Le Cateau 1914: Triumph or Disaster?

[Steven Broomfield]

. The 3rd Divs Cavalry (15th Hussars) was 'virtually wiped out' when ambushed at Blagnies according to The Marquess (page 125).

I'll have a look in the regimental history this evening. From memory it was A Squadron of the 15th.

[Guest]

More evidence of poor defence work and the hard yards immediately before the artillery opened up. Note the timing differences when recording the start of the bombardment 9:00 v 8:15 reported elsewhere.

1st Bn Queen's Own Royal West Kent Regt.

26th Aug 1914. 4:00 am Battalion moved off its bivouac ground and shortly afterwards took up a position in rear of the 2nd Bn KING'S OWN YORKSHIRE LIGHT INF. Trenches had to be dug with the light entrenching implements and a very few tools in possession of the 13th INF BDE HQ. All those in possession of the Battalion having been lost in the withdrawal from ST GHISLAIN. Good progress was made, and trenches giving cover for shell fire, but which were so sited that they could not be used as fire trenches were constructed in about 1.5 hrs.

9:00 am German artillery opened fire on the BRITISH line which extended east and west through LE CATEAU (the 13th INF BDE being on the west side of this town, and about 2 miles from it). A vigorous artillery duel ensued and this was followed by the German MG fire. (Ref Map LAON FT 22).

Several of our guns were put out of action and that part of the line of Infantry to then eastward of the 13th INF BDE was forced to retire from their trenches in the direction of REUMONT. An order had previous to this, been received to the effect that the British force would not retire at 11:00 am as previously ordered, but would hold onto the position.

2:00 pm Orders were now received from the Brigadier that the Brigade would retire from the trenches in the direction of REUMONT. The Battalion came under heavy shrapnel and rifle fire during the retirement but suffered comparatively little loss. Capt R M G TULLOCH was wounded in the face. The Battalion continued the retirement on ESTRÉES, the rear bodies of troops reaching that place at about 9:00 pm.

The information was to the effect that the GERMAN forces were still following up our rear and orders were received that the retirement would be continued at 2:00 am the 26th inst

[David Ridgus]

Does anyone have any character descriptions of S-D written by the men he served with. I don't know anything about his character at all. Presumably someone wrote a long eulogy when he died. Times obit. that sort of thing. Ditto French.

I really had little feel for the levels of animosity between the senior men at the time.

This from Richard Holmes 'Riding the retreat'

French asked for Plumer to replace Grierson, Kitchener sent SD, "It was a deeply controversial choice. The bad relations between French and Smith Dorrien were, as Major-General Sir Charles Callwell recognised, 'almost a matter of common knowledge within the service', and Kitchener knew that French cherished 'great jealousy of and personal animosity towards' Smith Dorrien,...He (SD) was a deeply moral man...and made no secret of his disapproval of the Field-Marshal's light cavalry lifestyle" (What a typical Holmes flourish at the end there!)

He also goes on to say that there was no doubt of his "military competence or popularity with the rank and file - who knew him as 'Smith-Doreen'"

David

[David Ridgus]

Like Hazel i have found this thread fascinating reading, although as someone who has always rather liked Smith-Dorrien it has been a bit depressing.

I have no expertise in military matters and I am certainly not going to stick my head above the parapet on the main thrust of this thread. However I wonder if non-experts like me have traditionally leaned towards S-D because of the patent unfairness of his subsequent treatment by French and by a general antipathy towards the Commander in Chief who just seems like a bit of a wrong un', and not a very good General either.

But as I say a decision based on emotion and not clouded by anything as intrusive as facts!

David

[Guest]

Like Hazel i have found this thread fascinating reading, although as someone who has always rather liked Smith-Dorrien it has been a bit depressing.

I have no expertise in military matters and I am certainly not going to stick my head above the parapet on the main thrust of this thread. However I wonder if non-experts like me have traditionally leaned towards S-D because of the patent unfairness of his subsequent treatment by French and by a general antipathy towards the Commander in Chief who just seems like a bit of a wrong un', and not a very good General either.

