Inventing the Schlieffen Plan

[Chris Boonzaier]

Persoanlly this is not an issue that really excites me, so I dont really have a dog in the fight, but a Couple of points do jump out

1) When does a Schlieffen plan, become "Not a Schlieffen Plan"

2) How many ways can you skin a cat?

3) Just who was protecting who?

4) So what plan was it?

5) Plan kept secret in coverup ??

1) If schlieffen had a plan, but the plan used was not his... how much of his original plan was used? i.e. if you take 25 points from his plan, compare it to the plan used... how many points would match? and at what point would it no longer be "his"

2) Just how many ways can you march off to war? Was the order "We want a plan, with no schlieffen ideas in it... and dont come up with something like landing at normandy and marching on Paris!"... Once Schlieffen had done the basic plan... could a plan be made that did not include a lot of his stuff?

3) There is a lot of talk of covering a3§§es and shifting blame. Everyone knows what it is like to work with a lame duck. The guy who is slow, always sick, never pulls his weight. A bit like Moltke... I would imagine that his comrades had little sympathy with him. Why would the disciples of schlieffen allow the blame to be heaped on the old master they respected... instead of dumping it on Moltke with "it was his fault! if only he had listened to Schlieffi"

4) With all the books and articles and butt covering and finger pointing... why did noone back then ever mention this plan a la Voldemort... the plan that must not be named!

5) I have seen the argument that the plan was kept secret as part of a coverup... I would imagine that out of purely Military and Political reasons it was kept under wraps... as we were to see later, the Germans really believe in the "if at first you dont succeed, try and try again" model of invasion. Seen as such... what reason would they have for publishing the plans?

There are 250 posts on this thread, and the simple answer to "if it was not old Schlieffies plan, whose was it?" still cannot be answered. Maybe all the details need a book... but usually a proof can be covered in 3-5 lines.

Best

Chris

[Wuerzburg]

Persoanlly this is not an issue that really excites me, so I dont really have a dog in the fight, but a Couple of points do jump out

1) When does a Schlieffen plan, become "Not a Schlieffen Plan"

2) How many ways can you skin a cat?

3) Just who was protecting who?

4) So what plan was it?

5) Plan kept secret in coverup ??

1) If schlieffen had a plan, but the plan used was not his... how much of his original plan was used? i.e. if you take 25 points from his plan, compare it to the plan used... how many points would match? and at what point would it no longer be "his"

2) Just how many ways can you march off to war? Was the order "We want a plan, with no schlieffen ideas in it... and dont come up with something like landing at normandy and marching on Paris!"... Once Schlieffen had done the basic plan... could a plan be made that did not include a lot of his stuff?

3) There is a lot of talk of covering a3§§es and shifting blame. Everyone knows what it is like to work with a lame duck. The guy who is slow, always sick, never pulls his weight. A bit like Moltke... I would imagine that his comrades had little sympathy with him. Why would the disciples of schlieffen allow the blame to be heaped on the old master they respected... instead of dumping it on Moltke with "it was his fault! if only he had listened to Schlieffi"

4) With all the books and articles and butt covering and finger pointing... why did noone back then ever mention this plan a la Voldemort... the plan that must not be named!

5) I have seen the argument that the plan was kept secret as part of a coverup... I would imagine that out of purely Military and Political reasons it was kept under wraps... as we were to see later, the Germans really believe in the "if at first you dont succeed, try and try again" model of invasion. Seen as such... what reason would they have for publishing the plans?

There are 250 posts on this thread, and the simple answer to "if it was not old Schlieffies plan, whose was it?" still cannot be answered. Maybe all the details need a book... but usually a proof can be covered in 3-5 lines.

Best

Chris

Chris,

Schlieffen was chief of the general staff from 1891-1905. In those 14 years he conducted many wargames and wrote 14 annual war plans.

None of these had anything to do with what is commonly understood to be the "Schlieffen plan".

The "Schlieffen plan' was written after Schlieffen retired on 1 January 1906 and had a distinct set of characteristics: 96 divisions (24 of which did not exist) etc.

