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It would be a shame if this thread, which I feel is discussing a very worthwhile issue, is thrown off course.

When Martin chose his title "Triumph or Disaster" I'm sure he thought, as do I, that the truth is somewhere in between. Casualties in this case are only a small part of the picture. Le Cateau was important both in respect of the escape/retreat of the BEF and, although even more difficult to quantify and qualify, our relationship with the major allied force, the French (who do not view the retreat of the BEF in the same hallowed way as many British commentators, particularly French's reticence to turn and fight at the Marne) .

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Surely the key thing in a battle is the consequence: thus, Jutland was, in terms of tonnage sunk and casualties inflicted, a German victory; however, it was a strategic defeat, as the German High Seas fleet - upon which so much treasure had been spent - never ventured out again in a meaningful way during the war. Ergo, it was a British victory, although an expensive one.

Le Cateau, in terms of casualties and possession of the battlefield, was a British defeat (though there was no intention to hang around at Le C, of course); however, the failure of von K to take any sort of meaningful advantage out of it meant that the British manoeuvre (ie the Retreat) was allowed to continue, relatively unimpeded (at least that of II Corps was - and presumably that was the objective of SD - to break contact with the Germans) and the conseqence was a major lost German opportunity for a decisive action, the continued withdrawal of the British in a reasonably orderly manner, especially a couple of days after Le C; and the arrival of the British in a position to be able to take its part in the Battle of the Marne which was, at the very least, a German reverse. Therefore the Germans 'won' aspects of the battle and lost others - arguably the more important aspects.

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Folks - please treat each other with respect - one or two contributions to this thread have been a little too combative in tone

Thanks

Alan

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If anyone can hear my bootless cries, please can we all try and be civil. I am sure we can discuss, debate and strongly disagree in part but if we do it with some humility and respect for each other it always helps..... I would be the last person to tell anyone what to debate, but in order to get to the vital ground of this debate, can we all drop casualties for at least a few days and discuss other stuff...please :) It is necessary (in part) but lets assume OH is right and be done with it... the numbers in the great scheme of things are relatively small.

 

To what extent was French to blame for Smith-Dorrien's lack of time. The 4th Div were already engaged when SD asked Snow if he could stand. In terms of 'Battle Preparation' (yes I know a modern expression but I dont know what the 1914 equivalent of the process was called) it put Snow in an impossible position. My sense is that French was out of touch in more senses than one. Terraine argues he had an obsession with an imaginary threat to I Corps which never materialised. Spooked by Landrecies.

 

I thought Nigel's point that 4th Div had no support arms very telling. Makes the decision even harder yet Snow agreed. I think Terraine makes this very point; if anyone thought it was a bad idea it should have been Snow.

 

Also interested if anyone has first hand accounts (not the Generals but CO downwards) on their views. SD was apparently a regular guest of honour to the 5th DIv reunions after the war I read.

 

Was SD 'lucky' that Von Kluck didn't follow through. Given SD's description of them something akin to men leaving a racecourse heading to the station I get the impression that II Corps were not panicking and still had some fight in them.

 

Thoughts?

MG

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It would be a shame if this thread, which I feel is discussing a very worthwhile issue, is thrown off course.

When Martin chose his title "Triumph or Disaster" I'm sure he thought, as do I, that the truth is somewhere in between. Casualties in this case are only a small part of the picture. Le Cateau was important both in respect of the escape/retreat of the BEF and, although even more difficult to quantify and qualify, our relationship with the major allied force, the French (who do not view the retreat of the BEF in the same hallowed way as many British commentators, particularly French's reticence to turn and fight at the Marne) .

Steve

Are you able to expand on the French view of events?

MG

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Point taken, Nigel ; although I'm sure you'll agree that as far as Jutland is concerned, there has never been an attempt to persuade us that the Germans lost vastly more tonnage and men than the Royal Navy. The assessment of the outcome is predicated on agreed figures for ships sunk and men lost.

Le Cateau differs very markedly from this, with many people absolutely convinced that the Germans were inordinately punished and took disproportionate casualties. That's a dangerous distortion, in my opinion, and one that bears all the hallmarks of a historiographical issue.

