Le Cateau 1914: Triumph or Disaster?

[Robert Dunlop]

Does anyone have "Trial by Fire: Command and the BEF in 1914" by Nikolas Gardner. I suspect it would shed a lot of light on some of the questions raised.

MG, Gardner's book has little to add with respect to this thread. The only significant new point is 'Allenby also suggested [at 2 am on the 26th August] that Smith-Dorrien's force would be attacked if it could not get underway by 5 am.' He notes that Haig requested and was hoping that S-D would come to his aid. Gardner also makes the point that 'while this is impossible to confirm, Haig was undoubtedly aware [later on August 26th] that II Corps was in some difficulty. The I Corps and 1 Division war diaries note that during the day artillery could be heard from the direction of Le Cateau. In addition, E.S. Bulfin, commander of the 2nd Brigade of 1 Division, commented in his diary: "gather there was a bit of a mix up at Le Cateau." Haig proved more concerned for the safety of his own force than for the rest of the army, however, leaving II Corps to face the Germans alone.

Robert

[bill24chev]

." Haig proved more concerned for the safety of his own force than for the rest of the army, however, leaving II Corps to face the Germans alone.

Robert

Haig and the rest of I corps Staff seem to have been shaken by the much smaller engagement (compared to Le Cateau) at Landrecies. At one point they believed that Corps HQ was surrounded and expected capture. Haig, also, may not have been at his best due to a stomach complaint or the cure for it.

bill

[Robert Dunlop]

In relation to the aforementioned trenches, various war diaries cast further light. II Corps WD only mentions the following:

"BERTRY - Aug 25th 4.30 pm: Halt orders issued for the occupation of the portion of the defensive position allotted to 2nd Corps.

5th Div MONTAY - REUMONT road inclusive to TROISVILLES exclusive

3rd Div TROISVILLES - AUDENCOURT - CAUDRY inclusive"

As noted before, this mention of a defensive position was made on the afternoon before the widely-touted decision was made to stand at Le Cateau on the 26th. Fifth Division's WD notes:

"Aug 25th: Division continues retirement by North West corner of BAVAY and western edge of FORET DE MORMAL through ENGLEFONTAINE and MONTAY, a march of 25 miles. 13th and 15th Bdes bivouac on a line which has to some extent been prepared across the TROISVILLE to LE CATEAU Road. 14th Bde 2 bns on right of above line + 2 bbs on high ground NE of LE CATEAU in order to connect with 1st [sic - should be 2nd? 1st Corps not near this location] Corps Div HQ at REUMONT."

This from 15th Brigade's WD:

"On arrival at the scissors cross roads on LE CATEAU heights the battalion [sic brigade] was halted. The men were done up by the heat & want of rations but a company from each occupied the partly prepared trenches by the French between the scissors cross roads and Troisvilles, and remainder marched into bivouac at Pt 116 SE of Troisvilles in order from the right as follows: Cheshires, Norfolks, Bedfords, Dorsets. At 5 pm orders were received that the right half of the trenches would be occupied by 13th Inf. Bde., thus the Cheshires & Norfolks were relieved. The Dorsets & Bedfords pushed out outposts on to the line of the Le Cateau - Cambrai road."

The British 59th Company Royal Engineers was part of 5th Division in the lead up to Le Cateau. The company followed 14th Brigade during the retreat on the 25th August but there is no mention of any trench digging on that day. By way of contrast, there is a clear reference on the 26th:

"26th August REUMONT 7.15 am: Company paraded and was about to move off to the starting point when orders were received to report to G.O.C. 14th Inf. Bde. (headquarters said to be in LE CATEAU) to assist in strengthening a position about that place.

The officer sent ahead to report & reconnoitre LE CATEAU for materials for head cover was unable to find 14th Bde Headquarters & met German cavalry in the place.

Efforts were made to find the Headquarters of the 14th Brigade but without success, so as the battle was now beginning to develop the company was employed in assisting the 19th Brigade to strengthen its position on their right flank of the 5th Division. Little time was available for work but fire trenches were dug & communications improved. Deep trenches were dug giving good protection from shrapnel & the value of these was proved when the attack on 19th Brigade was repulsed. The trenches served as rallying points & checked the retreat."

This means that 59th Company RE was unlikely to have dug the trenches referred to in the discussion.

Fifth Division's CRE (Commander Royal Engineers) wrote in the WD:

"25th [August] Marched to LE CATEAU and then on to REUMONT. As CRE was informed that retirement would continue early next morning no steps were taken to improve the trenches at LE CATEAU - these trenches had been constructed by civil labour and were badly designed. In certain places there were no trenches."

