Inventing the Schlieffen Plan

[cdr]

I am working from the original documents in the Freiburg archive, Nachlass (papers) Schlieffen N43/138, a photocopy of which I have in my possession. See my translation in: German War Planning 1891-1914. Sources and Interpretations.

I think that 'Krieg gegen Frankreich' doesn't require much interpretation, particularly since the Russians are not mentioned again and no forces are sent east.

I have no idea where your transcription originated, but the transcriber was sloppy.

As for presumed Belgian hostility, the Germans were going to march through their country. The German intelligence analyses, under Moltke at least, assumed that the Belgians would align themselves with the French, prett y much regardless of what the Germans did.

just this

we're probably talking about different documents. My transcript is from Denkschrift 'Krieg gegen Frankreich' Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv N 323/19

It is interesting to consider ther German intelligence analyses. At the same time French intelligence analyses assumed the Belgians would align themselves with the German. So somebody must have not doing his job properly.

Carl

[Wuerzburg]

Mr. Zuber,

Ouch, "simple minded", well, I'm sure there are other members of this forum that would probably agree with you. I don't want to put words in your mouth (I'm sure you will let me know if I do) but is it your contention that since the Schlieffen "plan" was only a ploy to enlarge the size of the army Germany did not actually have an offensive plan (through Belgium) and was simply responding to the French incursions in Alsace-Lorraine?

Regards,

Dave

Dave,

Sorry, I should have left it at "simple".

German actions would always be dependent on French actions. The Germans had to reckon with the possibility that the French would attack in Lorraine. In that case, the right wing would swing south and the decisive battle would be fought in German Lorraine. The French could also attack into Belgium, where they would be met by the German right wing, a frequent scenario for Schlieffen's war games. The French could attack into both Lorraine and Belgium, on both sides of Metz (which was in fact Joffre's original plan): the Germans would stand on the defensive in Lorraine while the right wing fought the French in Belgium. It was hardly likely that the French would stand on the defensive, and no surviving German war game under Schlieffen or Moltke played this possibility.

The Germans assumed that the French would be attacking and that the resulting battle would be a meeting engagement: German troop training was therefore heavily weighted in that direction. The German intent, up to Moltke's decision to pursue into the interior of France on about 24 August 1914, was to defeat the French as quickly as possible, and as close to the German railheads as possible, to allow the rapid transfer of forces to the east.

In 1914 the military doctrine of all four major land powers emphasized the operational and tactical offensive. In 1911-13 the French and Russians agreed to attack Germany on the 15th day of mobilization because this was the optimal Franco-Russian military course of action. Therefore the French adopted the offensive a outrance.

Whether any of these four land powers was conducting a strategic offensive and is therefore 'guilty' of starting the war is a political, not a military question, and is at least one level above my area of expertise.

Nevertheless, operational and tactical offensive doctrine in no way implies offensive strategic (political) intent.

Terence Zuber

[Wuerzburg]

I am working from the original documents in the Freiburg archive, Nachlass (papers) Schlieffen N43/138, a photocopy of which I have in my possession. See my translation in: German War Planning 1891-1914. Sources and Interpretations.

I think that 'Krieg gegen Frankreich' doesn't require much interpretation, particularly since the Russians are not mentioned again and no forces are sent east.

I have no idea where your transcription originated, but the transcriber was sloppy.

As for presumed Belgian hostility, the Germans were going to march through their country. The German intelligence analyses, under Moltke at least, assumed that the Belgians would align themselves with the French, prett y much regardless of what the Germans did.

just this

we're probably talking about different documents. My transcript is from Denkschrift 'Krieg gegen Frankreich' Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv N 323/19

It is interesting to consider ther German intelligence analyses. At the same time French intelligence analyses assumed the Belgians would align themselves with the German. So somebody must have not doing his job properly.

Carl

Carl,

On the original handwritten Memorandum 'Krieg gegen Frankreich' is at the top left, just under 'Berlin, December 1905', which is, after all, the title of the file in your possession and not 'Krieg gegen Frankreich verbunden mit Russland'. So both are talking about the same thing: a one-front German-French war. What is the Findbuch title for file N323? I assume the copy of the Memorandum there is typed.

I have Greiner's summary of German intelligence analyses in German War Planning and both French and German intel estimates in The Real German War Plan, but I've never heard of a French analysis that said the Belgians would maybe side with the Germans since Napoleon III was angling to annex Belgium. I would be interested in the specifics.

