Le Cateau 1914: Triumph or Disaster?

[squirrel]

A thoroughly absorbing thread. One point that has been made is that SD's Staff were "in fear" of him.

Given that SD had taken command of the Corps only a few days before fighting a major engagement, followed by a retreat and then had to make the decision regarding Le Cateau, the right one IMHO, why were they in fear of him? How many knew him and had served with him before - or was it his reputation they were "in fear" of rather than the man?

In the circumstances, any Commander worth his salt with a non functioning GHQ would not have wasted time with the niceties of etiquette and the social graces but would have just got on with the job of issuing clear, concise orders and would have expected these to be carried out without question or delay.

That these orders would have been given to tired, confused and in some cases inexperienced officers, proves the need for swift decisions and clear, concise instructions.

If that means being abrasive and short with some of them, then so be it. Having a friendly and lengthy "O Group" discussion was not an option.

[Guest]

I am just trying to work out where this sits with your post #124 "Smith-Dorrien was a brilliantly lucky general ... Lucky, not skilful".

Should we assume this is an acknowledgement that given the chaotic circumstances that prevailed, that S-D made the right calls based on his long and distinquished military experience? Sure S-D had his fair share of luck, but I rather concur with Napoleon's thoughts on lucky generals.

The quote has been clipped. I believe he was lucky in that Kluck did not pursue. It was the mistake of Kluck, not SD's skill in this part.

[Guest]

A thoroughly absorbing thread. One point that has been made is that SD's Staff were "in fear" of him.

Given that SD had taken command of the Corps only a few days before fighting a major engagement, followed by a retreat and then had to make the decision regarding Le Cateau, the right one IMHO, why were they in fear of him? How many knew him and had served with him before - or was it his reputation they were "in fear" of rather than the man?

In the circumstances, any Commander worth his salt with a non functioning GHQ would not have wasted time with the niceties of etiquette and the social graces but would have just got on with the job of issuing clear, concise orders and would have expected these to be carried out without question or delay.

That these orders would have been given to tired, confused and in some cases inexperienced officers, proves the need for swift decisions and clear, concise instructions.

If that means being abrasive and short with some of them, then so be it. Having a friendly and lengthy "O Group" discussion was not an option.

I think quite a few. A significant number of Staff Officers would have served in the Boer War. I think it would be easier to count the numbers who didn't serve in South Africa. Since Smith-Dorrien commanded a Brigade and later a Division in South Africa, I suspect he was reasonably well known. The Suffolks who suffered the most that day were known to Smith-Dorrien. He mentions that he knew the Suffolks in South Africa in his introduction to the chapter on Le Cateau in the History of the Suffolk Regiment.

I would agree that niceties have no place on the battlefield, but I wonder if his character and reputation made it difficult for subordinates to ask questions. French had this problem, famously snapping at Smith-Dorrien when asked if the line at Mons was offensive of defensive (or words to that effect).

To be clear, it is my speculation that his temper might have been a factor. Highly stressed situtations often bring out the worst in people and a man with a "Volcanic" temper might in the circumstances have shown this characteristic. I wonder how many subordinates would dare point out that the right flank was a terrible position. All the written accounts I can find on this are unanimous. Here is the Suffolks:

"C Company's (Captain Orford) trenches were represented by a few scratches in the ground; D Company's (Maj Peebles) position was totally unprepared.......Lt Col Brett, in discussing this state of affairs with his company commanders, explained that he had nothing whatever to do with the selection of the position; they were committed to it and everyone must do the best he could. He then impressed on them there was to be no retirement.

Lt Col Brett died that day. He served with the Suffolks in South Africa* and probably knew of Smith-Dorrien.

* shot through the lungs and a POW of the Boers at one stage. DSO too. A typical Victorian hero if the eulogy in Bond of Sacrifice is anything to go by

MG

[Jonathan Saunders]

Jonathan. I have no idea why you think having military experience matters. It does not qualify anyone for being able to discuss military history

I agree with you that you do not need military experience to discuss military history and that definitely was not my point – hence reference to nearly all GWF members being interested amateurs and nothing wrong with that. As you say most “professional” historians have never worn military uniform. My point really was context.

It is useful background information to have your cv, so you should leave it here. At the end of the day I provoked you into putting it up and if you are going to raise controversial issues I think its useful for people to understand the context that makes you say what you do.