On the 26th the CRE and staff were involved in burying their 'revolver ammunition'. No mention of trying to strengthen the trenches mentioned in the 25th entry.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Haig and the rest of I corps Staff seem to have been shaken by the much smaller engagement (compared to Le Cateau) at Landrecies.

bill

Correct Bill. It is important to understand though that this engagement took place towards I Corps' open left flank. Mormal Forest was thought to be essentially impenetrable to troops, hence the two BEF corps diverging to bypass the forest. The emergence of troops from the forest towards the open flank would have been, quite rightly, a major concern. This would be irrespective of the size of the German force that was engaged. I Corps would have had no way of knowing that a much larger outflanking force was not travelling in the attacker's wake.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

I honestly think we are making far too much of Le Cateau as a battle; OK, for understandable reasons, the Brits get excited about Mons and the Retreat.

Nigel, I understand and concur with your points about the relevant scale of actions taking place elsewhere FWIIW. The issues around Le Cateau are very important for another reason though. This discussion is exposing some of the long-standing accepted wisdoms associated with this famous (from a British perspective) battle. If this is the case then the same spirit of doubt should be fostered for other historical accounts, whether these accounts be positive or negative in relation to the British and their commanders, where such doubt does not already exist in the minds of Forum members.

Robert

[bill24chev]

Correct Bill. It is important to understand though that this engagement took place towards I Corps' open left flank. Mormal Forest was thought to be essentially impenetrable to troops, hence the two BEF corps diverging to bypass the forest. The emergence of troops from the forest towards the open flank would have been, quite rightly, a major concern. This would be irrespective of the size of the German force that was engaged. I Corps would have had no way of knowing that a much larger outflanking force was not travelling in the attacker's wake.

Robert

I see now why Haig asked for II Corps Support. It was to protect his left flank that he must have expected to be turned which would allow envelopment of I Corps or at the least forcing the two Corps even further apart.

bill

[Guest]

Not sure how much this adds, but interesting enough?

Schlacht bei Le Cateau 26/8/1914

Mike

[Robert Dunlop]

Chris, it is wonderful to have your input again. With respect to your point about Smith-Dorrien and his staff managing not more than two down, there is every indication that this was the case. This was just as true for Mons as it was at Le Cateau. Smith-Dorrien was not totally unfamiliar with his new staff - there is a photograph of S-D and Forrestier-Walker, II Corps Chief-of-Staff, taken before the war. The two worked together very closely with their other staff, with 3rd and 5th Divisions and their respective brigades, in the lead up to and during Mons.

When considering the terrain issues, it is vitally important to take into account the ground that the Germans took up. This is so for the area to the N, NE and E of the main ridge occupied by II Corps right flank elements. There are photographs of a model of the battlefield here (taken from the 'north' looking 'south) and here (taken from the 'east'). It will be hard to make out but the contours of the battlefield have been reproduced under the table cloth. What stands out immediately is that the Germans were able to occupy a semi-circle of high ground around the bend in the Selle river after it leaves Le Cateau. This enabled their artillery to enfilade the British positions along the high ground overlooking the Selle river valley plus, once Le Cateau was occupied, to enfilade the British line towards Cambrai.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Mike, I have just completed a translation of Die Schlacht bei Mons into English. It should be published shortly. There is nothing about the Battle of Le Cateau itself but the monograph deals with the lead up to the battle.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

I see now why Haig asked for II Corps Support. It was to protect his left flank that he must have expected to be turned which would allow envelopment of I Corps or at the least forcing the two Corps even further apart.

That's right, Bill. Interestingly, II Corps war diary contains the following entry:

"Aug 25th 9.15 pm: G.H.Q. wired to ask whether 2nd Corps could support the 1st Corps at LANDRECIES, where the situation was becoming serious, with 19th Inf. Bde.

11.25 pm Reply that troops unable to move tonight as 19th Inf. Bde. could not arrive in a useful state."

This shows that II Corps was aware that I Corps was experiencing a situation that was 'becoming serious' and that the situation was arising at 'LANDRECIES', which was off II Corps' exposed right flank. I don't think S-D could have known the exact dispositions of I Corps at that time so he could not be certain, I imagine, that the attack was against I Corps' exposed left flank. Presuming I Corps received II Corps' reply about not getting any reinforcements then it is not too surprising that Haig would have then focused on what I Corps had to do on its own. This is where GHQ should have been more on top of the situation, though GHQ was clearly in communication with II Corps by wire and was trying to sort something for I Corps. A gap between corps is always a very dangerous situation, indeed any major formations. It leads to indecision or, rightly, self-protection if the odds seem unmanageable otherwise.

Robert

[Chris_Baker]

Haig proved more concerned for the safety of his own force than for the rest of the army ...

Was that not his job?