But as I say a decision based on emotion and not clouded by anything as intrusive as facts!

David

I think there is an element of cometh the moment cometh the man. In the context of the background at the time, French was detached in all senses, and Haig's I Corps had barely been engaged. Smith-Dorrien was in the right place at the right time and got the right result. History has treated him kindly - everyone likes a winner. I can't help thinking that there wasn't much competition for the role of hero of the British Army at the time. In the immediate aftermath

there were some detractors in the higher echelons of the Army, particularly within the BEF who at the time who argued he took an enormous risk; had it gone wrong the II Corps would have been destroyed.

I believe Edmonds was a supporter and wrote about him in the OH 1914 Part 1 (1922) in very positive terms, which may well have started or - at least helped - his broader popularity in the post war years. Edmonds (I think) was GSO 1 4th Div so would have had a fairly good feel for events and would have had the ear of a number of key players.

Digging a bit deeper one only has to barely scratch the surface to find the General Staff of the BEF seemed to be a political viper's nest. It is a whole new horizon for me - exploring the machinations behind the scenes. The intrigue and back-stabbing reads like Julius Caesar. The wars between the generals are almost as exciting as the campaign. Quite eye-opening and quite expensive as I have just had to buy seven books which have to be smuggled past the memsahib. Delivery date carefully chosen for recycling bin-day to jettison the evidence.

I read that Forestier-Walker tried to resign in the middle of the retreat his relationship with SD was so bad. If anyone knows of any memoirs written by and II Corps staff I would be grateful for the pointer. Someone who had a ringside seat must have put pen to paper. I suspect that SD was such a strong character that people loved him or hated him. The volcanic temper is an interesting characteristic.

Why has the BBC not done a documentary on this. It has everything a drama needs. And more. I do think Aug-Oct 1914 is a simply fascinating period. Far more interesting than I ever believed it would be. I may never get to 1915 at this rate.

MG.

Warning Order: Indian Army Corps coming to a thread near you very soon. Stand by.

[Steven Broomfield]

Warning Order: Indian Army Corps coming to a thread near you very soon. Stand by.

Amazon should have the book in the post next week.

[Steven Broomfield]

. I do think Aug-Oct 1914 is a simply fascinating period. Far more interesting than I ever believed it would be. I may never get to 1915 at this rate.

MG.

Sounds like a new-style epitaph on an army of mercenaries.

[Guest]

Sounds like a new-style epitaph on an army of mercenaries.

Have you been reading A E Houseman?

[Steven Broomfield]

I'll have a look in the regimental history this evening. From memory it was A Squadron of the 15th.

A Squadron of the 15th Hussars did suffer losses at Blangies/Offignies. The two villages were conjoined, but the 15th didn't realise and galloped the former village, only to find no enemy there. They carried on down the main street and discovered a barricade across; due to the narrow nature of the street and high walls they couldn't deploy and were shot down. Two officers were killed and, from the Roll of Honour, 8 or 9 men. The rest of the squadron (less one Troop detached and the rear Troop which managed to halt and take cover), the rest were scattered but the regimental history makes no obvious mention of prisoners.

[Jonathan Saunders]

...although as someone who has always rather liked Smith-Dorrien it has been a bit depressing.

David if you think that then you should re-read the very pertinent contributions by Terry Reeves, Nigel Cave and the much maligned Salesie amongst others.

Smith-Dorrien made the right decision resulting in II Corps eventually getting away to fight another day despite the depressing circumstances that they found themselves in, which it should be remembered were not of S-D's making.

To quote Terry Reeves "It might be worthwhile exploring the more longer term effects of S-Ds stand rather than seeing it just as a day of triumph of disaster ... there was a cause and an effect, and in this case the effect, as it turned out, was positive. You cannot judge success or failure simply by analysing casualty figures. That sort of narrow view is likely to distort matters."

