Le Cateau 1914: Triumph or Disaster?

[Guest]

On 5/13/2014 at 18:30, lostinspace said:

Martin,

To be fair to S.D., by the time the decision to stand was made (in my opinion) there simply wasn't time to make sure the troops were dug in properly, and if I remember correctly some "trenches" had been dug by civilians (instructed by ?), so were likely located on the topographical crest, from what I can tell (Google Earth) the Suffolk position (perhaps the most critical position on the right flank) stuck out like a sore thumb and by afternoon would have been taking fire from German artillery located to the north and east in addition to rifle and machine gun fire, making it almost impossible to resupply them with reinforcements and ammunition (or give them an order to retire). It's a wonder to me that they held out as long as they did. I would be interested to find out what sort of input, if any, the brigade commanders had in locating where their troops were positioned - the few sources available (Haldane, Gleichen, Hunter-Weston) have very little to say about the subject, I suppose the brigade war diaries are similar?

Dave

The Brigade War Diaries are quite detailed and quite revealing of the chaos and intensity (13th Inf Bde on the morning of the 26th);

 

"The KOYLI and KOSB had been located in trenches which had been previously dug. It is not known by whom. These trenches were of the ordinary 3' by 3' type each about 20 to 25 yards long. The siting of these trenches left much to be desired. As the engagement developed they soon proved to be unsuitable for the work in hand and the casualties among the troops occupying them were exceedingly heavy. The general line of the trenches ran along the foot of a long gradual slope towards the front. The fire of the 2nd line in the rear was masked by the front line. There were no trenches for the supports who consequently had to dig in the open or [illegible] such little cover as they were able to construct in the short time available. several of the trenches in the section occupied by the KOYLI were opened to enfilade fire. ..... .....

 

7:30 am. Orders were received that the proposed further retirement of the Division towards ESTREES would not be carried out and that the force would fight in its present position. The dispositions of the Battalion and attached artillery had been made for a rearguard to cover a withdrawal of the Division and were therefore not well suited to the altered conditions. There was no time however to effect any modifications as at 8:15 am the battle opened with a heavy artillery fire. The enemy's artillery fire both shrapnel and high explosive was terrific and lasted continuously until until our troops left the field at about 3:30 pm

 

10:00 am The enemy's infantry advance was seen approaching. This advance never became serious opposite 13th infantry Brigade and was at no time pushed forward with any vigour.

 

Throughout the day the Brigade was in positions from which it could neither move forwards or backwards was subjected to a terrific and increasing hostile artillery fire which continued until the troops left the field at about 3:30 pm.

 

I suspect CAB files will be a gold mine - the correspondence files between the OH team and senior survivors. It really will be a gold mine.

To me the above diary entry simply substantiates my initial thoughts looking through the wrong end of the telescope of time. No time, orders to stand and fight, poor trenches, badly positioned trenches in an exposed enfiladed position with little time to make improvements and little ability to move from the exposed position once the battle had started.

MG

PS. There is tons of this kind of gritty material.

Edited 4 March , 2017 by Guest

[salesie]

The Brigade War Diaries are quite detailed and quite revealing of the chaos and intensity. How about this for starters (13th Inf Bde on the morning of the 26th);

"The KOYLI and KOSB had been located in trenches which had been previously dug. It is not known by whom. These trenches were of the ordinary 3' by 3' type each about 20 to 25 yards long. The siting of these trenches left much to be desired. As the engagement developed they soon proved to be unsuitable for the work in hand and the casualties among the troops occupying them were exceedingly heavy. The general line of the trenches ran along the foot of a long gradual slope towards the front. The fire of the 2nd line in the rear was masked by the front line. There were no trenches for the supports who consequently had to dig in the open or [illegible] such little cover as they were able to construct in the short time available. several of the trenches in the section occupied by the KOYLI were opened to enfilade fire. ..... .....

7:30 am. Orders were received that the proposed further retirement of the Division towards ESTREES would not be carried out and that the force would fight in its present position. The dispositions of the Battalion and attached artillery had been made for a rearguard to cover a withdrawal of the Division and were therefore not well suited to the altered conditions. There was no time however to effect any modifications as at 8:15 am the battle opened with a heavy artillery fire. The enemy's artillery fire both shrapnel and high explosive was terrific and lasted continuously until until our troops left the field at about 3:30 pm

10:00 am The enemy's infantry advance was seen approaching. This advance never became serious opposite 13th infantry Brigade and was at no time pushed forward with any vigour.

Throughout the day the Brigade was in positions from which it could neither move forwards or backwards was subjected to a terrific and increasing hostile artillery fire which continued until the troops left the field at about 3:30 pm.

I suspect CAB files will be a gold mine - the correspondence files between the OH team and senior survivors. It really will be a gold mine.

To me the above diary entry simply substantiates my initial thoughts looking through the wrong end of the telescope of time. No time, orders to stand and fight, poor trenches, badly positioned trenches in an exposed enfiladed position with little time to make improvements and little ability to move from the exposed position once the battle had started.

MG

PS. There is tons of this kind of gritty material.