Terence Zuber

[lostinspace]

Mr. Zuber,

Thanks for the reply. You say that "German actions would always be dependent on French actions" yet the first German move was into Luxembourg closely followed by a highly co-ordinated attack on the bridges and forts around Liege, all of this before the German Army was fully mobilized. The "Army of the Meuse" (von Emmich) was on the road almost immediately after the ultimatum to the Belgians had expired, not only that but the force was made up of six converging brigades from six different divisions marching from different directions (indicating pre-war planning?), or had the German plan alway included eliminating Belgium as a first step.

Regards,

Dave

[salesie]

Salesie,

You really have to read Inventing the Schlieffen Plan. I discussed all this nearly 10 years ago, and several times since, including in The Real German War Plan.

The sole and distinguishing characteristic was not, as you say, that the Germans were going to enter Belgium. Any war in west Europe was going to be fought in Belgium, period. Both the French and German armies had grown to near 70 divisions and were too large to fight it out in Alsace-Loraine or eastern France, particularly since the Vosges mountains covered 3/4 of the border and made large-scale military opeartions practically impossible. The French had recognized this since the First Moroccan Crisis (1905) and French politicans and sioldiers were saying so in the newspapers and books. When Joffre took over in 1911 he told the government that he would have to enter Belgium. Ostensibly, the government refused to grant him permission to do so until the Germans had, but on 2 August 1914, the first day of mobilization and before war had been declared, Joffre implemented "Varaint 1" of Plan 17 which put three of five French armies on the Franco-Belgian border. The Franco-Russian alliance required an immediate French offensive: Joffre was going to enter Belgium, regardless. He just got lucky and Moltke made a completely unnecessary attack on Liege first. The initail battles between the French and German main bodies were not fought in France, as "common knowledge" maintains, but inside Belgium, as a meeting engagement between two advancing armies.

Let's clear away the "Schlieffen plan" nonsense before we discuss real German planning, which requires serious study of war games, intelligence estimates and war plans over a 23-year period.

Terence Zuber

My whole point, Terence, for re-introducing George's Haig snippet was to show that Belgium was seen, by military minds throughout Europe, as the obvious/most-likely path for a German invasion of France for some considerable time prior to Schlieffen's "memorandum" of 1905/06. It was to make, in a more subtle way, the very point that you make above i.e. "Any war in west Europe was going to be fought in Belgium, period." It was not, as you say, to make the German invasion of Belgium the "sole and distinguishing characteristic" that links Schlieffen’s memorandum with the actual invasion of 1914 itself. If it had been, how would my political point about Schlieffen's motives have stood up to scrutiny?

What I was saying, in other words, is if it was common knowledge throughout Europe, amongst military circles from at least 1897, that Belgium would become the route for any invasion of France, then what would Schlieffen’s motive have been in drawing up such a memorandum a good few years later? I suggested a purely political motive i.e. to pressurise for an increase in the size of the German Army, because his memorandum clearly shows, as you say, that in order to defeat France alone (let alone Russia in alliance) then many more divisions would be needed to succeed if applying the obvious/most-likely route.

All of which is highly pertinent to this debate, because it begs the question that you seem very reluctant to answer directly i.e. In 1914, Germany went to war with a plan (otherwise there would have been chaos on mobilisation and deployment, which there clearly wasn't), a plan which, on the western front, resembled closely (not exactly matched), in strategic intent and operational movement, that outlined by Schlieffen in his memorandum as early as 1905/06 (and in British minds at least as early as 1897) - if not a modified (changed by some lesser or greater degree) Schlieffen plan (i.e. a memorandum turned into a plan) by 1914 then whose plan was it? Who was the architect of the plan that Germany used in its pre-emptive strike of August 1914?

Because as sure as eggs is eggs, Germany didn't go to war with no plan at all, and someone, or a collective of someone's, must have written and sanctioned the thing - plans don't just appear out of thin air and take on a life and soul of their own, plans are nothing more than non-conscious, inanimate, unfeeling products of the human imagination until put into action by humans; so who was/were the architect/s of the plan that Germany used in its pre-emptive strike of August 1914?

Cheers-salesie.

[bob lembke]

I suggested a purely political motive i.e. to pressurise for an increase in the size of the German Army, because his memorandum clearly shows, as you say, that in order to defeat France alone (let alone Russia in alliance) then many more divisions would be needed to succeed if applying the obvious/most-likely route.

Cheers-salesie.

In recent months I have read one of Professor Zuber's books, half (so far) of another, and attended a couple of his talks and chatted to him twice. I mention that, because I recall (possibly erroniously), that in all that exposure I think I have picked up the notion that the German Highest Army Command (OHL) did not share the plans with the government. If my recollection is correct, the plan could hardly pressurize the government, if it was kept secret from them.

