Inventing the Schlieffen Plan

[Wuerzburg]

You say, "Schlieffen must have been turning in his grave", Terence? But how can that be? I thought your whole premise is based on the notion that Schlieffen's plan was to fight a two-front war along internal lines, to defeat the French close to the German railheads then transport enough divisions east to likewise defeat the Russians, and so on and so forth. Schlieffen didn't intend, so you say in your earlier posts, to penetrate into France at this stage because the German Army was tens of divisions short for a pursuit into France (pursuit was purely Moltke's decision on the 24th August you say) - so why would Schlieffen be turning in his grave if the German Army was following the plan you say was his and not pursuing into France (in line, you also say, with German Staff thinking of the previous decades)?

Those damned Whatifs partying and dancing around in your head, Terence?

Cheers-salesie.

In his wargames Schlieffen always decried officers who were satisfied with "ordinary victories" - successful frontal attacks that merely pushed the enemy back. What Schlieffen advocated were attacks on the enemy flanks and rear to destroy him in place: see any of Schlieffen's General Staff rides East, like the 1894 ride, which was the template for Tannenberg.

The commanders of XIII and XVI Corps had the opportunity to penetrate into the French rear, cut off and destroy French corps - they chose "ordinary victories" and "safety first".

Winning a decisive operational victory near the Meuse (as the Germans did when they destroyed 3 DIC at Rossignol) is a far cry from enveloping Paris to the west.

Terence Zuber

[Wuerzburg]

I know the thread is perhaps deviating from the original "Inventing the Schlieffen Plan" remit and yes (with deference to my fellow Yorkshireman Salesie) it is a bit "what-iffy" (but then isn't that a central plank of all military planning - examining the "what if" )

"it had no organised enemy " - but there was still a lot of French artillery in the (delayed) II Corps column and with IV Corps to the west and south-west of Virton. As you say in your book, it hadn't supported the advancing French infantry particularly well, with some batteries not engaging targets until late morning but it was then able to successfully engage targets advancing out over the plateau to the north of Virton and similarly to the east. The French may not have made the best use of their artillery but the German forces were still very wary of it.

The main river valleys and communications run east-west not north-south here, it isn't until you pass Montmedy/Stenay that the axis changes north-south along the Meuse valley. If XIII Korps had advanced as you suggest, if the Korps to the north hadn't kept up, at some stage it's right flank would have been exposed.The French didn't have enough roads to effectively send their forces north through the great forested belt to the south of the Semois, wouldn't the German Korps to the north have had the same problem hurrying south ? I remain to be convinced of that particular "what if" !

In the entire southern half of the German front in the Ardennes on 23 August, only German 9 ID at Virton, on the German 5th Army right flank, has problems. It digs in and the French shell it to no effect. The French 8 DI infantry to the German 9 ID sector was destroyed on 22 August. To the German 9 ID right, the French Colonial Corps is a wreck. To the German 9 ID left, German 10 ID has only the remnants of French 7 DI to its front and 10 ID is in position to guard the XIII Corps right flank. Indeed, to avoid Montmedy, 9 ID will soon follow 10 ID. The XIII AK right (north) flank is completely secure. German XIII Corps hammered French V Corps flat by noon 22 August.

The best-case scenario for German 5th Army is a rapid pursuit by 10 ID of V AK and XIII AK on 22 August to break up the remnants of the French IV and V Corps and envelop the north flank of the French VI Corps, while on 22 August the German XVI Corps envelops French VI Corps from the south. XVI Corps is Graf Haeseler's old unit - if any corps in the German army was capable of fast, long-range operational movement, XVI Corps was it. If the Germans are quick enough, the only thing the French artillery and any remaining combat-effective infantry can do is delay the Germans. On 23 August the Germans are catching the retreating French IV and V Corps while making multiple river crossings and French VI Corps - three French divisions - go into the bag: Rossignol on steriods. The entire French 3rd Army front is blown to pieces. If the Germans dwadle (as they did), then the French have time to recover from the beating they have taken reorganize.

Schoen waere es.