[phil andrade]

Trelawney,

Discernment is indeed necessary, and your post reveals plenty of that.

Absolute numbers are one thing ; but their composition is another.

The thing that exercises me - apart from the clearly contradictory citations of evidence from CWGC records - is the very large proportion of prisoners that were captured.

To allow for a total of eight thousand British casualties in the battle, it is almost certain that more than half of them would have been prisoners, wounded or otherwise.

What does this tell us about the outcome of the fight, and the morale of the troops committed to it ?

My supposition is that a large proportion fell into German hands in the day or two after the battle.

I have not endeavoured to cite the casualty figure as a yardstick of SD's generalship.

I do think that, in historiographical terms, the size of the casualty list has significance.

Phil (PJA)

[Robert Dunlop]

Was that not his job?

Yes, it was. In the context of the broader whole though but, as I noted in a subsequent post, there was good reason to be focused more on I Corps alone. Please note that I quoted Gardner's view and not a personal one.

Robert

[Guest]

Martin,

Looking at this in more detail. The Roman Road was the principal line of retreat for II Corps. Your dispositions have the effect of opening it to the Germans moving around your right flank, and cutting off that line of retreat. It also has the very real possibility of driving II Corps to the west - away from I Corps, and the main French Armies. Indeed, I would think such a disposition would place II Corps in very real danger of being cut off and destroyed in detail.

In making his dispositions S-D had to consider these issues, rather than the tactical deployment of battalions on the ground, which was the responsibility of divisional and brigade commanders.

Regards

Chris

Chris - If I might respond. The dispositions I suggested had the extreme right hand portion of the front line running parallel with the Roman Road. This would dominate the Roman Road This is in fact where the B Coy trenches and HQ of 2/KOYLI were actually positioned. (Originally they were the support trenches which later became the front line trenches as the threat shifted from the North to the East) The reverse slope was the fall back position. There is a small indication from Lt Col Bond's long 3,000 word account that the KOYLI's dispositions were very effective in this sense as the Germans having driven the Suffolks off the hill were hit hard from this deeper position.

The main difference with my suggestion and the actual deployment was the area of Suffolk Hill. With the Suffolks (forward) and the Manchesters to the rear of the Suffolks on the higher ground. Both these positions could be enfiladed from the East right from the top of the ridge down to their lowest parts North and East. The contour maps clearly show that Suffolk Hill is a convex hill, which as you know provides some challenges for defenders in that there is a significant amount of dead ground. This aspect (lots of dead ground) is also mentioned in the diaries The decision to put the troops very far forward was (I think) a result of this convexity. It effectively dragged the whole position forward, and personally I think too far forward. The other critical decision, (and I don't yet know whose decision it was) was to deploy artillery between the infantry. In some cases they were dug into the infantry lines. Their limbers and horses blocking the sunken road that diagonally crossed the position. This is also mentioned in the diaries. Edit: within the RA there appears to have been an understanding that this was gong to be a fight to the last (their words) - I am quoting Becke here. Given the RA integrated their batteries with forward infantry battalions their dispositions seem to reveal a sense of 'last stand' rather than any intention of retiring. One of the consequences of having the guns so far forward was that the range eventually became too short. Becke mentions guns not being able to fire less than 1,400 yards.

I mentioned in an earlier post that it is possible to deny the ground without putting troops on it. The Roman Road in particular is ground that lends itself to being denied from a deeper position. The hill (spot height 143) near Reumont has some advantage in this respect. It has clear line of sight nearly the whole length of the Roman Road until it finally dips down the convex hill into Le Cateau. Artillery placed here would be in the region of 5-10m higher than the highest point of the ridge/Roman Road and also is able to cover the other lines of approach further East. Incidentally this is where the OC 59 Fd Coy RE put himself - a man that might appreciate the topographical military advantage of the location. My point is that using carefully placed artillery in depth might well have achieved the aim of denying this route as well as preserving some of these valuable assets. They were not easily replaced when lost.

75% of the guns that were lost that day were lost on the extreme Right Flank from very this very exposed positions . No cover except the clogged sunken road with the Artillery's horses. Wide open spaces. It appears that the exposed artillery simply became the primary target for the Germans Artillery and with nowhere to hide and numerically outnumbered they were systematically destroyed. Maj Becke RFA (part of the Historical Branch) who collected the RA data records:

5th Div RA losses:

XXVIII Bde RFA

122 Bty RFA - 4 guns

123 Bty RFA - 6 guns

124 Bty RFA - 6 guns

XV Bde RFA

11 Bty RFA - 2 guns

80 Bty RFA - 1 gun

52 Bty RFA - 6 guns

37 Bty RFA - 1 gun (Howizters)

108 Hy Bty RGA - 1 gun.

So of these six batteries of 18 pdrs (each a 6 gun battery) 69% of their 18 pdrs were lost (25 of the available 36). Looking at the broader picture for 5th Div Artillery, they ended the day with 27 of their 54 18 pdrs or 50% losses in this category of Artillery. When losses get to this level it has an impact on future operations. - part of the broader context.