Is my memory correct?

Bob

[Terry Duncan]

Hi Terence,

I would like to say that I think you have done very good work in creating debate on what had long since seemed a closed subject - I can remember a very long argument with a history teacher many years ago when I mentioned some things did not make sense, or at least to me, which led to almost an entire lesson being taken up on the subject - and I would agree that the Schlieffen Plan as commonly accepted may well be doubtful, though to many the name itself matters a lot less than the fact several German armies made their way across Belgium and northern France. I have read all of your works, and although I would not agree with everything, I certainly do not entirely disagree either.

I would first like to ask a question about 'The Real German War Plan 1904-14' where on page 159 you say;

As planned, the Franco-Russian armies attacked on the 14 August, secured the initiative, and forced the Germans on to the defensive both in the west and east. The initial battles at Stalluponen and Tannenberg in the east, and Alsace and Lorraine in the west, were all fought on German territory.

This would seem to overlook entirely that the German army was very busy in Belgium at this time, and that the initiative was at best still contested. I think most people would find it hard to conclude that the Germans were being forced onto the defensive, not least because they were only defending in areas they fully expected to defend whilst they developed their own attack. I would like to know how you can class Germany as losing the initiative at this time, and why their actions in Belgium are ignored in this statement?

A more interesting question arises out of 'Inventing the Schlieffen Plan' with regards to your comment here;

Nevertheless, operational and tactical offensive doctrine in no way implies offensive strategic (political) intent.

On page 264 of 'Inventing the Schlieffen Plan' you record;

Nevertheless, in a discussion with Freytag-Loringhoven on 2 May 1915, Bethmann contended that he had maintained in July 1914 that mobilization would not mean war. Bethmann said he was opposed to the General staff's insistence that German troops immediately enter Luxembourg. Belgium wasn't even mentioned.

Now it does seem somewhat unusual to say the least to see that Bethmann was conducting German policy during the July Crisis with the understanding that mobilization did not mean war, and we do know that the plan to declare war directly and move into Belgium was a surprise to many in the hierarchy. Tirpitz notably out of the military was unaware of the army's plans and supposed lack of alternatives, so how much do you think Bethmann, Jagow, and the Kaiser knew of the military plans? I am aware the Liege operation was a more recent addition to the German plans, but when reading many of the accounts of those conducting the German policy it appears that they were at least very confused about the plans of their own military, if not totally unaware! How much was known and by who?

[Michelle Young]

Whilst this thread is very interesting, is it really necessary for the amount of quotes being used by certain members? Surely fast reply is better rather than wasting bandwidth?

Michelle

[truthergw]

Dr. Zuber, I have followed your discussion here on the forum with great interest but growing dismay. Holger Herwig, in his book on the Marne, comprehensively refuted your stance. I am quite certain that you will be aware of the arguments, for those who are not , consult " The Marne 1914", Holger Herwig. Random House 2011. I had hoped to see some new arguments put forward but have been greatly disappointed. The existence of a Schlieffen Plan is clear and there is documentary evidence for it from before the Great War right through to the compilation of the Reichsarchiv Official History in the 1920s.

[Chris Boonzaier]

if not a modified (changed by some lesser or greater degree) Schlieffen plan (i.e. a memorandum turned into a plan) by 1914 then whose plan was it? Who was the architect of the plan that Germany used in its pre-emptive strike of August 1914?

Because as sure as eggs is eggs, Germany didn't go to war with no plan at all, and someone, or a collective of someone's, must have written and sanctioned the thing - plans don't just appear out of thin air and take on a life and soul of their own,

I hate to agree with Salesie.... but he makes a very, very good point indeed.

It is easy enough to go on the offensive saying "Prove they used the plan"... But it may be fairer for T.Z. to just show what they used instead?

Surely a General Staff as evolved as the German one did not go to war saying... "Hmmm... lets just advance and see what happens..."

[Wuerzburg]

I hate to agree with Salesie.... but he makes a very, very good point indeed.

It is easy enough to go on the offensive saying "Prove they used the plan"... But it may be fairer for T.Z. to just show what they used instead?

Surely a General Staff as evolved as the German one did not go to war saying... "Hmmm... lets just advance and see what happens..."

Chris,

I'd recommened you look at my last book, The Real German War Plan 1904-1914, which explains German (and Franco-Russian) planning over this period in some detail. The Germans went to war with a real war plan, not a '"Schlieffen plan" based on having 24 'ghost divisions' etc.