I personally incline to the view that the stand was a triumph of sorts, in so far as it demonstrated determination and pluck in a situation where battles might have been " lost in the minds of commanders". Apparently, von Kluck was convinced that the BEF was bigger than it actually was as a result of the stand made at Le Cateau, and he wrongly concluded that the British were retiring to the southwest rather than southwards, thereby allowing the BEF to retreat for several more days without being seriously molested.

But the actual battle itself was hardly a triumph : all those guns deployed in that quixotic ( that word again !) manner, out in the open and too vulnerable. All those prisoners captured. Not a good day for British arms, certainly not when compared with Waterloo, which is what some commentators have done.

Phil (PJA)

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Steve

Are you able to expand on the French view of events?

MG

Hi Martin,

Hopefully I'll get time to re-read some sources over the next few days. I know you are vey meticulous in your use of references so I want to be specific when I reply

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Le Cateau GE perspective.docx

I recently posted some of my thoughts on Le Cateau from the German perspective on another thread but, because this one is gaining momentum, I repeat it here. If anybody has any queries, I should be pleased to expand on these notes.

Jack

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Thanks Jack most useful.

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attachicon.gifLe Cateau GE perspective.docx

I recently posted some of my thoughts on Le Cateau from the German perspective on another thread but, because this one is gaining momentum, I repeat it here. If anybody has any queries, I should be pleased to expand on these notes.

Jack

Fascinating: thanks. I ask this question seriously, though - it seems to me that some ascribe the mid-30's published figures as tainted by the Nazis. Is that the case? Is it possibly the case? Or can we be assured that the figures are pukka?

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I only observe that I think that the German Official Medical History was published in 4 Volumes, Volume 3 in 1934. The Nazis came to power the year before, so I wouldn't have thought they had the time to interfere with the figures, but, as they say, OOAA.

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Martin,

First off, thanks for starting this thread, it's nice to have a conversation about Le Cateau (especially this year)! In regards to your question concerning the disparity in artillery, if I recall correctly, Mr. Zuber has carefully listed the number of German guns and when they arrived, I'll take a look again but the total didn't seem to represent much of an advantage over the number that S.D. had available. I think one of the reasons that the British guns were posted the way they were - too close, with some being in the front line, had a lot to do with the way the "stand fast" order was distributed to the troops (and the terrain of course). I'm sure you have read the accounts of "there will be no thought of retreat, fill your trenches with food and ammunition" etc., there are quite a few examples of this in the battalion histories, so from the very start a large proportion of the fighting troops thought it was a "last man, last round" situation; with that in mind it is no wonder that several battalions were cut off and largely destroyed when they didn't receive the order to retreat. I think that later S.D. denied that he had given the order with "no retreat" in mind but that must have been how his staff interpreted it.

Dave

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Anyone who has taken a look at the sanitatsbericht will soon realise that it is about the most sterile ground that could possibly be selected for purposes of propaganda, nazi or otherwise.

If you want to find out how many German soldiers suffered from piles in the Riga campaign of september 1917, then this is the stuff for you.

Phil (PJA)

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A fair question, Steven, so I have just re-checked the publication dates of the various histories of the formations I mentioned. Bear in mind also that Ralph checked some of the infantry figures for me from contemporary records and uncovered no discrepancies worth the name. Here are the results: IR 72 1930; IR 26 1925; IR 66 1930; IR 93 1929; Fues 36 1931; IR 153 1927; FAR 10 1930; FAR 40 1932; FAR 74 1928; FAR 75 1934; Foot Arty 4 1924; Jaeger 3 1940; Jaeger 4 1927; Jaeger 9 1932; Leibhusaren 1929; Husaren 3 1930; Koenigsulanen 1927; Kurassier 4 1932; Kurassier 7 1925; Ulanen 5 1930. So you can see all the infantry which bore the majority of the casualties were published before AH came to power and the same applied to most of the rest. I feel quite confident about them, especially when the figures relate to actual Rolls of Honour. I can see no reason for falsifying those.

