure that the divisions had enough information about the overall threats to II Corps. Both flanks were at risk and, at a high level, we see that both flanks were refused. The left flank had the advantage of Sordet's cavalry corps echeloned back.

3. Ensure that a reserve was in place that II Corps could distribute as required. This was done.

4. Make sure that the communications were as good as possible in order that the reserve could be utilised when required.

As Chris noted, the actual dispositions on the right flank were not Smith-Dorrien's direct responsbility. II Corps gave a general indication of what the divisions should do. It was the responsibility of the lower level commanders to ensure that the most favourable tactical advantages were exploited locally. Put another way, it was definitely not S-D's role to go around and inspect each battalion trench line or each artillery battery location on the right flank.

As to the communications issue, there has been mention of this being 'poor' at Le Cateau. Much of this discussion has centred around the instructions to battalions on the right flank. I have suggested that these instructions may have reflected a need to ensure consistency in tactical response to perceived and actual attacks. The contrast is with the relatively uncoordinated approach where some decisions to hold/withdraw were left to battalion commanders at Mons. It is very clear, however, from II Corps war diary that the corps' HQ received a steady stream of communications throughout the battle. It was this quality of communications that led to an appropriate response to Fergusson's request for reinforcements. II Corps was able to set in train the movement of reserves, which S-D had rightly put in place as part of his command responsibility.

The level of comms was pretty good actually, when you consider all WW1 battles were subject to major problems in the heat of moment.

Robert

[MartH]

I am have been re-reading up on Edmonds and Le Cateau. It appears that his mistrust of war diaries comes from this time. He was on the staff of 4th Division on the retreat, and it had not kept a war diary at all, and it was subsequently filled in up to the 6th of September, from that date, sometimes by officers who were not even in the actions. Hence his cross checking of written orders, signals, personal diaries, and war diaries.

[Guest]

I would urge significant caution in accepting Gardner's conclusions. He had a particular agenda IIRC. We need to examine all of his references in the original if possible.

As Chris noted, the actual dispositions on the right flank were not Smith-Dorrien's direct responsbility. II Corps gave a general indication of what the divisions should do. It was the responsibility of the lower level commanders to ensure that the most favourable tactical advantages were exploited locally. Put another way, it was definitely not S-D's role to go around and inspect each battalion trench line or each artillery battery location on the right flank.

It is very clear, however, from II Corps war diary that the corps' HQ received a steady stream of communications throughout the battle. It was this quality of communications that led to an appropriate response to Fergusson's request for reinforcements. II Corps was able to set in train the movement of reserves, which S-D had rightly put in place as part of his command responsibility.

The level of comms was pretty good actually, when you consider all WW1 battles were subject to major problems in the heat of moment.

Robert

Robert. Thanks for your thoughts.

1. Your point on Gardner is noted. It seems a rather important statement to make if there is no evidence. The parts that I can check have stood up to scrutiny.

2. I would agree with most of your second paragraph. One of my earliest questions was to try and establish if SD had to stand and fight. My sense is that he had no choice and I think there is 'heated agreement' on this.

3. On the issue of the Right Flank and SD's level of responsibility. I agree that 5th Div had local responsibility and SD would not be placing trenches. This is not about single trenches it is about Brigade size positions. i.e two levels down.

SD personally went to Fergusson's HQ at Reumnont to communicate the order to stand and fight. It is my conjecture, but I think he may have chosen to go to Fergusson rather than the other Div commanders because this was the most vulnerable point. We therefore know that he had an opportunity to discuss matters directly with Fergusson. There is no record of this 'conference'. SD may have simply assumed Fergusson would execute his orders in detail without any need for discussion over actual deployment. I would have thought this unlikely since he chose to meet with him.

The critical part was the extreme forward positioning of the Infantry, and an assumption that the RFA had to be in very close support. The infantry's position seems to have fallen out of the previous nights bivouac area. I still have no idea who marked it out. We do know that troops were moved in this area as for example the 2/KOYLI (13th Inf Bde) were moved from the East side of the Roman Road to the West side to make way for the Battalions of the 14th Inf Bde. Given this was a boundary between two Brigades it suggests decisions at least at Brigade level (maybe higher?) were being carried out - decisions on where to place the troops. According to diary accounts there were no proper trenches on the East side of the Roman Road, so wherever the troops were put they would have had to dig. The point here is that they did not stay where they had been the night before. They were moved and more troops (13th Inf Bde) brought in.