Terence Zuber

Terence

[salesie]

In his wargames Schlieffen always decried officers who were satisfied with "ordinary victories" - successful frontal attacks that merely pushed the enemy back. What Schlieffen advocated were attacks on the enemy flanks and rear to destroy him in place: see any of Schlieffen's General Staff rides East, like the 1894 ride, which was the template for Tannenberg.

The commanders of XIII and XVI Corps had the opportunity to penetrate into the French rear, cut off and destroy French corps - they chose "ordinary victories" and "safety first".

Winning a decisive operational victory near the Meuse (as the Germans did when they destroyed 3 DIC at Rossignol) is a far cry from enveloping Paris to the west.

Terence Zuber

I'm sorry, Terence, but a glib answer like this simply creates yet further inconsistency in your apparent line of thinking - not only do you miss the point, but you compound the earlier contradiction in your argument. For example, not only did you say "Schlieffen must be turning in his grave" in post #195 but you followed it up in the same post with "Given two aggressive corps commanders at the right place, and France 1914 becomes France 1940." A decisive operational victory near the Meuse, as you say above in your somewhat glib answer, is a far cry from France 1914 becoming France 1940 is it not?

Don't get me wrong, I don't particularly care whose name goes on the German plan of 1914, as I said earlier in the thread; for some time now I've been of the opinion that it should be called the "Failure Writ Large" plan. The point I'm making is not about research, not about staff rides of 1894 or any other year, not about names being put to plans, but about logic - you can't have it both ways; you can't tell us several times over that Schlieffen's plans were all about fighting a two-front war along internal lines without any deep penetration into France at the outset (because Germany was twenty-odd divisions short, and Schlieffen knew that such a venture was therefore doomed in a two-front war) then tell us that Schlieffen would have turned in his grave because two Corps Commanders missed an opportunity in 1914 to knock France out of the war 1940 style (in 1940, deep and rapid penetration into France was used to knock France out of a one-front war).

This line of argument creates a blatant oxymoron in your premise, does it not?

Cheers-salesie.

[SteveMarsdin]

Good morning Salesie,

In earlier posts I mentioned that I had points to discuss with Terence Zuber and he acknowledged that he was willing to discuss any of his books. I said I would wait until the Schlieffen discussion had run its course. As I am aware that he checks this thread I posted reflections on the Battle of the Frontiers here (with what I considered a "light touch"). If you would prefer me to start a new thread then I would be pleased to do so.

[Wuerzburg]

I'm sorry, Terence, but a glib answer like this simply creates yet further inconsistency in your apparent line of thinking - not only do you miss the point, but you compound the earlier contradiction in your argument. For example, not only did you say "Schlieffen must be turning in his grave" in post #195 but you followed it up in the same post with "Given two aggressive corps commanders at the right place, and France 1914 becomes France 1940." A decisive operational victory near the Meuse, as you say above in your somewhat glib answer, is a far cry from France 1914 becoming France 1940 is it not?

Don't get me wrong, I don't particularly care whose name goes on the German plan of 1914, as I said earlier in the thread; for some time now I've been of the opinion that it should be called the "Failure Writ Large" plan. The point I'm making is not about research, not about staff rides of 1894 or any other year, not about names being put to plans, but about logic - you can't have it both ways; you can't tell us several times over that Schlieffen's plans were all about fighting a two-front war along internal lines without any deep penetration into France at the outset (because Germany was twenty-odd divisions short, and Schlieffen knew that such a venture was therefore doomed in a two-front war) then tell us that Schlieffen would have turned in his grave because two Corps Commanders missed an opportunity in 1914 to knock France out of the war 1940 style (in 1940, deep and rapid penetration into France was used to knock France out of a one-front war).

This line of argument creates a blatant oxymoron in your premise, does it not?

Cheers-salesie.

My translation of the "Schlieffen plan" Memorandum (German War Planning 1891-1914) is 18 typed pages long and it cannot be accurately summarized in one sentence as 'a rapid penetration into France to knock France out of a one-front war'. That is so general as to be practically meaningless.

The subject here was tactical/operational combat in the Ardennes in 1914, and not strategy. The reference to 'France 1940' was that the Germans used their initiative to penetrate the French front.

Even if the the reference to 'France 1940' were to strategy, in 1940 the German Schwerpunkt went from the Ardennes north to the Channel, not from northern Belgium west to envelop Paris. There is a considerable. difference.