Regards,

Jonathan S

[Steven Broomfield]

Have you been reading A E Houseman?

The street sounds to the soldiers' tread

And out we troop to see;

A single redcoat turns his head,

He turns and looks at me.

My man, from sky to sky's so far,

We never crossed before;

Such leagues apart the world's ends are,

We're like to meet no more;

What thoughts at heart have you and I

We cannot stop to tell;

But dead or living, drunk or dry,

Soldier I wish you well.

A Shropshire Lad, Atanza XXII

[phil andrade]

Writing his history of the 1914 campaign in 1916, Conan Doyle had this to say about our man :

Smith- Dorrien was a typical Imperial soldier in the world-wide character of his service, for he had followed the flag, and occasionally preceded it, in Zululand, Egypt, the Soudan, Chitral, and the Tirah before the campaign against the Boers. A sportsman as well as a soldier, he had very particularly won the affections of the Aldershot division by his system of trusting to their honour rather than to compulsion in matters of discipline. It was seldom indeed that his confidence was abused.

Here's what he has to say summarising the events of 26 August :

So ended the perilous, costly, and almost disastrous action of Le Cateau. The loss to the British Army, so far as can be extracted from complex figures and separated from the other losses of the retreat, amounted to between seven and eight thousand killed, wounded, and missing, while at the time of the action, or in the immediate retreat, a considerable quantity of transport and thirty-six field-pieces, mostly in splinters, were abandoned to the enemy. It was an action which could hardly have been avoided, and from which the troops were extricated on better terms than might have been expected.

Phil (PJA)

[David Ridgus]

Smith-Dorrien made the right decision resulting in II Corps eventually getting away to fight another day despite the depressing circumstances that they found themselves in, which it should be remembered were not of S-D's making.

Thank you Jonathan, backbone suitably stiffened. Let's hear it for 'orace!

"Gentlemen, we will stand and fight"

David

[David Ridgus]

Why has the BBC not done a documentary on this. It has everything a drama needs. And more. I do think Aug-Oct 1914 is a simply fascinating period. Far more interesting than I ever believed it would be. I may never get to 1915 at this rate.

MG.

"No part of the Great War compares in interest with its opening" Churchill

David

[neverforget]

Let's hear it for 'orace!

"Gentlemen, we will stand and fight"

David

Hear hear!!

To be fair; if you don`t mind me giving my opinion as a fairly neutral and inexpert observer, it seems to me that we are not hearing enough about the mitigating circumstances of the situation, of which there were very, very many.

Mistakes may have been made, that left it somewhat short of a perfect military manouvre, but all things considered,(as the negative aspects most certainly have been here) in this layman`s opinion, which I`m sure isn`t worth a jot, S.D. made a decision to deliver a stopping blow, and at the end of the day, I think he got more men away, than would have been swallowed up if he hadn`t stood.

The parameters of "Triumph or Disaster" have been too widely set perhaps ?

[salesie]

For all you iconoclasts, for all you armchair generals, for all of you so quick to loose your beliefs, for all of you so-called myth busters, for all of you so swift to accept such shallow, thinly disguised criticism of a true fighting General - a question.

Given the dire circumstances that II Corps found itself in that night - what would you have done as Corps commander? (and please don't bog down your answer in tactical pedantry such as forward and reverse slopes, poorly sited and ill prepared trenches, casualty exchange rates etc. because that's not what a Corps commander should have concerned himself with in 1914; such things were the domain of battalion COs, company OCs and maybe platoon leaders and perhaps even brigadiers at a stretch). What would you have done?

Cheers-salesie.

[SteveMarsdin]

As has already been mentioned Spears "Liaison 1914" has much detail and opinion on the retreat and Le Cateau. It also contains translations of some of the French reports and orders of that time. The French official history contains little detail on Le Cateau itself but reminds us that Amade's territorial divisions (to the west) were engaged with the enemy throughout this period (although not at Le Cateau) and some of Sordet's Cavalry Corps artillery and cyclists did participate.