It certainly irked me a couple of times when I read you saying “I would have done it this way (better)” and as a stand-alone response I most certainly found it pretentious. However, if you have professionally analysed battles then I now understand why you would use that terminology.

As you say, your military experience is not a prerequisite to discuss military history but it does set context for what you say and how you say it. I have found it difficult at times to follow and accept some of your thinking and criticism giving the extenuating circumstances that S-D and II Corps were faced with. I don’t necessarily agree with several things you have said but at least I can now better understand the context of some of your thoughts.

A final criticism or request: it would be useful if you could find a way of keeping the same level of detail but delivering your message in a more succinct way. That is genuine feedback and meant as such, and not trying to teach you how to write English.

I have purposely not quoted the body of your reply so if you want to take it down that’s up to you, but I really think it’s a part of this thread and you should leave it there.

[Guest]

Does anyone have "Trial by Fire: Command and the BEF in 1914" by Nikolas Gardner.

I suspect it would shed a lot of light on some of the questions raised. One can read snippets on the Google preview of the book and it looks pretty interesting here

MG

[Guest]

The return of my library is yielding some more anecdotes...

History of the Middlesex Regt says there was no time to improve the poor trenches.

Universal references to the trenches having been dug by civilians under military supervision (who? I wonder) poorly sited and inadequate for the task. A few of the histories stress the lack of time to do anything about it. Aslo it might have been worse... the entrenching tools of a few battalions had been sent off on wagons and when the order to stand and fight came, Adjutants set off on horseback to bring the tools back. Some entrenched without tools and some of the positions had no trenches at all - support lines of the 2/KOYLI for example

A painting by Lt Col RC Bond (wounded and POW at Le Cateau) CO of 2/KOYLI . Painted from memory I suspect while a POW. Picture is opposite p.728 of the KOYLI history written by Bond.

Caption describes it as looking NE up the road to Bavai. Bn HQ 2/KOYLI by the side of the main road [Roman Road]...The spire of Le Cateau Church is seen over the ridge.

My impression is that it clearly shows the effect of a position on top of a convex hill. Much of the ground to the front can not be seen when in a trench.

MG

[Gareth Davies]

What orders were issued to and by I and II Corps during 25 and 26 Aug?

[Guest]

There are a few interviews with veterans available in the IWM Sound Archives that should be worth a listen. Le Cateau

I have headphones plugged in, and listen to them as I work away on laptop. Who says men can't 'multi-task'?

Mike

[Guest]

What orders were issued to and by I and II Corps during 25 and 26 Aug?

OH has Op Order No.7 issued by French as an appendix. Very short.

Have not seen SD's OP Order.

At Bde level (13th, 14th, 15th Inf Bdes) Op Order No. 5 dated 25th deals with the continued retreat and then Op Order No. 6 is dated 27th Aug

[Gareth Davies]

Have you looked at the 1933 War Office publication Battle Of Le Cateau Tour of the Battlefield? It says a few interesting things (which may well have been very adequately covered already in this thread, apologies if they have and sorry for my late arrival). The book says that Le Cateau was not a defensive battle of the text books (what it doesn't say was whether this was by accident or by design). It goes on to say that it was instead a delaying operation.

But according to FSR Pt 1 1909 Sect 114: The guiding principle in all delaying operations must be that where an enemy has liberty to manoeuvre, the passive occupation of a position, however strong, can rarely be justified and always involves the risk of crushing defeat; under these circumstances a delaying force must manoeuvre, so as to force the enemy to deply as often as possible, but should rarely accept battle.

[Gareth Davies]

I have just been reunited with my books, including Bond's "The King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry in the Great War 1914-1918" . Bond commanded the 2/KOYLI at Le Cateau and was wounded and became a POW. On page 721-723:

Within the position of the KOYLI there seems to have been some attempt to consider the threat fro the east. He records the battalion arrived at Le Cateau in the middle of the afternoon on the 25th and it was dark when they finally reached their allotted ground. He gives a general description of the ground and ends with " The town lies in a valley., the slope into the valley being convex inplaces , very favourable to troops advancing to attack the ridge". He continues:

".. Brig Gen Cuthbert directed that a company should entrench itself alongside the Bavai-Remont road [the Roman Road] facing South East in order to defilade the front now held by the battalion of the Manchester Regiment .... Maj Yate with B Company took over this duty.....Thus B Company was now at right angles to the line held by D and it linked up the right of D Company where Lt G C Wynne's platoon was in position.....The arrival of the filed batteries complicated matters for the infantry, for the batteries took up positions within the line of the infantry supports....the teams and limbers...packed in a sunken road ....severed communications between portions of the KOYLI battalion"

