Le Cateau 1914: Triumph or Disaster?

[SteveMarsdin]

Salesie has given us a timely, if slightly one-sided reminder, that we mustn't look at the retreat purely in terms of the British perpective. Spears makes quite clear how important it was to the French that the action was fought at Le Cateau but equally we mustn't forget that the left flank of the BEF was ably protected by Amade's territorial divisions and assistance was asked for and given by Sordet's cavalry corps on more han one occasion.

The great triumph was that the allies weren't out-flanked by von Kluck and, from the perspective of the BEF, they might have been beaten on the field and were exhausted but they suffered very few casualties and "lived to fight another day".

[phil andrade]

The great triumph was that the allies weren't out-flanked by von Kluck and, from the perspective of the BEF, they might have been beaten on the field and were exhausted but they suffered very few casualties and "lived to fight another day".

Very few casualties ?

They lost a heap of men and a lot of guns.

But I take your point, Steve.

Phil (PJA)

[Guest]

On 5/12/2014 at 18:56, Terry_Reeves said:

I'm pleased that Martin has pointed out the danger of statistics, but at the moment the thread seems to a be a bit like the football league, using the casualty statistics to signify a win lose or draw.

Le Cateau was a significant battle which was forced upon Smith-Dorrien who had very little time to respond to the German advance, in fact just a matter of hours. If it was ill- organised as mentioned, it was because of this shortage of time. For me, it was a battle that required great deal of extemporisation in the face of, not just infantry attacks, but of superior artillery fire.

It might be worthwhile exploring the more longer term effects of S-Ds stand rather than seeing it just as a day of triumph of disaster.

TR

Terry I would agree with all your sentiments It is not my intention to judge the outcome based on some dry casualty stats. That said, warfare by necessity involves the sometimes distasteful task of tallying the human cost. It is just one measure that without context provides a very one-dimensional story. We may as well get it out of the way....

 

I have no doubt this will develop into a much broader discussion and I am sure members will put it in the context of what it achieved beyond 26th Aug 1914. Doing some background reading, I am exploring the near contemporary books that were written in the immediate aftermath. Lord Ernest Hamilton's "The First Seven Divisions" (Feb 1916) and Arthur Conan Doyle's account in his "A History of the Great War - Vol I" (1916) provide some interesting context of how Le Cateau was interpreted in print during the war. Lots of apologetic explanation and theoretical analysis of should-have, would-have and could-have which clearly shows questions in 2014 were not really that different to questions in 1916.

 

One of the things I would like to explore is how Le Cateau was seen through different generations of authors and see to what extent the view of the OH overshadows the views of subsequent authors. Dare I say, it would be interesting to show the OH stats on casualties were not quite what they seemed to be. I have a strong suspicion that the OH used Statistics and made the same error which has been perpetuated.

 

Anyway enough of Stats. A few random thoughts that need to be kicked around.

 

1. To what extent was Le Cateau that 'forced'? S-D could have kicked back. One of the principles of defence is that the defender has an advantage by choosing the ground. If I look at the German retreat in Sep-Oct 1914 their choice of where to make a stand seems to me to be geographically and topologically infinitely more suited superior to defence than the groundchosen by S-D's. The 1916 books clearly indicate that there was a debate raging at the time whether SD would have been better to delay the stand for a day for example.

 

2. The Artillery differentials were vast if the RFA account is to be believed. If one thinks this is not a triumph but a disaster (for the RA at least) could some of the reasons be traced back 7 years to doctrinal reform? The levels (absolute and relative) of available Artillery appear to be vastly different. Given doctrine accomodated the idea of a land war in Europe, it seems this aspect was a massive oversight. I dont think this can be lumped into 'hindsight'. Ratios of available artillery compared to European armies seemed lower. The British had the option of sending TF artillery (as they sent TF Infantry later) but chose not to. .... etc....

 

What is the best first hand account that has not yet been published? And where can I find this?

Lastly: Triumph and Disaster? A random choice of measures. It doesn't have to be either impostor.

MG

Edited. Emphasis on RA in point 2.

Edited 4 March , 2017 by Guest

[Terry_Reeves]

If we've been lead to believe that the Germans suffered ten to fifteen thousand casualties, and it turns out that they actually suffered three thousand, I would say that that kind of distortion has some historiographical significance.

Phil (PJA)

Phil

You may have been lead to believe it, I don't count myself in the "we'

TR

[Terry_Reeves]

Terry I would agree with all your sentiments It is not my intention to judge the outcome based on some dry casualty stats. That said, warfare by necessity involves the sometimes distasteful task of tallying the human cost. It is just one measure that without context provides a very one-dimensional story. We may as well get it out of the way....