Here are Maj A F Becke RFA's thoughts on the matter when assessing the deployment of the RA at Le Cateau. He was writing in 1918, published in 1919 and had the opportunity to speak with men who had fought that day (page 79). Note the book was published by the Royal Artillery Institution:

"Our manual [Field artillery Manual] also states that "a rearguard is usually strong in artillery...positions in rear of crests are preferable....the flanks of a rearguard position are especially important and some guns should usually be employed in their defence." Here, at Le Cateau , all the Artillery was deployed for the delaying actions that was fought. In the case of XV RFA and 37 (Hows) on the Right Flank of the Fifth Division it may be considered that it would have been wiser to to place only sections in the forward position, the rest of the guns being brought back into action in the valley and about three-quarters of a mile further back. Had this course been pursued a more difficult target would have been presented to the German Artillery in the misty light of the early morning; the batteries would have been less liable to be doubly enfiladed: the spur south of Le Cateau could have been kept under effective fire: the southern exits from the town as well as the Selle valley could have been denied to the German infantry and nearly all the guns could have been saved"

The last two lines are very telling. The purpose of Becke's book so that the RFA might learn from the experiences. It is interesting that a professional Artilleryman and a member of the Historical Section at least considered how things might have been done differently. To be fair he does spend lots of time explaining what was done correctly, particularly in the 3rd Div area. In his opening paragraph Becke does describe Le cateau as a 'Triumph' and that he thought future historians would regard Le Cateau as one of the most important delaying actions in history. Interestingly he also claims that the "present day popular view" [1919] was that the British had been overwhelmed at Le Cateau.

There is an interesting footnote which might be of interest to those who emphasis the context of the longer term impact:

"To take two examples from the Artillery of the Fifth Division: - XV RFA after Le Cateau had 9 instead of 18 18 pdrs: whilst XXVIII RFA had only 2 18 pdrs until after the Aisne was crossed."

For those with a desire to read another detailed account Brig Gen C De Sausmarez' RFA CB CMG DSO writings will be of interest. He commanded a Heavy Battery at Le Cateau. He clearly thought the decision to stand and fight was the right one. Incidentally he uses the word 'epic' when describing Beck's narrative and does not agree with all of Becke's assessment, which perhaps is another axample of the range of views even in 1919. He does also speculate on what might have been done differently.

MG

[Guest]

Reading Becke's detailed account of the RA at Le Cateau, it is very clear that there was considerable confusion among the RA as to what the higher commanders' intentions were. Le Cateau is variously described as a Rear Guard action or a Delaying Action. We absolutely know that SD's intentions were to eventually break free and resume the Retreat, but some of the accounts show that some of the units read the 'no retirement from here' was going to be a 'last stand' or a 'fight to the finish' allegedly (their words). I am fairly sure the latter two expressions are not defined in the military manuals (happy to be corrected).

MG

[phil andrade]

Delaying Action fits better, don't you think ?

EDITING : Not even that does justice to it, does it ? This was more than just an effort to cover a retreat or slow down a pursuer. This was much more than that, surely. The whole command made a stand. Rearguard or delaying action implies something more partial , almost acquiescing in the role of withdrawal. This was supposed to be a bit of a game changer, wasn't it ?

More editing....I must reconsider : SD envisioned a "stopping blow, under cover of which we could retire".

So acquiescence in withdrawal was implicit.

Phil (PJA)

[Guest]

Delaying Action fits better, don't you think ?

EDITING : Not even that does justice to it, does it ? This was more than just an effort to cover a retreat or slow down a pursuer. This was much more than that, surely. The whole command made a stand. Rearguard or delaying action implies something more partial , almost acquiescing in the role of withdrawal. This was supposed to be a bit of a game changer, wasn't it ?

More editing....I must reconsider : SD envisioned a "stopping blow, under cover of which we could retire".

So acquiescence in withdrawal was implicit.