Jack

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Did they? I thought the TF artillery were still equipped with the 15 pdr (I may well be wrong, of course). If so, supply would have been pretty complex.Additionally, surely the training and efficiency of artillery units would have been pretty sketchy. My suspicion would be that TF artillery may well have been more hindrance than help.

That's not to say that the doctrinal approach of the British to artillery was somewhat confused.

Steven

Rather fortuitously Becke's History of the Great War Order of Battle Part 2A: TF Divs arrived today thanks to Mr Donovan.

You are right. TF was still equipped with 15 pdr until 19th-20th Nov 1915. Example is 46th North Midland Div (TF) Artillery the first TF div to deploy to France. At least this shows they did go to France with 15 pdrs. I would therefore argue the logistic challenges of using two different calibre guns was at least overcome by March 1915 which raises the question if this was logistically possible in August 1914? Could TF batteries have mobilised and got to France in two weeks and been effective? Anyway, I thought I would answer the question on 15 pdrs. MG

I suspect the answer will be "theoretically 'yes' but practically speaking 'no' ".

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Jack: thank you. I confess the question was rhetorical as it appears to have been answered several times in the past (normally in response to the same allegations from the same person).

Martin: regarding artillery, I imagine the reason no artillery was sent at the outbreak of war was the same as the reason no TF forces were sent - no-one foresaw the problem. It was assumed that the artillery assets (as we presumably must now call them) with the BEF were adequate. So my thinking would be that I agree - a theoretical yes, but ... (And isn't that Mr Donovan helpful? Mrs Broomfield just loves seeing his name on an address label).

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I only observe that I think that the German Official Medical History was published in 4 Volumes, Volume 3 in 1934. The Nazis came to power the year before, so I wouldn't have thought they had the time to interfere with the figures, but, as they say, OOAA.

It was 3 Volumes, Volume 2 having a map and text volume, published dates Volume 1 1935, Volume 1938, and Volume 3 1934.

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On 5/13/2014 at 16:16, lostinspace said:

Martin,

First off, thanks for starting this thread, it's nice to have a conversation about Le Cateau (especially this year)! In regards to your question concerning the disparity in artillery, if I recall correctly, Mr. Zuber has carefully listed the number of German guns and when they arrived, I'll take a look again but the total didn't seem to represent much of an advantage over the number that S.D. had available. I think one of the reasons that the British guns were posted the way they were - too close, with some being in the front line, had a lot to do with the way the "stand fast" order was distributed to the troops (and the terrain of course). I'm sure you have read the accounts of "there will be no thought of retreat, fill your trenches with food and ammunition" etc., there are quite a few examples of this in the battalion histories, so from the very start a large proportion of the fighting troops thought it was a "last man, last round" situation; with that in mind it is no wonder that several battalions were cut off and largely destroyed when they didn't receive the order to retreat. I think that later S.D. denied that he had given the order with "no retreat" in mind but that must have been how his staff interpreted it.

Dave

Dave

Thanks The CRA diaries should be quite illuminating. Will post later when I have digested. The RA At Le Cateau by Becke, posted earlier by Mart H is very valuable.Looking at the ground, especially the Right Flank, I simply cant understand why they put them right out in the open. Terriane says they were firing 'at point blank range' on a few occasions which I guess is possible but I am not entirely sure why this is relevant given the lay of the land.

 

I recall being on a TEWT once and suddenly understanding the huge difference in what one can see when one'e eye is at ground level (i.e. in a trench) compared with standing up. About 330 idle officers milling around a field not caring too much when the DS staff went ballistic (excuse the pun) and made us all lie down to get a better feel. Suddenly everyone decided a reverse slope position was infinitely better in defence than on the crest of a convex hill or on the forward slope. It always stuck in my mind and looking at the ground on the Right Flank they appear to be on the crest or on the forward slopes of a fairly barren piece of land with sunken roads in front. Every slight undulation provides dead ground in front from the perspective of a man in a trench. Map posted below to illustrate. Early historians compared Le cateau to Waterloo. Sadly Wellington's use of the reverse slope does not appear to have been used.