What you would have us believe is that "Any plan Schlieffen wrote is a a Schlieffen plan" which is merely a tautology - circular reasioning.

4 lines - I guess that fits your criteria.

Terence Zuber

[Wuerzburg]

There is a terrible habit of dismissing anything written by a socialist offhand... about the same as OJ Simpson getting off because the testimony of one of the wirnesses was discounted because he was considered a racist.

You dont tackle the issue of the reischstag agreeing that it was the bees knens plan. If that was so, then it is true whether this appeared in a socialist publication or not.

Best

Chris

Chris,

Sorry - "bees knens plan"?

I don't care if it appeared in Cosmopolitan - there was no new information in the article, which merely rehashed what had been written in the last 8 years.

Terence Zuber

[Wuerzburg]

Thanks Terence I will of course be buying that book and also the one on the Ardennes as I'm really interested in the early phases of the war.

As regards Schlieffen promoting/publishing his 1906 memorandum Hew Strachan says the following p170 'To Arms'

Strachan also goes on to say that Schlieffen devoted much of his energy leading up to and just after his retirement acquiring evidence to support these assumptions.

So it does seem that the central aspects of the 1906 memorandum were published at some point (I assume before 1914 unless I am badly misunderstanding the quote above) and Schlieffen was active in acquiring evidence to support them.

As always open to correction and enlightenment and thanks again for informing this thread with your great knowledge of the subject.

Best/Liam

Liam,

To reduce the 1906 Memorandum to the point where it merely calls for an envelopement is reductio ad absurdum. The Memorandum is 18 typed pages long and says a great deal more than "envelop the enemy".

In the 14 years that Schlieffen was chief of the general staff, and in retirement, he wrote a great deal about strategy. Envelopement was certainly a central theme, but how that was to be accomplished was far more important. Nor did Schlieffen regard envelopement as a panacea. He pointed out the dangers associated with conducting envelopements in general and the envelopement through Belgium in particular.

Most important, practically all the envelopements in Schlieffen's war games were conducted as counterattacks against Franco-Russian offensives: it is much easier to envelop the enemy if he is running right at you.

Even in strategy, attention to detail is essential.

Terence Zuber

[Chris Boonzaier]

Chris,

Schlieffen was chief of the general staff from 1891-1905. In those 14 years he conducted many wargames and wrote 14 annual war plans.

None of these had anything to do with what is commonly understood to be the "Schlieffen plan".

The "Schlieffen plan' was written after Schlieffen retired on 1 January 1906 and had a distinct set of characteristics: 96 divisions (24 of which did not exist) etc.

What you would have us believe is that "Any plan Schlieffen wrote is a a Schlieffen plan" which is merely a tautology - circular reasioning.

4 lines - I guess that fits your criteria.

Terence Zuber

Just to help my understanding... how much of Schlieffens 14 Annual war plans were included in the post january 1906 plan?

Was the core of the plan the same year after year... or did they have to reinvent the wheel every year?

Best

Chris

[yelob]

Thanks Terence for the informative answer and interesting information.

Chris,

My understanding is that the 1906 Memorandum is unique and bears no relation to any previous war games or staff rides and that the first time that Schlieffen considered breaking Belgian neutrality was in 1904.

Best/Liam

[Chris Boonzaier]

Thanks Terence for the informative answer and interesting information.

Chris,

My understanding is that the 1906 Memorandum is unique and bears no relation to any previous war games or staff rides and that the first time that Schlieffen considered breaking Belgian neutrality was in 1904.

Best/Liam

Hi Liam,

How many options were there? I am not trying to be facetious in any way... but dropping paratroopers, going through Switzerland or landing at Normandy were not really alternatives.

Although TZ dismisses it without comment, the Karl Mayr article seems to have Schlieffen considering violating Belgian neutrality in 1896 already? It is an article worth reading.

Best

Chris

[Terry Duncan]

Hi Liam,

How many options were there? I am not trying to be facetious in any way... but dropping paratroopers, going through Switzerland or landing at Normandy were not really alternatives.