Phil (PJA)

It was clear in SD's mind. His aims were two-fold

1. To inflict a stopping blow

2. To retire

(his words)...however when the diaries and contemporary histories are studied in detail there seems to be a little confusion down the chain of command. Some of the units (infantry and RA) believed it was simply 'no retirement' i.e they did not get the second part of SD's intention. I suspect that this was a function of two things:

1. No detailed written orders below Corps Level.

2. Verbal orders relayed by staff Officers using their own words (some evidence in the diaries).

Somewhere between 04:00 and 07:30 the essence of what he was trying to achieve was lost on some of the troops. This might have contributed to their actions that day. Lt Col Bond 2/KOYLI

"About 6:00 am there arrived a final order from the Brigade, the last written order that reached the battalion headquarters that day. It was to the effect that there could be no retirement now for the 'fighting troops' of the rearguard. They must be self sufficient and must fight to the end........No trench had been dug for the headquarters of the battalion. I had given my position to the Brigade early in the morning viz:, close by the roadside near the crest of the modest slope overlooking the forward line. We had one equipment shovel between us and the four members of my little party took turns to throw up the soil and make a shallow trench..............our last official visitor before the curtain rose was a staff officer who came to repeat the order "NO RETIREMENT!"

Emphasis in the original. MG

[phil andrade]

That phrase " stopping blow" can be interpreted in a multiplicity of ways.

To my mind, it seems to imply more than delay, and certainly more than protecting the rear.

Phil (PJA)

[Crunchy]

The dispositions I suggested had the extreme right hand portion of the front line running parallel with the Roman Road. This would dominate the Roman Road

With respect, this is irrelevant. These dispositions still uncover II Corps' principal line of retreat. Just as your position covers the road by fire, so could the Germans from the ground to the east of the road. The further south they movie up the Selle valley, which is in dead ground to your position, the greater their chance of cutting off the main line of retreat. Any general worth his salt wouldn't attempt to withdraw his force across the front of an enemy force able to bring fire on the line of retreat. Thus the withdrawal routes are forced further west, probably through Ligney en Cambresis and down the valley in which Esnes sits, which drives II Corps further away form I Corps, and isolated from the remainder of the allied armies.

The main difference with my suggestion and the actual deployment was the area of Suffolk Hill. With the Suffolks (forward) and the Manchesters to the rear of the Suffolks on the higher ground. I agree these are not great positions to occupy, but at least they cover the principal withdrawal route. Sometimes, and often in fighting withdrawals, one has to fight on ground one would prefer not to in better circumstances. We all know Suffolk Hill and the right flank were not great positions, but in discussing tactical dispositions we cannot ignore the overall operational picture - and the need for II Corps to withdraw such as to be able to maintain contact with I Corps and the French armies. You seem to be intent on ignoring the situation as it was from early am on 26th August, which has been recounted very clearly by Nigel and others. S-D, didn't have the luxury of time we have in this thread to seek out the perfect tactical position - that is, if there was one that enabled him to achieve his operational objective - to be able to withdraw his Corps in line with the general allied withdrawal.

The other critical decision, (and I don't yet know whose decision it was) was to deploy artillery between the infantry. In some cases they were dug into the infantry lines. I understand this had more to do with the gunners than S-D. Some gunner officers believed the guns should be with the infantry as a morale factor, to visibly show their support, and provide direct fire. Others believed they should adopt indirect fire positions. Shelford Bidwell in his Fire Power discusses this very point at Le Cateau. Apparently there was considerable discussion over this doctrinal difference amongst the gunners before the war. This was alluded to in Charles Messenger's post, and perhaps he can add more than I am able to.

"Our manual [Field artillery Manual] also states that "a rearguard is usually strong in artillery...positions in rear of crests are preferable....the flanks of a rearguard position are especially important and some guns should usually be employed in their defence." Here, at Le Cateau , all the Artillery was deployed for the delaying actions that was fought. In the case of XV RFA and 37 (Hows) on the Right Flank of the Fifth Division it may be considered that it would have been wiser to to place only sections in the forward position, the rest of the guns being brought back into action in the valley and about three-quarters of a mile further back. Had this course been pursued a more difficult target would have been presented to the German Artillery in the misty light of the early morning; the batteries would have been less liable to be doubly enfiladed: the spur south of Le Cateau could have been kept under effective fire: the southern exits from the town as well as the Selle valley could have been denied to the German infantry and nearly all the guns could have been saved"

The highlighted portion of the quote suggests to me that Becke is suggesting a layout to support the right flank as it was on the ground during the battle. We seem to be discussing two different issues - earlier your answer to the infantry problem, and here as to where the guns ought to have supported the original line taken up on 26th August? So I am not sure how this quote ties in with your argument for pulling the infantry line back to the other side of the Roman Road. If you pull the infantry line back to your positions, the guns have to come back too, leaving the Selle Valley in dead ground, and more importantly unobserved. For the guns to effectively stop any movement up the Selle valley, fire into it must be observed to know when and where to fire on enemy movements in the valley. Otherwise, the only means is to lay down an unobserved continuous barrage across a section of the valley, which can be hit and miss. Moreover, the gunners didn't have the ammunition to do this.