 

On the command and control aspect, it is startlingly clear if you give and order to 'stand fast' or 'hold at all costs' etc and then countermand that order, you jolly well need to ensure there are means of communicating this in the worst case scenario. This seems to be an all too common theme. I would raise command and control as an issue here. By placing them where he did wth very difficult exit routes and by issuing the (alleged) order (the diaries substantiate this by the way - 2/KOLYI's last order came at 6:00 am) the commander severely limits his options if and when things change unless his lines of comms are intact. In extreme circumstances one would expect comms to rapidly deteriorate. Again this might be linked to the lack of time with no time to prepare thorough written orders. ...it is all linked. IF DS did want to keep his options open, he certainly had not got the message through to the Suffolks and KOYLI. As far as they were concerned they were not moving until ordered and didn't expect an order to withdraw. Lt Col Bond (2/KOYLI) is crystal clear on this issue. One Div (4th) had had its Signals section destroyed only two days earlier.

More on this later... MG

 

Le Cateau RA.jpg

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Smith Dorrien's decision to stand at Le Cateau in defiance of orders from GHQ reminds me rather of Dan Sickles's behaviour at Gettysburg.

Both controversial episodes, with far reaching consequences. In both cases, imprudent deployment resulted in terrible punishment, but both corps commanders have been praised for their combattive approach and their determination to wrest initiative from the enemy.

Phil (PJA)

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Apparently S-D did not have the luxury of statistics, decent ground or come to that any reserves. Worn down men were given the opportunity to give the Germans a bloody nose in an attempt to slow them down. Without Le Cateau, would we have had any army left to stand on the Marne. Hindsight they say is a wonderful thing and maybe S-D would have done things differently given more time, more men, more guns and less Germans.

A gap to large to fill to the east of Le Cateau, gave S-D little choice, and in my humble opinion if he had not disobeyed French who wanted to run, the Army would have been annihilated. French was some 20 miles away and had no idea of the situation on the ground and seemed intent on flight. The German commanders had little idea of how weak the British army was and this also aided S-D. I believe that if he had attempted to 'sneak' away during the night, his rear-guard would have been decimated and he would still have had a battle to fight soon afterwards. He chose the ground because he had no choice in the matter.

Steve M

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An extract from Smith-Dorrien's memoirs - it is obvious from this (and other reliable accounts) that this was not a battle that had the benefit of lengthy planning. The situation was dire and needed a man of action, needed a man not afraid to be decisive, needed a man not scared of exercising his professional experience and judgement. From this it is clear that there was neither time nor opportunity to prepare proper defences and/or choose ideal ground before the inevitable onslaught ensued - a decision needed to made and was made, and the individual units (who received orders) did their utmost to comply without having the time to go by the book.

Cheers-salesie.


"I reached the town of Le Cateau at 3.30 p.m., and at once went to report myself to the C -in-C He was not there, but I found the Chief of Staff, who had little fresh information to give me and no news of the I Corps. The forest of Mormal, which kept the I Corps some four or five miles from us and General Head-quarters which had also moved west of the forest, for some ten miles of our march, had proved an impenetrable wall.

General Head-quarters was in process of moving to St Quentin, twenty-six miles to the south, and it was thought probable that the C.-in-C. had gone there. This was unfortunate, as there were several matters I wished to ask him about. From Le Cateau I went south to the position selected by General Head-quarters, on which we were to meet the enemy next day. It was quite a good one - on rising ground with a fine field of fire and with several villages capable of defence along it. The right, or east flank was certainly turnable, but that did not matter as the I Corps were to go there. Then, with Forestier-Walker I allotted the ground for the two Divisions to occupy We constantly looking out for the arrival of the I Corps, and late the afternoon, when they did not appear I requested the Commander of the 5th Division to hold the ground on the north-east of Le Cateau until they arrived. This he did by sending back one and a half battalions of the 14th Brigade to entrench themselves there.

