Le Cateau 1914: Triumph or Disaster?

[phil andrade]

People all around him losing their nerve ; it's going to Hell in a handcart ; he makes a good account of himself, IMHO. Kipling would love it !

Phil (PJA)

Martin,

Your Kiplingesque nuance did NOT fall on stoney ground

Phil (PJA)

[Robert Dunlop]

There was a brief foray earlier in this thread into how the Battle of Le Cateau should be categorised. The Field Service Regulations (FSR) definition would have been a 'delaying action'. Here is the description of 'The delaying action' (Section 114 in the 1909 edition):

"A commander may decide to offer battle without aiming at a decisive result, either in order to await the arrival of some other portion of the army, or to cover the concentration in rear, or to gain time for decisive action in some other part of the theatre of war. In the first case the principles of defensive action will be similar to those already described in Sec. 108, the force which is actually on the field when battle is accepted being considered as that which prepares the way for the assumption of the offensive, while the force whose arrival is expected may be looked upon as the general reserve with which the decisive blow is dealt.

When the object is to act as a covering force, or to gain time, a commander will be much influenced by the strategical situation and the nature of the country in which he is operating. The delaying power of a numerically inferior force is greatly affected by ground. When a force is occupying a strong position which cannot be turned, or can only be turned by a wide movement through difficult country, its delaying power is very great; and where a series of such positions exist, a comparatively small force, acting on the general principles described in Sec. 72 for the action of a rear guard, can exhaust the offensive energy of one which is much larger. On the other hand, if such a force accepts battle in a position which is liable to envelopment, or in a country and under conditions where the enemy has liberty to manoeuvre, it can extricate itself only under cover of darkness, or by a successful counter-attack. Where it is possible for the delaying force to await an enemy, who is advancing through difficult country, on ground where it [the delaying force] can manoeuvre freely, it fulfils its role in a most effective manner by attacking the enemy's advancing troops as they emerge, and pushing them back on their main body, which will thus have great difficulty in deploying. The guiding principle in all delaying action must be that when an enemy has liberty to manoeuvre, the passive occupation of a position, however strong, can rarely be justified, and always involves the risk of crushing defeat; under these conditions a delaying force must manoeuvre, so as to force an enemy to deploy must manoeuvre, so as to force an enemy to deploy as often as possible, but should rarely accept battle."

Please note that the emphasis is in the original.

Robert

[Chris_Baker]

2. There is a strong school of thought that believes trying to re-assess battles is heresy. I am very glad to be in the minority here.

Sorry Martin, but I think that is twaddle.

[Guest]

MG, I have gone back over Gardner's reconstruction of the events related to II Corps. The reason for carrying out this review was based on an unease with the interpretation you provided above. After Gardner concluded his analysis of the reasons for Smith-Dorrien's decision, he went on to write:

Gardner then goes on to discuss Haig's concern about the situation with I Corps. Haig "continued to expect reinforcement from II Corps. When Hugh Dawnay, the liaison officer between GHQ and I Corps, arrived at 6 am with the commander-in-chief's new instructions, it became evident that such assistance would not be forthcoming. Haig thus chose to ignore the orders... As he remarked in his diary: 'GHQ had evidently given my corps up as lost from their control!'" p.55

On p.57: "Following Smith-Dorrien's telegram indicating his decision to face the enemy, the next communication between GHQ and II Corps took place around 7 am when Smith-Dorrien contacted St. Quentin using the French railway telephone system. Henry Wilson took the call, and the II Corps commander summarised the situation facing his force. As Smith-Dorrien related in his diary: 'I explained the state of affairs, and that we should put up a real grand fight, but that as the men were too weary to march there was a real possibility, with both our flanks en l'air and a vastly superior number of the enemy against us, of our being surrounded.' [reference is to S-D's diary in CAB45 and to Scott's publication of Sir Charles Deedes diary]"

'en l'air' refers to no evidence of any support from a neighbouring friendly force. In the case of II Corps' right flank, this is a direct reference to I Corps. In other words, Smith-Dorrien was indicating to Henry Wilson that S-D knew that I Corps was not available to support him. At the very least, we know from II Corps' war diary that there was evidence to support this conclusion from the previous evening. Any doubts raised on the evening of the 25th August will have been further supported by the news from GHQ to II Corps at 3.45 am on the morning of the battle that "...enemy reported working round S of LANDRECIES [ie to the east of II Corps' right flank]. French cavalry will cover retirement & West flank."