I have no doubt this will develop into a much broader discussion and I am sure members will put it in the context of what it achieved beyond 26th Aug 1914. Doing some background reading, I am exploring the near contemporary books that were written in the immediate aftermath. Lord Ernest Hamilton's "The First Seven Divisions" (Feb 1916) and Arthur Conan Doyle's account in his "A History of the Great War - Vol I" (1916) provide some interesting context of how Le Cateau was interpreted in print during the war. Lots of apologetic explanation and theoretical analysis of should-have, would-have and could-have which clearly shows questions in 2014 were not really that different to questions in 1916.

One of the things I would like to explore is how Le Cateau was seen through different generations of authors and see to what extent the view of the OH overshadows the views of subsequent authors. Dare I say, it would be interesting to show the OH stats on casualties were not quite what they seemed to be. I have a strong suspicion that the OH used Statistics and made the same error which has been perpetuated.

Anyway enough of Stats. A few random thoughts that need to be kicked around.

1. To what extent was Le Cateau that 'forced'? S-D could have kicked back. One of the principles of defence is that the defender has an advantage by choosing the ground. If I look at the German retreat in Sep-)ct 1914 their choice of where to make a stand seems to me to be geographically and topologically infinitely more suited superior to defence than the groundchosen by S-D's. The 1916 books clearly indicate that there was a debate raging at the time whether SD would have been better to delay the stand for a day for example.

2. The Artillery differentials were vast if the RFA account is to be believed. If one thinks theis is not a triumph but a disaster could some of the reasons be traced back 7 years to doctrinal reform? The levels (absolute and relative) of available Artillery appear to be vastly different. Given doctrine accomodated the idea of a land war in Europe, it seems this aspect was a massive oversight. I dont think this can be lumped into 'hindsight'. Ratios of available artillery compared to European armies seemed lower. The British had the option of sending TF artillery (as they sent TF Infantry later) but chose not to. .... etc....

What is the best first hand account that has not yet been published? And where can I find this?

Lastly: Triumph and Disaster? A random choice of measures. It doesn't have to be either impostor.

MG

Martin

I agree with much of what you say. S-D however had a decision to make in a very short space of time. He and his staff were the only ones to have a real handle on the situation and the state of his troops, and not his critics sometime later, who did not have the responsibility. It turns out of course that his decision was right.

I am not disagreeing with your use of statistics, but more with the general tenor of the thread so far. As I have said, there is more to a battle.....

TR

[nigelcave]

I think that the casualty issue is reasonably well covered in Jack Sheldon's and my Le Cateau. Jack gives a summary of his views as regards the consequences and outcome of the battle from the German point of view. In my opinion, I think that S-D had very little option but to stand and fight. Both sides - or at least many of the individual and unit accounts of both sides - tend to exaggerate to a considerable extent the lethal effect of their fire on the opposition. The French on the left were a considerable asset to the British (but a pain in the neck as they moved across the British withdrawal routes). If anyone has a case to answer it is French and his staff sending 4th Division into the line without much of its support 'tail'.

II Corps got away - in disorder, true - to fight another day and von K lost a major opportunity whilst, at the end of the day, being the victor on the battlefield - whatever that might mean. The battle certainly slowed the German advance and then the error was compounded whilst command dithered.

[Guest]

S-D however had a decision to make in a very short space of time. He and his staff were the only ones to have a real handle on the state of his troops, and not his critics sometime later, who did not have the responsibility. It turns out of course that his decision was right.

TR

Terry.

I agree , however this immediately makes me think: if he was 'forced' was everything beyond his control? ...and if this was the case then one might argue that even the best of men had little choice, but with the benefit of hindsight might we trace this back to what he/French could have done before Le Cateau. Even trace this back to the decision to hold the Mons Canal and the confusion (then) was this a defensive or offensive position. etc... or trace this back to the delays in concentrating the BEF who were I believe days behind schedule despite what is commonly believed (rightly in my view) a very efficient mobilisation. The delays in deploying and mobilisation might have has a knock-on effect to where the BEF deployed and the size of the opposition. My instincts tell me that if SD was forced to stand at Le Cateau (And that is a big IF in my view) he can not necessarily be exonerated from blame as he was in command . Arguably the French dictated a large part of the unfolding events but my sense is that historians have been too apologetic on SD's behalf. He had a choice to stand and fight or stand and fight another day. I am not yet convinced that this was as forced as we are led to believe. My conjecture as yet unsubstantiated. MG

[Guest]

I think that the casualty issue is reasonably well covered in Jack Sheldon's and my Le Cateau. Jack gives a summary of his views as regards the consequences and outcome of the battle from the German point of view. In my opinion, I think that S-D had very little option but to stand and fight. Both sides - or at least many of the individual and unit accounts of both sides - tend to exaggerate to a considerable extent the lethal effect of their fire on the opposition. The French on the left were a considerable asset to the British (but a pain in the neck as they moved across the British withdrawal routes). If anyone has a case to answer it is French and his staff sending 4th Division into the line without much of its support 'tail'.