Terence Zuber

[Chris Boonzaier]

I have been following this with interest...

I am sure this forum allows one to build in a poll....

Maybe it is time to have one?

To see what the majority now believes?

[cdr]

What if the German units were not so busy shooting civilians ?

[salesie]

My translation of the "Schlieffen plan" Memorandum (German War Planning 1891-1914) is 18 typed pages long and it cannot be accurately summarized in one sentence as 'a rapid penetration into France to knock France out of a one-front war'. That is so general as to be practically meaningless.

The subject here was tactical/operational combat in the Ardennes in 1914, and not strategy. The reference to 'France 1940' was that the Germans used their initiative to penetrate the French front.

Even if the the reference to 'France 1940' were to strategy, in 1940 the German Schwerpunkt went from the Ardennes north to the Channel, not from northern Belgium west to envelop Paris. There is a considerable. difference.

Terence Zuber

I know there is a considerable difference between France 1914 and France 1940, Terence - that was my whole point. And even if you were talking operationally not strategically, your analogy still does not stand up to close scrutiny on at least two counts:

Firstly, those differences are so great that an operational pursuit by those two German Corps in 1914 would have created a strategic impediment (under your own premise that is e.g. can't entrain two corps quickly if they're chasing after Frenchies, and Germany was twenty-odd divisions short in order to exploit such a pursuit in 1914's two-front war), unlike the strategic benefit that the German breakthrough in 1940 provided (didn't need to entrain any units to fight the Ruskies in 1940's one-front war).

And, secondly, to reinforce point one. In post #136 (and several others similarly) you told us that, "His (Schlieffen's) solution to the strategic problem was to use the same strategy Frederick the Great had used in the 7 Year's War (1756-63) at Leuthen, Rossbach and Zorndorf. Prussia/Germany was on an interior position between France and Russia. He would mass against one enemy, counter-attack, then shift forces and counter-attack against the other. All this had to be done quickly, so there would be no opeartional pursuit after each victory. Eventually, the Germans would wear their enemies down, as Old Fritz had done. Schlieffen's contributuion was to utilize rail mobility to make the force shift faster and move forces opeartionally to attack the enemy flanks. This is easiest to see in Schlieffen's General Staff rides in the west, which I summarized in detail in Inventing the Schlieffen Plan." The bold highlights are mine.

Schlieffen's actual plan (and Germany's until Aug 24th 1914), so you've told us several times, was on internal lines, with the rapid movement of troops between fronts by rail, which necessitated no operational pursuit after each victory. All of which means, unless you didn't actually mean what you said in earlier posts, that the question I posed earlier has gone unanswered by you i.e. why would Schlieffen turn in his grave at two corps failing to pursue a defeated French force if operational non-pursuit was a vital part of the German strategy for winning a two-front war?

It seems to me that operationally or strategically your analogy is a pretty poor one, not to mention that, logically, when coupled with your “turning in the grave” comment, you contradict much of what you've said in this thread about the realities of the actual German war plans as written by Schlieffen et al.

I’ll withdraw from the thread for good now, I’ve made my points about the main inconsistencies in your line of argument (there are more than two though) . All I’ll say as a parting shot to those trying to make sense of this – remember Einstein’s words, “If a man cannot explain his own theory in simple summary then he doesn’t truly understand his own theory”. In other words, don’t let the smoke and mirrors of complexity prevent you from getting down to the bottom line of any argument.

Cheers-salesie.

[David Filsell]

Whilst I believe Terence Zuber's views to be frequently highly and too Germanocentric for my taste - I must say how impressed I am with his willingness to join in and remain into such long debate with those far more expert than I and also the way that he has stood his corner. My congratulations to you for your contributions and your highly detailed knowledge sir. This has been a splendid thread which has remained free of the acrimony which can enter into such discussions on this site. It has pushed debate forward and given me much to think about. I am waiting for it to conclude before printing for my future reference and detailed consideration. Here's to the first annual Schliefen Conference!.

Best regards and thanks to all who have made this a must read debate.