Robert

Robert

Thank you for taking the trouble to dig so deeply.

1. 05:00: Smith Dorrien's telegram informing GHQ of his decision to stand and fight arrives at 05:00.

2. 06:00: GHQ's instructions to I Corps arrived at 06:00. These instructions must have been written before 06:00 and (I think) immediately after GHQ had received Smith Dorrien's message that he had resolved to stand and fight. The descriptions of the doom and gloom, Wilson's comments etc. To me these appear to be the critical timings. GHQ's instructions do not tell Haig and I Corps to join up with II Corps at Le Cateau as originally ordered, so this is a change in the grand plan.

3. 07:00 Subsequent to French's instruction to Haig and I Corps, Wilson had a telephone conversation with Smith Dorrien at 07:00 . It seems that GHQ's new instructions to I Corps were not explained in this conversation.

4. All the timings of the above are supported with first hand accounts or orders or both. When Smith-Dorrien mentions his Flanks as being en l'air , I think he is describing the situation at that time. His later memoirs and multiple diary entries clearly show that he and his troops on the right were still expecting I Corps to arrive. The troops in 5th Div certainly were when they received their orders as late as 07:30.

From the above it seems certain that sometime after 05:00 and before 06:00 French made the decision to order I Corps to retreat further south and to not link up with II Corps. I would simply ask when did Smith-Dorrien become aware that I Corps was not coming? MG

[Guest]

Sorry Martin, but I think that is twaddle.

Chris - there is a trail of arguments on this thread that re-assessing this battle (or any battle for that matter) with the benefit of hindsight somehow invalidates arguments or views. There has been some suggestion too that one needs military experience to be able to make comment. I strongly disagree with both. MG

[bill24chev]

Chris - there is a trail of arguments on this thread that re-assessing this battle (or any battle for that matter) with the benefit of hindsight somehow invalidates arguments or views. There has been some suggestion too that one needs military experience to be able to make comment. I strongly disagree with both. MG

I believe that there are sound reasons for "re-assessing" a battle or any other important historic event.

Initial reports,diaries and assessment close in time to the event may contain inaccuracies, misinterpretations and, using modern terminology spin .there are many reasons for this , politics, security and protection or attack on reputations to name a few.

"Hindsight" allows us to have a wider view of the event from such things as archives and individual diaries etc.that were not available when for example the OH was written.

What we should not do is attempt to re-fight the battle in a "What if" scenario using information and data that was not available to those who took part in the battle (or other event) who did not have this info. to make there decisions. Comments such as "SD, or any other commander, should have" or I bevel SD would have been better doing this or that fall into this category.

bill

[Chris_Baker]

There is a large and growing community of people, some of whom use this forum, both academic and non-academic, who are objectively re-assessing battles and many other aspects of military operations. There has, for perhaps ten to twenty years now, been an upsurge in publication of their work and I am sure we are going to see much more over the next few years. Having read through this thread I simply do not see the reactionary view that such re-assessment is heresy and I do not buy at all the idea that to do so places one in some kind of heroic minority.

[Jonathan Saunders]

Chris - there is a trail of arguments on this thread that re-assessing this battle (or any battle for that matter) with the benefit of hindsight somehow invalidates arguments or views. There has been some suggestion too that one needs military experience to be able to make comment. I strongly disagree with both. MG

I rather think you are purposely taking comments out of context. A pretty poor show.

[Guest]

What we should not do is attempt to re-fight the battle in a "What if" scenario using information and data that was not available to those who took part in the battle (or other event) who did not have this info. to make there decisions. Comments such as "SD, or any other commander, should have" or I bevel SD would have been better doing this or that fall into this category.

bill

Why not? The OH's did it. They hypothesise over what could have been. Battles often hang by a thread. What if Hamilton had not wasted a day at Suvla Bay? Would Gallipoli have turned out differently? etc... historians ask these valid questions all the time. The British Army's academy and Staff College does this all the time. They learn from this process.