II Corps got away - in disorder, true - to fight another day and von K lost a major opportunity whilst, at the end of the day, being the victor on the battlefield - whatever that might mean. The battle certainly slowed the German advance and then the error was compounded whilst command dithered.

Nigel

Were the casulaty numbers calculated from original material (diaries) or taken from the OH? Just curious because I think the OH numbers are wrong. MG

[nigelcave]

Quite frankly I do not know how the OH got its figures - I assume from some form of divisional returns via brigades and battalions. Given the state of confusion in the days post Mons (several of the Le Cateau fatalities are dated for early September, to illustrate this confusion) I would be surprised if any of the figures are accurate. My best guess woudl be that honours in terms of killed and wounded were roughly equal at Le C, but the Germans with far fewer casualties overall, as they held the field at the end of the day (ergo few of them made prisoner), whilst the Briish lost a large number as prisoners, given the poor communciations when entire battalions were left high and dry (though they did have the unexpected effect of causing the Germans considerable inconvenience and possibly, through their often persistence in continuing to fight, played a part in the delay of von K's army to press on after the battle).

As regards post 32, poor old S-D had only been in command of II Corps for, effectively, a week or less by the time of Le C, given the unexpected death of Grierson on the 17th on a train in France. S-D himself said to Edmonds, at the time a senior staff officer with the freshly arrived 4th Div: ...I am sent out here without time to collect even a kit, still less to make myself fully acquainted with the situation and I have had to make two great decisions [ie his actions at Mons and Le C]. Edmonds was in no doubt that if he [ie S-D] had not fought at Le C, the fate of the 4th Division, at least, would have been sealed. Quote taken from Edmonds' intro to a British edition of Bloem's Advance from Mons.

[Steven Broomfield]

The British had the option of sending TF artillery (as they sent TF Infantry later) but chose not to. .... etc....

MG

Did they? I thought the TF artillery were still equipped with the 15 pdr (I may well be wrong, of course). If so, supply would have been pretty complex.Additionally, surely the training and efficiency of artillery units would have been pretty sketchy. My suspicion would be that TF artillery may well have been more hindrance than help.

That's not to say that the doctrinal approach of the British to artillery was somewhat confused.

[salesie]

Terry.

I agree , however this immediately makes me think: if he was 'forced' was everything beyond his control? ...and if this was the case then one might argue that even the best of men had little choice, but with the benefit of hindsight might we trace this back to what he/French could have done before Le Cateau. Even trace this back to the decision to hold the Mons Canal and the confusion (then) was this a defensive or offensive position. etc... or trace this bak to the delays in concentrating the BEF who were I believe days behind schedule despite what is commonly believed (rightly in my view) a very efficient mobilisation. The delays in deploying and mobilisation might have has a knock-on effect to where the BEF deployed and the size of the opposition. My instincts tell me that if SD was forced to stand at Le Cateau (And that is a big IF in my view) he can not necessarily be exonerated from blame as he was in command for weeks. Arguably the French dictated a large part of the unfolding events but my sense is that historians have been too apologetic on SD's behalf. He had a choice to stand and fight or stand and fight another day. I am not yet convinced that this was as forced as we are led to believe. My conjecture as yet unsubstantiated. MG

Why on earth do you say that historians have been too apologetic for Smith-Dorrien? Apologetic for what? Holding up the German advance? Preventing the French 5th army from having its flank turned? What on earth is there to apologise for?

1) Of course, as commander of II Corps, he had a choice (the same choice all commanders have at times) i.e. follow his orders (and continue to retire in this case) or, as per army field regulations, reassess his position given the changed, and wholly exceptional, circumstances he found himself in.

2) In the event (in response to his reassessment), II Corps stood and fought and then went on to fight another day. Forget about antecedents alone, whatever had gone on before is out of context and thus irrelevant if not also considering what happened after the event (when dealing with cause and effect, it's best to deal with the whole chain rather than bits in isolation); Smith-Dorrien faced an extremely tricky situation at Le Cateau and he exercised professional judgement when the situation called for it, he delivered operational success (for a rear-guard action that is) which greatly helped to open the door for the strategic opportunities that Joffre recognised and grasped with both hands.