Although TZ dismisses it without comment, the Karl Mayr article seems to have Schlieffen considering violating Belgian neutrality in 1896 already? It is an article worth reading.

Best

Chris

Chris,

Where has Terence dismissed the idea Schlieffen considered violation of Belgium as an option in 1896? Working from memory I though he detailed this in Inventing the Schlieffen Plan, along with noting that the artillery was insufficient to undertake the task? Having said that, there were studies for how to attack the US east coast and iirc it was also supposed to have been considered briefly if it was worth invading Denmark too as an extreme version of the attack in the west. The actual 'plans' here seem to be rather more studies into how to approach a problem rather more than a serious wish to attempt such things, and many are subject to exaggeration to feed the militaristic Germany line of thought - as though Russia and France were not highly militaristic themselves!

The idea of an attack in the west almost requires an attack through Belgium to work, although this was a political disaster for Germany even before the atrocity claims.

Terence,

I would like to ask about the disposition of the German cavalry arm after mobilization, as the left flank armies seem to retained their units despite the obvious benefit of having as many of these forces on the right wing as possible, especially if the left was simply intended to absorb any French attack and play a very passive role in the procedings? I have always felt this to be strange and wondered how this can be explained other than that the Germans did indeed expect the left flank to play a very active role at some point.

Terry

[Guest]

Another very interesting online book The German Army in War by A Hilliard Atteridge 1915

How The Germans Fight

Page 90

" As to the general form of the battle, it is often said that the German Staff had a kind of fixed pattern for securing victory. The current idea appears to be that an attempt is always made to turn and envelop one or both flanks of the enemy. Indeed one popular writer on the German methods published not long ago a description, illustrated by elaborate diagrams, of the standard attack of the German Army, the scheme showing the centre held back and the wings pushed forward on a wide front so as to encircle both flanks of the opponent. This would be really not the Prussian method of attack, but the Zulu crescent magnified to an enormous scale. The real fact is that the German Army has no " sealed pattern " for it's attack. Like every other army, it of course accepts the principle-old as organised warfare itself-that the flank attack combined with the attack in front gives the most decisive result. "

Page 94 & 95

" But enough is known to show that in the first stage of the war the German battle leading on a grand scale was modelled precisely on this idea of breaking through the long Allied line, and then striking at the flanks then created. In the last days of August and the first week of September, before the tide turned and victory was won on the Marne, we here in England heard very little except news of the movements of Sir John French's force and Von Kluck's attempts to outflank it's left were naturally supposed to be the main effort of the enemy. But since then we have learned something of the great operations on other parts of the line. It is evident that the general retreat of the Allies was the result of not a movement against their extreme flank in Belgium, but a blow delivered at their centre by a huge mass of troops concentrated in the third week of August in the wooded and hilly country of the Ardennes. Those who believed in the " sealed pattern " method of attack being the only one that our German opponents would adopt, thought they saw in the fighting about Mons and the flank attack on the extreme Allied left the repetition of what they assumed to be the invariable battle plan of the German Staff. But there is no such invariable plan, and in this case the main stroke was at the Allied centre, it's success enabling the Germans in reaping it's results to have recourse to a series of flank attacks once the line was broken. "

Mike

[yelob]

Thanks Mike and Terry for the interesting info and comments.

This has been part of my problem in understanding all this from the start ie the assumption that the German attack in 1914 attempted to invoke the Schlieffen memorandum of 1906 despite not having the manpower.

However flexibility was very much (acc to Strachan) present in Moltke's thinking as he took account (too much?) of what the

French might do.It's also my understanding that the Schlieffen 14 war games/plans pre 1906 memorandum also involved flexibility.It's worth noting that some of these war games involved stalemates,victories for the other side and even a German victory over Russia first.

I don't know how much flexibility was built into the 1906 memorandum,it would be interesting to know.

It's also worth bearing in mind Moltke's remarks that he would do what he could in the event of a war with France and his

further remark that no plan would survive contact with the enemy.These remarks seem to indicate he wasn't attempting to act out of any rigid formula.