David

[Wuerzburg]

I know there is a considerable difference between France 1914 and France 1940, Terence - that was my whole point. And even if you were talking operationally not strategically, your analogy still does not stand up to close scrutiny on at least two counts:

Firstly, those differences are so great that an operational pursuit by those two German Corps in 1914 would have created a strategic impediment (under your own premise that is e.g. can't entrain two corps quickly if they're chasing after Frenchies, and Germany was twenty-odd divisions short in order to exploit such a pursuit in 1914's two-front war), unlike the strategic benefit that the German breakthrough in 1940 provided (didn't need to entrain any units to fight the Ruskies in 1940's one-front war).

And, secondly, to reinforce point one. In post #136 (and several others similarly) you told us that, "His (Schlieffen's) solution to the strategic problem was to use the same strategy Frederick the Great had used in the 7 Year's War (1756-63) at Leuthen, Rossbach and Zorndorf. Prussia/Germany was on an interior position between France and Russia. He would mass against one enemy, counter-attack, then shift forces and counter-attack against the other. All this had to be done quickly, so there would be no opeartional pursuit after each victory. Eventually, the Germans would wear their enemies down, as Old Fritz had done. Schlieffen's contributuion was to utilize rail mobility to make the force shift faster and move forces opeartionally to attack the enemy flanks. This is easiest to see in Schlieffen's General Staff rides in the west, which I summarized in detail in Inventing the Schlieffen Plan." The bold highlights are mine.

Schlieffen's actual plan (and Germany's until Aug 24th 1914), so you've told us several times, was on internal lines, with the rapid movement of troops between fronts by rail, which necessitated no operational pursuit after each victory. All of which means, unless you didn't actually mean what you said in earlier posts, that the question I posed earlier has gone unanswered by you i.e. why would Schlieffen turn in his grave at two corps failing to pursue a defeated French force if operational non-pursuit was a vital part of the German strategy for winning a two-front war?

It seems to me that operationally or strategically your analogy is a pretty poor one, not to mention that, logically, when coupled with your "turning in the grave" comment, you contradict much of what you've said in this thread about the realities of the actual German war plans as written by Schlieffen et al.

I'll withdraw from the thread for good now, I've made my points about the main inconsistencies in your line of argument (there are more than two though) . All I'll say as a parting shot to those trying to make sense of this – remember Einstein's words, "If a man cannot explain his own theory in simple summary then he doesn't truly understand his own theory". In other words, don't let the smoke and mirrors of complexity prevent you from getting down to the bottom line of any argument.

Cheers-salesie.

Just to close the loop on Salesie's comments. The envelopement and destruction of the French VI Corps (and, from the German point of view, hopefully other French corps in the Battle of the Frontiers) would perform the same function in Schlieffen's interior-lines mobile-warfare doctrine as Rossbach did for Frederick the Great. Old Fritz did not crash off and chase the defeated French army. Instead, he turned around and attacked the Austrians at Leuthen. Fritz and Schlieffen were right: what did Moltke think he was going to gain gain by chasing off into central France? I doubt Moltke knew himself. What did he actually gain? Nothing. Exhausted his army in return for occupying potatoe fields, most of which he had to give back anyway. And for that nothing he sacrificed the near-certainty that he could have destroyed the Russian 1st Army.

The 'bottom line' of Salesie's arguent is that he has a "Schlieffen plan" idee fixe that is immune to documentary evidence and military analysis..

Terence Zuber

[salesie]

Just to close the loop on Salesie's comments. The envelopement and destruction of the French VI Corps (and, from the German point of view, hopefully other French corps in the Battle of the Frontiers) would perform the same function in Schlieffen's interior-lines mobile-warfare doctrine as Rossbach did for Frederick the Great. Old Fritz did not crash off and chase the defeated French army. Instead, he turned around and attacked the Austrians at Leuthen. Fritz and Schlieffen were right: what did Moltke think he was going to gain gain by chasing off into central France? I doubt Moltke knew himself. What did he actually gain? Nothing. Exhausted his army in return for occupying potatoe fields, most of which he had to give back anyway. And for that nothing he sacrificed the near-certainty that he could have destroyed the Russian 1st Army.

The 'bottom line' of Salesie's arguent is that he has a "Schlieffen plan" idee fixe that is immune to documentary evidence and military analysis..