3) Some say that he was lucky at Le Cateau - bullshit, he made his own luck.

I ask again - why on earth would anyone be apologetic on Smith-Dorrien's behalf? Why on earth do you believe they needed to be?

Cheers-salesie.

[phil andrade]

Phil

You may have been lead to believe it, I don't count myself in the "we'

TR

Your discernment is admirable, Terry.

I was a victim of the " spin" that historians and commentators upheld for generations : the success of the BEF in inflicting disproportionate damage in its opening battles.

This was endorsed by James Edmonds, John Terraine and Richard Holmes, and many others.

The accounts of Le Cateau were - to a large degree - predicated on this.

The revelations of the more recent research in regard to the casualty exchange have shattered this illusion.

The exigencies of battle are not determined by casualty figures alone, of course ; but when they form an important component of how historians have chosen to depict the outcome, it matters that proper analysis is applied. To shy away from that is like trying to make an omelette without breaking eggs.

Phil (PJA)

[Guest]

Did they? I thought the TF artillery were still equipped with the 15 pdr (I may well be wrong, of course). If so, supply would have been pretty complex.Additionally, surely the training and efficiency of artillery units would have been pretty sketchy. My suspicion would be that TF artillery may well have been more hindrance than help.

That's not to say that the doctrinal approach of the British to artillery was somewhat confused.

Steven I think they did have this option despite the logistic challenge. More than enough men had volunteered for Overseas service and if memory serves one of the six TF units that was fully signed up for overseas service pre-War was an artillery unit. The RFA TF went overseas (Egypt) in 1914 and also deployed in 1915 with the same equipment (I believe) so from a logistics perspective I cant see a significant difference between 1914 and early 1915. I take your point on the training and efficiency but one might use the same arguments for the 19 TF battalions in F&F in 1914 and the RE TF etc that deployed in 1914 and the Yeomanry. Circumstances forced the issue in these cases, partly I think because of the overwhelming casualties. Back to artillery: some additional artillery is better than no additional artillery surely, even if it is a logistical challenge. It is a good question though and one that expands the debate into the broader issue of the efficiency of the available troops

Also, would the War Office have had the option of sending 6th Div's Artillery earlier than 8th/9th Sep - II Bde RFA XXIV Bde RFA, XXXVIII Bde, XII (Howitzer) Bde RFA, 24 Hy Bty RGA etc, and the respective Ammunition columns. I understand the invasion threat and reasons for keeping the 6th Div Back, but its didn't last long with the Div deploying on 8th/9th Sep. The opening 'half' of Le Cateau is typically described as an artillery duel, but one in which the British were vastly outnumbered. Authors don't seem to be able to agree on the actual numbers, particularly on the Germans side

Not sure where 7th Div's Artillery were before Aug 5th 1914. and whether this group was also available. If anyone can shed light on this it would be useful. MG

[salesie]

Your discernment is admirable, Terry.

I was a victim of the " spin" that historians and commentators upheld for generations : the success of the BEF in inflicting disproportionate damage in its opening battles.

This was endorsed by James Edmonds, John Terraine and Richard Holmes, and many others.

The accounts of Le Cateau were - to a large degree - predicated on this.

The revelations of the more recent research in regard to the casualty exchange have shattered this illusion.

The exigencies of battle are not determined by casualty figures alone, of course ; but when they form an important component of how historians have chosen to depict the outcome, it matters that proper analysis is applied. To shy away from that is like trying to make an omelette without breaking eggs.

Phil (PJA)

What particular revelations in what recent research, Phil?

Cheers-salesie.

[nigelcave]

Gentlemen:

1. 7th Div was not available in August 1914 or in time for Le Cateau.

2. The government had to consider the possibility of an invasion - OK, we know it did not happen but that did not mean it was not a reasonable contingency to consider. I think some extra TA units would not have made a shred of difference. There was still a fairly substantial body of regulars, reserves and Special reserves in the UK and there were new formations in the process of being formed from regular troops. It si doubtfil, in any case, if any of them could have been got out to France in time, given the basis upon which the BEF was originally planned. events were moving too quickly.

3. Considier the state of the troops withdrawing from Mons: some of them did not get in to their billet areas until the battle was more or less under way on the right.

4. The Germans had a cavalry corps gathering no great distance to the north of what was to be the British lcentre/left flank. The Germans made a complete cock up of their use of cavalry.