As pointed out earlier there had been a doctrinal debate among the RA about how to deploy Field Artillery. Clearly the view at Le Cateau was one of placing the guns among the Infantry, so any decision to have the Infantry on the extreme forward slope may well have 'dragged' the guns forward too. It was a decision that was taken in the early hours of the 26th. I assume the 'guns forward' decision was made by Fergusson in conjunction with CRA 5th Div Brig-Gen J E W Headlam. I am trying to establish if SD was part of this decision as there would have been an opportunity to discuss this since SD was at 5 Div HQ. The tactical deployment of the Divisional Artillery on the exposed right flank might have been of some importance to SD.

Comms. The communication upwards from Div to Corps may well have been running smoothly but we know communication between Corps and between II Corp and GHQ was patchy. The diaries reveal that communication of the aim down to Brigade and Battalion and Battery level was poor. 14 Inf Bde Commander (Rolt) was informed by an ADC fro 5th Div. There was no Conference with Fergusson. None of the Brigade diaries have any record of Orders or signals in their appendices. Op Order No. 6 is missing from every one. If the Battalion and Battery commanders thought they were fighting to the last and there was no retirement, it is hardly surprising they were annihilated. Smith-Dorrien in his own words:

"Some one, certainly not I, ordered that on no account were the Suffolks to retire...... it was never my intention that any troops should be called on to fight to the last. My intention was to fight a serious rear-guard action and, when the pressure became too great to order a general retirement by divisions, and this I actually did about 2:00 pm" *

Ironically this poor communication may well have saved the rest of the Division and II Corps. The remnants of the forward troops capitulated at 4:30 pm.

MG

* Foreword to Chapter III The History of the Suffolk Regiment 1914-1927. The foreword was written at the request of the Suffolk regiment and was written by Smith-Dorrien 25th Nov 1927.

[Guest]

I am have been re-reading up on Edmonds and Le Cateau. It appears that his mistrust of war diaries comes from this time. He was on the staff of 4th Division on the retreat, and it had not kept a war diary at all, and it was subsequently filled in up to the 6th of September, from that date, sometimes by officers who were not even in the actions. Hence his cross checking of written orders, signals, personal diaries, and war diaries.

He was also breaking down from stress at this time I believe so his own personal recollections might have been impacted. MG

[MartH]

He was also breaking down from stress at this time I believe so his own personal recollections might have been impacted. MG

No question of that too!

[Guest]

I would recommend Adrian Gilbert's "Challenge of Battle: The Real Story of the British Army in 1914" He has done a fairly forensic trawl of archive material and provides some fascinating detail. There are some interesting revelations about the thoughts of the RA battery commanders when pushed forward on the right:

Gilbert believes the 5th Div CRA - Brig Gen J Headlam was reckless and that the Battery commanders were appalled with his decision to deploy the guns on the forward slope;

Maj Kinsman RFA (124th Bty) "the position was an impossible one - a death trap"

Lt Lutyens RFA (122nd Bty) "We realised from the start, of course, that our gun positions couldn't be worse"

Maj Kinsman was to lose all six of his guns. Lutyen's Battery lost 4 of their 6.

Many of the sources have already been flagged on this thread. It seems that the CAB files at the National Archives may be where some of the skeletons are buried. Gilbert is quite critical of Edmonds and the OH and uses the archive material to show where Edmonds was perhaps being economical with the truth. An interesting and provocative read. Not for the faint hearted.

MG

[Chris_Baker]

Have you ever seen a CAB45 file, Martin?

I believe that on one hand, you may be mighty disappointed. On the other, you may be astonished how much anecdotal material, written years after the event, wound its way into the OH. At least, that is what I found when studying the material on the Battle of the Lys. Admittedly the Lys volume was written many years after 1914 volume 1, but I suspect the same applies. My conclusion was that neither war diaries nor OH are reliable representations of events. A basis, perhaps, but no more.

[Guest]

Have you ever seen a CAB45 file, Martin?

I believe that on one hand, you may be mighty disappointed. On the other, you may be astonished how much anecdotal material, written years after the event, wound its way into the OH. At least, that is what I found when studying the material on the Battle of the Lys. Admittedly the Lys volume was written many years after 1914 volume 1, but I suspect the same applies. My conclusion was that neither war diaries nor OH are reliable representations of events. A basis, perhaps, but no more.