It seems (again from Strachan) that by the 27th August Moltke was no longer thinking of winning on the right flank but was considering attacks from the left and the centre too.

The big questions to me are still

1.What were the German Army's intentions in 1914

2.What was Moltke's plan and the evolution of his thinking? and

3.How Schlieffenesque was it?

I'm hoping to read Terence's books when I have the time and that they will shed some light on these questions.

Best/Liam

[Guest]

Another book of interest HERE

Mike

[Wuerzburg]

Just to help my understanding... how much of Schlieffens 14 Annual war plans were included in the post january 1906 plan?

Was the core of the plan the same year after year... or did they have to reinvent the wheel every year?

Best

Chris

Chris,

The plan changed to meet the changing military and political situation. For two years Moltke even had an East-front first plan.

I hate to sound like a nag, but get The Real German War Plan 1904-1914 and most of your questions will be answered.

Terence Zuber

[Wuerzburg]

Hi Liam,

How many options were there? I am not trying to be facetious in any way... but dropping paratroopers, going through Switzerland or landing at Normandy were not really alternatives.

Although TZ dismisses it without comment, the Karl Mayr article seems to have Schlieffen considering violating Belgian neutrality in 1896 already? It is an article worth reading.

Best

Chris

Chris,

How would Mayr know? What access did he have to actual German planning documents? What sources does he cite?

If you want to know what Schleffen's planning was in 1896, and from 1891 to 1904, for that matter, see Inventing the Schlieffen Plan. I did have access to the source material.

Terence Zuber

[Terry Duncan]

Thanks Mike and Terry for the interesting info and comments.

This has been part of my problem in understanding all this from the start ie the assumption that the German attack in 1914 attempted to invoke the Schlieffen memorandum of 1906 despite not having the manpower.

However flexibility was very much (acc to Strachan) present in Moltke's thinking as he took account (too much?) of what the

French might do.It's also my understanding that the Schlieffen 14 war games/plans pre 1906 memorandum also involved flexibility.It's worth noting that some of these war games involved stalemates,victories for the other side and even a German victory over Russia first.

I don't know how much flexibility was built into the 1906 memorandum,it would be interesting to know.

It's also worth bearing in mind Moltke's remarks that he would do what he could in the event of a war with France and his

further remark that no plan would survive contact with the enemy.These remarks seem to indicate he wasn't attempting to act out of any rigid formula.

It seems (again from Strachan) that by the 27th August Moltke was no longer thinking of winning on the right flank but was considering attacks from the left and the centre too.

The big questions to me are still

1.What were the German Army's intentions in 1914

2.What was Moltke's plan and the evolution of his thinking? and

3.How Schlieffenesque was it?

I'm hoping to read Terence's books when I have the time and that they will shed some light on these questions.

Best/Liam

Liam,

Strachan does allow for Moltke being far more flexible than many like to claim, which given the needs of any army can only be a good thing.

As to your questions, I would say the answers are as follows, and though some may seem flippant they may be closer to the truth than some like to think.

1. To win or at least do as well for their nation as possible. Terence Zuber's conclusion that they wished to force the French away from their fortifications in order to fight a decisive battle certainly looks correct, and from the information we have from Moltke he expected the war to be a long war and not a single short campaign - the comment about the war lasting 7 -30 years, until one nation (alliance) or the other was utterly exhausted certainly would support this. The massive attack to win the war with France in six weeks seems to be supported nowhere prior to WWI and even for some time after. The entire Idea you can plan events faultlessly for six weeks in advance irrespective of what the enemy does and be ensured victory, and indeed plan this six years in advance not knowing what technology advances would be seen in between times, is so far fetched it is laughable, but it is what many really do believe.

2. I believe a lot is still lost, but Terence Zuber has certainly opened up a debate amongst authorities. We may never know all of it, but all the while people are looking there is a chance something will be found to settle matters once and for all.