Doesn't this snippet tell us that your earlier assertions about bad ground being chosen were ill-judged - a change from rear-guard to a determined stand to impart a stopping blow with no time to adjust?

Cheers-salesie

[Steven Broomfield]

The reference in Salesie's post to S-D's conversation with Allenby raises another deciding issue. The Cavalry Division was incapable of screening the retirement.

As alluded-to, Gough had removed his 4th Cavalry Brigade from the control of Allenby and attached himself to his friend Haig's I Corps (taking with him the 11th Hussars from 1st Cavalry Brigade), while de Lisle's 2nd Cavalry Brigade had been scattered by the action at Audregnies on the 26th. Oh his 12 regiments, Allenby probably had control of no more than 5.

I might also add my thought that Gough's actions at le Cateau are questionable. He positioned his enhanced brigade on high ground to the eat of the town, but then moved and ceded it to the Germans without a thought. His retirement, followed by a counter-march back to the action also led to the 11th Hussars losing the better part of the whole of a Squadron (A) which was captured that night as it tried to relocate friendly forces.

I have frequently wondered what effect (if any) Gough having held the high ground might have had.

[salesie]

Salesie - many thanks for posting the SD memoire snippet. It is extremely useful in this debate.

Here are two scenarios : In scenario 1 a commander thinks ahead, anticipates his next move and decides to make a stand. He deliberately chooses the ground he fights on. It is an active choice - the careful selection of ground to optimise its defensive qualities. In Scenario 2 a commander is overwhelmed by rapidly unfolding events mostly beyond his control. He is forced to stand and fight because he has no choice. He does not dictate the ground he fights on. Circumstances do.These are very different scenarios and most would probably agree Le Cateau was an example of the second scenario. In the latter scenarios commander need to make the best of the bad cards they are dealt.

This was not a preconcieved plan. S-D does not go through a process of deliberately selecting the ground. He was not thinking of making a stand at Le Cateau a day or two days previously. Annihilation was not an option. It wasn't even a bad option, it was simply no option. S-D seems to understand this from the narrative above and his citing of FSR is to justify his action interesting in this aspect. Note the use of the word 'circumstances'. This is subtle but important difference. It is important because if the ground is selected for a commander (by circumstances) then it is already sub-optimal and he therefore has to make the very best of the ground that circumstances dictate. I don't think he did make the best decisions particularly on the Right flank. He even states:

"The right, or east flank was certainly turnable, but that did not matter as the I Corps were to go there"

His forced decision and his choice of where his troops were placed was predicated on the belief that I Corps would protect his right flank. So from the outset this part of the plan would not unfold as he expected. If so much of the plan depended on I Corps being present, I ask the question why did he believe this? It might not be S-D's fault that I Corps did not materialise, the reason might lie in other decisions (French?), but if so much depended on this, it seems to me that nothing was done once he discovered I Corps would not be arriving. In fact the battle unfolded more-or less as he feared: his right flank was turned and systematically rolled up with considerable loss. If this was the biggest single weakness in the plan why did S-D gamble with the disposition of his troops in the open? He surely must have considered the possibility that I Corps might arrive late, or even not arrive at all. There seems to be nothing in his thought process (see his account) or actions that accommodated this possibility. Commanders are constantly asking themselves 'what if?' I wonder what his answer would have been if asked 'what if I Corps fail to materialise?' It is here I see the primary weakness.

Back to the Future. There seems to be some objection to even dare theorise about what could have been done differently. There are comments that its is all too easy to criticise with the benefit of hindsight. Of course it is easy, and of course hindsight gives us benefit but that should not prevent us from studying the past and learning from it. Constructive analysis and criticism and debate can often open our eyes and help us see further. War Diaries were part of Army Regulations. The central reason for keeping War Diaries is that campaigns could be studied and lessons could be learned so that the same mistakes were not repeated. The gathering of the War Diaries was a continuous process throughout the War. The British Army has continually used critiques of past operations to teach its Officer Corps during training its Military Academies, and both divisions of Staff College. It has a military history department - incidentally full of academics who have never served in the military, yet curiously enough the British Military sees value in their analysis, criticism and writings. So much so that they let them loose on their officer corps to teach them. During and after the war had the Historical Section produce the Official Histories it took 33 years to complete the 29 volumes. These monumental tomes were critical analyses of the campaigns. They were not simply written as narrative of what happened, the often explored the 'what ifs' and analysed what went wrong and why it went wrong. They did so because that was part of their raison d'etre. If we don't study the past and learn from it we are condemned to repeat the mistakes. In complex campaigns and actions it is impossible for one man to be aware of every factor. Smith-Dorrien had no idea what was happening on parts of his battlefield and it was probably not until the OH was written that anyone really had the full picture. I am simply baffled why people rail against analysis years after the events. It can be a positive thing.

MG

Reinforce the right wing in case I Corps didn't appear? Where would he get them from? He didn't have the whole of the BEF at his disposal (though the Germans thought he had after the action) - he only managed to obtain a reserve very shortly before the action actually began.