In this example (Le Cateau) if Smith Dorrien was making decisions without the necessary information and we believe (with hindsight) that the information would have made a difference, we can learn from it. So if SD knew I Corps was not coming, he may have acted differently. The lesson here for future commanders is that GHQs need to keep Corps level better informed. The Army would assess this battle on a 'what if SD had the info earlier?...would it have made a difference? What if Von Kluck had pursued? Would it have made a difference? Would it have turned the Triumph into a Disaster? These are valid questions and despite having more information than SD or French and the benefit of hindsight we can learn from it.

At Le Cateau "what if" CRA 5th Div had not ordered the guns so far forward? Maj Becke RA asks this question and concludes that they would have lost far fewer guns. He was writing the official Royal Artillery history of this action, published by the Royal Artillery Institution...with hindsight, with more information. These are perfectly valid and reasonable questions.

MG

[CaroleHope]

Seems to me it's OK to reassess as long as you ultimately agree with the re-assessor. Are people on this thread truly reassessing or using sources selectively to support their own preconceived opinions? All I know is that looking from the perspective of someone who knew very little about the subject before trying to keep up with this thread it hasn't added to my overall understanding. There is no clarity of direction, but then that is the nature of the beast compared to published academic works.

Carole

[Robert Dunlop]

Thank you for your comment, Carole. From past experience I know that it can be very difficult to follow multiple threads. There are several things that I would still like to touch on but then it would be useful, by the sounds, to pull together a review. As to direction, the areas that I want to review are:

1. The degree to which the FSR description of a 'holding action' conforms to Le Cateau, particularly II Corps' understanding of how much 'liberty of manoeuvre' was available to von Kluck's forces.

2. Depending on the outcome of 1., the degree to which Smith-Dorrien's decision and then oversight of the battle enabled II Corps to avoid the FSR warning of the usual outcome ('crushing defeat') if Le Cateau was a 'passive' defence against an enemy with freedom to manoeuvre. This will provide another perspective on the Triumph vs Defeat question as it was posed at the beginning. The perspective will, hopefully, be grounded in the criteria that might have been used to judge the outcome at the time.

3. How appropriate it is to regard the events on the right flank, specifically around the positions of some infantry battalions and some artillery batteries, as indicative of the outcome of the battle as a whole.

4. The alternative to Smith-Dorrien's decision to stand and fight.

Hopefully this casts some light but do come back if you have any questions or points for clarification.

Robert

PS: FWIIW I don't have a problem with contributors using sources to back particular preconceived notions. This is often the best way to flush out new insights. The key, as ever, is to maintain a respect for others' views. It is difficult with this type of Forum as electronic messages are not accompanied by the usual supplementary behaviours that characterise robust but respectful face-to-face debates. We all need to be mindful of this.

[Guest]

the areas that I want to review are:

1. The degree to which the FSR description of a 'holding action' conforms to Le Cateau, particularly II Corps' understanding of how much 'liberty of manoeuvre' was available to von Kluck's forces.

2. Depending on the outcome of 1., the degree to which Smith-Dorrien's decision and then oversight of the battle enabled II Corps to avoid the FSR warning of the usual outcome ('crushing defeat') if Le Cateau was a 'passive' defence against an enemy with freedom to manoeuvre. This will provide another perspective on the Triumph vs Defeat question as it was posed at the beginning. The perspective will, hopefully, be grounded in the criteria that might have been used to judge the outcome at the time.

Robert

Robert

My reading of the issues raised in 1. and 2. above is that when Smith-Dorrien made his decision he believed his flanks would be protected by the French on the left and I Corps on the right. That is the impression I get from his memoirs. In that scenario Von Kluck would have less room to manoeuvre around his flanks and the risk of a 'crushing defeat' as cautioned by FSR would be significantly lower. A 'Holding Action' seems a reasonable course of action if he believed his flanks would be secure. I would argue this was the right decision.

Smith-Dorrien was aware that I Corps was engaged, but (I think) still expected them to arrive at some stage - in line with French's original Op Order that I and II Corps join at Le Cateau. Since securing the flanks is the part of the plan that limits the enemy's ability to manoeuvre, in the context of FSR this becomes critical.: Securing the flanks = restricting the German's ability to manoeuvre.

