Le Cateau 1914: Triumph or Disaster?

[salesie]

Salesie - You are in danger of wearing out the idolatry expression "fighting General" as well as equally invidious "armchair General". Between these two extremes where do you place yourself?.

I am still very curious to know whose other memoirs you have tested Smith-Dorriens' self-serving memoir against. The references would be useful for this debate.

It is difficult to answer your question as you appear to absolve a commander's objectives and responsibility from the tactical pedantry realism. However, you ask, so I shall try and answer, in full expectation of being called (again) an armchair general:

Firstly, I would have ensured that the chain of Div/Bde/Bn/Coy/Pl commanders that I was responsible for and who reported to me did not fear me. He didn't

Secondly I would have ensured that the chain of Div/Bde/Bn/Coy/Pl commanders that I was responsible for and who reported to me made the most of what they had. He didn't.

Thirdly: As a leader I would ensure that if I made a catastrophically bad decision, my immediate subordinates would have enough confidence and moral courage to stand up and protest. They didn't and that is ultimately his failure as they feared him.

Fourthly: I would not have allowed to have 5,000 men put on a bare forward slope outnumbered 5:2 in men and 2:1 in artillery and 3:1 in machine guns in shallow trenches, with no cover, with no clear instructions, with no cover, with no ability to move forward or backwards, with no ability to be reinforced, with no clear orders regarding holding/ retreating, with full knowledge that this position could be 'outflanked' and 'rolled up' (his words). In the full knowledge they would be bombarded with Shrapnel and HE and subjected to relentless machine-gunning.

Fifthly: I have lost the will to live...

You may argue that the utterly suicidal positioning of 13th and 14th Inf Bdes was rational and Smith Dorrien had no responsibility, but I would beg to differ. Blame the Div Commander, blame the Bde commanders, blame the COs, blame the Coy Commabers, the Platoon commanders. Ultimately he was responsible and it was a terrible decision. I have not seen anyone yet dispute this. Ultimately this comes down to the balance of outcomes. The (lucky) escape of II Corps outweighs the catastrophic losses of 5th Div. The propaganda machine has been 'set' by the Govt in 1914 and perpetuated by the sycophantic Edmonds in the OH.... and 'the rest is history'

At 04:00 the troops quite obviously realised the position was utterly untenable but did their best. (multiple diary references) Given his explosive character I wonder aloud if his subordinates dared tell him the positions dug (allegedly) by local inhabitants that were plainly and obviously 'inadequate' according to the men who used them and were wounded in in them (the dead clearly had no voice) were utterly useless. It is one of the key elements of leadership that a Leader should at least enable his subordinates to challenge his views. I suspect that due to SD's rather abrasive character, his subordinates rather shied away from telling him the ground they were given was terrible. Don't believe me;read the (multiple) diaries rather than his self-aggrandising memoir.That the message did not filter upwards is a catastrophic failure of leadership. Ultimately he is to blame. The fact that Le Cateau was an overall 'success' masks underlying failures of command in my view. To appraise a battle such as Le Cateau as a 'net' result really misses many important lessons.

Smith-Dorrien lead through fear. It is the very worst type of leadership and the consequences were fairly grave. His reputation was temporarily rescued by a few factors

1. French was worse, and completely out of his depth.

2. Haig had barely been engaged

3. British Govt/propaganda needed some good news to offset the 7 days of catastrophe (only the British see Mons to Cateau as a success)

4. His critics were mostly fired.

Smith-Dorrien was a brilliantly lucky general. Kluck's misjudgment saved him from what might have been a catastrophe. Smith Dorrien rolled the dice and it came up double six. Lucky, not skillful. There is a subtle difference. Slim was brilliant and so was Wellington. Vision, creativity, forethought. Smith Dorrien shone because he was surrounded by men out of their depth.

MG

PS IT is 'lose' not 'loose'.

Where do I place myself - an aircraft technician in the REME, mate, that's my only claim to military fame.

Now, you tell us what you wouldn't have done (mostly tactical pedantry and political waffle yet again) but I asked what you would have done. Go on, tell us what you would have done?

Cheers-salesie.

[nigelcave]

I think that we need to look at all of this in context:

1. SD had no time to get to know anyone - maybe four days - because he was not personally involved in the BEF per se until after Grierson died. He inherited his staff, for example.

2. All this about choosing ground - there was no intention to defend Le Cateau: it wasa billeting stop, and that a pretty short halt.

3. II Corps did not just arrive - it took several hours for the whole Corps to come into area from first arrivals until last, the last coming in more or less as the fighting starts off on the right. The BEF separated for many hours by the perceived need to skirt the Foret de Mormal on its astern and western edges.

4. Context - what was happening on the right (Haig having a bad day, possibly from a personal viewpoint his worst of the war in terms of a panic attack).