Here's another snippet from Smith-Dorrien's memoirs - this piece is taken from immediately before the earlier one I posted and refers to the movements from Mons to Le Cateau, perhaps this explains his thoughts on I Corps:

Cheers-salesie,

"

At 6 p.m., hearing the Chief had come up from Le Cateau to his advanced Head-quarters at Bavai, I sought him out and found him in the Mairie, and, describing the action of the II Corps and its positions, asked for instructions as to our further retirement. The Chief replied that I could do as I liked, but that Haig intended to start at 5 a.m. I remonstrated, saying that unless we moved early we should have a repetition of that day (the 24th) when orders had been issued too late to avoid the enemy coming to close grips. He asked me what I proposed. I replied that I wished to start off my impedimenta, which had already been in bivouac several hours, soon after midnight, followed by the troops at such times as would ensure my rear-guards being south of the Valenciennes-Jenlain—Bavai road by 5 a.m. Sir John concurred, remarking that Haig could still do as he intended. I then crossed the room to the table where Sir Archibald Murray, the Chief of the Staff, was working, and asked him to induce the Chief to issue an order for the whole force to move early and simultaneously. Murray said he would see what he could do later on, and he was evidently successful, for an order was issued, timed 8.25 p.m., ordering the B.E.F. to move to the Le Cateau position and to be clear of the Jenlain-Bavai-Maubeuge road by 5.30 a.m. Soon after midnight the transport, reserve ammunition columns, etc., were on the move, and by 5.30 a.m„ in accordance with G.H.Q. orders, my rear-guards were endeavouring to leave the Jenlain-Bavai-Maubeuge road, but the whole Corps was delayed somewhat by the passage of General Sordet's Cavalry Corps, which, ordered to the west of the Le Cateau position, was moving from east to west. It will be seen from the order that the boundary, east of which I could not go, which separated the I and II Corps in this day's march, was the very straight road from Bavai to Montay, which latter place is one mile short of the town of Le Cateau. On the I Corps side of this road is the forest of Mormal, devoid of practicable roads leading in the direction in which the B.E.F. was moving; consequently the I Corps had to march on the east side of this forest and to maintain communication with the II Corps through it—a matter of supreme difficulty. As a matter of fact, I heard nothing of the I Corps throughout the day. No information was sent me by G.H.Q. concerning it, and I imagined that all was going well and we should join upon the Le Cateau position in the evening according to orders.

The nearest part of the Le Cateau position was some two miles beyond the town, and as the II would occupy the western half and the I Corps the eastern half, the distances we had to march were about the same. In any case it was a very long march with troops worn out with incessant fighting and by lack of sleep, for by the shortest road over twenty miles had to be covered and as much as twenty-five by the longest.

I heard, some time afterwards, that the I Corps had had considerable difficulties to deal with, for although but little interfered with by the enemy, they had had to cross and recross the Sambre and to share roads with French troops retiring in the same direction, and further that they had been some hours late in starting that morning, with the result that they had only reached the line Landrecies-Maroilles-Marbaix when night overtook them and they had gone into billets, thus leaving a dangerous gap of eight miles between the two Corps. These delays were quite unknown to me at the time, and, as I record later, it will be seen that I counted on the I Corps coming into line with us on the Le Cateau position in accordance with G.H.Q. operation order, and that I sent back weary troops to the east side of the town of Le Cateau to look out for them and to guard the flank until they appeared.

Whatever the cause, the delay was of very serious moment to the II Corps, and indeed to the whole B.E.F. Had it not occurred the actions at Landrecies and Maroilles would not have taken place, and, instead of being out of touch with each other for the next six days, the two Corps would have had a united front on the night of 25th August under the hand of the C.-in-C. and the decision to fight at Le Cateau would not have rested with me. As things were, however, as will be seen later, the news that the I Corps was heavily engaged and the fear that their safety might be endangered unless the II Corps made a stand, though not the deciding factor, carried weight with me in coming to the decision I took in the small hours of the morning of the 26th.

It is evident that the G.O.C. I Corps considered his situation serious, for I see in the Official History that at 1.35 a.m. on the 26th he reported it as critical to General Head-quarters, at 3.30 a.m. he asked that troops near Le Cateau should advance straight on Landrecies to assist him, and further that he issued an order to his troops to dump supplies so that wagons might be freed to carry men's packs. These facts, given in the Official History, lead me to believe that the battle of Le Cateau must have prevented the situation in the I Corps from becoming even more critical."

[Guest]

On 5/13/2014 at 20:48, salesie said:

Doesn't this snippet tell us that your earlier assertions about bad ground being chosen were ill-judged - a change from rear-guard to a determined stand to impart a stopping blow with no time to adjust?