For me this then becomes a question of when did Smith-Dorrien know his Right Flank was not going to be secured by I Corps? I still don't know that answer to that question, but it must have been after he issued his orders. I feel that French would have immediately understood that II Corps risked a 'crushing defeat' the second he allowed I Corps to continue retreating and not join II Corps - hence the doom and gloom at GHQ.

MG

[Robert Dunlop]

MG, it may be the case that Smith-Dorrien believed his flanks would be protected. In the absence of very clear evidence of this, I doubt that he will have made this information into a clear-cut determination. Clear evidence would have to be provided by formal confirmation through the chain of command that contact was established. I have never seen evidence of this in any war diaries. In the absence of this evidence, my impression is that good commanders will adopt a scenario-based approach to military planning. The approach requires at least two different scenarios to be held in juxtaposition. In this case, the scenarios were that I Corps would be able to help and the alternative scenario that it would not. Clearly the latter falls out as having the most serious consequences. The refused flank on the right points to this being the driver of the tactical deployments. It is quite likely, therefore, that this scenario was in Smith Dorrien's mind when the decision to stand was made. The information from the night before, coupled with no evidence of contact with I Corps and the French forces, would have been upper-most IMHO. Please note that I have not served in the military and am very aware of the cautions that Chris and Jack have provided. This emphasis on clear evidence of contact is something I have inferred from my reading so it would be useful to have a reality check from the likes of Chris or Jack.

In respect of securing II Corps' right flank, any expectation that Smith-Dorrien might have held based on GHQ's Op Order would have been overridden by the lack of evidence of direct contact. There is only so far that a commander was prepared to push out contact units with their associated contact patrols. There were cyclists and divisional cavalry off to the West of 5th Division's position but not much beyond the Selle valley or Le Cateau town. They were not in contact with any elements of I Corps. So to all intents and purposes I Corps was NOT a factor in the thinking about flank security. Smith-Dorrien ensured the right flank was refused, which gave the Germans more room to manoeuvre on the right flank.

A further reason for worrying about flank security was provided by II Corps' Intelligence section. On 24th August, a prisoner interrogation resulted in the following remark in the intel war diary: "Possibility that Guard Cav Div as well as 4 & 9 [German cavalry divisions] are in vicinity, possibly in rear". Next day: "From GHQ (result of aerial reconnaissance) 7.10 am Column of all arms head at HOUDAIN, tail still issuing from DOUR probably a corps.

7.30 am A second column head at SAULTAIN marching on VALENCIENNES. Calvary distributed on both flanks of German advance."

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

I feel that French would have immediately understood that II Corps risked a 'crushing defeat' the second he allowed I Corps to continue retreating and not join II Corps - hence the doom and gloom at GHQ.

I respectfully disagree. French would have known, as did Wilson, that the minute Smith-Dorrien committed II Corps to a fighting stand that there was a major risk of 'crushing defeat'. The prospect occurred after Smith-Dorrien's decision. The concern was not generated before S-D's decision based on some collusion around saving I Corps and not letting S-D know.

II Corp's position could be turned - it was not bounded by steep cliffs or ocean or similar. The generally rolling countryside of the Le Cateau area clearly did not fulfil the criteria of 'difficult country' in the FSR description. It was thought that Mormal Forest would fall into that category but the affair at Landrecies showed this was unlikely to be the case. In any event, reports to II Corps clearly showed that the Germans were actively pursuing II Corps' rear guards on the right - forest or no forest. GHQ staff had crossed the terrain and, knowing that Haig's I Corps had been attacked at Landrecies and that a very large combined arms force was bearing down on the left, they would have immediately recognised the terrible danger to II Corps. Hence Wilson's comment in his diary in the immediate aftermath of S-D's telephone call at 7 am.

Robert

[Muerrisch]

One hopes that General French had been alert to "a crushing defeat" well before EITHER S-D committed to the stopping blow OR the failure/inability of I Corps to join II Corps ......... his and his staff's shortcomings [including dividing his force], various allies' shortcomings, and the German strength and momentum had made that possibility fairly obvious.

Has anyone on this thread suggested for one moment that there was " some collusion around saving I Corps and not letting S-D know". If so, I find that extraordinary.