5. French and GHQ had more or less vanished into thin air; Archie Murray, the CofS, was really not up to the job and gets unstuck a couple of months later.

6. A French Army commander on your right who probably bears the most responsibility for the tetchy relationship between the French and British armies in those first weeks: Lanrezac, much respected by Joffre and one of his mentors, and yet gets the chop within several weeks, partly bcause he is a pessimist, partly because he will not do what he is told to do and partly because Joffre felt he played a big part in the fraught Anglo-French military relationships at the time (not that I am trying to heap all the blame on the French, of course). Perhaps not the most confidence inducing scenario for a Corps commander who is far from certain as to what might be going on the left - where, in fact, the French cavalry played an important role (and whose overall commander, Sordet, was highly rated by the British).

7. Where would you have put your billeting line given all the circumstances?

8. The British are operating off 1:80000 (or worse) scale maps.

9. The right flank of II Corps HAD to be covered: looking at the ground, unless he had occupied the high ground maybe two kms to the east (and thus extended his line even further) there was not much alternative to providing the right flank guard that he did, as the valley to the east ran parallel to the line of Retreat and it needed to be covered.

10. The artillery issue is the one about which everyone can, I feel, most justly get excited.

11. Comms: given the length of the line, the fact that the ground was an unknown to practically every participant (on both sides, of course), that the means of communication were limited in the extreme, in some ways it is surprising that the comms were as good as they were, albeit in the great scheme of things very poor.

12. No luxury to pick and choose your defence line and remember that this was a withdrawal that was in contact with the enemy (even though the Germans had been kept, generally, a respectful distance); that your men have been uner considerable pressure for at lest forty eight hours; that they have been marching around in the hot August sun for several days, many of them with new boots (the reservists - and they formed about 60% of the infantry). An army marches on its feet before ts stomach and some of the reports of the condition of the men's feet, even at this fairly early stage in the campaign and before the retreat gathers momentum, are pretty gruesome.

Given all of this .... In my view the battle was not a great military victory and does not fall into either the triumph or catastrophe category; BUT, to repeat - in any battle the important thing is the impact and outcome of the fighting.

I continue to believe that SD had no choice but to fight but that was a decision that was taken very late on and left practically no time to get any idea of new dispositions, with a defensive line in anticipation of a battle as opposed to basic defences for an overnight billet, under way before the action commenced.

As an aside, when Lanrezac asked the British for assistance at Guise it is interesting to note that Haig did offer to do what he could.

[nigelcave]

I think that we need to look at all of this in context:

1. SD had no time to get to know anyone - maybe four days - because he was not personally involved in the BEF per se until after Grierson died. He inherited his staff, for example.

2. All this about choosing ground - there was no intention to defend Le Cateau: it wasa billeting stop, and that a pretty short halt.

3. II Corps did not just arrive - it took several hours for the whole Corps to come into area from first arrivals until last, the last coming in more or less as the fighting starts off on the right. The BEF separated for many hours by the perceived need to skirt the Foret de Mormal on its astern and western edges.

4. Context - what was happening on the right (Haig having a bad day, possibly from a personal viewpoint his worst of the war in terms of a panic attack).

5. French and GHQ had more or less vanished into thin air; Archie Murray, the CofS, was really not up to the job and gets unstuck a couple of months later.

6. A French Army commander on your right who probably bears the most responsibility for the tetchy relationship between the French and British armies in those first weeks: Lanrezac, much respected by Joffre and one of his mentors, and yet gets the chop within several weeks, partly bcause he is a pessimist, partly because he will not do what he is told to do and partly because Joffre felt he played a big part in the fraught Anglo-French military relationships at the time (not that I am trying to heap all the blame on the French, of course). Perhaps not the most confidence inducing scenario for a Corps commander who is far from certain as to what might be going on the left - where, in fact, the French cavalry played an important role (and whose overall commander, Sordet, was highly rated by the British).

7. Where would you have put your billeting line given all the circumstances?

8. The British are operating off 1:80000 (or worse) scale maps.

9. The right flank of II Corps HAD to be covered: looking at the ground, unless he had occupied the high ground maybe two kms to the east (and thus extended his line even further) there was not much alternative to providing the right flank guard that he did, as the valley to the east ran parallel to the line of Retreat and it needed to be covered.

10. The artillery issue is the one about which everyone can, I feel, most justly get excited.

11. Comms: given the length of the line, the fact that the ground was an unknown to practically every participant (on both sides, of course), that the means of communication were limited in the extreme, in some ways it is surprising that the comms were as good as they were, albeit in the great scheme of things very poor.

12. No luxury to pick and choose your defence line and remember that this was a withdrawal that was in contact with the enemy (even though the Germans had been kept, generally, a respectful distance); that your men have been uner considerable pressure for at lest forty eight hours; that they have been marching around in the hot August sun for several days, many of them with new boots (the reservists - and they formed about 60% of the infantry). An army marches on its feet before ts stomach and some of the reports of the condition of the men's feet, even at this fairly early stage in the campaign and before the retreat gathers momentum, are pretty gruesome.