3. This depends, a large right wing attack - Terence calls it a counter-attack but I would not really agree with that 100% - through the Low Countries into France is all that can be agreed by both sides of the debate. Moltke was the leader at the time and it is pretty inconceivable that he did nothing for eight years, so the plan used in 1914 would have been his. If we are to claim any right wing first attack is a Schlieffen Plan, maybe we should style that itself differently? After all, the flank attack is hardly new. That would make all of Alexander's great victories Epaminondian at least! The German War Plan of 1914: A Variation on a Theme by Epaminondas really doesnt have the same ring to it. Sadly that is likely the future, the name Schlieffen is known by people who have not the slightest idea of what went on in 1914, and they are the people least likely to be convinced by cogent debate or evidence.

Terry

[Wuerzburg]

Chris,

Where has Terence dismissed the idea Schlieffen considered violation of Belgium as an option in 1896? Working from memory I though he detailed this in Inventing the Schlieffen Plan, along with noting that the artillery was insufficient to undertake the task? Having said that, there were studies for how to attack the US east coast and iirc it was also supposed to have been considered briefly if it was worth invading Denmark too as an extreme version of the attack in the west. The actual 'plans' here seem to be rather more studies into how to approach a problem rather more than a serious wish to attempt such things, and many are subject to exaggeration to feed the militaristic Germany line of thought - as though Russia and France were not highly militaristic themselves!

The idea of an attack in the west almost requires an attack through Belgium to work, although this was a political disaster for Germany even before the atrocity claims.

Terence,

I would like to ask about the disposition of the German cavalry arm after mobilization, as the left flank armies seem to retained their units despite the obvious benefit of having as many of these forces on the right wing as possible, especially if the left was simply intended to absorb any French attack and play a very passive role in the procedings? I have always felt this to be strange and wondered how this can be explained other than that the Germans did indeed expect the left flank to play a very active role at some point.

Terry

Terry,

You hit on a very sore point. The German cavalry in Lorraine accomplished practically nothing, the two cavalry corps in the Ardennes nothing after 22 August. In Lorraine they were worn out being shuffled back and forth to fill imaginary holes in the line. The other two corps literally had nothing to do. There was simply no way for them to maneuver in built-up and wooded terrain against infantry security posts hiding in the trees, which found mounted horsemen to be fine targets. HKK (Cavalry Corps) 2 and it's light infantry battalions accomplished great things on the right - the other eight cavalry divisions zip. Finally, in late September and erly October 1914 the Germans began to concentrate the cavalry where it should have been all along - on the open country in right flank in Belgium and northern France. German critics after the war jumped on the misuse of the cavalry.

In Moltke's defense, he initially spread his cavalry evenly along the front because he had no idea how the campaign was going to play out and he needed his strategic reconnaissance assets to be prepared to discover whatever action the French would take.

We now know the difficulty that cavalry had in operating everywhere but on the North European plain, but hindsight is 20/20.

What Moltke can be criticized for is not reacting sooner to the fact that 3/4 of his cavalry was accomplishing nothing and moving it north where it might have been decisive.

Terence Zuber

[Terry Duncan]

Terry,

You hit on a very sore point. The German cavalry in Lorraine accomplished practically nothing, the two cavalry corps in the Ardennes nothing after 22 August. In Lorraine they were worn out being shuffled back and forth to fill imaginary holes in the line. The other two corps literally had nothing to do. There was simply no way for them to maneuver in built-up and wooded terrain against infantry security posts hiding in the trees, which found mounted horsemen to be fine targets. HKK (Cavalry Corps) 2 and it's light infantry battalions accomplished great things on the right - the other eight cavalry divisions zip. Finally, in late September and erly October 1914 the Germans began to concentrate the cavalry where it should have been all along - on the open country in right flank in Belgium and northern France. German critics after the war jumped on the misuse of the cavalry.

In Moltke's defense, he initially spread his cavalry evenly along the front because he had no idea how the campaign was going to play out and he needed his strategic reconnaissance assets to be prepared to discover whatever action the French would take.

We now know the difficulty that cavalry had in operating everywhere but on the North European plain, but hindsight is 20/20.