Martin,

In terms of low order tactical dispositions I don't have any difficulty with many of the points you are making. At battalion, company and battery level your dispositions make sense as pure tactical doctrine - and in isolation of the wider events affecting II Corps, but as I mentioned above, the overall operational picture must be considered There is no point in having the perfect tactical layout if it defeats the whole operational purpose of fighting the delaying action. One just cannot divorce the two.

Regards

Chris

[Robert Dunlop]

Presuming I Corps received II Corps' reply about not getting any reinforcements...

I have checked I Corps' War Diary and related WDs, such as the Signals Company, but can find no evidence of a message or other information about II Corp's reply to GHQ on the issue of 19th Infantry Brigade's unavailability.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

It was clear in SD's mind. His aims were two-fold

1. To inflict a stopping blow

2. To retire

(his words)...however when the diaries and contemporary histories are studied in detail there seems to be a little confusion down the chain of command. Some of the units (infantry and RA) believed it was simply 'no retirement' i.e they did not get the second part of SD's intention. I suspect that this was a function of two things:

1. No detailed written orders below Corps Level.

2. Verbal orders relayed by staff Officers using their own words (some evidence in the diaries).

Somewhere between 04:00 and 07:30 the essence of what he was trying to achieve was lost on some of the troops. This might have contributed to their actions that day. Lt Col Bond 2/KOYLI

"About 6:00 am there arrived a final order from the Brigade, the last written order that reached the battalion headquarters that day. It was to the effect that there could be no retirement now for the 'fighting troops' of the rearguard. They must be self sufficient and must fight to the end........No trench had been dug for the headquarters of the battalion. I had given my position to the Brigade early in the morning viz:, close by the roadside near the crest of the modest slope overlooking the forward line. We had one equipment shovel between us and the four members of my little party took turns to throw up the soil and make a shallow trench..............our last official visitor before the curtain rose was a staff officer who came to repeat the order "NO RETIREMENT!"

Emphasis in the original. MG

MG, there is an alternative perspective on this issue. II Corps had been involved in the heaviest fighting at Mons. The German success at Mons came about largely due to the collapse of the defences of the Nimy-Obourg salient. This enabled German forces to penetrate deep into the British position to just south of Mons, in the vicinity of Mont Hyon. In turn this unlocked Jemappes, which placed the British positions to the west along the canal under significant threat of being turned.

A major contributor to the Nimy-Obourg collapse was the different approaches to the outpost defence adopted by the Royal Fusiliers (Nimy) and the Middlesex (Obourg) Regiments. The following message was issued by II Corps to 3rd Division on the morning of the battle:

"Message from: Second Corps [timed] 2.30 am 23/8/14 [to:] 3rd Division

Should an attack be made during the night or early morning troops will hold their ground. Outpost line will be strengthened as much as possible in the time available."

II Corps then issued a further update just before the battle was due to start:

"Message from: Second Corps [timed] 7 am Twenty-third [August, to:] 3rd Division

A suitable defensive position to South of MONS should be selected and if possible prepared AAA The Southern exits of MONS should be barricaded AAA This is to enable troops North of MONS to fall back in safety if necessity arises but it must be understood that canal line and Outpost line must be strengthened and held as long as possible AAA Acknowledge"

8th Brigade's War Diary was lost in the retreat. The notes that were re-entered into what is now the only record of the day do not contain the details of information sent to the 4th Middlesex. The regiment's diary, however, records the following for the day before the battle:

"8.0 am Ordered to occupy outpost positions from Harmignies exclusive, to NIMY inclusive, including 3 bridges across the canal.

2.0 pm Ordered to hold fresh position"

On the day of the battle, the regiment received this note from 8th Brigade at 1 pm:

"You will decide when the bridges and boats within your areas should be destroyed aaa Acknowledge."

and another note at around 1 pm, which was sent at 12.30 approx:

"O.C. 2nd Bn. Royal Irish report aaa My scouts report a large force of infantry in close order, moving West along the BINCHE - ST GHISLAIN road. I am going to obtain further details aaa"

Then a note received at 2.15 pm:

"Did you get my 46 re destroying bridges aaa Please inform me if they have been destroyed or not."

None of these messages referred to any retirement of the regiment. By way of contrast, the situation was different with 9th Brigade. Here is the first message sent to the Royal Fusiliers on the day before the battle:

"Message from: 9th INF BDE [dated] 22 [August; timed] 1.7 PM

Enemy is reported to be advancing due SOUTH on MONS with heavy infantry columns the advanced guards of which may get touch with us this afternoon.