Given all of this .... In my view the battle was not a great military victory and does not fall into either the triumph or catastrophe category; BUT, to repeat - in any battle, fromthe military-political perspective, the important thing is the impact and outcome of any particular engagement. In this case and for whatever reason, von K wasted twenty four hours, refused to believe what the facts were telling him and acted according to that opinion and II Corps got off to fight another day. Cld the battle have been fought better? Yes; but ... there are substantial mitigating factors. Was he right to fight it - see below.

I continue to believe that SD had no choice but to fight but that was a decision that was taken very late on and left practically no time to get any idea of new dispositions, with a defensive line in anticipation of a battle as opposed to basic defences for an overnight billet, under way before the action commenced. Better these basic defences than the alternative, fighting a rearguard action whilst on the move and, remember, with a German cavalry corps hovering around on the British left which, fortunately for the British, was being very badly handled.

[As an aside, when Lanrezac asked the British for assistance at Guise it is interesting to note that Haig did offer to do what he could.]

[keithmroberts]

Thank you Nigel, for that summary . The fog of war must have been at it's worst in a retreat, with communications a nightmare given the technology and resources available. Just setting up a temporary HQ and making contact with the various units must have been an incredibly challenging and confusing problem in itself. The issues raised by communication with Sir John French at the time don't need repeating as they are covered in most published work but they perhaps should also be thought of in terms of the command and control issues that SD was addressing at corps level.

Reports could surely not be instantly updated, and information about the position of retreating units must surely have been coming in piecemeal over several hours, just in fact as the troops were. The mapping point is a significant one in itself - given the early stage of the war how many subordinate commanders would even have had the same maps if any, as the corps commander? Would not position reports tend to be more descriptive than precise. Quite a challenge.

Keith

[Jonathan Saunders]

... what bothers me about this whole conversation is the fact that one person can use some pretty nasty terms to challenge the opinion of another

Do you mean the very distasteful condescending tone that has prevailed throughout this thread?

[Jonathan Saunders]

I think that we need to look at all of this in context ...

Nigel, many thanks for this succinct yet comprehensive and erudite assessment. A most important and fair contribution.

Regards,

Jonathan S

[phil andrade]

Go on, tell us what you would have done?

Cheers-salesie.

Burst into tears and hoped for an immediate change of underwear, which, in those circumstances, would not have been forthcoming.

Yes, truly, poor SD was up to his eyebrows in the brown and sticky stuff.

Despite - or, perhaps, because of mutual detestation - French issued this statement regarding the conduct of commander, II Corps, at Le Cateau :

The saving of the left wing of the Army could never have been accomplished unless a commander of rare and unusual coolness , intrepidity, and determination had been present to personally conduct the operation...

I have to wonder what possessed Kitchener to select SD for command, bearing in mind that the personality clash was so obvious and acknowledged.

This battle could not have been a disaster : forgive me repeating....disaster in those circumstances was tantamount to destruction, and that did not happen.

In tactical terms, it was equally clearly not a triumph.

The strategic exigencies were to the Allies' advantage, and this was due in large measure to German failure to pursue and exploit properly. German cavalry had been engaged with the intention of fixing the British in position at Le Cateau, but they fought dismounted and had outrun their ammunition supply. The failure to outflank and annihilate the enemy was attributed to the time lost on 23 August when the cavalry moved towards Courtai ( this is what I've learnt from reading Joe Robinson's book THE GREAT WAR DAWNING).

There is an anomaly in so far as CWGC records of deaths that day do not conform with the official total of 7,812 British casualties at Le Cateau , unless we allow for an inordinately high proportion of prisoners, which, in itself, suggests how dire the situation was.

Incidentally, the treatment of British POWs by the Germans in this phase of the war was shockingly bad. My initial reaction was to dismiss the accounts as wartime propaganda ; but the memoirs of General Horrocks, written long after the Second World War, testify to his own experience as a wounded prisoner in that campaign, and the account is grim evidence of atrocious treatment.

Phil (PJA)

[Guest]

On 5/15/2014 at 07:45, Nigel Cave said:

Given all of this .... In my view the battle was not a great military victory and does not fall into either the triumph or catastrophe category; BUT, to repeat - in any battle, fromthe military-political perspective, the important thing is the impact and outcome of any particular engagement. In this case and for whatever reason, von K wasted twenty four hours, refused to believe what the facts were telling him and acted according to that opinion and II Corps got off to fight another day. Cld the battle have been fought better? Yes; but ... there are substantial mitigating factors. Was he right to fight it - see below.