5. The 4th Division was just coming in to the immediate area during the night preceding the battle and was hardly in position on the British left before the battle commenced.

6. British GHQ was flitting hither and thither - comms not good, orders vague in the extreme.

7. From the British perspective, the French on the right were not trustworthy. The French on the left, on the other hand, were.

8. Outcome? The Germans won the battle on the ground, so to speak - that needs qualifyin - but they most certainly did not win what happened afterwards: II Corps survived (disordered, confused, but survived) and lived on to fight another day. In Clausewitz's terms, the Germans failed at Le C.

It is very difficult to see how the Retreat could have been continued successfully in the early hours of the 26th, given the state of the troops, the arrival of 4th Division, the ignorance of what was happening to I Corps and with the knowledge of a substantial body of German cavalry in the vicinity, with some uncertainty about the security of the British left flank..

In all of this the final casualty figures, really, are pretty irrelevant looking at it from purely a military outcome perspective.

[Guest]

On 5/12/2014 at 23:40, salesie said:

Why on earth do you say that historians have been too apologetic for Smith-Dorrien? Apologetic for what? Holding up the German advance? Preventing the French 5th army from having its flank turned? What on earth is there to apologise for?

Cheers-salesie.

Salesie, if one looks at the large body of literature on the Retreat from Mons, there are a wide range of views and even the most ardent supporters of Smith-Dorrien point out a few areas where he is criticised. At one extreme we have John Terraine who in his "Mons: The retreat to Victory" (1960) describes the stand at Le Cateau "...in truth, not only the most brilliant exploit of the BEF during the retreat but one of the most splendid feats of the British Army during the whole of the War" while at the other end we have French retracting his initial praise and replacing it with thinly veiled criticism later. Terraine dismisses French's volte face and criticism of Smith Dorrien as being a 'unjust' and goes as far as to call it a 'falsification'. Strong words. Between these two extremes we have a range of views, most of which are eulogies on Smith Dorrien. They might be correct in their praise but in their zeal to create a hero they might be ignoring some factors. I am trying to explore this.

 

The Retreat from Mons is treated by the British with the same degrees of reverence that the Australians and New Zealanders have for the first ANZACs and Gallipoli. It is hallowed territory that has an almost sacred position in their military histories.I suspect that any attempt to reassess this period will be caught in a low-wire entanglement of entrenched views.

 

Smith-Dorrien knew he had Allenby's full support, but Snow of the 4th Div argued later that he was put in an impossible position when asked whether he could stand and fight as he was already engaged, so the 'decision' for this part of the combined formations of 3rd, 4th and 5th Div's was arguably not a decision at all but forced by circumstances. Smith-Dorrien allegedly believed that I Corps would be in support* and it was not until the battle had commenced that he realised they were not coming. This aspect seems to be glossed over. His decision to stand and fight was based on an expectation of an Army level stopping action rather than a Corps level operation, albeit with Allenby. Some might argue that this makes his 'brilliant exploit' even more of a splendid feat. This seems to be current consensus. Others might argue that the severe damage done to 5th Div with the near annihilation of a number of battalions might have been avoided had they been positioned more carefully, especially the supporting artillery. His deployment of his right flank (5th Div and in particular 13th and 14th Bde) was predicated on the assumption I Corps would come up on his right. They didn't materialise and consequently the outflanking move on his right wing ended up with the envelopment of a number of units.

 

Losses in the Suffolks and King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry were so great, the need to reconstruct these battalions had a knock on effect. The drain on the depleting number of available trained reserves in these two regiments was so great that they both literally ran out of trained reinforcements not long after. This is an aspect that is not well understood by historians. Le Cateau was for both regiments their most costly day of the campaign by far and their later manning crisis can in part largely be traced back to this day. The consequences resonated weeks and months later. One might argue that sacrificing battalions was an inevitable part of a Corps level rear-guard action against such an allegedly large force - this again seems to be the consensus view starting as far back as 1916 (and possibly earlier) and one that has not been challenged that often. Others might argue had Smith-Dorrien delayed the action for a day, I Corps might have been involved on his right wing as he expected the fate of 13th and 14th Bde's might have been rather different.

 

This is where the debate quickly delves into what I call 'could-have-should-have-would-have' and there will be those who believe it is pointless to speculate on the 'what ifs'. There are however very legitimate questions such as; with better planning could the BEF have deployed with more artillery? With such a large disparity in levels of artillery was Smith-Dorrien's deployment of them optimal? Had Smith Dorrien delayed for a day would I Corps have made a difference to the outcome? Once Smith-Dorrien realised I Corps was not coming he made no change to his deployment, particularly his exposed right flank. Was this impossible to do, and if so it might suggest if his plans hinged on this single factor he might have made greater efforts to establish if I Corps could protect his flank. etc... I think these are reasonable questions (and I am sure there will be many more). That these questions don't appear to have been explored with much zeal by authors is something I find interesting.