[Guest]

MG, it may be the case that Smith-Dorrien believed his flanks would be protected. In the absence of very clear evidence of this, I doubt that he will have made this information into a clear-cut determination. Clear evidence would have to be provided by formal confirmation through the chain of command that contact was established. I have never seen evidence of this in any war diaries. In the absence of this evidence, my impression is that good commanders will adopt a scenario-based approach to military planning. The approach requires at least two different scenarios to be held in juxtaposition. In this case, the scenarios were that I Corps would be able to help and the alternative scenario that it would not. Clearly the latter falls out as having the most serious consequences. The refused flank on the right points to this being the driver of the tactical deployments. It is quite likely, therefore, that this scenario was in Smith Dorrien's mind when the decision to stand was made. The information from the night before, coupled with no evidence of contact with I Corps and the French forces, would have been upper-most IMHO. Please note that I have not served in the military and am very aware of the cautions that Chris and Jack have provided. This emphasis on clear evidence of contact is something I have inferred from my reading so it would be useful to have a reality check from the likes of Chris or Jack.

In respect of securing II Corps' right flank, any expectation that Smith-Dorrien might have held based on GHQ's Op Order would have been overridden by the lack of evidence of direct contact. There is only so far that a commander was prepared to push out contact units with their associated contact patrols. There were cyclists and divisional cavalry off to the West of 5th Division's position but not much beyond the Selle valley or Le Cateau town. They were not in contact with any elements of I Corps. So to all intents and purposes I Corps was NOT a factor in the thinking about flank security. Smith-Dorrien ensured the right flank was refused, which gave the Germans more room to manoeuvre on the right flank.

A further reason for worrying about flank security was provided by II Corps' Intelligence section. On 24th August, a prisoner interrogation resulted in the following remark in the intel war diary: "Possibility that Guard Cav Div as well as 4 & 9 [German cavalry divisions] are in vicinity, possibly in rear". Next day: "From GHQ (result of aerial reconnaissance) 7.10 am Column of all arms head at HOUDAIN, tail still issuing from DOUR probably a corps.

7.30 am A second column head at SAULTAIN marching on VALENCIENNES. Calvary distributed on both flanks of German advance."

Robert

Robert I am not sure I follow this so apologies if I appear to ask an odd question: Are you saying his plan was based on the assumption I Corps was not going to be able to protect his right flank?

I ask because his memoirs seems to say he believed it was when he made his plan. The OH also alludes to II Corps expectations that I Corps will arrive on a number of occasions.

MG

[Guest]

I respectfully disagree. French would have known, as did Wilson, that the minute Smith-Dorrien committed II Corps to a fighting stand that there was a major risk of 'crushing defeat'. The prospect occurred after Smith-Dorrien's decision. The concern was not generated before S-D's decision based on some collusion around saving I Corps and not letting S-D know.

Robert

I agree with your statement. We may be talking at crossed purposes here..... French's message to I Corps was sent after he received SD' message The sequence of events is

1. SD sends a message to French he is standing and fighting. Message arrives at GHQ at 05:00. French already knows I Corps cant reach II Corps in time and thinks II Corps is doomed

2. French sends a message to I Corps at 06:00 telling Haig to continue retreating south. This means there is absolutely no chance of I Corps joining II Corps at Le Cateau. No mention of meeting II Corps at Le Cateau.

The missing part is that SD has no idea that I Corps has been told to continue marching South.

Are we agreed on the sequence of events? Am I missing something? MG

[Robert Dunlop]

Are you saying his plan was based on the assumption I Corps was not going to be able to protect his right flank?

I ask because his memoirs seems to say he believed it was when he made his plan.

Not an odd question at all. Thank you for raising it and apologies for not making my point more clearly. Everything about the behaviour of II Corps suggests me to that the tactical preparations were based on the assumption that I Corps was not going to be able to protect the flank. This does preclude Smith-Dorrien from holding hopes or expectations otherwise. Good generals have this ability to hold things in juxtaposition that otherwise seem mutually exclusive. I am cautious about Smith-Dorrien's memoirs though.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

The missing part is that SD has no idea that I Corps has been told to continue marching South. Are we agreed on the sequence of events? Am I missing something?

We are agreed on the sequence of events, thank you. Let's presume that Smith-Dorrien was told that I Corps was to continue marching South, just for the sake of argument. He still could not count on this information being correct. As it turned out, Haig chose to disobey GHQ's instructions. The real issue is, however, whether Smith-Dorrien would have changed the defensive set up on 5th Division's right flank. I doubt it, given the limited amount of time available to make fundamental changes.