Naturally the men were dead tired; they had had two days' desperate fighting, and now had done a march of over twenty miles in a burning sun, and, as 60 per cent of them were reservists, were not in marching condition, and suffered terribly from sore feet. Some of the 5th Division were still out, the 28th Brigade R.F.A. only reaching Reumont, Sir Charles Fergusson's Head-quarters, at 11.30 p.m., and the divisional ammunition column did not arrive until the morning of the 26th. The arduous work of the day was much enhanced by a heavy thunderstorm in the evening drenching the troops to the skin. My Staff established our Head-quarters at the village of Bertry, where I joined them at dark and awaited news of the arrival of my scattered troops. In the course of the afternoon, as far as I recollect about 6 p.m., I received a note from the Sub-Chief of the General Staff, Henry Wilson, saying the Chief had told him to warn me that orders would shortly be issued for continuing the retreat instead of standing at Le Cateau. The actual General Head-quarters' order reached me at 9 p.m., and my order to the II Corps to continue the retirement next day was issued at 10.15 p.m.


It will be difficult for any reader to realise the fog of war which surrounded us that night. Communication was most difficult, and although the Corps signallers, under that most resourceful of men, Major A. B. R. Hildebrand, R.E. (now Brigadier-General, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.), performed miracles with their wires and cables, it was impossible to find out the positions of units until hours after they reached them. Then it was not as if I only had the II Corps to deal with, for mixed up with them, fighting and retiring together, were the Cavalry Division, the 19th Infantry Brigade, and the 4th Division, none of which were under me, but were reporting their movements to and getting their orders from General Head-quarters, twenty-six miles to the rear. It is true that General Head-quarters issued an order timed I p.m. 25th August, placing the 19th Brigade under the II Corps, but it was then with the Cavalry Division, miles away, and Heaven knows when it got the order. only succeeded in collecting them next morning, when they were starting south from the town of Le Cateau. It appears that they had reached that place at 10 p.m. the night before, and, thoroughly exhausted, had dumped down in the marketplace and were resuming their retirement at 6 a.m. when my order caught them. This latter ear-marked them as my own reserves for the day, and most valuable they proved: a busy time of it they had, now supporting one part of the line, now another, and finally forming a rear-guard which, with that of the 15th Brigade, stubbornly covered the retreat of the 5th Division. The Brigade consisted of 2nd Royal Welch Fusiliers, 1st Scottish Rifles, 1st Middlesex, and 2nd Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, and were then commanded temporarily by Lieutenant-Colonel Ward of the Middlesex in the absence of the Brigadier, Major-General L. G. Drummond. At last, about 8 p.m., I got news of the 3rd Division ; the main bodies of the 8th and 9th Brigades had reached the vicinity of their allotted positions about Audencourt and Inchy respectively about 6.30 p.m.; but there was still no news of the 7th Brigade, nor did I get any until the small hours of the 26th, and then to the effect that it had reached its destination at Caudry about midnight, but with the loss of the 2nd Royal Irish Rifles, part of the South Lancashires, and the 41st Battery R.F.A. Next day I heard that these units had reached Reumont and bivouacked there at 2 a.m., and had only rejoined their Brigade at 9 a.m. when the battle was pretty lively. Of the Cavalry Division and 4th Division I had no news, for they were not under me, though I had been given permission to call on the latter Division for help should I require it. Rumours were afloat during the evening that the I Corps were heavily engaged, and reports came in that heavy firing was heard in the direction of Landrecies. This was serious as, if they were not nearer than that, it meant a gap of eight miles between the right of my Corps and the left of the I Corps.


Thus it will be gathered that, with the exception of a few units of the5th Division, no fighting units were on the position before dark, that a great many of those of the II Corps were on the move until after midnight, and that the 4th Division only reached the position at daylight next day. I specify " fighting units," as all transport and impedimenta accompanied by baggage guards, cooks, clerks, sick, etc. had moved off from our line positions on the night of the 24th about midnight and had therefore mostly reached their new positions in the course of the next morning, so a large number of men were to be seen cooking, washing, and waiting for the arrival of their Corps. I mention this as a good deal has been written on the subject as evidence that troops were in camp early, for I feel sure these detachments I have mentioned were mistaken for the actual fighting troops—Map 9 of the Official History illustrates clearly the scattered situations of the troops on the night of 25th-26th August.