As I have said, studying war planning requires attenion to detail. At the risk of violating my own principles, for a very short summary, we need to start wth the Franco-Russian plan, which called for both to attack Germany by the 15th day of mobilization. The French were pretty sure that the Germans could not attack before then. Schlieffen had been certain that something like this would be the case. His solution to the strategic problem was to use the same strategy Frederick the Great had used in the 7 Year's War (1756-63) at Leuthen, Rossbach and Zorndorf. Prussia/Germany was on an interior position between France and Russia. He would mass against one enemy, counter-attack, then shift forces and counter-attack against the other. All this had to be done quickly, so there would be no opeartional pursuit after each victory. Eventually, the Germans would wear their enemies down, as Old Fritz had done. Schlieffen's contributuion was to utilize rail mobility to make the force shift faster and move forces opeartionally to attack the enemy flanks. This is easiest to see in Schlieffen's General Staff rides in the west, which I summarized in detail in Inventing the Schlieffen Plan. Moltke intended to use this plan up until about 24 August, when, instead of shifting major forces east, he decided to pursue into central France.

Terence Zuber

[Wuerzburg]

Dr. Zuber, I have followed your discussion here on the forum with great interest but growing dismay. Holger Herwig, in his book on the Marne, comprehensively refuted your stance. I am quite certain that you will be aware of the arguments, for those who are not , consult " The Marne 1914", Holger Herwig. Random House 2011. I had hoped to see some new arguments put forward but have been greatly disappointed. The existence of a Schlieffen Plan is clear and there is documentary evidence for it from before the Great War right through to the compilation of the Reichsarchiv Official History in the 1920s.

Tom,

I don't believe you have read "The Schlieffen Plan Reconsidered" (War in History Vol 6 Number 3 1999, 262-305 ), which started the "Schlieffen plan" controversy. Herwig did not bother to answere any of my objections, nor for that matter, similar objections put forward by Terence Holmes.

What Herwig says in his half-page 'proof' for the Schlieffen plan is, in effect, that any reference to Schlieffen's planning must prove there was a "Schlieffen plan", which is mere tautology - circular reasoning. According to Herwig, Groener believed that in 1914 Germany was going to use a one-front war plan which required 24 ghost divisions, etc. In fact, Groener was referring to Schlieffen's actual planning.

Nor have you answered any of the objections to the "Schlieffen plan" that I presented in my first two posts., which I think any serious defender of the "Schlieffen plan" has to confront.

Terence Zuber

[cdr]

Well

I do notthink that there are many publications in English on this topic (French opinion that Belgium would seek a German alliance).

A good example of the search for a German alliance is the press campaign in 1911 by Belgian general Leon De Witte (under the pseudonym Audax). De Witte was then commander

of the 2^nd cavalry brigade. He is of course better known as theBelgian commander at the cavalry battle of Haelen in 1914 and accidentally oneof the few senior officers who kept a command from the beginning to the end ofthe war.

Frenchmilitary attachés like Derrecagaix (1878), Lebon (1887) and Gallet (1903) wereconvinced of the existence of a secret treaty between the king of the Belgiansand the German emperor offering territorial expansion after a French defeat. .As late as 1911 Duruy writes in one of his rapports: ‘ce serait une erreur depenser que la Belgique se met de notre côté’. As late as 27/07/1914 the Frenchattaché Génie fears an “the possibility of an act of disloyalty by the Belgiangovernment’.

Carl

[Wuerzburg]

Hi Terence,

I would like to say that I think you have done very good work in creating debate on what had long since seemed a closed subject - I can remember a very long argument with a history teacher many years ago when I mentioned some things did not make sense, or at least to me, which led to almost an entire lesson being taken up on the subject - and I would agree that the Schlieffen Plan as commonly accepted may well be doubtful, though to many the name itself matters a lot less than the fact several German armies made their way across Belgium and northern France. I have read all of your works, and although I would not agree with everything, I certainly do not entirely disagree either.

I would first like to ask a question about 'The Real German War Plan 1904-14' where on page 159 you say;

As planned, the Franco-Russian armies attacked on the 14 August, secured the initiative, and forced the Germans on to the defensive both in the west and east. The initial battles at Stalluponen and Tannenberg in the east, and Alsace and Lorraine in the west, were all fought on German territory.

This would seem to overlook entirely that the German army was very busy in Belgium at this time, and that the initiative was at best still contested. I think most people would find it hard to conclude that the Germans were being forced onto the defensive, not least because they were only defending in areas they fully expected to defend whilst they developed their own attack. I would like to know how you can class Germany as losing the initiative at this time, and why their actions in Belgium are ignored in this statement?