It should be noted that steps were being taken to shore up the trenches on the right flank with overhead cover. The 59th Company Royal Engineers was attached to 5th Division. They were paraded at 7.25 am on the morning of the battle and were 'about to move off to the starting point when orders were received to report to the G.O.C. 14th Inf Bde (headquarters said to be in LE CATEAU) to assist in strengthening a position about that place. The officer sent ahead to report & to reconnoitre LE CATEAU for materials for head cover was unable to find 14th Bde Headquarters & met German cavalry in the place."

It is also of interest that 59th Co RE bivouacked overnight at Reumont, towards the rear of the position. At 5 am (2 1/2 hours earlier) "Two sections of company ordered out to picket roads heading into the village to protect it against possible attack from patrols of Uhlans known to have penetrated our outpost line."

Robert

[Guest]

Robert

A few hundred posts ago I assumed S-D would follow the thought process you described: worst-case scenario, no support from I Corps. Plan accordingly. As you and others have noted there were enough signals that there were risks that I Corps might not arrive, or might not arrive in time. Having read a fair bit, including all the diaries (I have everything up to II Corps including the RE diaries) my strong feeling is that when SD gave the orders to stand and fight he (and his subordinates) assumed I Corps would arrive. This is not just my view. The OH makes this point a few times and most authors also make this point in their assessments. I don't have Nigel's and Jack's book so it would be interesting to hear what they think on this aspect. I am pretty sure some of the diaries make this point too (I will check and revert). Also Smith Dorrien's account suggest this too.

That aside it becomes binary: He either thought they were coming or he didn't and the disposition of the troops would (in theory) change depending on what he thought. There was a small window of time to do something. We know troops were moved, guns brought up, troops redeployed and others brought in to the position, everyone digging furiously between orders being given and the first shots being fired. The way he/Fergusson deployed his troops suggest to me that he expected I Corps. It is interesting that we have diametrically opposite views on this. I will revert with some evidence which I hope supports this view; ie that the troops were expecting I Corps.

If as you suggest he wasn't expecting I Corps I think the dispositions were sub-optimal. So did some of the survivors. MG

My

[SteveMarsdin]

I'm on a ferry on the North Sea at the the moment so can't easily check sources but IIRC Sordet's cavalry corps crossed from the E of Morval, across the "top" of II Corps to a position echeloned to II Corps' NW, on the 25th. Joffre issued orders for Sordet's to assist S-D by intervening on his W flank at the meeting at St Quentin on the 26th, and 3DC and 5DC's artillery did so in the afternoon.

There may not have been any formal contact between Sordet and S-D on the 25th but surely S-D would have been aware of the movement of Sordet's three cavalry divisions to his NW on the 25th ?

[Robert Dunlop]

Steve, I hope the trip goes well. The British Official History contains a synopsis from the comprehensive account of Sordet's Cavalry Corps, published in French (I haven't looked up my copy yet):

"The appearance of Sordet's cavalry in the left rear of the 4th Division now provided a most opportune diversion. General Smith-Dorrien had naturally counted on this cooperation, and General Sordet, having visited Sir John French at 9 A.M., was fully conversant with the situation. His corps on the night of the 24th/25th had bivouacked near Avesnes-Dompierre, and on the 25th moved more than thirty miles across the line of march of the B.E.F. in order to reach its left flank. It arrived late at night in the neighbourhood of Walincourt, about ten miles west by south of Le Cateau, men and horses dog-tired and soaked with rain. Of its three divisions, the 5th halted for the night in and about Esnes, the 1st at Lesdain and the 3rd at Le Bosquet (3 miles south-west of Esnes). The corps moved out to the south of Cambrai on the morning of the 26th in observation of the ground on the left rear of the British and of the southern exits from Cambrai.