I continue to believe that SD had no choice but to fight but that was a decision that was taken very late on and left practically no time to get any idea of new dispositions, with a defensive line in anticipation of a battle as opposed to basic defences for an overnight billet, under way before the action commenced. Better these basic defences than the alternative, fighting a rearguard action whilst on the move and, remember, with a German cavalry corps hovering around on the British left which, fortunately for the British, was being very badly handled.

[As an aside, when Lanrezac asked the British for assistance at Guise it is interesting to note that Haig did offer to do what he could.]

Nigel

 

Many thanks for your very detailed thoughts. I suspect you have probably researched this more than most of us, so I am particularly grateful. If you know of any first hand accounts written by the General Staff I would be interested in tracking them down. Also, if you are familiar with the CAB files I wonder if you have any pointers. I am heading to the TNA with my entrenching tool. My experience of CAB files is that they are usually a mess.

 

I would not disagree with most of your points 1-12, particularly point 5. but not point 9 as I think ground can be denied without having to occupy it. The reason for occupying it was because he expected I Corps to be able to provide support on their immediate right, which would have made the position stronger and prevent envelopment. By his own admission this was his biggest concern on the position given to him.. Had he known I Corps was not going to be there I suspect his dispositions would have been altered. The key issue as I see it is did he have enough time to alter the position after becoming aware that I Corps were not coming? Maybe that was Fergusson's responsibility. There are some interesting maps in Becke's account of the RA at Le Cateau and in Bond's account in his lengthy correspondence to Atkinson. Bond's clearly show the positions at the beginning and later in the day. His battalion effectively had to turn their trenches 90 degrees to face East - effectively doing what would have been done had they realised earlier that I Corps was not coming. Without moving location his HQ which started the day on the right rear ended up on the front line with the ill-fated B Coy commanded by Maj Yate.

 

As you point out the context is terrifically important.

 

When I started out I had assumed that Le Cateau was a location dictated by circumstances. On reading a bit more, particularly Operational Order No. 7 dated 24th Aug 1914 issued at 8:25 pm (Appendix 13 page 515 of the OH 1914 Part 1) 'the neighbourhood of Le Cateau' was named as the place that the Army would move to. It further states that 'exact positions will be pointed out on the ground tomorrow' [25th Aug 1914]. So it seems that the location of the neighbourhood of Le Cateau was not entirely dictated by circumstance.

 

It seems fairly clear that it was French's intention to re-concentrate the Army in the neighbourhood of Le Cateau following the decision to send I and II Corps either side of the Foret de Mormal. Smith Dorrien, Snow, Allenby and Haig would presumably have understood this. Certainly Smith-Dorrien's remarks would corroborate this. Smith-Dorrien states:

 

"...As a matter of fact, I heard nothing of the I Corps throughout the day. No information was sent me by G.H.Q. concerning it, and I imagined that all was going well and we should join upon the Le Cateau position in the evening according to orders...".

 

He later goes on to state;

 

"....it will be seen that I counted on the I Corps coming into line with us on the Le Cateau position in accordance with G.H.Q. operation order, and that I sent back weary troops to the east side of the town of Le Cateau to look out for them and to guard the flank until they appeared."

 

And later still....

 

".... the two Corps would have had a united front on the night of 25th August under the hand of the C.-in-C. and the decision to fight at Le Cateau would not have rested with me..."

 

At some stage he seems to indicate there had been a verbal plan to stand at Le Cateau (my underlining):

"...about 6 p.m.[25th], I received a note from the Sub-Chief of the General Staff, Henry Wilson, saying the Chief had told him to warn me that orders would shortly be issued for continuing the retreat instead of standing at Le Cateau.

 

The army was retreating in contact with the enemy and I would argue that in these circumstances it should be prepared for the worst-case scenario - being caught by the enemy - and have to stand and fight at any of the places it stopped. Their intention was of course to break free, but any commander retreating in contact would surely have to consider the worst case scenario. I suspect Smith-Dorrien, Haig, Snow, Allenby and French would have been thinking about this constantly - the possibility of being forced to turn and fight at any moment.

 

The plan was to consolidate in the neighbourhood of Le Cateau and continue the retreat. II Corps were effectively caught - most would agree I think that retreating another day would have been too risky as the enemy were too close: he effectively had no choice. Part of his decision making process was Allenby and Snow agreeing to operate under Smith-Dorrien. Snow (in his own words) really had no choice. The other main part of Smith-Dorrien's decision was that he expected I Corps on his right flank.

 

I guess this is where I being to struggle. Did French think that the chances of being caught at Le Cateau (or any other stopping point) were small? Given he had split his Army in two and intended to re-consolidate in the neighbourhood of Le Cateau one might imagine that is where he would have located his forward GHQ. It seems that is where Smith-Dorrien expected to find him. One can only imagine Smith-Dorrien's utter amazement that French was nowhere near Le Cateau. In this sense I can see how Smith-Dorrien was effectively filling the void created by French's absence. Decisions needed to be made there and then and the man whose had that responsibility was nowhere to be seen.