A more interesting question arises out of 'Inventing the Schlieffen Plan' with regards to your comment here;

Nevertheless, operational and tactical offensive doctrine in no way implies offensive strategic (political) intent.

On page 264 of 'Inventing the Schlieffen Plan' you record;

Nevertheless, in a discussion with Freytag-Loringhoven on 2 May 1915, Bethmann contended that he had maintained in July 1914 that mobilization would not mean war. Bethmann said he was opposed to the General staff's insistence that German troops immediately enter Luxembourg. Belgium wasn't even mentioned.

Now it does seem somewhat unusual to say the least to see that Bethmann was conducting German policy during the July Crisis with the understanding that mobilization did not mean war, and we do know that the plan to declare war directly and move into Belgium was a surprise to many in the hierarchy. Tirpitz notably out of the military was unaware of the army's plans and supposed lack of alternatives, so how much do you think Bethmann, Jagow, and the Kaiser knew of the military plans? I am aware the Liege operation was a more recent addition to the German plans, but when reading many of the accounts of those conducting the German policy it appears that they were at least very confused about the plans of their own military, if not totally unaware! How much was known and by who?

Terry,

[/quote

The German attack on Liege was conducted by six peacetime (half) strength brigades, the equivalent of maybe a wartime division and a half, against a similar-sized Belgian force, which represented about 2% of the total German force in the west, so I don't think that the Germans could be considered to be "very busy" in Belgium.

More to the point, the Liege opertaion did nothing to change the Franco-Russian attack plan, which had been determined in 1911 and finalized in 1913-14.

I don't think you can say that the Germans gained the initiative back until after they had won the Battle of the Frontiers in the west (20-23 August) and Tannenberg in the east.

In any case, up to that time, in general it was the Franco-Russians who were attacking and the Germans counter-attacking.

The third quote you cite was presented to show that Belgium was not a major factor in German political calculations. I will freely admit to a problem with this: it was made in 1915, and by that time pretty much everybody in the German political and military hierarchy was playing the blame game. Figuring how much the army told the politicians and the Kaiser, and how much the politicians and the Kaiser understood, is damned hard, particularly since the Reichsarchiv, which surely would have provided indices, was destroyed in April 1945.

Terence Zuber

[cdr]

Just another thing

This might be of interest

http://www.1000dokumente.de/index.html?c=dokument_de&dokument=0097_spl&object=facsimile&pimage=1&v=100&nav=&l=de

scan of the december 1905 denkschrift in N 323/19 . According to German research the notes in pencil are by von Moltke

Carl

[Wuerzburg]

Just another thing

This might be of interest

http://www.1000dokumente.de/index.html?c=dokument_de&dokument=0097_spl&object=facsimile&pimage=1&v=100&nav=&l=de

scan of the december 1905 denkschrift in N 323/19 . According to German research the notes in pencil are by von Moltke

Carl

Carl,

The attribution of this document is not exact - it is a copy of the Memorandum plus Moltke's marginal comments, which means that it was produced in 1911 or later. This is also a copy of a copy, since the original is in the Schlieffen Nachlass file, and this was copied from a copy in Boetticher's file, which has apparently been lost. I'd still be interested in knowing who had this ciopy, and what the N323 file is called.

Terence Zuber

[Wuerzburg]

Well

I do notthink that there are many publications in English on this topic (French opinion that Belgium would seek a German alliance).

A good example of the search for a German alliance is the press campaign in 1911 by Belgian general Leon De Witte (under the pseudonym Audax). De Witte was then commander

of the 2^nd cavalry brigade. He is of course better known as theBelgian commander at the cavalry battle of Haelen in 1914 and accidentally oneof the few senior officers who kept a command from the beginning to the end ofthe war.

Frenchmilitary attachés like Derrecagaix (1878), Lebon (1887) and Gallet (1903) wereconvinced of the existence of a secret treaty between the king of the Belgiansand the German emperor offering territorial expansion after a French defeat. .As late as 1911 Duruy writes in one of his rapports: 'ce serait une erreur depenser que la Belgique se met de notre côté'. As late as 27/07/1914 the Frenchattaché Génie fears an "the possibility of an act of disloyalty by the Belgiangovernment'.

Carl

Carl,

Interesting. From 1865-1909 the King was Leopold II, so he was suspected of having made an agrement with Wilhelm I, which was still in effect under Wilhelm II. Since, in fact, there was no such agreement, I wonder where the attaches were getting their (false) information. Territorial expansion where, one wonders. Colonial? And again, in 1911 and 1914. Were there any specifics given?