He goes on to say that the supports, just 200 yards behind the firing line had no time to dig trenches and records that they heard about the decision at 06:00. The last order he received was a verbal reiteration by Col Romer (II Corps Staff): "No retirement". Some more snippets:

"The weak spots of a position taken up in half light and only half prepared were only too apparent ....there was dead ground everywhere to cover [the German's] infantry in their approach

The bill at the end: Casualties:

Officers.........18

Sgts...............21

Cpls...............22

Buglers............7

Privates.......532

Total............600

Out of this number a total o 310 were later reported to be prisoners in Germany, 170 of whom were wounded.

The CWGC data shows 48 Killed that day which would imply 242 wounded escaped. The proportion of wounded to killed is over eight and a half times which is exceptionally high.

The KOYLI casualty figure contrast with those of 1st Wiltshires. 2 KOYLI were on the right (east) flank. Much more central, and initially to the north of the Cambrai-Le Cateau road were the Wilts. Their diary records 80 - 100 casualties on 26 Aug of which 5 were KIA (all Ptes).

[Steven Broomfield]

. Who says men can't 'multi-task'?

Mike

Women, generally.

[Guest]

Women, generally.

Mike

[Jonathan Saunders]

The Wikipedia entry on S-D, which I am aware isn't necessarily accurate, refers to Kitchener appointing S-D in the full knowledge of French's animosity, but believing he would stand up to French, presumably thinking that Plumer wouldn't. The entry also says that K told S-D that he had doubts about making the appointment. The sources cited are Richard Holmes 'The Little Field Marshal' for K's knowledge of animosity, and Ian Beckett 'Haig's Generals' and John Terraine 'Mons, The Retreat to Victory' for K's doubts about the appointment. I have all three books, but not to hand, so I cannot trace what the primary sources are for the various authors referred to.

According to Smith-Dorrien's "Statement with regard to Sir John French Book '1914'":

"Lord Kitchener's first words to me, when, in response to his order, I entered his room at the War Office on the 18th August, 1914, expressed grave doubts as to his wisdom in selecting me to succeed the late General Grierson in command of the 2nd Army Corps; he explained that the Chief of the Staff, Sir Charles Douglas, had just told him that it would be putting me in an impossible position, as Sir John French had shown great jealousy of, and personal animus to me for some years, and that such was well known to the Army Council; on my replying that I had no such feelings towards Sir John and that I felt sure I could, by serving him loyally, overome his dislike, Lord Kitchener,adheared to his decision to send me."

I cant find my copy of S-D's memoirs but I would expect it would recount a similar story. Also this reason alone, seems to be supported by Smithers in TMWD, but I assume his source was S-D's diary/book.

However if K had had any doubt as to S-D's ability on merit then it stands to reason he would not have asked him to take command of II Corps in the first place.

No doubt the terms of sJF Despatch of 7 Sept 1914 are known by most following this thread, but probably worth transcribing as it is now at hand:

"I cannot close this brief account of this glorious stand of the British troops, without putting on record my deep appreciation of the valuable services rendered by General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien. I say without hesitation that the saving of the left wing of the army under my Command on the morning of the 26th August, could never have been accomplished unless a Commander of rare and unusual coolness, intrepidity and determination had been present to personally conduct the operation."

[Stoppage Drill]

Does anyone have "Trial by Fire: Command and the BEF in 1914" by Nikolas Gardner.

I suspect it would shed a lot of light on some of the questions raised. One can read snippets on the Google preview of the book and it looks pretty interesting here

MG

Yes, I have.

And "The Man Who Disobeyed" by A L Smithers

And "The Judgement of History" , being essentially a facsimile of S-D's "Statement with Regard to the First Edition of Lord French's Book '1914'" plus an introductory essay by Ian Beckett.

If you have any specific questions that I can answer from this pile, I'll try and help, but I don't really want to get drawn into reading or writing all these lengthy posts.

[phil andrade]

The bill at the end: Casualties:

Officers.........18

Sgts...............21

Cpls...............22

Buglers............7

Privates.......532

Total............600

Out of this number a total o 310 were later reported to be prisoners in Germany, 170 of whom were wounded.

The CWGC data shows 48 Killed that day which would imply 242 wounded escaped. The proportion of wounded to killed is over eight and a half times which is exceptionally high.