 

Le Cateau was known to GHQ as it had based its HQ there. Clearly some defensive preparations had been made and despite the fact that maps were thin on the ground (non-existent according to some accounts) GHQ at least would have had the opportunity to recce the ground and mark out the positions. It states in Op Order No. 7 that "exact positions will be pointed out on the ground tomorrow". I assume Smith Dorrien was not familiar with the ground and arriving in the small hours of the morning would not provide an opportunity to appraise it himself other than by using a map. He effectively fought a Battle on lines marked out by GHQ. His window of opportunity to do something was very small. I would dearly love to see what Fergusson thought of his position when he received his order at 04:00 and then saw it as dawn broke.

 

It is still unclear to me at what stage Smith-Dorrien realised I Corps would not arrive in time to help. When he discovered this, he surely would have understood that his single biggest risk was the envelopment of his right flank.

 

Finally it appears Smith-Dorrien and Forestier-Walker allotted the ground:

 

"From Le Cateau I went south to the position selected by General Head-quarters, on which we were to meet the enemy next day. It was quite a good one - on rising ground with a fine field of fire and with several villages capable of defence along it. The right, or east flank was certainly turnable, but that did not matter as the I Corps were to go there. Then, with Forestier-Walker I allotted the ground for the two Divisions to occupy We constantly looking out for the arrival of the I Corps, and late the afternoon, when they did not appear I requested the Commander of the 5th Division to hold the ground on the north-east of Le Cateau until they arrived".

 

MG

Edited 4 March , 2017 by Guest

[Crunchy]

Hello Martin,

You have certainly started a healthy debate, which I have followed with interest.

Having only a cursory knowledge of the battlefield, I am wondering where the reverse slope positions S-D could have occupied you speak of, remembering we are considering an entire corps? I don't recall any that would have materially improved the corps position, although as an engineer you would have better eye for the ground than me.

As a general comment, in siting a position, for forum members who might not be aware, commanders site two down, although I am not sure if this was the practice in 1914. Hence as the corps commander S-D would be allocating positions to brigades at best, with divisional commanders siting battalion positions, etc down the chain of command. However, under the circumstance I doubt very much that S-D had much time to reconnoitre a corps position, consider a plan and allocate detailed positions, let alone for this to percolate down the chain of command, with the all the subsequent reconnoitring, further plans, and orders and getting the troops into position. It seems to me he pretty much had to fight on the ground he occupied, with the troop locations he had, with all the apparent problems. Given retreating British troops were still arriving in the position as the battle ignited on the right, to have continued the retreat could well have courted the disintegration of his corps.

However, in discussing whether it was a triumph or defeat, as Nigel and Salesie, have said, I think we have to look at what the battle achieved from the operational level, not getting into a discussion of the tactical position taken up - that was pretty much a given. I agree with Martin that it wouldn't be the position one would choose to conduct a rearguard action, but as already mentioned he didn't have time to find a better position at corps level, and certainly in the dark. Having been tasked to site positions as a mere brigade major, I wouldn't think anyone could reconnoitre, site, issue orders and occupy a full corps level position in the dark in the time available, especially with dog tired troops.

That II Corps broke contact with Von Kluck, and continued their retreat unmolested (the aim of a rearguard action) I think S-D achieved his purpose, and IMO that was no mean achievement.

Regards

Chris

[SteveMarsdin]

Finally it appears Smith-Dorrien and Forestier-Walker allotted the ground:

"From Le Cateau I went south to the position selected by General Head-quarters, on which we were to meet the enemy next day. It was quite a good one - on rising ground with a fine field of fire and with several villages capable of defence along it. The right, or east flank was certainly turnable, but that did not matter as the I Corps were to go there. Then, with Forestier-Walker I allotted the ground for the two Divisions to occupy We constantly looking out for the arrival of the I Corps, and late the afternoon, when they did not appear I requested the Commander of the 5th Division to hold the ground on the north-east of Le Cateau until they arrived".

I think his calm prose hides the hectic scenes on the ground, for example, Spears talks of GHQ staff taking lorries and hunting round for entrenching tools for the French civilians to try and dig some sort of trenches

[nigelcave]

(1) Some trenches had been dug in some areas and in a rather desultory fashion, by the locals and were found not to be in particularly good positions.

(2) Worth bearing in mind that much of the Roman road was sunken at that time.

(3) GHQ did go in a rush - the Germans claim to have found numerous maps of the area abandoned, thus proving that perfidious Albion was always going to come into the war; the fact that the Germans had maps of the same area, I suppose, never crossed their minds as indicating a vaguely hostile pre war mind set?

(4) I Corps was not anticipating, or not really expecting, though some precautions were taken of course, an attack during the night 25/26 August and were thus caught more than somewhat on the hop.