The line of the canal is to be the line of resistance 4/R FUS will hold all crossings from NIMY inclusive to including letter S of STA ¾ miles W & S of word MONS"

The an updated message at 7.15 pm that evening, which introduces an element of doubt about how determined the defence of Nimy should be:

"9th Infantry Brigade Special Instructions 22-8-14 7.15 pm

1. If attacked the outposts are to hold their ground as long as possible but they will not be reinforced from Units in CUESMES.

3. Outposts Officers Cmdg Battns or outposts will keep the Brig. Gen. fully informed of the progress of any attack.

If finally compelled to retire the 4th Rl. Fus. will do so by the MONS-CHASSE ROYAL ROAD to a position in rear of the right of the Lincolnshire R."

9th Brigade's WD for the 23rd, the day of the battle, records:

"The R Fus reported that they were attacked by 6 Battalions. About 2 pm they began to withdraw, doing so in excellent order. At the time Lt Col M--- reported casualties as about 3 officers and 150 men, amongst these being the whole of the machine gun section.

About 2.30 pm orders were sent to units of the outpost line to commence retirement on FRAMERIES or rather to a position just north of it. Bde HQ moved to a point near the tailing heaps just N of FRAMERIES about 3 pm. The retirement was covered by the Linc R and ½ North Fus."

The Royal Fusiliers' WD shows that the order to retire was issued by the regiment even earlier:

"1.10 pm MONS 23rd Aug.

First order to retire was given.

1.40 pm

Final order to retire was given."

I recount these details for two reasons. First, this is an excellent example of how a lack of clarity about the trigger for retirement can cause major problems. Second, this example may be directly relevant to Le Cateau. II Corps became aware of what unfolded in the defence of the salient but it is not clear if the issues revealed by the different approaches taken by 8th and 9th Brigades were explicitly picked up as 'lessons learned'. If yes then this could explain why more definitive orders not to retire were issued lower down the chain of command.

Robert

[Guest]

"

I recount these details for two reasons. First, this is an excellent example of how a lack of clarity about the trigger for retirement can cause major problems. Second, this example may be directly relevant to Le Cateau. II Corps became aware of what unfolded in the defence of the salient but it is not clear if the issues revealed by the different approaches taken by 8th and 9th Brigades were explicitly picked up as 'lessons learned'. If yes then this could explain why more definitive orders not to retire were issued lower down the chain of command.

Robert

Robert, thanks for this context. Interesting.

I am not sure what was doctrine/teaching in 1914 when giving orders. I don't get the impression from the paper trail in the diaries that there was a particularly rigid standard practise. With regards to Le Cateau we know some of the records (signals, messages) were destroyed as positions were overrun. The examples you give above and the evidence from Le Cateau suggest tsome confusion over the intentions; Within the same Brigade local commanders had different ideas of what the intention was, which in itself is an interetsing.

With regards to the Mons a Divisional commander 'exhorted his men to fight to the last and to use their fists even if the ammunition were exhausted'. I am not sure if that was the intention at Mons - to fight to the last - but clearly that is what had been communicated at one stage. The same Div commander Maj Gen Sir C Fergusson was in command of the troops on the Right Flank where there appears to be some confusion over the intentions. To date I have not found written orders at Battalion level from Brigade. We know there were written orders cancelling the previously planned continued retirement as these are alluded to in subsequent narratives by survivors. I wonder if the same Div commander's zeal in 'fighting to the last' at Mons continued at Le Cateau.

[Guest]

Martin,

In terms of low order tactical dispositions I don't have any difficulty with many of the points you are making. At battalion, company and battery level your dispositions make sense as pure tactical doctrine - and in isolation of the wider events affecting II Corps, but as I mentioned above, the overall operational picture must be considered There is no point in having the perfect tactical layout if it defeats the whole operational purpose of fighting the delaying action. One just cannot divorce the two.

Regards

Chris

Chris - many thanks for your detailed reply. It is greatly appreciated. I assumed it would be obvious that pulling the infantry back would necessitate pulling the artillery back as well. I would't advocate leaving artillery in such exposed positions with or without infantry. My failing for not being clear. I would make three last points;

Firstly the line of retreat under the existing plans was completely exposed to German artillery from positions east of the Selle valley. My suggestions would not make a blind bit of difference to that fact, it simply would have reduced the catastrophe that befell the men on the forward slopes who were sitting ducks all day. The forward and extreme right flank positions and their forward artillery were exposed to frontal and enfilade artillery and MG fire for the best part of 6-7 hours, resulting in the destruction of 69% [Edit] 89% the British Right Flank's artillery [XV and XXVIII Btys] in their exposed positions and two of the four battalions. The whole of the road to Reumont was exposed regardless of any realignment of troops. To be fair SD assumed I Corps would be on his right and did not expect this, however at some stage in the morning he became aware that I Corps was not coming and must have immediately realised that the Road to Reumont (already under heavy artillery fire) had become extremely vulnerable as a line of retreat. Your comments on the other thread that French might have ordered I Corps not to join II Corps might have profound implications for this part of the battle given 5th Div's line of retreat was on the very extreme right of his II Corps position. Without I Corps it was untenable. Incidentally a word used to describe the forward position by one of the COs.