Terence Zuber

All the best, Terence - here's to the next time.

Cheers-salesie.

[SteveMarsdin]

What did Moltke think he was going to gain gain by chasing off into central France?

Terence Zuber

So to summarise, in your view Moltke's dithering cost the Germans the chance of an unexpected quick victory in the west also at the expense of the (planned) quick victory in the east ?

Edited for clarification: Refers also to post #202

[SteveMarsdin]

If the Germans are quick enough, the only thing the French artillery and any remaining combat-effective infantry can do is delay the Germans.

Terence Zuber

Point taken, but the extent of that delay is all important. I can follow the logic of your argument in the "what if" scenario in the southern half of the sector, although I am still less than certain of its achievability even though the Ardennes peter out there, the area still doesn't lend itself to rapid movement.

In the more pronounced geography and limited road network of the northern sector, rapid movement would be extremely difficult (and there were still some decent French units to hinder any advance, 2e DIC for example had only partially committed two of its regiments, late in the day on 22 August, to protect the reteat of the debris of 3e DIC units and its artillery was hardly used until the 23rd).

Another question:

You mentioned early on that, given the size of the opposing armies, both sides knew they would "have to" fight in Belgium, were there any German plans that didn't violate Belgian neutrality but did allow for the invasion of Luxembourg (i.e involving Luxembourg/French/German border area) ?

[Chris Boonzaier]

In his wargames Schlieffen always decried officers who were satisfied with "ordinary victories" - successful frontal attacks that merely pushed the enemy back. What Schlieffen advocated were attacks on the enemy flanks and rear to destroy him in place.

You mean like the Germans were trying to do when they went into Belgium and get around the French flank, race for the sea and all that?

Best

Chris

[Wuerzburg]

You mean like the Germans were trying to do when they went into Belgium and get around the French flank, race for the sea and all that?

Best

Chris

Chris,

Look at what the German army commanders, and more important, their chiefs of staff, actually did in August 1914. 6th Army counterattacks way too early in Lorraine, before they're actually in position and before the French are far enough away from their fortifications. The result is a frontal attack and an "ordinary victory" with no effective pursuit. 5th Army attacks before either it or 4th on the left are ready: three of the ten German corps don't make it to the battlefield at all or arrive late. Again, an ordinary victory. Same with 2nd Army. 1st Army screws the pooch completely and blows a chance to annihilate the British II Corps - twice. In every case, instead of waiting a day or two in order to hit the French full-force on the flank or at a weak spot, they attacked right away.

The Germans needed at least one solid army-level victory that destroyed two or three French corps outright - like Tannenberg - (two or three would have been better) to fundamentally change the force ratio in the west - this was doable, but the German senior officers were more concerned with their own reputations and uninterested in taking chances.

Terence Zuber

[Wuerzburg]

So to summarise, in your view Moltke's dithering cost the Germans the chance of an unexpected quick victory in the west also at the expense of the (planned) quick victory in the east ?

Edited for clarification: Refers also to post #202

Joffre was no fool. For all his bluster, he fully recognized that the Germans could beat the paste out of his army. In that case, he was fully prepared to fall back between the eastern border fortifications and Paris as far as the plateau of Langres (south France, south of Dijon) if need be, pulling the German army with him. This would give the Russians time to overwhelm the Germans in the east. After the Battle of the Frontiers he did just that. In September 1914 he said that his limit of withdrawal was the Seine.

The Germans were no fools either: the 1912-14 west front intelligence estimate said that in case of defeat this was exactly what the French would do.

By advancing into central France, Moltke in effect was hoping for a deus ex machina, like the happy accidents that saved his uncle the Elder Moltke so often from well-deserved disaster.

For this, the Younger Moltke sacrificed the opportunity to really hammer another Russian army and threw away the best chance that Germany had to end the war on favourable terms.

Terence Zuber

[Wuerzburg]

Point taken, but the extent of that delay is all important. I can follow the logic of your argument in the "what if" scenario in the southern half of the sector, although I am still less than certain of its achievability even though the Ardennes peter out there, the area still doesn't lend itself to rapid movement.