However, some of the fog was cleared away by the arrival of General Allenby, accompanied by his G.S.O.I, Colonel J. Vaughan (now Major-General, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.) at my head-quarters at 2 a.m. Allenby told me his troops were much scattered, two and a half brigades being about Catillon, five miles east, and the other one and a half brigades at Viesly, six miles north-west of Le Cateau, that his men and horses were pretty well played out, and that he could not get into touch with General Head-quarters. He wanted to know what I was going to do, saying that unless I could move at once and get away in the dark, the enemy were so close that I should be forced to fight at daylight. I then sent for Major-General Hubert Hamilton, the Commander of the 3rd Division, whose head-quarters were close by, and asked him whether his troops could move off at once or at any rate before daylight, and his reply was very definite that the 3rd Division could not move before 9 a.m. The 5th Division were if possible in a worse plight, being more scattered, whilst of the 4th Division, which, though not under me, I could not possibly leave in the lurch, there was no news, except that they had last been seen after dark still in their positions south of Solesmes, covering the retirement of masses of transport and fugitives jammed up in the roads.


The following arguments passed through my mind:

(1) It must be a long time after daylight before the whole force covered by rear-guards can get on the move.


(2) The enemy are in force close to our billets (for such Allenby had impressed on me).


(3) To turn our backs on them in broad daylight with worn-out men suffering from sore feet will leave us a prey to hostile cavalry supported by infantry in motors.


(4) The roads are encumbered with military transport and civilian fugitives and carts, some still on the enemy side of our position, and time to allow them to clear off is essential.


(5) The I Corps is reported to be engaged some miles northeast of us and to retire would expose their flank to the full brunt of Von Kluck's troops.


(6) The Cavalry Division can be of little help in covering our retreat, for this Allenby had told me.


(7) Our infantry have proved their staunchness and astounding accuracy with the rifle, our gunners are a marvel, and if Allenby and Snow will act under me, and Sordet will guard my west flank, we should be successful in giving the enemy a stopping blow, under cover of which we could retire.


Well do I remember the dead silence in the little room at Bertry when I was rapidly considering these points and the sigh of relief when, on my asking Allenby if he would accept orders from me, and he replied in the affirmative, I remarked : " Very well, gentlemen, we will fight, and I will ask General Snow to act under me as well." The die was cast, and it is lucky it was, for it appeared afterwards that the 4th Division did not commence moving back from opposite Solesmes until long after dark, the rear Brigade not until midnight, and only reached the fighting positions allotted to them on the west of the II Corps from Fontaine-au-Pire to Wambaix (a front of three miles) after daylight on the 26th. They were very weary, having journeyed straight from England, detrained at Le Cateau on the 24th, and marched thence at I a.m. on the 25th eight or nine miles to Solesmes, been in action there all day, and marched back over ten miles in the dark to their position, which was reached after dawn on the 26th. The unfortunate part about this Division was that it lacked the very essentials for a modern battle. It had none of the following: Divisional Cavalry, Divisional Cyclists, Signal Company, Field Ambulances, Field Companies R.E., Train and Divisional Ammunition Column, or Heavy Artillery. Let the reader think what that means—no troops to give warning, neither rapidly moving orderlies nor cables for communication, no means of getting away wounded, no engineers, who are the handy men of an army, no reserve ammunition, and no long-range heavy shell fire—and yet the Division was handled and fought magnificently, but at the expense of losses far greater than, if they had been fully mobilised.

Having decided to fight, there was a good deal for my Staff to do. General Head-quarters had to be informed, a message had to be sent to General Sordet to tell him and ask him to guard my west flank, and Snow had to be asked if he would fight under me, and last, but not least, carefully detailed orders for the battle had to be drawn up and circulated. Forestier-Walker, who was a very clear thinker and rapid worker, soon got all this done. To make certain that General Sordet should get the request, in addition to my message to him, a wire was sent to General Headquarters asking them too to invoke his assistance.

General Snow received my message about 5 a.m. just as he was issuing orders to retire, and readily consented to remain and fight vnder my orders.

Snow wrote to me subsequently as follows : " When you sent to me the morning of the 26th to ask if I would stand and fight, I ought to have answered: ' I have no other choice, as my troops are already engaged in a battle of encounter, and it must be some hours before I can extricate them " The message informing General Head-quarters is referred, to in the Official History) p. 136, as follows :

" A lengthy message was dispatched by II Corps at 3.30 a.m. to General Head-quarters St. Quentin by motor-car, which was received there about 5 a.m., informing Sir John French in detail of the decision taken."