Secondly, as mentioned in my earlier post Artillery placed on the high ground near Reumont (spot height 143) would cover the Selle valley. The map clearly shows this and Becke also makes this specific point i.e. the Selle valley would not be in dead ground to artillery in that position. German infantry approaching along the Selle valley would could be observed from this position - the highest point along the whole route and again I believe this route could be denied by carefully place Artillery. I am struggling to understand there was not enough time to cover the Selle valley with artillery at least. Presumably a consequence of pushing all the field artillery so far forward. Your point about the debate among RA Officers over the positioning of Artillery is interesting. I would certainly like to explore this and would be very interested in any reference material.

Thirdly. Ammunition. Becke seems to imply there was enough ammunition. He provides detailed ammunition expenditure tables by battery in his appendix. Given so much was left on the battlefield it might suggest there was sufficient ammunition. I will if necessary revert with numbers but from memory over 50 limbers of ammunition were abandoned. One battery certainly shot away all its ammunition. One BC having been told to abandon the guns was so incensed that he ran back to ensure all the remaining ammunition was fired off before finally abandoning his guns.

The extreme forward positions seem to me to be a pointless waste of life and artillery.The men were subjected to 6 hours of artillery bombardment which destroyed the exposed artillery. Only after this did the German Infantry move in and despite a tenacious defence by the survivors, it was overrun with fairly little loss to the German side.

We may have to agree to disagree on whether the forward slopes had to be occupied and the artillery had to be that far forward. The troops that did occupy stood to arms at 04:00 and there were no pre-prepared trenches to the east of the Roman Road according to Bond, whose battalion initially were partially deployed there before being moved to the west of the road. The order to not retire was received at Div level not long after this and took 3 hours to reach the Battalion COs. Given the KOYLI did relocate trenches and re-orientate them in this time, I suspect there was time (in theory). Maybe the fog of war obliterated the small window of opportunity. We shall never know.

Anyway I really appreciate your comments. It has certianly helped me better understand the decision process and the broader issues. MG

[Robert Dunlop]

Dealing with your second point first, we have to be very cautious about interpreting what was said and, perhaps more importantly, how it would have been interpreted by the recipients. There are some lovely anecdotes from the likes of De Lisle, for example, giving a Fergusson-like pep talk to his staff. In seperate accounts, staff officers write ho-hum reviews suggesting that the sentiments being espoused were treated with scepticism.

There was a standard approach to giving orders. This was taught in the staff college and was touched on in the likes of FSR. There were several problems with enforcing this, not least the changing circumstances within a battle. Another important aspect was the informal communication networks that existed in the BEF. It was possible to bypass standard processes by talking directly to a fellow officer. Etonians were very strong on this, for example. The regimental system also created powerful informal networks. The BEF was small enough that officers were quite likely to have served together, sharing the bonds created by campaigning. Finally, the experience of previous engagements likely had an affect on the thinking and behaviours of some commanders, depending on their pre-existing personalities. It is interesting to speculate whether Gough's self-confessed failure to take a more pro-active role with 3rd Cavalry Brigade at Le Cateau related to his capture by the Boers in that earlier war...

The German First Army had had the advantage of previous contacts and engagements to iron out some of the difficulties that inevitably afflict a new force in the field. Even so, there were still issues arising as late as Le Cateau and beyond. It is not surprising that we see many of the same problems being played out in the BEF.

Robert

[Guest]

Dealing with your second point first, we have to be very cautious about interpreting what was said and, perhaps more importantly, how it would have been interpreted by the recipients. There are some lovely anecdotes from the likes of De Lisle, for example, giving a Fergusson-like pep talk to his staff. In seperate accounts, staff officers write ho-hum reviews suggesting that the sentiments being espoused were treated with scepticism.

Robert

Robert, thank you for your thoughts.

The reason I raise this point - confusion about what the aim was - is that there are multiple sources that expose this from those very recipients. Not just a few. Interestingly even when writing many years after the events there seems confusion with some author/participants/recipients. It may be that they were using language that better fitted the outcome (for some) rather than the intention - "fight to the last" doesn't convey the aims of giving the Germans "a stopping blow, under the cover of which we could retire". It may have been simply aimed at raising morale among weary troops but it may have had unintended consequences since some units did indeed fight to the last.

MG