S-D may not have acted in line with French's thinking but it was certainly in line with the spirit, if not the detail, of Joffre's. His "Instruction Generale no.2", of which S-D was unaware at the time and which laid out Joffre's plans for the retreat (including his embryonic ideas for "the Marne") and was partly superseded by events, included this line "The retirement will be covered by rearguards established on favourable topographical positions so as to take advantage of every obstacle to arrest or at least delay the advance of the enemy by short and violent counter-attacks, the principal element of which will be the artillery" It was tissued on 25th August but not received by the British until the day after; when Joffre paraphrased at the St Quentin meeting on 26th August, it was the first French had heard of it.

What is abundantly clear from all accounts is the chaos of the retreat and the difficulties of timely communication. In Les chemins de fer français et la guerre / Colonel Le Hénaff et capitaine Henri Bornecque they state that 1.5 million refugees arrived in or passed through Paris in a period of 10 days, 100,000 through Laon in the last days of August alone. S-D had to make a quick decision at this chaotic time, with little intelligence or readily available lines of communication. I think he made the right one.

[hazelclark]

the much maligned Salesie amongst others.

I enjoy Salesie's contributions except when he gets too cranky for comfort.

H

[SteveMarsdin]

I think a brief partial translation has already been posted (from Spears) but this is Joffre's thoughts the day after:

[keithmroberts]

I think Salesie has it this time.

As very strictly an armchair general, who has read a few of the books, and a couple of memoirs, (but not any of the relevant war diaries), I would like to think that I would have had the confidence in myself,my junior commanders and my troops to do the same. I think his point about levels of responsibility is also surely spot on. In the circumstances of the retreat has anyone established that S-D had good mapping of the area, that he knew exactly where the Germans were, or even in detail where all of his own units had halted? He would have few if any working telephone lines given the fact that the army was in retreat and that the ground had not been prepared for a defensive stand. He had choices to make, accepted the responsibility, and got on with it.

keith

[hazelclark]

I think a brief partial translation has already been posted (from Spears) but this is Joffre's thoughts the day after:

JJ (600 x 451).jpg

If my French translation was up to par, Joffre's letter says it all.

H

[neverforget]

I think Salesie has it this time.

As very strictly an armchair general, who has read a few of the books, and a couple of memoirs, (but not any of the relevant war diaries), I would like to think that I would have had the confidence in myself,my junior commanders and my troops to do the same. I think his point about levels of responsibility is also surely spot on. In the circumstances of the retreat has anyone established that S-D had good mapping of the area, that he knew exactly where the Germans were, or even in detail where all of his own units had halted? He would have few if any working telephone lines given the fact that the army was in retreat and that the ground had not been prepared for a defensive stand. He had choices to make, accepted the responsibility, and got on with it.

keith

These are some of the many mitigating factors to which I referred earlier.

[lostinspace]

Folks,

Everyone is free to believe whatever they want and that's the way it should be, what bothers me about this whole conversation is the fact that one person can use some pretty nasty terms to challenge the opinion of another and then have it unofficially sanctioned by an administrator, Martin did not do anything to warrant such treatment, as a matter of fact he has provided this forum with an incredible amount of information over the years involving a ton of research and a lot of hours.

Dave

[Guest]

On 5/14/2014 at 22:24, salesie said:

For all you iconoclasts, for all you armchair generals, for all of you so quick to loose your beliefs, for all of you so-called myth busters, for all of you so swift to accept such shallow, thinly disguised criticism of a true fighting General - a question.

Given the dire circumstances that II Corps found itself in that night - what would you have done as Corps commander? (and please don't bog down your answer in tactical pedantry such as forward and reverse slopes, poorly sited and ill prepared trenches, casualty exchange rates etc. because that's not what a Corps commander should have concerned himself with in 1914; such things were the domain of battalion COs, company OCs and maybe platoon leaders and perhaps even brigadiers at a stretch). What would you have done?

Cheers-salesie.