What Moltke can be criticized for is not reacting sooner to the fact that 3/4 of his cavalry was accomplishing nothing and moving it north where it might have been decisive.

Terence Zuber

Terence

My thoughts would be that if Moltke had been following the plan as believed by many, almost no cavalry would have been needed on the left at all, especially if it was to be deliberately weak and possibly even to fall back as Groener suggested. Certainly the right wing would appear the logical option if such a huge advance was expected, Sordet's troops were also exhausted and a few extra German cavalry could have been important here.

To me the only two real possibilities would be that 1: The Germans had no specific plan that dictated all the cavalry be on the mobile right wing when they mobilized, and each unit therefore mobilzed with its parent formations. 2: The Germans did indeed expect the left wing to advance at some point and it therefore needed its full compliment of cavalry.

The latter would certainly fit in with the words of Wenninger, and with Moltke's known interest in Cannae.

Terry

[Jack Sheldon]

Can I commend to everyone following this thread that they go to the 'Virtual Library' sub-section of the 'Documents' forum and click on the link provided today by Skipman to Gen von Stein's war memoirs 'A War Minister and His Work'? Not only did Stein have an interesting war, he knew Schlieffen well and he makes a number of useful remarks about S and his planning in the book.

Jack

[Wuerzburg]

Terence

My thoughts would be that if Moltke had been following the plan as believed by many, almost no cavalry would have been needed on the left at all, especially if it was to be deliberately weak and possibly even to fall back as Groener suggested. Certainly the right wing would appear the logical option if such a huge advance was expected, Sordet's troops were also exhausted and a few extra German cavalry could have been important here.

To me the only two real possibilities would be that 1: The Germans had no specific plan that dictated all the cavalry be on the mobile right wing when they mobilized, and each unit therefore mobilzed with its parent formations. 2: The Germans did indeed expect the left wing to advance at some point and it therefore needed its full compliment of cavalry.

The latter would certainly fit in with the words of Wenninger, and with Moltke's known interest in Cannae.

Terry

The distribution of cavalry evenly along the entire front would surely be an indicator that the German plan in 1914 did not share the "Schlieffen plan's" monomaniacal fixiation on the right wing.

Moltke had no idea what was going to happen in Lorraine or in the Ardennes; therefore 3/4 of the German cavalry was employed there.

The Germans thought that the French could:

1) Launch a mass attack in Lorraine with some 46 divisions. In fact, on 14-15 August 1914 this is exactly what Moltke thought the French were doing. In this case, the German 5th and 4th Armies would swing dead south. Moltke actually issued 'be prepared' orders for this maneuver, and called them off only when contact with enemy forces showed the French weren't this strong.

2) Launch an attack on both sides of Metz (this was Joffre's original Plan XVII intent and in modified form his actual actions)

3) Attack solely into Belgium (Joffre's preferred course of action).

German strategic cavalry recon was the only (safe) way to determine what the French were doing.

All this supposes that the French would use their faster deployment to sieze the initiative, which is what they actually did in Lorraine.

No 'Schlieffen plan' here.

Terence Zuber

[Terry Duncan]

Terence,

I recall an argument with a history teacher I had about 35 years ago, where my questions on the entire Schlieffen Plan were met with 'because they did' as a final argument to cover the various strange problems I noted. He was equally displeased when I drew another heavy line towards Paris from between Belfort and Verdun and captioned it 'Why Not?' and my suggestion he did not understand history or what he was talking about. Maybe this was rude, but I had never found anyone who could explain how this master plan was meant to work, only many who insisted that it must have worked because the Germans lost the war by not sticking to it! It all seemed like a bad case of the Emperor's New Clothes.

In your book Inventing the Schlieffen Plan I believe you mentioned that Falkenhayn and Tappen were in favour of a more central attack, do any details of their proposal survive?

Terry

[Wuerzburg]

Can I commend to everyone following this thread that they go to the 'Virtual Library' sub-section of the 'Documents' forum and click on the link provided today by Skipman to Gen von Stein's war memoirs 'A War Minister and His Work'? Not only did Stein have an interesting war, he knew Schlieffen well and he makes a number of useful remarks about S and his planning in the book.