Cheers-salesie

No. I dont think it does. The inference is that this was vital ground and had to be occupied. They did not have to occupy it. It was a terrible position. Nothing was right. This is where he did have a choice. Smith-Dorrien could have chosen instead to defend it more deeply or not occupy the exposed position at all. He chose to occupy the same lines that the units on the ground recognised as being unsuitable. It is possible he could have withdrawn his line to the reverse slope. He effectively had 13th Inf Bde in shallow trenches on a forward slope with hardly any cover. The trenches were in the wrong place even for a rearguard action if I read the entry correctly. Standing and fighting is one thing, but doing it in such an exposed position was tantamount to inviting a catastrophe. ...and for the KOYLI and Suffolks and most of the artillery on the right flank it was.

 

I think he must have realised how precarious it was once he knew I Corps were not coming, and accepted that 13th Bde would be partially sacrificed. It is worth considering what else he could have done on that flank.

 

Looking at the time line, the Bde diary records being told they would stand and fight at 7:30 am and the artillery opened up 8:15 am. Smith-Dorrien spent hours (I will revert with the exact number *) trying to locate French. Valuable hours that were delaying the decision. If French had put himself closer to Smith Dorrien things might have been different. I will try and work out how many hours were wasted. I don't have a vendetta against Smith-Dorrien. I think he did most things right and given the terrible hand he was dealt played it pretty well. There were however tactical errors on the right flank in my view. Arguably these cascaded out of French's dithering in the previous three days so French and his staff might be culpable. The situation was fluid and running fast and yet the key commanders on the ground were completely out ot touch with each other. French had not even bothered to tell Smith-Dorrien where he might he heading and it was only Smith-Dorrien's intuition that allowed him to track French down. Valuable hours that could hve been used for a better defence. The Suffolks arrived in position at 4:30 which means they would have had nearly four hours had they known wht the objective was. The KOYLI arrived at 4:00 am. So had 4:15 mins before the first shot was fired. These are critical decisions that were delayed by a breakdown in command and control at the highest level of the BEF.

 

* Edit. The time line does not reveal how much time was wasted looking for French. S-D records he got to Fergusson at 5th Div at 4:00 am and the Battalion diaries do not record getting the order until 7:30 which seems like an inordinate amount of time to get the message from Div to Bde to battalions. If the timings are correct, Fergusson knew about the plan as his troops were arriving in the position. Again, valuable time wasted.

MG

Edited 4 March , 2017 by Guest

[salesie]

No. I dont think it does. The inference is that this was vital ground and had to be occupied. They did not have to occupy it. It was a terrible position. Nothing was right. This is where he did have a choice. D-S could have chosen instead to defend it more deeply or not occupy the exposed position at all. He chose to occupy the same lines that the units on the ground recognised as being unsuitbale. Is is possible he could have withdrawn his line to the reverse slope. He effectively had 13th Inf Bde in shallow trenches on a forward slope with hardly any cover. The trenches were in the wrong place even for a rearguard action if I read the entry correctly. Standing and fighting is one thing, but doing it in such an exposed position was tantamount to inviting a catastrophe. ...and for the KOYLI and Suffolks and most of the artillery on the right flank it was.

I think he must have realised how precarious it was once he knew I corps were not coming, and accepted that 13th Bde would be partially sacrificed. It is worth considering what else he could have done on that flank.

Looking at the time line, the Bde diary records being told they would stand and fight at 7:30 am and the artillery opened up 8:15 am. Smith-Dorrien spent hours (I will revert with the exact number) trying to locate French. Valuable hours that were delaying the decision. If French had put himself closer to Smith Dorrien things might have been different. I will try and work out how many hours were wasted. I don't have a vendetta against Smith-Dorrien. I think he did most things right and given the terrible hand he was dealt played it pretty well. There were however tactical errors on the right flank in my view. Arguably these cascaded out of French's dithering in the previous three days so French and his staff might be culpable. The situation was fluid and running fast and yet the key commanders on the ground were completely out ot touch with each other. French had not even bothered to tell Smith-Dorrien where he might he heading and it was only Smith-Dorrien's intuition that allowed him to track French down. Valuable hours that could hve been used for a better defence. The Suffolks arrived in position at 4:30 which means they would have had nearly four hours had they known wht the objective was. The KOYLI arrived at 4:00 am. So had 4:15 mins before the first shot was fired. These are critical decisions that were delayed by a breakdown in command and control at the highest level of the BEF.

MG

I think you're missing a vital point, MG - a point made several times in this thread already i.e. that it was not the intention to stand at Le Cateau, they were to retire beyond it but rapidly changing circumstances made the order to retire redundant. The Germans, with a determined and rapid follow up from Mons, changed everything - as has been pointed out several times; there was no time to bolster defences and choose ideal ground.

For sure, Smith-Dorrien tried to find French for several hours but how did that make a difference? Allenby only arrived at Smith-Dorrien's HQ with the full picture in the early hours (well after the chase for French ended) and only then was the decision to fight made not before. Exhausted men, been retreating, fighting and marching for two whole days, who arrive at their hastily decided new positions just before dawn (hastily chosen by dire necessity), expecting to be attacked at any moment, and you think they could have substantially improved their defences and/or found better ground in four short hours?

I've been accused of treating your assertions with disdain - is there any wonder?

Cheers-salesie.

