Le Cateau 1914: Triumph or Disaster?

[Guest]

Martin: love the overlays.

There is a problem, however; Suffolk Hill had to be occupied Why? It wasn't Suffolk Hill it was effectively Suffolk ' exposed forward slope' in reality....- and the ridge running back towards the east of Reumont overlooking the Selle valley. Your proposal would suit a Corps defence line - but it was not a Corps defence ine - it was a two corps defence line: I would disagree but there is not enough space to elucidate: It was scale-able. the British line extended from II Corps across to I Corps, with the slight problem that there was no one - or no one worth noting - in between the two. This is my very point. The assumption that I Corps would be present on the right of II Corps was flawed.

Indeed, it seems to me that the 'sacrifice of the Suffolks, Middlesex, Argylls and KOYLI was, in the end, an essential part of what enabled the 3rd and to some extent the 4th Divs to get away in reasonable order - they had far less satisfactory routes for the retreat than the rather handy Roman Road that the the 5th Div had. Agreed. But this is the 'buried' part of the story. I am not 'anti' SD but I feel his golden aura has blinded people from the less successful parts of the battle and the campaign.

So, on balance, a close run thing, Very definitely agree on this point. dependent on luck to a great degree but I am far from convinced that there were a great many alternatives in the context of the whole situation agree 100% and I feel that it is likely that SD would probably have played it the same way I would have spent longer on the right flank. He admitted it was the Achilles Heel. Failure in my view. Arguably a greater failure for Fergusson whose Division covered the area but SD was ultimately responsible. - except for comms problems and the location of some of the artillery all over again if he was confronted with the same situation and with the same information that he had at the time.

As regards the choice of SD to replace Grierson - well, SD was just about the only other active officer who had had the Aldershot command - the one and only, putative and scattered as it was, corps that GB had in peace time. Kitchener's choice seems sensible and at the least rational, especially given the emergency nature of the situation. I wonder how well French got on Grierson?

[phil andrade]

Having very recently finished reading Adrian Gilbert's CHALLENGE OF BATTLE, it's small wonder that I'm influenced by the view that the BOH account of Le Cateau exemplifies a school of wishful thinking, with uncomfortable truths played down.

This is what he writes about the appointment of Smith - Dorrien :

French telegraphed London asking for Sir Hubert Plumer to be sent out as Grierson's replacement, but Kitchener spitefully despatched General Sir Horace Smith - Dorrien instead, well aware of the antipathy between the two men.

That word " spitefully" carries an overwhelming implication here.

Phil (PJA)

[bill24chev]

Although the Right Flank was problematic because I Corps were not in contact there was also a difficult situation for General Snow's 4th Div on the left, which, as I understand it was the first of the three divisions actually in contact with the enemy and had got involved in the battle more or less on the march to join up with the rest of the BEF having only recently detrained in the area.

Gen.Snow had no option but to fight and 4th Div maywell have ben lost if SD had not decides to stand.

[Jonathan Saunders]

Having very recently finished reading Adrian Gilbert's CHALLENGE OF BATTLE, it's small wonder that I'm influenced by the view that the BOH account of Le Cateau exemplifies a school of wishful thinking, with uncomfortable truths played down.

This is what he writes about the appointment of Smith - Dorrien :

French telegraphed London asking for Sir Hubert Plumer to be sent out as Grierson's replacement, but Kitchener spitefully despatched General Sir Horace Smith - Dorrien instead, well aware of the antipathy between the two men.

That word " spitefully" carries an overwhelming implication here.

Phil (PJA)

What are Gilbert's sources for this comment?

[paulgranger]

Regarding Kitchener's appointment of S-D as Grierson's replacement, it does seem a perverse act,if he was aware of the bad feeling between French and S-D. It is hard to believe he would appoint S-D just to spite French and it would be interesting to know why he thought S-D a better choice than Plumer. Perhaps he thought that the circumstances that they found themselves in would persuade S-D and French to put their personal feelings aside for the greater cause. Perhaps no such thought entered his head, and he took the view 'you have your orders, now get on with them'.