Jack

Stein's book was published in 1919 (Erlebnisse und Betrachtungen). He makes some interesting but very general comments concerning war planning under Moltke and Schlieffen, making it quite clear that it was Schlieffen who professionalized the planning process. That's it.

No mention of a "Schlieffen plan".

Stein says that "The [German] deployment did not determine the concept of the operation. The enemy could sieze the initiative; his rail net made it likely" (p. 53)

What I found most interesting was Stein's observation concerning the considerable influence that the elder Moltke (and not Schlieffen) had on the younger Moltke.

It is important to remember that Stein was Moltke's Oberquartiermeister, his de facto chief of staff and he shared Moltke's supposed culpability in the loss of the Battle of the Marne. Stein draws heat not just from the 'Schlieffen school': I don't remember the Bavarians having a kind word to say about him. Stein, for his part, has axes to grind, especially against the current government (p. 192-3). After the Marne Stein was made commander of XIV Reserve Corps. Not exactly a promotion.

Terence Zuber

[Wuerzburg]

Terence,

I recall an argument with a history teacher I had about 35 years ago, where my questions on the entire Schlieffen Plan were met with 'because they did' as a final argument to cover the various strange problems I noted. He was equally displeased when I drew another heavy line towards Paris from between Belfort and Verdun and captioned it 'Why Not?' and my suggestion he did not understand history or what he was talking about. Maybe this was rude, but I had never found anyone who could explain how this master plan was meant to work, only many who insisted that it must have worked because the Germans lost the war by not sticking to it! It all seemed like a bad case of the Emperor's New Clothes.

In your book Inventing the Schlieffen Plan I believe you mentioned that Falkenhayn and Tappen were in favour of a more central attack, do any details of their proposal survive?

Terry

Terry,

I would have to agree with you about the Emperor's New Clothes.

The area betweeen Verdun and Belfort was covered by the French fortress line, except for the area between Touls and Epinal - the 'Trouee de Charmes' - which was commonly understood to be a trap.

The problem wasn't just that this area was fortified, but that even if you break through the fortress line you have just pushed the French to the rear and gained an 'ordinary vctory'. France is a big country - as the Germans discovered in 1870/71. The French had a lot of room to retreat into.

In short, a frontal attack was a non-starter. In fact, as the younger Moltke proved, the attack through Belgium into central France didn't accomplish much either.

That's why Schlieffen wanted to counter-attack.

Falkenhayn was the War Minister (until he replaced Moltke) and he could gripe, but had no say in strategy. Tappen was the ops officer and didn't have a big say in formulating strategy. That was the area of Moltke and Stein.

Terence Zuber

[Chris Boonzaier]

Chris,

How would Mayr know? What access did he have to actual German planning documents? What sources does he cite?

If you want to know what Schleffen's planning was in 1896, and from 1891 to 1904, for that matter, see Inventing the Schlieffen Plan. I did have access to the source material.

Terence Zuber

I would guess that he, and all the other writers of the 1920s etc. had access to real living and breating members of the General staff. Which we do not have today.

I would imagine that there were discussions going on by people who were actually there and involved in the planning.

I would think that if Mayr and a host of others in the inter war year years had spoken of things that did not exist... then some crusty old General would have written a book and put him in their place, especially if it meant they were able to put the Socialists and Anti militarists in their place... they did not.

Unfortunatley too many arguments today are based on things we dont find, as opposed to what we do.

I am of the firm belief that the writers of "then", with access to the protagonists, had living "source material" way better than the few documents found today and the mass that have not been found.

There are plenty of German generals who put a pen to paper between the wars... one would think that one of them would have "exploded the myth of the Schlieffen plan" in a period best seller.

As i have said before, I dont really have a dog in the fight, its not really my area of interest, so i came in willing to be persuaded. So far i am not.