[Guest]

On 5/13/2014 at 21:45, salesie said:

and you think they could have substantially improved their defences and/or found better ground in four short hours?

I've been accused of treating your assertions with disdain - is there any wonder?

Cheers-salesie.

Salesie

1. I don't think I have missed anything. I know there was no intention to stand at Le Cateau. I think there was time. It was simply wasted. The knock-on effect was that the Right Flank position didn't stand a chance - as S-D suspected it could be turned and it was turned. QED. I don't see any advantage in losing the best part of two battalions simply because they were dropped into 3' x 3' trenches, dug by the locals with no military knowledge, that were so badly place the second line couldn't shoot for fear of hitting the front line, which was placed at the very front edge of a low forward slope with no ability to retreat or reinforce and shelled and machine-gunned continuously from 8:15 am until the 3.30 pm - over seven hours of constant shelling. Call me a traditionalist but I think that was an appalling decision and I think there was time to do something about it between 04:00 and 08:15. I I think S-D and his subordinates could have chosen to move to a reverse slope position and dug in in the 4 hours they had. It really is that simple. It was an atrocious choice of ground and had absolutely no redeeming features. If you don't believe me I would suggest you download the 13th and 14th Inf Bde diaries because they show the consequences in fairly graphic detail.

 

2. Yes I do think they could have improved the position.

 

3. I don't understand the last part particularly the invidious remark at the end. You need to pick that point up with whoever is accusing you. I have no interest in anything other than polite debate. If you have some respect for people you disagree with, discussions tend to develop into something interesting. For some reason my PM box is jammed.

 

Thank you for taking the time to post more of Smith Dorrien's memoirs. It has been very useful and educational. Can I politely ask do you believe every word of it? And do you think there is any chance that his memoires written with hindsight and in the light of the oft quoted OH, itself a repository of biased views might in some way distort his recollections? Is there any scope in your mind that any part of this might be inaccurate or self serving?

 

I only ask this as having worked on rather a lot of first hand accounts, the more senior the person the more distorted their views are of their own personal experiences. . I think arguing a case based on the memoirs of one person is potentially quite fraught with risk - which is why I have spent so much time creating a broad and deep database for the BEF so that it does not rely on one account. I have not analysed S-D's memoirs but will for sure as soon as time permits and I suspect they will be riddled with conflicting info, which in themselves will each deserve some debate.

 

I sense my reluctance to hero-worship Smith-Dorrien is going to make me a heretic. He seems to me a rather significant architect of the mythology surrounding the sacred and hallowed ground of The Retreat from Mons. Nothing I have read so far tells me that his is credited with too much for Le Cateau. I do not mean to disparage his undeniable achievements but I think his the bright lights of his success can sometimes blind us to the slightly darker parts of his career.

 

We may have to agree to disagree and move on.

MG

Edited 4 March , 2017 by Guest

[phil andrade]

I've been accused of treating your assertions with disdain - is there any wonder?

Cheers-salesie.

Being the person that accused you, I must state that it was your disdain for Martin's EFFORT that I find hard to stomach. Assertions are a different matter.

Martin thanked you for your effort in presenting us with SD's account.

Phil (PJA)

[salesie]

I sense my reluctance to hero-worship Smith-Dorrien is going to make me a heretic. He seems to me a rather significant architect of the mythology surrounding the sacred and hallowed ground of The Retreat from Mons. Nothing I have read so far tells me that his is credited with too much for Le Cateau. I do not mean to disparage his undeniable achievements but I think his the bright lights of his success can sometimes blind us to the slightly darker parts of his career.

We may have to agree to disagree and move on.

MG

No hero worship, MG, and I do understand the dangers of relying on memoirs but I also understand the inherent flaws of war diaries - do you think they were actually written while bullets and shells were whizzing around? Many contradictions and plenty of hyperbole can be found in war diaries (they're famous for it). Now, the account of this action in Smith-Dorrien's memoirs is easily checkable with other accounts and I can tell you that his words are pretty accurate - and, in this instance, I'm going to stick with the words of a real fighting general not an armchair one whose been on a TEWT course and read plenty of war diaries.

Cheers-salesie.

[phil andrade]

I'm going to stick with the words of a real fighting general not an armchair one whose been on a TEWT course and read plenty of war diaries.Cheers-salesie.[/quote

That's not only disdainful, but antagonistic.

Phil (PJA)

[Guest]

Salesie

No I don't think the diaries were written when bullets were flying around. If you have the time you may wish to trawl my postings on this subject. I'll say it again; The diaries are not reliable as stand-alone documents. They were often written days or even weeks after the events and were often transcribed by the diarist from notebooks. Sometimes the diaries were lost and had to be reconstructed from memory and notebooks. Occasionally they are either substituted or supplemented with personal diary accounts. Authors changed frequently, writing styles changed and the level of detail changed frequently. Relying on a single diary is something I would not recommend, however sometimes it is the only contemporary document there is.