That just doesn't look right, does it ?

It certainly challenges all the evidence from Medical Statistics, which show that the proportion of wounded to killed in 1914 was three to one ( allowing for presumed dead).

You might have thought that Le Cateau was the last place to reduce the proportion of killed : positions overrun, some close quarters combat etc.

Might it be that many of those 242 were unwounded, but jolted loose from the ranks and left on the missing list ?

Indeed, might that not apply to a significant proportion of the supposed 7,812 casualties from the battle ?

Mindful of your heartfelt plea earlier on not to engage in discussion about casualties, I am frightened of raising the topic : but there is something distinctly " odd" here, and it bothers me.

Phil (PJA)

[Guest]

According to Smith-Dorrien's "Statement with regard to Sir John French Book '1914'":

"Lord Kitchener's first words to me, when, in response to his order, I entered his room at the War Office on the 18th August, 1914, expressed grave doubts as to his wisdom in selecting me to succeed the late General Grierson in command of the 2nd Army Corps; he explained that the Chief of the Staff, Sir Charles Douglas, had just told him that it would be putting me in an impossible position, as Sir John French had shown great jealousy of, and personal animus to me for some years, and that such was well known to the Army Council; on my replying that I had no such feelings towards Sir John and that I felt sure I could, by serving him loyally, overome his dislike, Lord Kitchener,adheared to his decision to send me."

I cant find my copy of S-D's memoirs but I would expect it would recount a similar story. Also this reason alone, seems to be supported by Smithers in TMWD, but I assume his source was S-D's diary/book.

However if K had had any doubt as to S-D's ability on merit then it stands to reason he would not have asked him to take command of II Corps in the first place.

No doubt the terms of sJF Despatch of 7 Sept 1914 are known by most following this thread, but probably worth transcribing as it is now at hand:

"I cannot close this brief account of this glorious stand of the British troops, without putting on record my deep appreciation of the valuable services rendered by General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien. I say without hesitation that the saving of the left wing of the army under my Command on the morning of the 26th August, could never have been accomplished unless a Commander of rare and unusual coolness, intrepidity and determination had been present to personally conduct the operation."

SD's memoirs are exactly the same as the quote above. Salesie kindly put a useful link. Here it is again.

it continues:

"I think I justified that decision, for the first six months at any rate, and especially after the battle of Le Cateau, for the C.-in-C. was so genuinely grateful to me, for having, as he described it in his generous dispatch, of 7th September 1914, saved his left wing, that he did not stint his praise of the Corps during that period. Perhaps the strongest evidence of his confidence in me was his selecting me at the end of the year for command of one of the two armies, which larger organisations had become necessary by the increase in the size of the British forces in France."

Edit. French famously retracted his earlier priase saying it was written in haste. Terraine had strong views on this volte face.

[Guest]

Not sure if this appears in the sections in Salesie's link?

In an article in the Tamworth Herald - Saturday 16 August 1930, after Smith-Dorrien's death it says

In his " Memories of Forty-eight Years Service " published in 1925, Sir Horace defended his action at Le Cateau, and dealt with his recall from France. His own view was that if he continued his retreat with his exhausted men he was courting certain disaster. " Well do I remember " he writes " the dead silence in the little room at Bertry when I was rapidly considering these points and the sigh of relief when I remarked: 'very well, gentlemen, we will fight.' "

His Comment on Recall

Discussing his recall, he stated that his relations with Sir John French were cordial until mid-February 1915. " Then something-I had no idea what-happened which appeared completely to change our relations. From then on, I and the Second Army could do nothing right. I became gradually aware that it was the Army Commander rather than the Army who had fallen into disfavour. " He wrote a letter to the Commander-in-Chief in which he said: " I have more to fear from the rear than the front. " No reply was made to that or to a second letter, and then came a curt memorandum from the Adjutant-General directing him to go to England and surrender his command.

Mike

[Guest]

Becke's book is also available on archive.org, for anyone who hasn't already seen it.

The Royal Regiment of Artillery at Le Cateau, Wednesday, 26th August, 1914, with a very interesting section at the end written by Brigadier General C. De Sausmarez, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.

Mike

[josquin]

I'm going to stick with the words of a real fighting general not an armchair one whose been on a TEWT course and read plenty of war diaries.Cheers-salesie.[/quote

That's not only disdainful, but antagonistic.