[Muerrisch]

The Royal Air Force say that every landing that you can walk away from is a good landing.

In this respect Le C. was a good landing.

One thing that niggles me is that, in the rapid onset of siege warfare from late October onwards, the lessons of Mons and Le C. were never pursued, so that the 100 days campaign was spent re-learning the rules of mobile conflict.

[keithmroberts]

Regarding Kitchener's appointment of S-D as Grierson's replacement, it does seem a perverse act,if he was aware of the bad feeling between French and S-D. It is hard to believe he would appoint S-D just to spite French and it would be interesting to know why he thought S-D a better choice than Plumer. Perhaps he thought that the circumstances that they found themselves in would persuade S-D and French to put their personal feelings aside for the greater cause. Perhaps no such thought entered his head, and he took the view 'you have your orders, now get on with them'.

Agreed Paul. A commander in chief, or a war minister is entitled to expect senior officers to behave loyally and professionally regardless of any personal feelings. Despite the history, is there anything to suggest that they didn't, in respect of their relationship and communications. All the venom and evident misrepresentation from French surely emerged only after he had been recalled and set about his campaign to justify his own actions.

Keith

[Jonathan Saunders]

Regarding Kitchener's appointment of S-D as Grierson's replacement, it does seem a perverse act,if he was aware of the bad feeling between French and S-D. It is hard to believe he would appoint S-D just to spite French and it would be interesting to know why he thought S-D a better choice than Plumer. Perhaps he thought that the circumstances that they found themselves in would persuade S-D and French to put their personal feelings aside for the greater cause. Perhaps no such thought entered his head, and he took the view 'you have your orders, now get on with them'.

Exactly. For Gilbert to have used the comment "spiteful" in this context then you would expect he has commented on, or referenced, primary, or even secondary, source material to sunstantiate his evaluation. I haven't read the book (although a browse through GWF Archive suggests this book was the catalyst for this thread) but if the suggestion is S-D's appointment by Kitchener was purely to spite French, then Gilbert must have also given his reasons for discounting S-D's appointment to II Corps on merit.

[Crunchy]

Martin.

Thank you for the overlays and your suggested positions. However, is this not with the benefit of hindsight, time to ponder the issue, and assuming you had the time to redeploy your force in the dark, and that it was an easy task to do so?

I think you are being a little harsh on S-D, especially the comment it was a flawed assumption to expect I Corps being able to support him in some form. We all know the difficulties of the fog of war, yet seem to make no dispensation for it when criticising. Nor am I sure he expected I Corps to support him, as the dispositions on the right in the overlay show a refused flank. We can all be wise after the event, but this was an exceptional circumstance for any commander to be in. Perhaps we are nick picking, and forgetting the bigger issue.

Regards

Chris

[phil andrade]

What are Gilbert's sources for this comment?

No annotations or footnotes are provided as reference for that damning implication.

Gilbert strives - successfully, I think - to make us aware that even in times of national crisis, the bickering and resentment that characterised the behaviour of prima donnas in the military command held sway, with awful consequences.

The inference is very strong that there has been manipulation by the Official Historian to enhance the pre-eminence of Le Cateau as the defining event of the campaign. Maybe this is why the British loss is stated to be about eight thousand, when the true figure would appear to be in the order of five thousand. Why on earth would he do that ? Perhaps it's an honest endeavour to try and identify statistics among a welter of fragmented records that were bound to reflect the chaos of retreat ; but I cannot supress the suspicion that there is an " agenda" here.

Phil (PJA)

[Jonathan Saunders]

No annotations or footnotes are provided as reference for that damning implication.

So this is just Gilbert's opinion and relatively unsubstantiated.

The comment also carries a hint (more an accusation) that S-D was not appointed to II Corps on merit (within the structures of seniority). Does Gilbert give any explanation why S-D should not have been given command of II Corps by Kitchener excluding his relations with French (preferably sourced material)?

[phil andrade]

Forgive me if I fail to provide answers today.

I will try,though.

Phil (PJA)

[Guest]

On 5/16/2014 at 11:33, Crunchy said:

Martin.