Best

Chris

[Terry Duncan]

Chris, I wanted to address a few of the points you raised;

I am of the firm belief that the writers of "then", with access to the protagonists, had living "source material" way better than the few documents found today and the mass that have not been found.

Sadly many of the protagonists were involved in a lot of blaming others, and in the case of the diplomatic history of the war, outright lies were told to justify actions or to hide what had taken place. This makes too much reliance on the works from the 1920's a problem. Certainly some were honest, but far from all. As Albertini noted, Jagow for one had a tenuous relationship with the truth!

There are plenty of German generals who put a pen to paper between the wars... one would think that one of them would have "exploded the myth of the Schlieffen plan" in a period best seller.

Terence does detail this in his books, generals did indeed put pen to paper and some said there was a great plan but couldnt describe it, others didnt even mention it. There were disputes between the main German archives who were trying to say there was a plan, and the Bavarian archive that said there was no plan they were aware of! With the coming to power of the Nazi's all debate in Germany seems to have ended from what Terence has written, and I am unaware of any myself, so it would be interesting to see if anyone can point to further debates in the period 1933-39?

Terence,

I agree with pretty much all you have said to me, but the German actions in 1914 do lend weight to those wishing to claim the orthodox idea of the Schlieffen Plan is correct. Very few actually address the many problems this idea should bring to mind, not least what to do about Paris! Returning to my history teacher, it seemed that he was totally unaware of the fact Paris was the largest fortress city in the world and had pretty much its own mini-army for defence, or that this meant it was impossible to pass either east or west of it without risking a massive defeat. This seem to still be a popular belief, along with German troops on the extreme right trying to march along the Channel coast and that Maunoury's 6th Army would have somehow not totally fubar'ed the entire plan if the arrows had only been followed.

Having read many of the 'rebuttals' or 'refutations' of your work on this subject on the War in History site, it seems some are simply arguing sematics and refusing to look at the actual detail, insisting that as the attack came through Belgium it must be Schlieffen's plan. One article in particular comes to mind - though I cannot recall who it was by - simply questioned how you found documents, if you had not published all you found, and noting that others may well contradict you when translated or found, but did not actually address anything about the actual fighting and what the Germans actually did. I may have expected that on a web site, but from an academic it did seem somewhat fixated on nothing being allowed to be revised or examined.

I would not say I am 100% convinced by your belief that the basic core of the plan was to counter-attack and fight the war on interior lines and therefore a long war scenario. I think the idea of trying to force the French away from the fortress line and fight a decisive battle may have been closer to the primary objective Moltke was aiming for, with your suggestion being a ' back-up plan' as such. If the decisive battle was the main objective it would explain Moltke's decision to advance further into France if he felt such a victory to be close at hand, than if a limited advance had been his maim objective all along. My major problem with the long war scenario is that it seems to have been agreed that this did not favour Germany, especially if Britain was involved, therefore a plan that could only deliver this scenario would always see people wanting to deviate from it if the hope of some quick victory did look possible. I freely admit it is only gut feeling and looking at what you and others have presented, there is just this big doubt that Moltke had got his eye on the big victory from the start.

Terry

[Guest]

I have no idea if this book is useful. Perhaps some of our German, or German speaking friends can comment?

Generalfeldmarschall Graf von Schlieffen: Sein Leben und die Verwertung

google translates this as " General Field Marshal Count von Schlieffen: His life and recovery .. "?

Mike

[Guest]

" This important new book makes some of Schlieffen's more important texts available to an English speaking audience for the first time. Robert Foley provides translations of Schlieffen's staff rides and other publications, as well as some rarely seen selections from the archives. Each selection is fully annotated, petting the documents into context for the modern reader. The texts reproduced here include 'On war of today' 'Cannae' 'Million man Armies' and Schlieffen's 'Last Kreigsspiel. The book also includes a section of contemporary photographs.

This book will be indespensable reading for all serious students of German military history and the First World War and will also appeal to the informed general reader."

From google books

Alfred von Schlieffen's military writings By Alfred Schlieffen (Graf von), Robert T. Foley

Mike