Phil (PJA)

Agreed--the sally is repellent and ad hominem. Far from a credit to the Forum's purpose or membership, it reflects on its author rather than its subject (or should I say "quarry?").

Trelawney

[Crunchy]

The short version is that I would have pulled them back some way to the angle formed by linking the areas with the words Champ Berant - Pont des Quatres Vaux and then cranking my extreme right flank to run parallel to the Roman Road essentially forming a slightly acute angle. This would be my first position. The second position would be further back on the downhill side which as the front line withdrew utilises the reverse slope features and capture the Germans as the crest the hill.

Martin,

Looking at this in more detail. The Roman Road was the principal line of retreat for II Corps. Your dispositions have the effect of opening it to the Germans moving around your right flank, and cutting off that line of retreat. It also has the very real possibility of driving II Corps to the west - away from I Corps, and the main French Armies. Indeed, I would think such a disposition would place II Corps in very real danger of being cut off and destroyed in detail.

In making his dispositions S-D had to consider these issues, rather than the tactical deployment of battalions on the ground, which was the responsibility of divisional and brigade commanders.

Regards

Chris

[phil andrade]

Was there a crisis of morale ?

The utter exhaustion of his men was one thing. Perhaps SD was worried that there was a diminishing will to fight.

Maybe this impinged on the decision to make the stand.

Phil (PJA)

[Crunchy]

An interesting point. How many commanders in 1914 were still around during the 100 days? From the little I have read the job security of a British General in the Great War was a rather low.

Of the original seven BEF corps and divisional commanders that were involved in the Great Retreat, Haig, and Fergusson were there for the 100 days.

Of the other five, Hamilton was killed in action in 1914, Lomax died of wounds in 1915, and Allenby went on to be C-in-C EEF where his campaign was an outstanding success. Munro went on to become GOC Third Army, replaced Ian Hamilton as C-in-C MEF, where he wisely recommended the peninsula be evacuated, incurring Churchill’s wrath, then GOC First Army, and then C-in-C India where he was responsible for oversight of Maude’s victorious Mesopotamian campaign. Smith-Dorrien was removed by French for making the very sensible recommendation of shortening the salient after the Second Battle of Ypres, a recommendation S-D’s successor also made and French approved almost immediately after he had removed S-D.

Not a bad a bad record all up, and shows to me at least. they were competent officers.

While Martin is quite correct that one doesn’t need military experience to discuss military history, it does provide a useful foundation, (Jonathan's context) on which to base reasonable and considered assessments and judgements. Those who have actually experienced the fog and friction of war are more likely to understand the difficulties these men worked under, and be more understanding of the decisions they made in difficult situations.

It is all too easy for some to pour scorn on S-D and his contemporaries. It is ironic that those who have never had the awful responsibility of commanding in battle, believe they are competent to pass judgement on those who have. As Jonathan has mentioned, I don’t think anyone who has contributed to this thread would have done any better than S-D did at Le Cateau, and most of us would have done a lot worse. The character assassination of the man in some posts is quite unnecessary, and adds nothing to a mature debate. There is no doubt in my mind S-D was a good fighting general, whose career was cut short unfairly.

Regards

Chris

[Steven Broomfield]

I can't be fagged to look, but I suspect a pretty high percentage of the brigade commanders with the BEF (those who survived) and battalion/regimental commanders (likewise) also went on to high command. For example, in the 4th DG three officers (Mullens, Solly-Flood and Bridges) went on to higher things, while each of the Brigade Commanders in the Cavalry Division (and the 5th Cavalry Brigade) - Briggs, Bingham, De Lisle, Gough and Chetwode - all did pretty well for themselves. Off the tp of my head, I know that Pitman (11th Hussars) and Bulkley-Johnson (Greys) also achieved Divisional or Brigade level command (the latter being killed at Arras in '17).

All in all, I'd suggest the BEF wasn't badly led; the experience honed on the Frontier and South Africa made them adaptable to change. I also feel that in many ways the BEF came better out of the encounter battle at Le Cateau than the Germans, who seemed incapable of following up their "success".

I dislike "what if" discussions ("if a fish had wheels, it would be a bicycle"), but I do wonder what might have happened had French not been C-in-C.

[Jack Sheldon]

I could not agree with you more Chris and I am reminded, once more, of the words of that veteran, Charles Douie, in his magnificent book 'TheWeary Road', 'Generals are accused of lack of imagination in their conduct of major operations by men who have never demonstrated their ability to command a platoon on a field day'.

Jack