Thank you for the overlays and your suggested positions. However, is this not with the benefit of hindsight, time to ponder the issue, and assuming you had the time to redeploy your force in the dark, and that it was an easy task to do so?

I think you are being a little harsh on S-D, especially the comment it was a flawed assumption to expect I Corps being able to support him in some form. We all know the difficulties of the fog of war, yet seem to make no dispensation for it when criticising. Nor am I sure he expected I Corps to support him, as the dispositions on the right in the overlay show a refused flank. We can all be wise after the event, but this was an exceptional circumstance for any commander to be in. Perhaps we are nick picking, and forgetting the bigger issue.

Regards

Chris

Chris

 

By definition it is with hindsight but as you know that shouldn't prevent us from trying to understand it better. Any judgement or criticism might well be unfair. It is difficult to prove anything, arguably impossible. We are not talking about disparities in numbers of men or casualties or guns or machine guns etc (although there are wide gaps in views on most of these) this is about someone's judgement and whether it was optimal. Not making the optimal decision in this case might have made the difference for several thousand men and rather a lot of artillery.

I am trying to understand the process of how the situation unfolded. Le Cateau was designated as the RV for I and II Corps two days earlier and the ground marked out. I am fairly sure SD, or anyone else for that matter would have deployed their troops differently had they known I Corps was not going to arrive in time.

 

As a commander constantly asking himself the 'what if' I wonder if he considered that I Corp might not arrive in time. In his memoirs he states that he had heard nothing from GHQ or I Corps. Given he would know that in the 'fog of war' things often do not go to plan that might have raised alarm bells.. Given the context, the separation by the Foret de Mormal, the lack of news, a Chief who was extremely difficult to contact, I wonder if SD considered it a possibility..... or at Least Fergusson thinking the same..or whoever had responsibility. What was his 'actions on I Corps not arriving' I wonder. I don't think this can be explained away by the 'fog of war'. This was a critical link and even in the most trying of circumstances commanders need to focus on the critical elements. This seems to me to be one of them.

 

I fear I keep repeating myself, so forgive me if I am sounding like a stuck record. SD acknowledged that the right flanks was particularly vulnerable to being rolled up. If that was the weakest part of the plan and critically relied on I Corps arrival, I would have thought it prudent to at least spoken with Fergusson to discuss what he should do in the event they did not arrive, or at least build in some flexibility in his plan.

 

Many of the factors discussed such as exhaustion, lack of time, etc (there's a long list) are generic to the Retreat they are not factors that were unique to Le Cateau. Of the factors that were unique to Le Cateau the ground is obviously one of them. The other unique factor in this battle was the reliance on I and II Corps coming together. When SD decided (or rather was forced by circumstances) to stand and fight (04:00?) he believed I Corps was coming and had the acquiescence of Snow and Allenby. The latter two were in situ (or very nearly so) which means the original plan heavily depended on I Corps and another 24 battalions of Infantry and supporting Artillery. It would have made a huge difference. If a plan is so critically dependent on one thing, the commander ought really to have a back-up plan in case it doesn't happen - 'actions on I Corp not turning up' . He doesn't appear to have had one.

 

It is distinctly possible that time had run out and that even if he had considered the above there was simply nothing he could do in the given time. This is really what I am trying to explore. The troops Stood to Arms at 04:00 as SD finalised his decision. Three and a half hour later they were told that they were making a stand. The Germans opened fire 45 minutes later. The window of opportunity was very small and arguably closed.

All that aside I am wondering how on earth the commanders thought the men in the front trenches were going to break contact with the German Army only 250 yards away by retreating across the forward slope and back to Reumont over what one soldier described as 'Salisbury Plain without trees'. The 1,500 year old Roman Road straight as an arrow running straight through the position gives us some idea of just how level the ground was. From the contemporary maps I have seen the ground does not appear to have changed considerably. I am heading out there soon and it will be interesting to get a feel of the terrain.