In the more pronounced geography and limited road network of the northern sector, rapid movement would be extremely difficult (and there were still some decent French units to hinder any advance, 2e DIC for example had only partially committed two of its regiments, late in the day on 22 August, to protect the reteat of the debris of 3e DIC units and its artillery was hardly used until the 23rd).

Another question:

You mentioned early on that, given the size of the opposing armies, both sides knew they would "have to" fight in Belgium, were there any German plans that didn't violate Belgian neutrality but did allow for the invasion of Luxembourg (i.e involving Luxembourg/French/German border area) ?

Steve,

It's reallly hard to know what the concept of the operation of each war plan was, in good part because that depended on what the French and Russians would do.

In the 1904/05 Aufmarsch I West the German right wing extended only as far as Bitburg, that is to say, not even up to the northern border of Luxembourg, and the rest of the armies were lined up along the Saar River, which is a defensive deployment.

The Ardennes doesn't lend itself to fast movement by either side: consider the number of rearward river crossings the retreating French had to make.

Terence Zuber

[Terry Duncan]

Terence,

Who would you have thought would have performed best in command of each of the German armies in 1914? It is fairly obvious Kluck (and Kuhl) performed badly - though far better in rewriting his role post war - but who could have replaced them directly in 1914? There are plenty of officers who later distinguished themselves but were not necessarily the most senior officers in line for promotion to army commander in 1914.

Terry

[Pete1052]

Occasionally threads on the evolution of military tactics, operational techniques and weapons technology transcend a specific war or point in time, so a bit of off-topic discussion ought to be tolerated and encouraged. In that regard I'd like to thank Terence Zuber for not staying rigidly locked into the years 1914-18, as though nothing had happened earlier or nothing came afterwards.

I prefer an evolutionary approach to discussions of military history, rather than a strict "Battles and Leaders" focus on a specific war. My tendency to skip back and forth in time in discussing things military has occasionally led to accusations of me being off-topic, both here and on a Civil War forum. One of the fascinating things about the Great War is that all at once one can see the legacy of Waterloo and Gettysburg as well as what was later to happen during World War II.

[SteveMarsdin]

The Ardennes doesn't lend itself to fast movement by either side.

Terence Zuber

Thank you for your informative replies; my final question relates to one of your earlier posts which says that Joffre (and the French) knew he would have to fight in Belgium. For political reasons (which are of course military strategic reasons) he can't make the first move. In fact the Plan XVII army orders signed for in early 1914 expressly prohibit it (without his authority). If they intended to fight in Belgium why then were the French so badly prepared to fight there ?

They had no decent maps: a few 1:40,000 obtained locally but mainly 1:200,000. They seemed ignorant of the geography a mere few miles over the border. Probably the worst example is when they tried to send the whole of II Corps on the narrow, steeply wooded valley road that runs north from Meix, finally emerging on to the plateau at Lahage.

[Wuerzburg]

Thank you for your informative replies; my final question relates to one of your earlier posts which says that Joffre (and the French) knew he would have to fight in Belgium. For political reasons (which are of course military strategic reasons) he can't make the first move. In fact the Plan XVII army orders signed for in early 1914 expressly prohibit it (without his authority). If they intended to fight in Belgium why then were the French so badly prepared to fight there ?

They had no decent maps: a few 1:40,000 obtained locally but mainly 1:200,000. They seemed ignorant of the geography a mere few miles over the border. Probably the worst example is when they tried to send the whole of II Corps on the narrow, steeply wooded valley road that runs north from Meix, finally emerging on to the plateau at Lahage.

Steve,

Plan XVII, which was issued in February 1914, had a "variant" which put the 3rd, 4th hand 5th Armies north of Verdun. Joffre implemented this variant on 2 August 1914, the first day of mobilization, even before war was declared on Germany. Joffre's intent, expressed in Plan XVII and in General Order No. 1 (8 August if I remember correctly) was 'to attack as soon as the armies are assembled'. The French and Russian alliance had also agreed on a joint attack on Germany. The French mass of manoeuvre was therefore located on the Franco-Belgian border and its miission was offensive.