There, about 1 P.M., General Sordet received the following message from Colonel Huguet of the French Mission at G.H.Q. (The message is recorded as telephoned at 12.10 P.M.). " General Joffre requests that you will not only cover the left of the British Army, but do more and intervene in the battle with all the forces at your disposal." At 1.30 P.M., therefore, General Sordet issued orders for his three divisions to recross the Schelde, the 5th at Crevecoeur, the 3rd at Masnieres, and the 1st at Marcoing, sending reconnaissance parties ahead. (Historique du Corps de Cavalerie Sordet," pp. 77-9.) Towards 4 P.M., when the divisions of the German IV. Reserve Corps (The 22nd Reserve Division had followed the 7th, and advanced on its right.) were crossing the front of the French cavalry, the artillery of the latter came successively into action and took the Germans in flank, whilst cyclists engaged them with success near Seranvillers (2 miles north-west of Esnes). It was this gun fire which was heard by General Smith-Dorrien about 4.30 P.M. as he was moving south from Bertry to his new headquarters at St. Quentin, and, not knowing whether the sound came from French or German artillery, he had a bad moment. Then, galloping up to some high ground near Maretz, he was able to satisfy himself that it could only come from French 75's. (The action was broken off by General Sordet at 6.30 P.M. and the cavalry corps retired so as to cover the British left ; it reached the area north-west of Villers Fauçon (15 miles south by west of Cambrai), with the horses Completely exhausted.) Further, beyond the left of the French cavalry, it was known that troops of General d'Amade were in and about Cambrai. All, therefore, seemed well, and the British left flank secure. (Lieut.-Colonel F. G. Anley, commanding 2/Essex Regiment on the left of the line, received two direct reports from the French cavalry, one about ten minutes before the attack opened, and another about noon, both saying that the French were maintaining their position. He, most unfortunately, failed to get either of these messages through to 12th Brigade headquarters.)"

From II Corps' perspective, as recorded in the war diary:

"2.20 am Report, through 5th Div, Cav Cyclists state that Germans entered CAMBRAI 7.15 pm yesterday.

3.45 am Message sent from G.H.Q. that… French Cavalry will cover retirement & West flank.

5 am Message to GHQ asking that French cavalry may be informed that 2nd Corps is not retiring."

The decision to stand was taken after the 2.20 am report of Germans being in Cambrai the night before and before the message from GHQ stating that Sordet's corps would provide flank protection to a retirement. The inference from GHQ's message is that Sordet's cavalry were further South and West of II Corps' position, hence Smith-Dorrien's request at 5 am that Sordet be formally notified of the change in plan. It would appear that the information got through to Joffre himself and was then upgraded to an order for Sordet to proceed North to provide active support.

The BOH's note on the information available to Lieut.-Colonel F. G. Anley is very interesting. It shows how formal contact was made with Sordet's right flank but that this information did not proceed up the chain of command. This means that, as far as Smith-Dorrien was concerned, Sordet's corps was not in position to help II Corps on the left flank. I posted earlier on the effect of this, namely that 4th Division was ordered to refuse the left flank back to Haucourt (which was NE of Sordet's right flank).

I will check 'Historique du Corps de Cavalerie Sordet' later today.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

...reports to II Corps clearly showed that the Germans were actively pursuing II Corps' rear guards on the right - forest or no forest.

Here are two reports in II Corps' war diary dated 25th August, one directly related to the right flank on that morning:

"7.20 am …the 14th Inf Bde rear guard of 5th Div, reported that a force estimated at about 1000 infantry was advancing on BAVAI from direction of HON; also that a mixed force was reported NNW and that artillery had opened on rear party.

5.40 pm Rear guard of 3rd Div (7th Inf Bde & Howitzer Bde) were engaged in rear guard action."

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

...my strong feeling is that when SD gave the orders to stand and fight he (and his subordinates) assumed I Corps would arrive.

That aside it becomes binary: He either thought they were coming or he didn't

FWIIW, my view is that we need not think of this as a binary, one way or the other, perspective on Smith-Dorrien's part. He may have assumed/hoped that I Corps would arrive when the orders were given but, as we have agreed, he planned for the worst case scenario in case I Corps did not arrive. The same applies to the situation with Sordet on the left flank, as noted in the earlier post.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Here is a diagram that illustrates the situation facing II Corps when the decision to stand was made. The information available about German forces from II Corps war diaries has been overlaid, along with the timings. I have not included the fact that German cavalry were reported as flanking the two German columns near Valenciennes on the morning of 25th August. The white lines represent the concept of enemy freedom to manoeuvre.

Robert