Yes. I am very familiar with the Gallipol ones which are a bit of a mess when I last ploughed through them a few years ago. I have transcribed the interesting parts of the Gallipoli CAB 45. Personal narratives etc - Shannon's criticism of the TF at Gallipoli is one example I recently posted on a thread. Mostly handwritten letters and some transcribed (typed up). There was quite a lot that didn't make it into the OH, most of it rather contentious stuff about who took Chocolate Hill first and Officers making accusations of cowardice. etc. I also went through the Aspinall-Oglander papers at the Isle of Wight records office which is rather like going through a CAB file. I think Oglander took a lot of his work home and forgot to return it. It was interesting. I was looking for his first edition on the ANZACs which he was forced to re-write to appease the Australian Govt. Possibly the largest single example of censorship in the OHs.

I have little doubt that there is a huge variance in the quantity and quality of the material in the other OH files. The reasons my expectations are high for CAB 45 relating to 1914 is that very little OH correspondence is in the War Diaries (The Gallipoli diaries are packed (or used to be) with OH correspondence) so I am assuming that the correspondence with Edmonds/OH team for 1914 will at least hold plenty of material that I have not seen. I may be wrong. I have every diary for 1914 (and most of 1915) and having transcribed them (well over a million words) I have a good feel for their content. I would agree that the war diaries are not wholly reliable as most (all?) were written days and weeks after the events with varying degrees of openess....but, when one is able to compare multiple accounts of the same events it becomes easier to determine which are the out-liers. I am under no illusions that the war diaries, personal accounts etc need to be treated with caution.

The other reason why my expectations are high is that where Gilbert makes references, I have already covered much of the same ground (TNA, NAM, IWM etc..) and mostly come to the same conclusions. The 'new' info (to me) are nearly all references from TNA CAB 45/196 and 197 - which I have not yet been through - and relates to what the RA Brigade and Battery Commanders thought about the suicidal positioning of the artillery on the right flank forward slopes. Valuable reference material that seems to corroborate my own thoughts as they were allegedly appalled. The Battery commanders' initial choice of deep positions were (allegedly) forcibly changed by the 5th Div CRA. All interesting stuff apparently in CAB 45. Not in the OH and not in any of the 20 odd books I have covering Le Cateau. I don't agree with all of Gilbert's conclusions but Gilbert challenges the mainstream view on Le Cateau and many aspects of 1914. Having only just received his book in the post this morning I find it interesting that someone who has done a forensic trawl of the archives has a similar view. I can't claim to have done as much research as Gilbert, but I think anyone who has been through all the diaries would find it hard to swallow the OH version of events. I wish I had bought the book when it came out.

Many years ago when I first read an OH, I naively believed them to be accurate. It triggered an unhealthy interest in the War Diaries and the more I read of the latter the more I realised they did not quite sit well with the OH. We know from research done by Andrew Green (Writing the Great War) that Edmonds tried to pressure Oglander to change his version of Gallipoli, which makes me think that Edmonds was not shy of massaging the narrative to fit an agenda. Alarm bells. Exploring the differences between the published accounts and the unpublished raw material is something that particularly interests me. I have spend months in the National Archives, NAM, IWM broadening my research tracking down personal diaries and narratives.

I would completely agree that neither the OH or the diaries and memoirs are reliable representations of events, but most generally concur so most of the narrative is generally OK. It is where they differ that matters (to me at least) as it is usually a sign that publications such as the OH or indeed Smith-Dorrien's memoirs or French's memoirs (in this example) are slight distortions in places. As you know there are many critics of the OH going back to Liddell Hart " "Official" but not "history" ". Given we now have unprecedented access to much of the raw material, it is probably time authors started really challenging the OH version of events. I don't see much of that in most of the books I have that cover 1914. Some, but not enough.

I have huge admiration for the OH volumes but they are far from perfect. As you say, they are a basis, but no more.

MG

Edit: By way of reminder here is the OP again. After 267 posts I am not sure I would change any of it.

Hello - as a spin-off from another thread the subject of Le Cateau has become an area of increasing interest. My perception (and this may be ill-informed) is that Le Cateau 1914 has largely been depicted as a tactical success for the British by military historians. Having now read a fair amount of the raw material my overriding impression is that Le Cateau was far from the success that it has been depicted. In particular aspects of the execution of the disengagement phase went disastrously badly for a number of units. It set me thinking that perhaps our understanding of this episode has been too heavily influenced by the legacy of the propaganda at the time - dressing up what was essentially a desperately ill-organised rearguard action as a major success. This seems to have been further exacerbated by the rather unbalanced version of events propagated by Edmonds and the British OH: France and Belgium 1914 Vol I.