 

I actually think that Smith-Dorrien did staggeringly well given the other possible outcomes. Could the execution have been better? I think it possibly could have. It should not detract from his achievement of breaking free from the German Army which was a triumph - to use the words of the OP.... but it was at a cost and a small disaster that befell parts of 5th Div. Understanding this battle is difficult as there were so many factors to consider. Smith-Dorrien's memoir lays them out fairly clearly and the burden of responsibility must have been immense. He effectively was doing French's job and I think after the fact French understood this too.

MG

Edited 4 March , 2017 by Guest

[paulgranger]

The Wikipedia entry on S-D, which I am aware isn't necessarily accurate, refers to Kitchener appointing S-D in the full knowledge of French's animosity, but believing he would stand up to French, presumably thinking that Plumer wouldn't. The entry also says that K told S-D that he had doubts about making the appointment. The sources cited are Richard Holmes 'The Little Field Marshal' for K's knowledge of animosity, and Ian Beckett 'Haig's Generals' and John Terraine 'Mons, The Retreat to Victory' for K's doubts about the appointment. I have all three books, but not to hand, so I cannot trace what the primary sources are for the various authors referred to.

[Jonathan Saunders]

Thanks Paul - it would be interesting to know the basis for K's doubts over appointing S-D, for example did the doubt arise because of the animosity from French?

[phil andrade]

Can anyone think of a better example of a battle being fought " on a wing and a prayer" than this one ?

Phil (PJA)

[Crunchy]

Martin,

Thank you for your explanation, and clarifying your position. I also think he did well in the circumstances.

Regards

Chris

[Jonathan Saunders]

By definition it is with hindsight ...

Even so on a couple of occasions you have said "I would have ..." or words to that effect. It might be beneficial if you changed this approach to "With the benefit of hindsight, I would have ..." or "After X years study of this battle, I would have ..." so it is perfectly clear you are talking with the benefit of hindsight.

As I am sure you would agree, in reality and in the same circumstances faced by S-D, you, and for that matter nearly all of us, would have done well to cling on to S-D's coat tails by our finger-tips if faced with his responsibility at that crucial time (I expect Chris "Crunchy" would be one of the exceptions).

[Guest]

I have just been reunited with my books, including Bond's "The King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry in the Great War 1914-1918" . Bond commanded the 2/KOYLI at Le Cateau and was wounded and became a POW. On page 721-723:

Within the position of the KOYLI there seems to have been some attempt to consider the threat fro the east. He records the battalion arrived at Le Cateau in the middle of the afternoon on the 25th and it was dark when they finally reached their allotted ground. He gives a general description of the ground and ends with " The town lies in a valley., the slope into the valley being convex inplaces , very favourable to troops advancing to attack the ridge". He continues:

".. Brig Gen Cuthbert directed that a company should entrench itself alongside the Bavai-Remont road [the Roman Road] facing South East in order to defilade the front now held by the battalion of the Manchester Regiment .... Maj Yate with B Company took over this duty.....Thus B Company was now at right angles to the line held by D and it linked up the right of D Company where Lt G C Wynne's platoon was in position.....The arrival of the filed batteries complicated matters for the infantry, for the batteries took up positions within the line of the infantry supports....the teams and limbers...packed in a sunken road ....severed communications between portions of the KOYLI battalion"

He goes on to say that the supports, just 200 yards behind the firing line had no time to dig trenches and records that they heard about the decision at 06:00. The last order he received was a verbal reiteration by Col Romer (II Corps Staff): "No retirement". Some more snippets:

"The weak spots of a position taken up in half light and only half prepared were only too apparent ....there was dead ground everywhere to cover [the German's] infantry in their approach

The bill at the end: Casualties:

Officers.........18

Sgts...............21

Cpls...............22

Buglers............7

Privates.......532

Total............600

Out of this number a total o 310 were later reported to be prisoners in Germany, 170 of whom were wounded.

The CWGC data shows 48 Killed that day which would imply 242 wounded escaped. The proportion of wounded to killed is over eight and a half times which is exceptionally high.

[Crunchy]

(I expect Chris "Crunchy" would be one of the exceptions).