 

If one looks at an action of one small group of units - take the 13th Inf Bde Le Cateau as a good example, there are five diaries that we can use to make comparisons - the HQ 13th Inf Bde and the four battalion diaries. When transcribed into a spreadsheet (dates running top to bottom, units running left to right) we can easily compare account day by day and sometimes hour by hour, cross checking timings, locations and the minute details of these accounts. If for example four out of the five agreed on a particular point -timing of say the artillery barrage starting - and one diary had it starting an hour later, then in this case we might reasonably conclude the out-lier recorded the time incorrectly. Simple stuff. We can also analyse more complex actions - say for example where the line broke and troops retired. Often diarists are keen to show it was not their battalion that broke first, but a neighbouring battalion and they were forced to retire because their flank was 'in the air'. When we compare five diaries it is often very clear who is confabulating and who is telling the truth. I have seen simply scores of examples of this and can post as many as you wish. The diaries are simply riddled with episodes such as this. Again, simple stuff, but something that is not apparent when reading the standalone diary that has distorted events.

 

The ability to compare across dates is quite useful. As the number of diaries recording one event increases, our ability to compare increases exponentially. In the case of the 13th Inf Bde and the 2/KOYLI as an example we have more sources. A subaltern's personal diary, the CO' personal diary - 3,001 words on Le Cateau alone -, the CO's extensive correspondence with the OH historian Atkinson. This makes at least eight sources. In this case it becomes really interesting as two of the accounts are written by the same person and they don't completely align. In this case it provides a good starting point to challenge the integrity of the account(s). When one has 147 diaries it becomes even more powerful. There is another thread running on the Christmas Truce of 1914 and an alleged football match. I am pretty confident it didn't happen as not one of the 147 diaries of infantry units in the front line records it. Not even in the diaries of the units alleged to have taken part, yet there are newspaper article quoting men who claimed it happened. It is a good example of the power of such a comprehensive database.

 

I have also digitised every unit published history and had then OCR'd and turned into searchable documents. These are also time-line pasted into the spreadsheets so I can compare the five unit diaries and three personal accounts with the four relevant Regimental histories. This becomes more interesting as the published material is sometimes quite different from the raw diary material. Stories change and get massaged to enhance unit and personal reputations further. In this example it becomes even more interesting as the author of the KOYLI history was Lt Col Bond - the CO who also wrote the two slightly differing personal accounts. Not surprisingly the published version (effectively his personal published memoir for this episode) is different in some detail.

 

Here is the crux: If I had used any of these single accounts - War Diaries, personal diaries or published histories - any one of them looks and feels as if it is a reliable document. As stand-alone documents they appear to be accurate records, however it is only when we compare the accounts that we begin to see the flaws in some of them. Occasionally we discover accounts that can easily be proven to be at best confabulation and at worst fabrication.

 

Published memoirs have an agenda. They are written in hindsight often years after the events with the primary aim of enhancing the author's reputation. The memoirs of some fairly senior politicians have shown all these hallmarks - Lloyd George, Churchill, and some fairly senior generals - Hamilton for example; People with an agenda aimed at defending or enhancing their reputations. Edit: The Marquess of Anglesey describing French's "1914": "Depressingly often his 1914 is a tissue of untruths and unwarranted self justifications".

For all the reasons above I treat any written material with a high degree of skepticism which rises the more important the person was and rises especially if it is published.

 

So, in summary I would simply argue that the more material one uses the greater the chances are of getting to the truth. Relying on a stand-alone memoir can on occasion be quite risky. I would be interested to know which accounts you have compared Smith-Dorrien's to to corroborate his account? I am sure his is pretty accurate, but if you have checked against other sources I wonder if there are any areas of conflict with other accounts?

 

I'll say it again: I am not an armchair general. I am simply interested in military history. Let's agree to disagree and please spare me the thinly veiled insults.

 

MG

Edited 4 March , 2017 by Guest

[Steven Broomfield]

I'm going to stick with the words of a real fighting general not an armchair one whose been on a TEWT course and read plenty of war diaries.Cheers-salesie.[/quote

That's not only disdainful, but antagonistic.

Phil (PJA)

It's what he does, Phil. He's good at it but the sad thing is that if he didn't reduce any discussion to the level of a bar-room brawl salesie's contributions might be useful. Sadly, salesie's not interested in discussion and debate. Personally I found a long time ago is the best way to deal with him is pretend he's not there. Don't respond to his bullying. I suspect he has no support and little credibility, so don't fuss yourself.

Anyone have any thoughts on my post 78?

[phil andrade]

.

Anyway, back to Le Cateau, does anyone have any idea of what proportion of the POWs were wounded?

MG

Here you are, Martin, from Antony Bird's book GENTLEMEN, WE WILL STAND AND FIGHT, pages 181-182 :

Of the more than 100 Le Cateau officers held captive in Torgau ( officer) prison camp, 70 per cent were suffering from wounds of one sort or another.

Edit : Would it be fair to suggest that the proportion among officers was a good deal higher than it was for the men ? Officers more determined to stay behind ?

Phil (PJA)

[Guest]

Here you are, Martin, from Antony Bird's book GENTLEMEN, WE WILL STAND AND FIGHT, pages 181-182 :

Of the more than 100 Le Cateau officers held captive in Torgau ( officer) prison camp, 70 per cent were suffering from wounds of one sort or another.