Terence Zuber

[lostinspace]

Mr. Zuber,

The original force sent into Belgium to capture the river crossings and forts around Liege was considerably larger than you describe (even at peace-time strength), by my count the "Army of the Meuse" contained: 13 infantry regiments, 5 light infantry battalions, 6 cavalry squadrons, 6 artillery groups (plus 2 extra batteries) and 5 engineer companies, preceded by 3 cavalry divisions. Not a huge force but after all it was just the vanguard, the real threat was building across the border -1st and 2nd Armies concentrating around Aachen and Malmedy.

Also, I don't see how you can say that the Germans "hadn't gained the initiative back until after they had won the Battles of the Frontiers" - the Germans had already captured a large chunk of Belgium and were in the process of driving both the BEF and French 5th Army out of the country, if that's not "initiative"...........

Regards,

Dave

[salesie]

Chris,

I'd recommened you look at my last book, The Real German War Plan 1904-1914, which explains German (and Franco-Russian) planning over this period in some detail. The Germans went to war with a real war plan, not a '"Schlieffen plan" based on having 24 'ghost divisions' etc.

As I have said, studying war planning requires attenion to detail. At the risk of violating my own principles, for a very short summary, we need to start wth the Franco-Russian plan, which called for both to attack Germany by the 15th day of mobilization. The French were pretty sure that the Germans could not attack before then. Schlieffen had been certain that something like this would be the case. His solution to the strategic problem was to use the same strategy Frederick the Great had used in the 7 Year's War (1756-63) at Leuthen, Rossbach and Zorndorf. Prussia/Germany was on an interior position between France and Russia. He would mass against one enemy, counter-attack, then shift forces and counter-attack against the other. All this had to be done quickly, so there would be no opeartional pursuit after each victory. Eventually, the Germans would wear their enemies down, as Old Fritz had done. Schlieffen's contributuion was to utilize rail mobility to make the force shift faster and move forces opeartionally to attack the enemy flanks. This is easiest to see in Schlieffen's General Staff rides in the west, which I summarized in detail in Inventing the Schlieffen Plan. Moltke intended to use this plan up until about 24 August, when, instead of shifting major forces east, he decided to pursue into central France.

Terence Zuber

Correct me if I'm wrong, Terence, but this seems to be saying that the plan Germany went to war with in August 1914 was in fact a Schlieffen plan (based on his pre-war General Staff rides, a la Frederick the Great's strategy of the 7 Year's War, not his memorandum of 1905/06), and that, on or about the 24th of August 1914, Moltke (the junior) decided to abandon the Schlieffen plan (based on Frederick the Great's concepts) and pursue a similar wheeling direction of march into central France that Schlieffen's memorandum showed.

In other words, Germany started out with a Schlieffen plan, proceeded with it up to around the 24th August 1914, then morphed Schlieffen's memorandum into a plan to use after that date?

Cheers-salesie.

[Terry Duncan]

Terence

Thanks for the reply. I would not really say that listing the troops involved in the Liege operation described entirely what the Germans were doing in the west, as the armies waiting to advance through Belgium do need to be included in a summary of what was happening on the western front at this time. If, due to some peculiar change of circumstance the French and Russians simply halted on the joint frontiers, the German advance through Belgium would still have happened, it did not rest entirely on the actions of France or Russia. It would look to be a far fairer description that both sides were busy with their own plans to attack each other, and both would attack irrespective of what the others did.

With regards to the blame game, I fully agree it was something all were playing, but there are indications from talks at the time that there certainly was some confusion over what mobilization meant. From looking through details of the July Crisis it appears Bethmann was playing a very dangerous game in hoping Russia would back down, but the final critical decision seems to be when Austria declared war and the Halt in Belgrade proposal was held back by Bethmann until after the declaration. It had long been expected that Russia would react to this, but obviously this takes an entirely different character if any Russian move against Austria must soon be followed by a German mobilization and therefore war.

Moltke's memo to Bethmann on 28th seems to be perfectly clear about the likely situation, so it would appear that from that moment Bethmann should have been aware that Germany would herself be forced to act in some way, and to me it does seem unlikely that he would not have at least asked for at least an outline of what this entailed. Politicians are very good at constructing 'deniability' so we may never be sure anyhow, but total ignorance of the military options on behalf of Bethmann and Jagow seem to be staggering incompetence or very much open to doubt.