It was acknowledged by a reply, sent off from General Head-quarters at 5 a.m., which, after giving the latest information, concluded:

" If you can hold your ground the situation appears likely to improve. Fourth Division must co-operate. French troops are taking offensive on right of I Corps. Although you are given a free hand as to method this telegram is not intended to convey the impression that I am not as anxious for you to carry out the retirement, and you must make every endeavour to do so."

This reply cheered me up, for it showed that the Chief did not altogether disapprove of the decision I had taken, but on the contrary considered it might improve the situation.

Consciousness that I was acting entirely without G.H.Q. approval would not have lightened my burden, especially as I had another master to consider, namely. Field Service Regulations, which direct (sub-para. iii. of para. 13 of Section 12 of Part I) :

" If a subordinate, in the absence of a superior, neglects to depart from the letter of his order, when such departure is clearly demanded by circumstances, and failure ensues, he will be held responsible for such failure."

The order to stand and fight drawn up by Forestier-Walker was clear and to the point, but the difficulty was to get it to the troops in time. It was fairly easy for Corps Headquarters, as they had simply to send copies of the order to the four Divisional head-quarters and the 19th Brigade, but the difficulties increased in mathematical progression when it came to informing the smaller units, many of whose positions were only very roughly known. Captain Walcot took the order to the 4th Division and I went myself to Fergusson (5th Division) about 4 a.m. to explain matters to him, and to learn all I could about the positions and state of the troops of his Division. Whilst I was talking to him the rearguard of the 3rd Division passed, having been out all night. Fergusson pointed to them as another indication of the impossibility of continuing the retirement at once. He added that the men of his own Division were exhausted, and that, although they might continue their rearward march in a fashion, it would be a slow and risky business; he further remarked he was relieved by my decision to stand and fight. There is no doubt but that there was the greatest difficulty in getting the orders round—in fact some few units never got them, but conformed to the movements of the troops which had. The orders given provided for the immediate retirement of all transport not necessary to the battle so as to leave our roads free for the troops later."


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Thanks to Salesie for the information above. This has been my argument all along, S-D had no time to prepare this battle, and as I said in an earlier post, it was a battle of extemporisation for II Corps.

I take issue with the criticism of S-Ds choice of battleground. He only had two choices, continue to retreat, which, given the physical state of his troops, was probably impractical, or fight a holding action. Once that decision was made his choice of ground was very limited under these circumstances. I pose this question: if S-D had continued his retreat, where would he have been able to make a stand on suitable ground that might have been the ideal for discussion for military commentators many years hence, but where the reality, and the nature of the terrain along the line of retreat, was very different? Take a look along the the axis of retreat.

With regard to communications problems: it is easy to say from a 21st century perspective that this or that should have been done, but 100 years ago conditions were very different of course. Indeed, even today, battlefield communications can and have failed at crucial times, so in this respect nothing much has changed, and this was a continuing problem throughout WW1. Commanders often worked somewhat blind-folded once the battle commenced, and the time-lag could have serious consequences for the units affected. Not forgetting of course that there was little or no intelligence about enemy movements.

In the end, S-D made a courageous, and as it happened, correct decision. Picking at the detail is fine for a debate, but the realities of war are very different from the theory.

TR

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Martin,

To be fair to S.D., by the time the decision to stand was made (in my opinion) there simply wasn't time to make sure the troops were dug in properly, and if I remember correctly some "trenches" had been dug by civilians (instructed by ?), so were likely located on the topographical crest, from what I can tell (Google Earth) the Suffolk position (perhaps the most critical position on the right flank) stuck out like a sore thumb and by afternoon would have been taking fire from German artillery located to the north and east in addition to rifle and machine gun fire, making it almost impossible to resupply them with reinforcements and ammunition (or give them an order to retire). It's a wonder to me that they held out as long as they did. I would be interested to find out what sort of input, if any, the brigade commanders had in locating where their troops were positioned - the few sources available (Haldane, Gleichen, Hunter-Weston) have very little to say about the subject, I suppose the brigade war diaries are similar?