Edit : Would it be fair to suggest that the proportion among officers was a good deal higher than it was for the men ? Officers more determined to stay behind ?

Phil (PJA)

Phil thanks - I am not sure at Le Cateau that the Officers were more prone to being wounded. The prisoners were largely from the Battalions that were overrun. They had been in shallow trenches and subjected to MG fire and continuous shelling for around 7 hours. Shrapnel, percussion injuries (burst lung) from proximal HE and enfilade MG fire with a large beaten zone are rather indiscriminate weapons. The samples are very small but I was rather surprised by the very low killed v wounded ratios and the high proportion of non-fatal casualties overall. Lots of people incapacitated but quite low numbers (absolute and relative) killed which I think could be a characteristic of area weapons and the type of action (defensive rather than offensive bayonet charging against fixed positions). This seems to have been largely an artillery duel with the PBI sitting ducks.

Suffering a non-fatal wound in a rear-guard action of course increases the chances of becoming a POW so I am not surprised about the 70%. Also being cut off and refusing to surrender might well increase the casualty rate. Maybe that's a circular argument.

Thanks

MG

[Guest]

The reference in Salesie's post to S-D's conversation with Allenby raises another deciding issue. The Cavalry Division was incapable of screening the retirement.

As alluded-to, Gough had removed his 4th Cavalry Brigade from the control of Allenby and attached himself to his friend Haig's I Corps (taking with him the 11th Hussars from 1st Cavalry Brigade), while de Lisle's 2nd Cavalry Brigade had been scattered by the action at Audregnies on the 26th. Oh his 12 regiments, Allenby probably had control of no more than 5.

I might also add my thought that Gough's actions at le Cateau are questionable. He positioned his enhanced brigade on high ground to the eat of the town, but then moved and ceded it to the Germans without a thought. His retirement, followed by a counter-march back to the action also led to the 11th Hussars losing the better part of the whole of a Squadron (A) which was captured that night as it tried to relocate friendly forces.

I have frequently wondered what effect (if any) Gough having held the high ground might have had.

Steven My only thought is that every Regiment in the 1st Cav Div has Le Cateau as a Battle Honour which seems at odds with their dispositions as you have described. I assumed that they eventually regrouped, When Allenby decided to fight with S-D did he know the other units intended to regroup ie. was there any prospect of having a Cav Div level screen later in the day or did Allenby simply offer what he had immediately available. If Gough was acting independently it perhaps highlights the importance of command and control.

I will have to see what the Marquess thought....

MG

[phil andrade]

Martin,

That low killed v wounded ratio is surely a function of the inflated overall total ?

The 7,812 figure - I would guess - is a bit suspect ; probably lumps into it thousands of stragglers who were taken prisoner in the ensuing days.

Taking your excellent graph as a source ( thank you for that ) it looks as if 800 dead might be attributable to the battle. That probably includes some died from wounds. Two thousand wounded - or thereabouts - would apply, allowing for the 2.5 multiple that might be expected. It really does look as if, in terms of bloodshed, the BEF gave as good as it got, more or less.

The book that I've quoted from above cites a British Staff College " official" estimate of German casualties for the battle : 8,930. Three times the Zuber figure.

This is a case of what the British wanted the German loss to have been, rather than what it actually was. Jack's research endorses this.

There is something innately glamorous about Smith- Dorrien. His exotic association with Isandlwhana ( that WAS a lucky escape) and the detestation between him and his boss, lends that extra something to the story of the campaign. And, let's face it, there's nothing like the image of a hard pressed army deciding to stop running and making a stand. Real Band of Brothers stuff.....echoes of Agincourt : being fought on the anniversary of Crecy amplifies the appeal.

' ORRACE, YOUR FOR 'ISTORY !

Phil (PJA)

[Guest]

Does anyone have any character descriptions of S-D written by the men he served with. I don't know anything about his character at all. Presumably someone wrote a long eulogy when he died. Times obit. that sort of thing. Ditto French.

I really had little feel for the levels of animosity between the senior men at the time.

[paulgranger]

Martin

You probably already have 'The Man Who Disobeyed' by A J Smithers, which might point to some personal views about S-D?

[Guest]

Martin

You probably already have 'The Man Who Disobeyed' by A J Smithers, which might point to some personal views about S-D?

Paul. Thanks for highlighting this. I don't have it. Would be illuminating to get some quotes....MG

[hazelclark]

I have been thoroughly enjoying this thread. Witness it is 3 a.m. and I got up to make a cup of tea and continue the saga of Le Cateau. Like Amiens, of recent mention, my information on the subject is sketchy at best, but reading the various "Histories" does leave one with an "impression" gained, in my case by some sort of osmosis. However, having read several threads of this type, engaged in, largely by people who seem to know their onions, and read oodles of WW1 books, I have come to the conclusion that when one thinks that one has finally come to understand a certain situation, the woodwork starts to come alive. All kinds of new information, new interpretations and aspersions cast on what I had taken to be gospel since it seems to me to be straight from the horses mouth. I was always taught to go back to the original documents to get at the truth. But if the "truth" turns out to be doctored, even when it has had corroboration from other involved parties, how can we ever know the "true" truth? I recently read a book by Terraine in which he largely uses original documents to support his view, only to find that claims are made that some of these documents are incorrect and others taken totally out of context.