(5) I think the first he knew about it was when I Corps asked II Corps for help ... not sure at what time that was as I am away from my books, but you ge the idea!

(6) It was raining pretty heavily when the elements of II Corps were coming into their billet areas, to add to the general misery.

(7) Quite a bit of pressure on 4th Div's front, 3rd Div relatively unscathed in teh fighting, but lost a lot of men as a consequence of the message to withdraw not getting through.

(8) Never, never underestimate the consequences of what Clausewitz called the 'fog of war' and 'friction'.

As regards first hand accounts - not that I can think of; however, Alexander Johnston, who was a Brigade Signals Officer, wrote very perceptively about McCracken's 7 Brigade: very well written and at the time - when he edits it is because he has found out something a few days later and thus mentions it then. Went on to be a brigadier general (starting as a lieutenant in the Worcesters) by autumn 1917, but was soon afterwards badly wounded. An edited version of his 'war diary' was printed a few years back by P & S. Interestingly enough, it was considered to be so good that much of it covering the early days of the war is to be found in the NA in the 7 Brigade box.

[lostinspace]

I think the controversy about the decision to stand at Le Cateau has always been about, not so much what actually happened, but more about what could have happened. S.D. was taking an enormous risk - that II Corps could withstand a German assault and be intact and on the move by the end of the day. Spencer Jones, editor of the recent 'Stemming the Tide' has some interesting observations in reference to S.D.'s decision - 'It also seems plausible that Smith-Dorrien anticipated the engagement that would follow would pose problems for the Germans. If they chose to launch an immediate attack then they would have little time to reconnoitre the British position, thus running the risk of being drawn into a frontal assault which he believed his men could hold off. However, more thorough preparations would take time, and every hour that the British could delay the Germans was precious. This assumption was the riskiest part of the plan. German operational art emphasised double encirclement, a fact that was well known in the British Army and II Corps' vulnerable flanks presented a perfect target for such a manoeuvre.', page 164.
As it turned out von Kluck was unable to co-ordinate an assault that could achieve the goal of destroying the B.E.F. (apparently he thought he was facing the entire British Army), and after the battle assumed that the British were running for their ports and could be safely disregarded. Another factor often overlooked in the escape of the B.E.F. was the French (Joffre's) decision to counter-attack at Guise on the 29th which tied up (and alarmed) von Bulow's Second Army for several days. Given the circumstances, I think Smith-Dorrien made the correct decision; he held the Germans just long enough for a successful withdrawal and kept his divisions largely intact.

Nigel,

In regards to your post (no. 1, above), I often wondered who located the civilian dug trenches, not sure if it's the final word but on the same page of the quote above Jones says - 'There were some rudimentary trenches in place which had been constructed by French civilians under G.H.Q. orders.' A footnote shows this information from Anthony Bird's ' Gentlemen, We Will Stand and Fight: Le Cateau, 1914'.

Dave

[nigelcave]

Hi Dave:

First off, to one and all, apologies for the duplicated (lengthy) post above - it was due to the fact that my computer froze at the vital moment, I had to copy to Word and paste and then...anyhow, you get the idea.

Anthony Bird will, I think, have got it from the same source that I did - which doubtless came from a printed source(s) - regimental history/biographical account.

The double encirclement idea is fine and was known about (Jack Sheldon describes this in various of his books - the Cannae approach); however, SD to start with would have anticipated I Corps on his right and not the Germans; the greater cause for concern in the early hours was the left flank: 4th Div, minus its train etc as mentioned before more or less had to go there as all that was over on the left flank was, essentially, some French cavalry. The left of the left flank took a bit of hammering when it was caught by surprise, but then the division managed to remove itself from the battlefield in surprisingly good order, helped considerably by effective use of artillery in the centre and on the left).

Of course his is the problem of quoting from a book, like mine, which is quoting from a book, which itself is quoting a book - and thus the myth is born and propagated. in this particualr case I have no reason at all to belief that it is untrue and would, in fact, make sense if GHQ had indcated the positions. hey would ahve been operating under the llusion, I suspect, that I and II Corps would be somewhat closer together (and there was Gough's cavalry brigade between the two ..).

[Guest]

Map Overlays. I have attached a series of Geoportail maps of the area of the right flank. The reason I have used these is because they show the contours. The map is overlaid on Google eath and can be put into 3D to show the relief. I have also overlaid Becke's map of the dispositions of the troops on the Right Flank so you can get and idea of where they were in relation to the modern terrain.lease excuse the graininess as I had to reduce the resolution to get the file sizes small enough to fit into the GWF limits.