 

One of the survivors of that day described the battlefield 'like Salisbury Plain but without trees'. Smith-Dorrien's choice of this bare plain - if indeed it was a choice - seems less than optimal given the massive asymmetry in Artillery and the lateness of the orders to stand and fight. By some accounts the entrenchments were little better than what I would call a shell-scrape by the time the actions started. Infantry not properly dug-in on a bare plain against an overwhelming artillery usually only has one outcome. The repeated attempts to relieve the pressure on the Suffolks in their exposed position by the A&SH and the Manchesters was extremely costly. One might argue that the 'triumph' was slightly less to do with Smith-Dorrien's brilliant generalship and slightly more to do with leadership, discipline and tenacity much further down the chain of command.

 

You talk about luck, or making luck. I would agree that one can make luck, but I also believe naked luck does still play a part. Personally I feel this factor came into play during the immediate aftermath. The German's decision not to pursue with vigour seems to be another major swing factor. Luck, possibly.... or maybe he made that luck. Try as I might I don't see it as the latter. Had the Germans pursued things might have turned out differently.

 

To avoid confusion, I have no strong view (yet) on how good a job Smith-Dorrien did - he certainly made a major impact and in his own words the BEF was not bothered for ten days afterwards. I am trying to explore the historiography of this action to better understand what could have been done differently and whether it was a close run thing;

 

I hope this at least partially explains some of my thinking at present. It will doubtless evolve.

* Terraine (page 142) "And it must be remembered that when he selected his position, he did so on the assumption that the I Corps would join him on it. When he decided to fight he was still unaware that they would not be able to carry out this part of GHQ's instructions"

MG

Edited. Fergusson for Snow.

Any mistakes are mine.

Edited 4 March , 2017 by Guest

[phil andrade]

Zuber .....yes, THAT MAN !

His research, his revelations, cited ( may I, Jack and Nigel ?) by British authors.

Zuber uses German regimental histories.

Twelve were seriously engaged at Mons, and he has figures for ten of them.

For Le Cateau, he writes :

" From German regimental records, most German unit casualties can be determined exactly, which allows an estimate of 2,900 total casualties with a high degree of confidence."

Contrast this with the BOH assertion that the British "....had inflicted on the enemy casualties never revealed, which are believed to be out of all proportion to their own " .

Lomas cited estimates of German casualties at Le Cateau ranging from 15,000 to 30,000. He exemplifies the depictions of the fighting that I was weaned on.

Zuber has a dog in this fight, I know.....but from what he writes in regard to German casualties, his account is plausible in this respect. For example, he cites the experience of a German burial detail which was charged with counting and burying the dead on a portion of the battlefield from the fighting of 24 August, and it reported burying 169 German and 135 British. No attempt to conceal German losses, and every testimony paid to the effectiveness of British resistance.

The German medical history cites the battle casualties of von Kluck's army for the last ten days of August 1914 and the total is below ten thousand.

British writers have attributed that scale of loss to the Battle of Mons alone, without even taking Le Cateau into account.

There has been a quixotic flavour to British histories of this fighting, a kind of David v Goliath fixation, without the addition of hordes of angelic bowmen.

Edit : sorry, this must seem like a non sequitur....I was replying to salesie's requirement that I reveal research and revelations.

Phil (PJA)

[salesie]

Zuber .....yes, THAT MAN !

His research, his revelations, cited ( may I, Jack and Nigel ?) by British authors.

Zuber uses German regimental histories.

Twelve were seriously engaged at Mons, and he has figures for ten of them.

For Le Cateau, he writes :

" From German regimental records, most German unit casualties can be determined exactly, which allows an estimate of 2,900 total casualties with a high degree of confidence."

Contrast this with the BOH assertion that the British "....had inflicted on the enemy casualties never revealed, which are believed to be out of all proportion to their own " .

Lomas cited estimates of German casualties at Le Cateau ranging from 15,000 to 30,000. He exemplifies the depictions of the fighting that I was weaned on.

Zuber has a dog in this fight, I know.....but from what he writes in regard to German casualties, his account is plausible in this respect. For example, he cites the experience of a German burial detail which was charged with counting and burying the dead on a portion of the battlefield from the fighting of 24 August, and it reported burying 169 German and 135 British. No attempt to conceal German losses, and every testimony paid to the effectiveness of British resistance.