Joffre actually had little choice but to enter Belgium, and he said so to the government when he took over as chief of staff.. He had an army nearly 70 divisions strong. It's only about 70 km between Metz and the Vosges at Saarburg, and that includes a lot of impassable areas (lakes in partiicular). The Vosges is completely unsuitable for large-scale military operations. There just wasn't enough room in German Lorraine. The two armies that Joffre deployed in Alsace-Lorraine (20 divisions) filled up the area nicely.

I have never heard the French complaining of inadequate maps. I know of a couple instances where the Germans captured French HQ which had maps of Germany up to the Rhineland.

The British had maps of Belgium, but none of France.

1: 40,000 is a nice tactical size, but a corps or army HQ trying to use it would need an entire wall: way too detailed for them.

I don't think sending II CA down one road was done because the French did not understand the terrain. It was a legitimate formation and the subject of German staff work since the Elder Moltke. The problem was that the Greman 9 ID overlooked the road.

Terence Zuber

[SteveMarsdin]

I have never heard the French complaining of inadequate maps. I know of a couple instances where the Germans captured French HQ which had maps of Germany up to the Rhineland.

1: 40,000 is a nice tactical size, but a corps or army HQ trying to use it would need an entire wall: way too detailed for them.

Terence Zuber

The scope of II Corps' days objectives would have been covered by 1 map sheet (maximum 2) at 1:40,000.

I agree it's a "nice tactical size" but then "tactical combat, not strategy or operations, is the foundation of warfare"; In Grasset's Virton and Ethe books he makes reference to the maps issue. In some cases no maps were available to the smaller unit commanders.

[Wuerzburg]

The scope of II Corps' days objectives would have been covered by 1 map sheet (maximum 2) at 1:40,000.

I agree it's a "nice tactical size" but then "tactical combat, not strategy or operations, is the foundation of warfare"; In Grasset's Virton and Ethe books he makes reference to the maps issue. In some cases no maps were available to the smaller unit commanders.

You don't just need the 1: 40,000 maps for that day's corps operations. You need the corps rear area, the corps to the left and right and the terrain in front for the next couple of day's operations. It starts to add up.

You can't compare modern availability of maps with that in 1914. Almost no small-unit commanders in any army in 1914 had maps. In the German army cavalry reconnaissance patrol leaders rarely had maps.

Terence Zuber

[SteveMarsdin]

Almost no small-unit commanders in any army in 1914 had maps. In the German army cavalry reconnaissance patrol leaders rarely had maps.

Terence Zuber

OK but to clarify, I said smaller unit commanders not small-unit; I meant units smaller than corps.

As you've touched on reconnaissance; as both you and Grasset highlight, this was a great failing of the French, both immediately before and on 22 August (partly due to effective screening by the German cavalry) but it was also exacerbated by poor interpretation and/or dissemination of information. For example: 4th Army received reports of the Battle at Hamipre/Longlier (just east of Neufchateau), which took place on 20 August and involved substantial German forces(infantry rather than just cavalry), the same day they passed on the order to the Colonial Corps to advance to Neufchateau (and beyond) but they failed to pass on information concerning German forces at Hamipre.

Thank you for taking the time to respond to my various posts - perhaps someone else will now ask further questions on war planning or Mons ? (or there's Terry Duncan's question at #218)

[Edited 12.05 for greater relevance]

[Wuerzburg]

Terence,

Who would you have thought would have performed best in command of each of the German armies in 1914? It is fairly obvious Kluck (and Kuhl) performed badly - though far better in rewriting his role post war - but who could have replaced them directly in 1914? There are plenty of officers who later distinguished themselves but were not necessarily the most senior officers in line for promotion to army commander in 1914.

Terry

The only German army commander/army command team on the west front to shine during the Battle of the Frontiers was the Duke of Wuerttemberg's 4th Army. As of about 0300 on 22 August they were faced with a completely unexpected situation that could have led to a German disaster: stopping Joffre's main attack, five corps strong (including the Colonial Corps) with two German active and a reserve corps. When the dust cleared, 3 DIC, 5 Colonial Brigade and 33 DI had been destroyed and Joffre's main attack decisively defeated. If even one other German army commander had produced those kinds of results, the Battle of the Frontiers migth have been a decisive German victory, instead of an "ordinary" one.

Terence Zuber