Some distances. All distances are taken from the centre of the cross-roads of the Roman Road(RR) - call it the Roman Cross Road or RXR - and the road that runs WNW towards Inchy (the German front line ran parallel to this road and (then) railway. Measured heading towars Reumont

1. RXR to front of KOYLI trenches. .............................240 m

2. RXR to KOYLI Bn HQ (on Roman Road)...............1,070 m

3. RXR to RWK position near D of ROAD..................1,505 m

4. RXR to A Coy DOWR (bottom left)........................2,872 m

5. RXR to 't' in Reumont (5th Div HQ)........................3,800 m

The Roman road runs just of a rough ridge line. the highest point in this area is spot height 142 just NW of the words Les Quatres Vaux. RXR to the Spot height is 1,438 m. The Right Flank position was perched on top of this feature and running down the forward slope towards the Inchy Road and Le Cateau. Essentially all troops were on an open plain running down towards the enemy. Poorly constructed and poorly positioned. The natural re-entrants are shown as sunken roads.

I will revert with some comments on why I think the position was so terrible and with they might have considered. Unfortunately I will have to post on this Post as pasting the files requires tricking the GWF system to allow more than 250Kb of images on one post.

The short version is that I would have pulled them back some way to the angle formed by linking the areas with the words Champ Berant - Pont des Quatres Vaux and then cranking my extreme right flank to run parallel to the Roman Road essentially forming a slightly acute angle. This would be my first position. The second position would be further back on the downhill side which as the front line withdrew utilises the reverse slope features and capture the Germans as the crest the hill. Their whole position was simply too far forward particularly the KOYLI and Suffolks. Both battalions lost around 600 men, or roughly two thirds of their fighting strength.

Pure conjecture. . MG

PS. Edit: Doubtless the landscape has changed a bit, but one immediately sees how bad the contour maps were in 1914. MG

..

[trajan]

"Wanted: someone very familiar with GIS: must be prepared to work for credit, not cash, and able to sustain and suffer numerous barbs from the disgruntled and even the gruntled"

Seriously, this is the right approach. Haven't tried the 3-D but I get the general picture from the contours (hey, those boy scout sessions worked well!).

Trajan

[lostinspace]

Nigel,

Thanks for the response, I have great difficulty keeping in mind that I Corps was supposed to be on the right flank, hindsight always gets in the way. But according to Martin's post of the brigade war diary, the positions were those of the K.O.Y.L.I. and K.O.S.B. not the Suffolk position on the far right; from that I would deduce that the staff officer (from Army H.Q.) indicating the position of the trenches to the French civilians didn't know what he was doing, I always thought it was unlikely that civilians were sent out willy-nilly to dig trenches, but in most accounts it seems like that is what we are expected to believe, trivia, I know, but I'm always drawn to that sort of thing!

Dave

[nigelcave]

Worth bearing in mind that some of II Corps were actually in Le Cateau when the fighting started - the DCLI amongst others IIRC; I think the transport and part of the battalion were not seen again until the Marne - or it might even have ben the Aisne, as they became subsumed into I Corps; some just wandered around for days until they eventually rejoined (feet in a TERRIBLE state for the most part).

There are many factors we have yet to consider: for example, what basis did GHQ use work on the billet lines? Where were the supply dumps, if any; what of the state of rural French roads (for the most part ghastly - the exceptions being the Roman Roads); how many were suitable for the sort of weight that would be put on them; confusion wth French units crossing across teh British line of march meant individual fficers just had to take control of the situation - the allocated length for a division on the march runs into miles; what of the weather conditions; how much time did everyone have to react to the unfolding situation at Mons and its immediate aftermath; what were the French up to (ie Lanrezac, principally); what had von K in mind?

We have a new formation - remembertat the British had only one corps, theoretically, formed in peacetime, based on Aldershot command; staff offciers who did not know each other well (or perhaps too well); units operating together for the first time in any meaningful way; tiny brigade and divisional staffs in any case; very tired (and somewhat battered in several cases, post Mons), hungry, wet men tramping along with the distant (and sometimes not so distant) sound of German guns in the background; very little idea of what was likely to happen next; sore feet; a very high proportion of men in units who had not worked together before (remember the number of reservists ...). Not a happy picture when you think about it.

[Guest]

Nigel,

Thanks for the response, I have great difficulty keeping in mind that I Corps was supposed to be on the right flank, hindsight always gets in the way. But according to Martin's post of the brigade war diary, the positions were those of the K.O.Y.L.I. and K.O.S.B. not the Suffolk position on the far right; from that I would deduce that the staff officer (from Army H.Q.) indicating the position of the trenches to the French civilians didn't know what he was doing, I always thought it was unlikely that civilians were sent out willy-nilly to dig trenches, but in most accounts it seems like that is what we are expected to believe, trivia, I know, but I'm always drawn to that sort of thing!