The German medical history cites the battle casualties of von Kluck's army for the last ten days of August 1914 and the total is below ten thousand.

British writers have attributed that scale of loss to the Battle of Mons alone, without even taking Le Cateau into account.

There has been a quixotic flavour to British histories of this fighting, a kind of David v Goliath fixation, without the addition of hordes of angelic bowmen.

Edit : sorry, this must seem like a non sequitur....I was replying to salesie's requirement that I reveal research and revelations.

Phil (PJA)

Zuber and the Sanitats, Phil? Is that's all you've got - an author as biased on the German side as you say the British historians are who made you a victim of illusion, and a seriously flawed tome published under the Nazis? Is that the limit of your revelations from recent research?

Cheers-salesie.

[Guest]

This chart is interesting. British fatal casaulties 1914. Source: CWGC. The data covers the whole of the British Army globally, so will include very small distortions. To instill some confidence in the integrity of the data, I did a cross check to calculate the % of the totals that died in France and Flanders. In the three largest spikes in the data running left to right (Le Cateau, Crossing the Aisne and Gheluvelt) France and Flanders accounted for 99.2%, 99.4% and 98.2% of the data respectively. If is a fairly robust representation of the fatalities in France and Flanders.

 

What is interesting is that Le Cateau can be seen in some context here. Smith Dorrien's wry observation that the BEF was unmolested for 10 days can clearly be seen here. The Crossing of the Aisne was in fact a more costly event, but only marginal. The change in fronts to Flanders and Ypres can be clearly seen with the culminating and most costy day of 1914 on the 31st Oct at Gheluvelt. The rest as they say is history.

 

For me this chart certainly makes me feel that the human cost at Le Cateau was not as dramatic as one might think. In the context of what happened subsequently, it was costly but 26th August 1914 represents only 4.1% of all British Army fatal casualties in the whole of 1914 and only 5.0% of British Army casualties for the dates of the Mons Star. In this context we begin to see the achievement. I perfectly understand this is a narrow measure and other categories of casualties may well distort this picture, it does however provide a view of Le Cateau in the context of the Retreat, Advance, and descent into trench warfare through 1914.

 

I am reluctant for the thread to spiral into analysis-paralysis of casualty data. It is one dimensional and I think there is much more to be learned from the other aspects of then campaign I thought that a picture would help understand the context better.

Le Cateau is in blue. Apologies to those who quite clearly will already know this. MG

Edited 4 March , 2017 by Guest

[AOK4]

Zuber and the Sanitats, Phil? Is that's all you've got - an author as biased on the German side as you say the British historians are who made you a victim of illusion, and a seriously flawed tome published under the Nazis? Is that the limit of your revelations from recent research?

Cheers-salesie.

Have you ever read a German regimental history or the Sanitätsbericht? If not, then please refrain from these absurd allegations.

[salesie]

I hope this at least partially explains some of my thinking at present. It will doubtless evolve.

MG

MG

Good luck with your quest, MG. But when armchair generals delve into the areas of "what ifs" and "luck" then I bow out - because the whole debate is in serious danger of disappearing up its own backside.

I leave you not with the words of armchair generals but with the words of the two who actually took part in this action:

Von Kluck - "'I always had the greatest admiration for the British Expeditionary Force. It was the wonderful kernel of a great Army. I have already said it in my book. The way the retreat was carried out was remarkable. I tried very hard to outflank them, but I could not do so. If I had succeeded the war would have been won.'"

Smith-Dorrien - "One has only to study Von Kluck's orders and subsequent movements to appreciate that his Army was delayed and misled for a sufficient period to gain valuable time for Paris to prepare.

Those orders of Von Kluck on the evening of the 26th indicate that his army rested that night on the north side of the Le Cateau position, from which it may be deduced that he was unaware of our retirement and had been hit sufficiently hard to prevent his making a further attempt to take the position that evening. Again the hour given in the order for moving on the 27th was not till 5 a.m., which is also significant. The German account of the battle concludes with this statement : " The whole B.E.F., six Divisions, a Cavalry Division and several French Territorial Divisions opposed the First Army," which statement alone is flattering to the prowess of the portion of the B.E.F. who stood at Le Cateau.

As a final and overwhelming testimony to the value of the day. General Joffre telegraphed to our C.-in-C. thanking him in the warmest terms for " the powerful effect that battle had had on the security of the left flank of the French Army.""