Dave

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Salesie - many thanks for posting the SD memoire snippet. It is extremely useful in this debate.

 

Here are two scenarios : In scenario 1 a commander thinks ahead, anticipates his next move and decides to make a stand. He deliberately chooses the ground he fights on. It is an active choice - the careful selection of ground to optimise its defensive qualities. In Scenario 2 a commander is overwhelmed by rapidly unfolding events mostly beyond his control. He is forced to stand and fight because he has no choice. He does not dictate the ground he fights on. Circumstances do.These are very different scenarios and most would probably agree Le Cateau was an example of the second scenario. In the latter scenarios commander need to make the best of the bad cards they are dealt.

 

This was not a preconcieved plan. S-D does not go through a process of deliberately selecting the ground. He was not thinking of making a stand at Le Cateau a day or two days previously. Annihilation was not an option. It wasn't even a bad option, it was simply no option. S-D seems to understand this from the narrative above and his citing of FSR is to justify his action interesting in this aspect. Note the use of the word 'circumstances'. This is subtle but important difference. It is important because if the ground is selected for a commander (by circumstances) then it is already sub-optimal and he therefore has to make the very best of the ground that circumstances dictate. I don't think he did make the best decisions particularly on the Right flank. He even states:

 

"The right, or east flank was certainly turnable, but that did not matter as the I Corps were to go there"

 

His forced decision and his choice of where his troops were placed was predicated on the belief that I Corps would protect his right flank. So from the outset this part of the plan would not unfold as he expected. If so much of the plan depended on I Corps being present, I ask the question why did he believe this? It might not be S-D's fault that I Corps did not materialise, the reason might lie in other decisions (French?), but if so much depended on this, it seems to me that nothing was done once he discovered I Corps would not be arriving. In fact the battle unfolded more-or less as he feared: his right flank was turned and systematically rolled up with considerable loss. If this was the biggest single weakness in the plan why did S-D gamble with the disposition of his troops in the open? He surely must have considered the possibility that I Corps might arrive late, or even not arrive at all. There seems to be nothing in his thought process (see his account) or actions that accommodated this possibility. Commanders are constantly asking themselves 'what if?' I wonder what his answer would have been if asked 'what if I Corps fail to materialise?' It is here I see the primary weakness.

 

Back to the Future. There seems to be some objection to even dare theorise about what could have been done differently. There are comments that its is all too easy to criticise with the benefit of hindsight. Of course it is easy, and of course hindsight gives us benefit but that should not prevent us from studying the past and learning from it. Constructive analysis and criticism and debate can often open our eyes and help us see further. War Diaries were part of Army Regulations. The central reason for keeping War Diaries is that campaigns could be studied and lessons could be learned so that the same mistakes were not repeated. The gathering of the War Diaries was a continuous process throughout the War. The British Army has continually used critiques of past operations to teach its Officer Corps during training its Military Academies, and both divisions of Staff College. It has a military history department - incidentally full of academics who have never served in the military, yet curiously enough the British Military sees value in their analysis, criticism and writings. So much so that they let them loose on their officer corps to teach them. During and after the war had the Historical Section produce the Official Histories it took 33 years to complete the 29 volumes. These monumental tomes were critical analyses of the campaigns. They were not simply written as narrative of what happened, the often explored the 'what ifs' and analysed what went wrong and why it went wrong. They did so because that was part of their raison d'etre. If we don't study the past and learn from it we are condemned to repeat the mistakes. In complex campaigns and actions it is impossible for one man to be aware of every factor. Smith-Dorrien had no idea what was happening on parts of his battlefield and it was probably not until the OH was written that anyone really had the full picture.

 

I am simply baffled why people rail against analysis years after the events. It can be a positive thing.

 

MG

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Taking a rather simplistic view of this, Le Cateau can't have been a disaster, for the simple reason that disaster in the perilous circumstances facing II Corps must have meant destruction.

The command was badly mauled, but not destroyed.

It got away.

Disaster averted, then.

Phil (PJA)

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