Salesie - You are in danger of wearing out the idolatry expression "fighting General" as well as equally invidious "armchair General". Between these two extremes where do you place yourself?.

 

I am still very curious to know whose other memoirs you have tested Smith-Dorriens' self-serving memoir against. The references would be useful for this debate.

 

It is difficult to answer your question as you appear to absolve a commander's objectives and responsibility from the tactical pedantry realism. However, you ask, so I shall try and answer, in full expectation of being called (again) an armchair general:

Firstly, I would have ensured that the chain of Div/Bde/Bn/Coy/Pl commanders that I was responsible for and who reported to me did not fear me. He didn't

 

Secondly I would have ensured that the chain of Div/Bde/Bn/Coy/Pl commanders that I was responsible for and who reported to me made the most of what they had. He didn't.

 

Thirdly: As a leader I would ensure that if I made a catastrophically bad decision, my immediate subordinates would have enough confidence and moral courage to stand up and protest. They didn't and that is ultimately his failure as they feared him.

 

Fourthly: I would not have allowed to have 5,000 men put on a bare forward slope outnumbered 5:2 in men and 2:1 in artillery and 3:1 in machine guns in shallow trenches, with no cover, with no clear instructions, with no cover, with no ability to move forward or backwards, with no ability to be reinforced, with no clear orders regarding holding/ retreating, with full knowledge that this position could be 'outflanked' and 'rolled up' (his words). In the full knowledge they would be bombarded with Shrapnel and HE and subjected to relentless machine-gunning.

 

You may argue that the utterly suicidal positioning of 13th and 14th Inf Bdes was rational and Smith Dorrien had no responsibility, but I would beg to differ. Blame the Div Commander, blame the Bde commanders, blame the COs, blame the Coy Commabers, the Platoon commanders. Ultimately he was responsible and it was a terrible decision. I have not seen anyone yet dispute this. Ultimately this comes down to the balance of outcomes. The (lucky) escape of II Corps outweighs the catastrophic losses of 5th Div. The propaganda machine has been 'set' by the Govt in 1914 and perpetuated by the sycophantic Edmonds in the OH.... and 'the rest is history'

 

At 04:00 the troops quite obviously realised the position was utterly untenable but did their best. (multiple diary references) Given his explosive character I wonder aloud if his subordinates dared tell him the positions dug (allegedly) by local inhabitants that were plainly and obviously 'inadequate' according to the men who used them and were wounded in in them (the dead clearly had no voice) were utterly useless. It is one of the key elements of leadership that a Leader should at least enable his subordinates to challenge his views. I suspect that due to SD's rather abrasive character, his subordinates rather shied away from telling him the ground they were given was terrible. Don't believe me; read the (multiple) diaries rather than just his self-aggrandising memoir.That the message did not filter upwards is a failure of leadership. Ultimately it was his responsibility. The fact that Le Cateau was an overall 'success' masks underlying failures of command in my view. To appraise a battle such as Le Cateau as a 'net' result really misses many important lessons.

 

Smith-Dorrien lead through fear. It is the very worst type of leadership and the consequences were fairly grave. His reputation was temporarily rescued by a few factors

 

1. French was worse, and completely out of his depth.

2. Haig had barely been engaged

3. British Govt/propaganda needed some good news to offset the 7 days of catastrophe (only the British see Mons to Cateau as a success)

 

Smith-Dorrien was a brilliantly lucky general at Le Cateau.. Kluck's misjudgment saved him from what might have been a catastrophe. Smith Dorrien rolled the dice and it came up double six. Lucky, not skillful. There is a subtle difference. Slim was brilliant and so was Wellington. Vision, creativity, forethought. Smith Dorrien shone because he was surrounded by men out of their depth.

MG

Edited 4 March , 2017 by Guest

[59165]

Just wondering how many of the contributors on here have even sniffed the Cateau air.

The landscape is harsh for attack & defence.The same thing happened in reverse on the same spot at the end of the 100 days.I guess that could be interesting to the folks asking about slopes etc.