It is often suggested that the German military used the July Crisis to force a war, and effectively forced the hand of the government, but from your studies would you say it was more likely that the politicians played a very dangerous game, placing Germany in a position where few or no options existed, and then blamed the military for the result?

Cheers,

Terry

[Wuerzburg]

truthergw said:

The existence of a Schlieffen Plan is clear and there is documentary evidence for it from before the Great War right through to the compilation of the Reichsarchiv Official History in the 1920s.

Truthergw:

Want to know exactly what the Richsarchiv official history siad about the Schlieffen plan? It said (Der Weltkrieg I, p. 55):

That the schlieffen plan was based on a one-front war against France only.

That "a number of resewrve corps, which were treated as full two-divisuion corps, in fact only had one division"

"There was no provision made in the mobilization calendar for creating ersatz corps".

The "Schlieffen plan" Memorandum was a secret in 1925, when Der Weltkrieg was published, but we now know that the "Schlieffen plan" was short an active division, 7 reserve divisions and 16 ersatz divisions.

So, the Reichsarchiv official history actually agrees with me.

You see, the Reichsarchiv was unwilling to tell an outright lie, but if it put the facts out there and the armchair generals were too slow to catch on, it wasn't the Reichsarchiv's fault.

Herwig, on the other hand, knows the truth, which doesn't prevent him from, let us say, being less than candid.

Terence Zuber

[Wuerzburg]

Terence

Thanks for the reply. I would not really say that listing the troops involved in the Liege operation described entirely what the Germans were doing in the west, as the armies waiting to advance through Belgium do need to be included in a summary of what was happening on the western front at this time. If, due to some peculiar change of circumstance the French and Russians simply halted on the joint frontiers, the German advance through Belgium would still have happened, it did not rest entirely on the actions of France or Russia. It would look to be a far fairer description that both sides were busy with their own plans to attack each other, and both would attack irrespective of what the others did.

With regards to the blame game, I fully agree it was something all were playing, but there are indications from talks at the time that there certainly was some confusion over what mobilization meant. From looking through details of the July Crisis it appears Bethmann was playing a very dangerous game in hoping Russia would back down, but the final critical decision seems to be when Austria declared war and the Halt in Belgrade proposal was held back by Bethmann until after the declaration. It had long been expected that Russia would react to this, but obviously this takes an entirely different character if any Russian move against Austria must soon be followed by a German mobilization and therefore war.

Moltke's memo to Bethmann on 28th seems to be perfectly clear about the likely situation, so it would appear that from that moment Bethmann should have been aware that Germany would herself be forced to act in some way, and to me it does seem unlikely that he would not have at least asked for at least an outline of what this entailed. Politicians are very good at constructing 'deniability' so we may never be sure anyhow, but total ignorance of the military options on behalf of Bethmann and Jagow seem to be staggering incompetence or very much open to doubt.

It is often suggested that the German military used the July Crisis to force a war, and effectively forced the hand of the government, but from your studies would you say it was more likely that the politicians played a very dangerous game, placing Germany in a position where few or no options existed, and then blamed the military for the result?

Cheers,

Terry

Since you are really conversant with this, I hope you can read German and French, because Stefan Schmidt has just written Frankreichs Ausenpolitik in der Julikriese, which is a brilliant, groundbreaking study oif French actions 21 July- 2 August. (Full disclosure - I reviewed it for the British MoD journal Global War Studies)

"both sides were busy with their own plans to attack each other, and both would attack irrespective of what the others did."

The Germans, with 6 active and 3 reserve divisions, were virtually incapable of attacking in the east.

Sorry. Suppertime. Get back to you later.

Terence Zuber

[Wuerzburg]

Terence

Thanks for the reply. I would not really say that listing the troops involved in the Liege operation described entirely what the Germans were doing in the west, as the armies waiting to advance through Belgium do need to be included in a summary of what was happening on the western front at this time. If, due to some peculiar change of circumstance the French and Russians simply halted on the joint frontiers, the German advance through Belgium would still have happened, it did not rest entirely on the actions of France or Russia. It would look to be a far fairer description that both sides were busy with their own plans to attack each other, and both would attack irrespective of what the others did.

With regards to the blame game, I fully agree it was something all were playing, but there are indications from talks at the time that there certainly was some confusion over what mobilization meant. From looking through details of the July Crisis it appears Bethmann was playing a very dangerous game in hoping Russia would back down, but the final critical decision seems to be when Austria declared war and the Halt in Belgrade proposal was held back by Bethmann until after the declaration. It had long been expected that Russia would react to this, but obviously this takes an entirely different character if any Russian move against Austria must soon be followed by a German mobilization and therefore war.