Dave

2/ KOSB and 2/KOYYLI were both in 13th Inf Bde (with 2/DOWR and 1/QORWKR, To their right (on the very extreme right) were 14th Inf Bde including the 2/Suffolks, 1/East Surreys, DCLI and 2/Manchesters

S/Suffolks and 2/Koyli were side by side separated by the Roman Road but in the most advanced (Northerly) positions - see third map above . When the Suffolks were overrun from the North and East the KOYLI had to face right. Neither battalion got the order to withdraw.

19th Inf Bde (Corps Reserve) were thrown in: 2 A&SH, mainly.

MG

[lostinspace]

Had a look in the K.O.S.B. history, on page 33 it states; 'The high ground south of the Le Cateau-Cambrai road had been prepared for defence by civilians under French military direction. Opinion seemed to vary according to locality as to whether the trenches were well sited.' I suppose the jury is still out as to exactly who sited the Le Cateau lines.

Dave

[charlesmessenger]

Just to add my pennyworth to this most interesting thread, HQ II Corps had only been created after the outbreak of war, unlike HQ I Corps, which was based on Aldershot Command. Smith-Dorrien's men were undoubtedly very tired, especially the reservists, who were not yet fully fit, as the subsequent retreat showed. There was, too, the fog of war, as many posters have made clear. Not only was the French situation unclear, but the Forest of Nieppe physically divorced SD from Haig. The mistaken view at the time was that it was impenetrable to large bodies of troops. Hence SD concluded that his left flank was reasonably secure. Given all these factors, it is understandable why he decided to stand and fight. This might in hindsight have been the wrong decision, but was understandable at the time. It seems to me that it was the handling of the battle of Le Cateau itself, which deserves criticism, especially placing many of the guns in the open because it would encourage the infantry if they could see them.

What is cl;ear is that the original Expeditionary Force was not the finely honed force that tradition has led us to believe. It did have weaknesses, but its individual members were resolute enough to help ensure that the Allied line was not decisively broken.

Charles M

[phil andrade]

What is cl;ear is that the original Expeditionary Force was not the finely honed force that tradition has led us to believe.

Charles M

The same needs to be said of the Germans.

Phil (PJA)

[Guest]

What is cl;ear is that the original Expeditionary Force was not the finely honed force that tradition has led us to believe. It did have weaknesses, but its individual members were resolute enough to help ensure that the Allied line was not decisively broken.

Charles M

Have just started a separate thread on Edmonds' claim of the BEF being the best trained, organised and equipped. etc. MG

[SteveMarsdin]

The same needs to be said of the Germans.

Phil (PJA)

I think the failings of the German cavalry and German intelligence (von Kluck) has already been covered but it is to do a disservice to the BEF not to note that the Germans were better than their opponents in those August encounters, by a margin they never regained.

PS. Phil, since I started typing Martin has wisely started a new thread more relevant to this aspect of the discussion, let's leave this very informative thread to Le Cateau

[salesie]

It seems to me that it was the handling of the battle of Le Cateau itself, which deserves criticism, especially placing many of the guns in the open because it would encourage the infantry if they could see them.

What is cl;ear is that the original Expeditionary Force was not the finely honed force that tradition has led us to believe. It did have weaknesses, but its individual members were resolute enough to help ensure that the Allied line was not decisively broken.

Charles M

Quite right, Charles, the BEF in 1914 did have weaknesses - but, surely, that's a relative concept seeing as the "perfect army" has never entered the field in any conflict? I'm quite happy to say that despite its inherent "faults" the contemptible little army certainly punched above its weight - what better accolade is there for fighting men?

As for the artillery at Le Cateau - for sure, we can all see aspects to criticise if so inclined but one of the problems I have with all this nit-picking is that 100 years on it is impossible for such criticism to be constructive.

Cheers-salesie.

[nigelcave]

Martin: love the overlays.

There is a problem, however; Suffolk Hill had to be occupied - and the ridge running back towards the east of Reumont overlooking the Selle valley. Your proposal would suit a Corps defence line - but it was not a Corps defence ine - it was a two corps defence line: ie the British line extended from II Corps across to I Corps, with the slight problem that there was no one - or no one worth noting - in between the two.

Indeed, it seems to me that the 'sacrifice of the Suffolks, Middlesex, Argylls and KOYLI was, in the end, an essential part of what enabled the 3rd and to some extent the 4th Divs to get away in reasonable order - they had far less satsfactory routes for the retreat than the rather handy Roman Road that the the 5th Div had.

So, on balance, a close run thing, dependent on luck to a great degree but I am far from convinced that there were a great many alternatives in the context of the whole situation and I feel that it is likely that SD would probably have played it the same way - except for comms problems and the location of some of the artillery all over again if he was confronted with the same situation and with the same information that he had at the time.

As regards the choice of SD to replace Grierson - well, SD was just about the only other active officer who had had the Aldershot command - the one and only, putativeand scattered as it was, corps that GB had in peace time. Kitchener's choice seems sensible and at the least rational, especially given the emergency nature of the situation. I wonder how well French got on Grierson?