[David Filsell]

Martin,

I do not like what ifs, and simplistic I know, but I feel forced to ask, with the detailed criticisms noted in this fascinating thread, had Smith 'Doreen" not stood what he consequences would have been had his Corps been hit on retreat. I have few doubts.

[War13Memorial]

Triumph

Billy

[Guest]

Martin,

I do not like what ifs, and simplistic I know, but I feel forced to ask, with the detailed criticisms noted in this fascinating thread, had Smith 'Doreen" not stood what he consequences would have been had his Corps been hit on retreat. I have few doubts.

David

1. I am 100% convinced he had no choice and had to stand.I don't know anyone who disagrees with this. In my view it was not a 'choice' it was a 'force majeure'. Semantics.

2. Under the circumstances I think he did an fantastic job, however the Triumph of breaking free masks some underlying mistakes that have been largely ignored by historians.

3. I have questions over the execution of his decision. I think the Right Flank in particular was poorly executed. In fact appallingly executed. Ultimately SD had responsibility although I understand why people think others were to blame. The right Flank was critical and his supervision of this part was not brilliant in my opinion.

4. The escape of II Corps had more to do with Von Kluck than Smith-Dorrien

5. I am trying to find evidence that will prove or disprove my theory.

6. Finally, to answer your question: I think they would have been caught at around 10:00 and destroyed. And then the I Corps would have been destroyed and then the UK would have been out of the War and then even more Frenchmen would have died and the Germans would still have lost.

Lastly. I deliberately used the term Triumph or Disaster (note the capitalisation) in the OP assuming Kipling's poem "If" would resonate. Like all great lines, the second (and often forgotten) line is often forgotten.

If you can meet with Triumph and Disaster

And treat those two impostors just the same

The seeds of my literary reference have clearly fallen on stoney ground. The point was that whether one regards it as a Triumph or a Disaster, both extreme views are deluded in my honest opinion. So I disagree with Edmonds, Buchan, Hamilton, Terraine, Caffrey, Ascoli, etc ad nauseam but equally I don't think it was a disaster. I simply think that the Triumph perpetuated in the minds of most British historians ignores a number of shortcomings that history has so far largely chosen to ignore.

Nothing so far has changed my view. The only things I have learned from this thread are;

1. Most authors are so obviously unfamiliar with the raw material and take the OH as a credible reference point. That in itself is worth a book.

2. There is a strong school of thought that believes trying to re-assess battles is heresy. I am very glad to be in the minority here. People holding this view might consider the long legacy of this analytical approach is a cornerstone of the education process of British Army Officers for nearly 100 years. It completely baffles me why some people are so offended by anyone challenging the entrenched view. If we don't challenge established views the earth would still be flat.

MG

[Guest]

Triumph

Billy

Thanks Billy. Any chance on expanding why you think it a Triumph? MG

[salesie]

Speaking for myself - your literary reference didn't fall on stoney ground as such, it fell on the well-trodden ground of "something new" about the Great War but when looked at more closely it's no such thing i.e. your overriding theme is that the BEF wasn't perfect and neither were its commanders (as if we didn't already know). As I said earlier, that's a relative concept seeing as the perfect army and the perfect commander has never taken the field in any conflict throughout history. Indeed, in any sphere of human endeavour perfection has never existed and never will, all you do is preach a universal truth; nothing and no one is perfect.

You say that II Corp's escape has more to do with von Kluck than Smith-Dorrien - but how would the imperfections of von Kluck and his 1st Army have been discovered so early without the stand at Le Cateau? Smith-Dorrien made his own luck that day by forcing von Kluck into making errors (along with a few unenforced ones that all men are sometimes prone too). You still don't seem to understand the Titanic/iceberg analogy, perhaps using sporting talk of enforced and unenforced errors may lead to a better understanding?

Cheers-salesie.

[Robert Dunlop]

Trial by Fire by Nikolas Gardner certainly has changed my view on timings. It seems that French made a decision to abandon II Corps sometime around 05:00 - when he received Smith-Dorrien's notice of his intention to stand. French then appears to have focused on 'saving' I Corps but - critically - did not communicate this to Smith-Dorrien. Wilson when speaking to Smith-Dorrien by telephone shortly after 06:00 also did not mention that I Corps would not be arriving on his right.