Moltke's memo to Bethmann on 28th seems to be perfectly clear about the likely situation, so it would appear that from that moment Bethmann should have been aware that Germany would herself be forced to act in some way, and to me it does seem unlikely that he would not have at least asked for at least an outline of what this entailed. Politicians are very good at constructing 'deniability' so we may never be sure anyhow, but total ignorance of the military options on behalf of Bethmann and Jagow seem to be staggering incompetence or very much open to doubt.

It is often suggested that the German military used the July Crisis to force a war, and effectively forced the hand of the government, but from your studies would you say it was more likely that the politicians played a very dangerous game, placing Germany in a position where few or no options existed, and then blamed the military for the result?

Cheers,

Terry

Terry

Back again.

The French were going to have the initiative because their deployment was more effective. They could concentrate quickly on their border wioth Germany. The Germans had to deploy on their border with Belgium, which was no secret (in 1905 Schlieffen said that even Americans recognized this), which meant two thinf=gs. First, the German raile net in the Eifel, oposite the Belgian Ardennes, was poor. More important, the Germans were faced with a long approach march across the Ardennes to get to the French border, which was along the Meuse, a significant terrain obstacle.

As far as the causes of German actions during the July Crisis, I would focus on a general atmosphere of fear among the German leadership elite. Domestically, the German Socialist Party was on the rise, and in 1914 the Socialists were unabashadely Marxist., which put the fear of God into the German aristocracy and bourgeoisie both. In the international sphere, Russia was rising demographically, industrially and militarily. The two worked in tandem: the Socialists would prevent Germany from matching the Russian military buildup. To make matters worse, Germany's sole reliable ally, Austria, seemed to be collapsing. Therefore, in 1914, better now than never.

Terence Zuber

[Wuerzburg]

Correct me if I'm wrong, Terence, but this seems to be saying that the plan Germany went to war with in August 1914 was in fact a Schlieffen plan (based on his pre-war General Staff rides, a la Frederick the Great's strategy of the 7 Year's War, not his memorandum of 1905/06), and that, on or about the 24th of August 1914, Moltke (the junior) decided to abandon the Schlieffen plan (based on Frederick the Great's concepts) and pursue a similar wheeling direction of march into central France that Schlieffen's memorandum showed.

In other words, Germany started out with a Schlieffen plan, proceeded with it up to around the 24th August 1914, then morphed Schlieffen's memorandum into a plan to use after that date?

Cheers-salesie.

Salesie'

German strategy, Schlieffen's strategy, was based on operations on interior lines, the same strategy Napoleon used in the Mantua campaign, the same strategy Lee used at Chancellorsville. I see no reason to rename "operatiions on interior lines" the "Schlieffen plan", aside from a "Schlieffen plan" idee fixe.

Schlieffen's sole contribution to operations on interior lines was to exploit the possibilities provided to Germany by rail mobility.

The "Schlieffen plan" Memorandum was not based on operations on interior lines, because it concerned an isolated one-front German-French war.

Terence Zuber

[Wuerzburg]

Mr. Zuber,

The original force sent into Belgium to capture the river crossings and forts around Liege was considerably larger than you describe (even at peace-time strength), by my count the "Army of the Meuse" contained: 13 infantry regiments, 5 light infantry battalions, 6 cavalry squadrons, 6 artillery groups (plus 2 extra batteries) and 5 engineer companies, preceded by 3 cavalry divisions. Not a huge force but after all it was just the vanguard, the real threat was building across the border -1st and 2nd Armies concentrating around Aachen and Malmedy.

Also, I don't see how you can say that the Germans "hadn't gained the initiative back until after they had won the Battles of the Frontiers" - the Germans had already captured a large chunk of Belgium and were in the process of driving both the BEF and French 5th Army out of the country, if that's not "initiative"...........

Regards,

Dave

Dave,

All these units were at peacetime (half) strength. The Belgians had blown the Meuse River bridges and the Germans wer ereluctant to committ themselves toi the west bank. Then cavalry divisions, in particular, were supposed to have opearted on the west bank and didn't

.

The German 1st and 2nd Armies were limited to shallow bridgeheads near Liege until the general advance was ordered on 18 August. The French attacked into Alsace on 7 August and Lorraine on 14 August. The German 3rd and 4th Armies hit the French 4th and 3rd Armies in the Ardennes on 22 August. The Germans did not make serious contact with the French 5th Army until 22 August, nor the BEF until 23 August.

When the Germans had won all these battles, the Germans had gained the initiative.

Terence Zuber