Not at all Jonathan. Thank you for the vote of confidence, but I very much doubt I could have handled the situation anywhere near as well as S-D. I admire what he did, and the way the officers and men of II Corps carried it off. A fighting retreat, involving a hasty delaying action, is the most difficult of operations to carry off successfully. Only a well trained force at all levels can do it.

Best wishes

Chris

[keithmroberts]

Jonathan like others before has made the main point. "in reality and in the same circumstances faced by S-D, you, and for that matter nearly all of us, would have done well to cling on to S-D's coat tails by our finger-tips if faced with his responsibility at that crucial time"

To attempt to review S-D's decisions, you need more than maps diaries and memoirs.To fairly review his decisions, and those of his generals, brigadiers and battalion commanders you need to have only the information that each one had, timed to take into account when each part of it became available, only the maps that he had, not the splendid products of modern mapping, the awareness of how long it took to get orders delivered to units in the dark, etc. Many of us might have worked out that the only choice was to stand and fight, I doubt if any of us could have made better decisions in that fog of war.

S-D did what he had to do. So did his army.

Keith

[Guest]

Even so on a couple of occasions you have said "I would have ..." or words to that effect. It might be beneficial if you changed this approach to "With the benefit of hindsight, I would have ..." or "After X years study of this battle, I would have ..." so it is perfectly clear you are talking with the benefit of hindsight.

I was answering a specific question from Salesie: "What would you have done?"

The fact that it is 2014 and we are discussing 1914 it is axiomatic that all comments are with the benefit of hindsight. I don't think it needs any expanding and I think everyone on this thread and GWF understands everything we discuss about 1914 is with the benefit of hindsight. What else could it be. The study of the whole of history, including the OH's, memoirs etc are surely all with the benefit of hindsight. MG

[Jonathan Saunders]

I was answering a specific question from Salesie: "What would you have done?"

The fact that it is 2014 and we are discussing 1914 it is axiomatic that all comments are with the benefit of hindsight. I don't think it needs any expanding and I think everyone on this thread and GWF understands everything we discuss about 1914 is with the benefit of hindsight. What else could it be. The study of the whole of history, including the OH's, memoirs etc are surely all with the benefit of hindsight. MG

Actually I noted it most recently in one of your replies to Nigel Cave.

I think delivery and communication are very important and also context and the context of your comments are, and please correct me if i am wrong, those of an interested amateur with no, or little, military experience. A category many of the GWF members find themselves in, so nothing wrong with that in itself.

However, employing the term "I would have ...." normally used to mean "I would have done it better", does comes across as a somewhat pretentious comment when in criticism of the highly experienced S-D in the very difficult circumstances he faced at Le Cateau.

On numerous occasions throughout this thread, contributors have felt inclined to point out your comments are made with the benefit of hindsight, so I think it a fair point I make. But at the end of the day it was just a suggestion to improve semantics and how you convey your point of view but if you aren't interested in any feedback, then thats up to you.

[Guest]

The Royal Air Force say that every landing that you can walk away from is a good landing.

In this respect Le C. was a good landing.

One thing that niggles me is that, in the rapid onset of siege warfare from late October onwards, the lessons of Mons and Le C. were never pursued, so that the 100 days campaign was spent re-learning the rules of mobile conflict.

An interesting point. How many commanders in 1914 were still around during the 100 days? From the little I have read the job security of a British General in the Great War was a rather low.

I would be very interested to understand what the lessons were from this phase....

[Jonathan Saunders]

I actually think that Smith-Dorrien did staggeringly well given the other possible outcomes. Could the execution have been better? I think it possibly could have. It should not detract from his achievement of breaking free from the German Army which was a triumph ...

I am just trying to work out where this sits with your post #124 "Smith-Dorrien was a brilliantly lucky general ... Lucky, not skilful".

Should we assume this is an acknowledgement that given the chaotic circumstances that prevailed, that S-D made the right calls based on his long and distinquished military experience? Sure S-D had his fair share of luck, but I rather concur with Napoleon's thoughts on lucky generals.