Before reading Gardner's book I was under the impression that Smith-Dorrien knew much earlier that I Corps was not coming. Effectively Smith-Dorrien's decision to stand and fight was (unknowingly to him) the catalyst for French to abandon II Corps. In this context (assuming Gardner is correct in his timings and analysis) that French's actions were nothing short of criminal.

MG, I have gone back over Gardner's reconstruction of the events related to II Corps. The reason for carrying out this review was based on an unease with the interpretation you provided above. After Gardner concluded his analysis of the reasons for Smith-Dorrien's decision, he went on to write:

"Sir John French and his staff had already spent 25 August in a state of trepidation. Throughout the evening, alarming messages had been arriving from I Corps. While these were generally exaggerated, they cannot have been reassuring to GHQ, especially in light of the long-standing and close relationship between Sir John French and Sir Douglas Haig. Consequently any subsequent information that arrived in GHQ was interpreted through a filter of anxiety. Arriving under these circumstances, the news that Smith-Dorrien intended to face the enemy at Le Cateau had a devastating impact on the psyche of GHQ. Upon receiving Smith-Dorrien's telegram shortly before 5 am, Sir John French and his staff rapidly concluded that II Corps was doomed [no references provided]. The low opinion of the II Corps commander that prevailed at GHQ encouraged this conclusion [no references provided]. The fact that it was Smith-Dorrien, rather than the well-respected Haig, who had resolved to defy orders and fight made the decision seem all the more catastrophic [no references provided]. After trying to convince French to force II Corps to retire, Henry Wilson apparently fell into a depression. As he remarked blackly in his diary: 'This will lead to disaster, or ought to.' Archie Murray was asleep when Smith-Dorrien's message arrived, but upon reading it shortly after he awoke, he promptly fainted. While Sir John French did not succumb to distress to the same extent as his subordinates, he too concluded that Smith-Dorrien's decision meant the almost certain destruction of II Corps [no references provided]. Thus, instead of bringing the two corps back together, the commander-in-chief resolved to salvage I Corps by directing Haig either to retreat southwest on St. Quentin, or southeast, to gain shelter with the French on his right [2 post war references provided, both from 1933]." p.55

Gardner then goes on to discuss Haig's concern about the situation with I Corps. Haig "continued to expect reinforcement from II Corps. When Hugh Dawnay, the liaison officer between GHQ and I Corps, arrived at 6 am with the commander-in-chief's new instructions, it became evident that such assistance would not be forthcoming. Haig thus chose to ignore the orders... As he remarked in his diary: 'GHQ had evidently given my corps up as lost from their control!'" p.55

On p.57: "Following Smith-Dorrien's telegram indicating his decision to face the enemy, the next communication between GHQ and II Corps took place around 7 am when Smith-Dorrien contacted St. Quentin using the French railway telephone system. Henry Wilson took the call, and the II Corps commander summarised the situation facing his force. As Smith-Dorrien related in his diary: 'I explained the state of affairs, and that we should put up a real grand fight, but that as the men were too weary to march there was a real possibility, with both our flanks en l'air and a vastly superior number of the enemy against us, of our being surrounded.' [reference is to S-D's diary in CAB45 and to Scott's publication of Sir Charles Deedes diary]"

'en l'air' refers to no evidence of any support from a neighbouring friendly force. In the case of II Corps' right flank, this is a direct reference to I Corps. In other words, Smith-Dorrien was indicating to Henry Wilson that S-D knew that I Corps was not available to support him. At the very least, we know from II Corps' war diary that there was evidence to support this conclusion from the previous evening. Any doubts raised on the evening of the 25th August will have been further supported by the news from GHQ to II Corps at 3.45 am on the morning of the battle that "...enemy reported working round S of LANDRECIES [ie to the east of II Corps' right flank]. French cavalry will cover retirement & West flank."

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

3. On the issue of the Right Flank and SD's level of responsibility. I agree that 5th Div had local responsibility and SD would not be placing trenches. This is not about single trenches it is about Brigade size positions. i.e two levels down.

Here is a perfect example of how S-D exercised command from II Corps' perspective. The following is recorded in II Corps' war diary from the morning of the battle, timed at 5 am:

"A staff officer (Capt Walcot) sent to 4th Div to say that Commander 2nd Corps had assumed command of all troops in the area of battle and ordering the 4th Div to prolong the line to West, with left thrown back from CAUDRY exclusive to the neighbourhood of HAUCOURT inclusive."

Haucourt-en-Cambrésis is WSW of Caudry, consistent the requirement to refuse the left flank.

Robert