You make the same mistake that most armchair generals make, MG - you don't consider in detail what the enemy was doing to effect and counter the real-time decision making of commanders at the sharp end - and that is akin to talking about the loss of the Titanic without even mentioning the iceberg. Then you draw one-sided conclusions/judgements that are unpressurised and full of hindsight, "what ifs" and an acceptance of "luck".

Cheers-salesie.

[trajan]

Guess on Salesie's viewpoint we have no need for after battle reports, sandhurst, etc...

[salesie]

Have you ever read a German regimental history or the Sanitätsbericht? If not, then please refrain from these absurd allegations.

Attached is my review of Mcrandle and Quirke's "blood test revisted" which uses the so-called "unimpeachable" Sanitats as its source - the only absurdity I can see is that some people still see the Sanitats as the "gospel" for German casualty stats.

Cheers-salesie.

Blood Test Revisited by James McRandle.doc

[Guest]

On 5/13/2014 at 11:21, salesie said:

You make the same mistake that most armchair generals make, MG - you don't consider in detail what the enemy was doing to effect and counter the real-time decision making of commanders at the sharp end - and that is akin to talking the loss of the Titanic without even mentioning the iceberg. Then you draw one-sided conclusions/judgements that are unpressurised and full of hindsight, "what ifs" and an acceptance of "luck".

Cheers-salesie.

Salesie, if you read my post carefully, you will see that I am merely asking a series of questions. The OP asks a question. It does not make a statement. I have not drawn any hard conclusions, and they are certianly not one-sided. I am trying to weigh things up. I specifically say:

 

"I have no strong view (yet) on how good a job Smith-Dorrien did - he certainly made a major impact and in his own words the BEF was not bothered for ten days afterwards. I am trying to explore the historiography of this action to better understand what could have been done differently and whether it was a close run thing;"

 

I am not an armchair general. I assume this was not intended as a compliment. I am simply someone with an interest in military history using a forum for people with an interest in military history asking some questions on military history in order to try and form a view. Hopefully people with constructive comments will help me do that. Comments on bullshit and backsides aren't particularly constructive. I am sorry if you find me asking questions so irritating.

 

Edit. There is a great irony here. I have probably transcribed more original material than most people. Specifically I have transcribed and edited every War Diary of the BEF battalions and Infantry Brigades in 1914. Over a million words. I have done the same with Gallipoli and am deep into the BEF in 1915,. I would say with great confidence the database is well over 1.5 million words - all first hand material and interestingly it includes every battalion and brigade diary that fought at Le Cateau. It is as a result of doing this painstaking task that one begins to see evidence " in the words of people who took part" (to paraphrase you) that conflicts with the mainstream views. Apologetic letters written by the OH historical section to COs who lost their battalions for as one simple example. The irony here is that most of my research (and my subsequent views) are very heavily based on what people wrote. Having waded through more first hand material than I care to remember, I can also safely say that not everything written by participants is correct. French's gross exaggeration of Casualties at Le Cateau is but one example.The ability to compare accounts tends to expose this. My questions are not based on some idle thoughts sitting in an armchair, they are based on years of painstaking research usually using the words of people who were there. You may want to trawl the GWF and see the evidence.

 

If we restrict discussions on the Great War only to the views of those who were present there wouldn't be much discussion at all and no need for Military History departments or parts of Staff College etc. Historians and dare I say armchair generals can look back at history and reassess it. Simply look how our appreciation of major characters such as Haig has been changed over time by academics a s a result of thorough analysis. My analysis has just started and I will leave any conclusions where they belong: at the end.

 

I am familiar with Von Kluck and Joffre's views (as anyone would be who has read the main tomes on this episode) and I would agree that they carry very great weight. Kluck's inability to catch and outflank the BEF before Le Cateau might have more to do with his incorrect assumption that they would be retreating West of South West rather than SD's brilliance. That is certainly the view of one respected author armchair general. I would not deny that SD fought an admirable retreat, but I think there were other factors at play beyond his control.

MG

 

P.S. was a Captain not a General and in my day we didn't sit around that much.

Edited 4 March , 2017 by Guest

[phil andrade]

Zuber and the Sanitats, Phil? Is that's all you've got - an author as biased on the German side as you say the British historians are who made you a victim of illusion, and a seriously flawed tome published under the Nazis? Is that the limit of your revelations from recent research?Cheers-salesie.

Yes, I'll nail my colours to the mast on those as a far more reliable indication than the estimates of Lomas, Ascoli and others who would have us believe that the German casualties in this fighting were three, five or even tenfold the figures that Zuber presents us with.

Your disdain for the efforts of Martin G is a disgrace.

Phil (PJA)