I have now come to the conclusion that if one digs deeply enough, one can find supporting evidence for just about any point of view. To a novice who is not an historian, this is extremely confusing. However, i will continue to monitor the various threads and at least get some ideas about who had axes to grind in their reporting. It is most disconcerting when one's idols turn out to have feet of clay.

Hazel

[Guest]

Anyone have any thoughts on my post 78?

The Marquess is surprisingly silent on this question...A few choice snippets used by the Marquess of Anglesey describing the situation and some comments on Gough;

"from this moment on [dusk on 25th Aug] the Cavalry Division became so split up that all staff work broke down. On both 25th and 26th there was a more or less total lack of communication between Allenby's headquarters and his units"

"That night [25th Aug] Gough telephoned GHQ...he asked for information and for instructions. Wilson answered him thus: 'As you are on the spot do what you like, old boy!"

Anglesey on S-D: "Much has been made of the idea that he disobeyed French's orders but this is hardly true and he anyway had no alternative"

Anglesey on French: " Depressingly often his 1914 is a tissue of untruths and unwarranted self justifications"

"Both Chetwode and Barrow believed that Gough only escaped censure and probable dismissal because of his friendship with French and Haig. His insubordination may have been of of the factors that counted against him when he was sacked...."

Ref the II Corps Right Flank: "There parts of de Lisle's command performed a rather haphazard flank protection while more effectively Gough's 3rd Brigade ...played quite an important part in this respect"

"Edmonds [Author of the OH 1914 Part 1] then a junior staff officer thought 'Allenby's staff were useless. They never knew where his brigades were'".

"The Cavalry Division's total casualties for the day were only fourteen showing that it took little part in the battle. Nevertheless it was believed at GHQ that the Cavalry Division had been almost totally destroyed!"

[lostinspace]

Martin,

A lot of activity on this thread overnight, well, overnight here anyway, I think Steven has the right idea as far as Mr. Salesie is concerned, I've noticed that strategy working in previous threads. In regards to S.D.'s character, about the only consistent trait ascribed to him that I can think of is his temper, usually described as "volcanic".

Dave

[Steven Broomfield]

"Edmonds [Author of the OH 1914 Part 1] then a junior staff officer thought 'Allenby's staff were useless.

As the division had no pre-war existence, I suppose that's not entirely to be a surprise. Gough was certainly no help to Allenby: he allegedly disliked Allenby immensely and did all he could to align himself with Haig, and his command of 3rd Brigade (sorry, I said 4th in post 78) was odd at Le Cateau - occupying high ground and then leaving it, before directing one of his regiments back again. very poor command and control. Briggs' 1st Brigade had lost a regiment to Gough, and the 2nd Brigade had been (temporarily) ruined by De Lisle's actions on the 26th, so there probably was little Allenby could do.

Remember also that the Cavalry Division had given more than adequate warning to French before Mons, only to have it disregarded - there may well have been a small amount of despondency at Div HQ, too!

[paulgranger]

Paul. Thanks for highlighting this. I don't have it. Would be illuminating to get some quotes....MG

Martin

I may have given the impression that I have the book, but sadly not, and current ABE Book prices put it down my list of wants for the moment. Hopefully other interested parties on the thread have access to it.

[Guest]

As the division had no pre-war existence, I suppose that's not entirely to be a surprise. Gough was certainly no help to Allenby: he allegedly disliked Allenby immensely and did all he could to align himself with Haig, and his command of 3rd Brigade (sorry, I said 4th in post 78) was odd at Le Cateau - occupying high ground and then leaving it, before directing one of his regiments back again. very poor command and control. Briggs' 1st Brigade had lost a regiment to Gough, and the 2nd Brigade had been (temporarily) ruined by De Lisle's actions on the 26th, so there probably was little Allenby could do.

Remember also that the Cavalry Division had given more than adequate warning to French before Mons, only to have it disregarded - there may well have been a small amount of despondency at Div HQ, too!

The other Cavalry factor is that the 4th and 5th Infantry Divs were deprived of their Cavalry - A and B Sqns of the 19th Hussars which were ordered to join the Cavalry Div on 24th Aug thus depriving these divisions of their mobile reconnaissance. Even Edmonds describes this as "a deplorable order" in the OH. Anglesey believes this had an impact on events at Le Cateau but does not expand on this. The 3rd Divs Cavalry (15th Hussars) was 'virtually wiped out' when ambushed at Blagnies according to The Marquess (page 125).

Martin

I may have given the impression that I have the book, but sadly not, and current ABE Book prices put it down my list of wants for the moment. Hopefully other interested parties on the thread have access to it.

Comprende. But thanks for the pointer. MG