Inventing the Schlieffen Plan

[yelob]

Thanks Terence again for the info,I suspect you are right and Hew Strachan is referring to its publication in 1956,however that's not entirely clear from the passage in question or perhaps I missed something in his overall argument.

Maybe an easier way to ask the question (as I'm still confused on this point) is how many people were aware of the 1906

Memorandum before 1914,the impression I get from Strachan is it was intended for Moltke and the war minister.If as you say the blame game started in 1914 on the basis that Moltke didn't use the 1906 Memorandum the blamers obviously had to know of its existence and its outline to accuse him of not using it.

Also could the blamers (back then) not be easily refuted by the simple fact that Moltke didn't have the 96+ divisions in the first place?

Best/Liam

[Terry Duncan]

Thanks Terence again for the info,I suspect you are right and Hew Strachan is referring to its publication in 1956,however that's not entirely clear from the passage in question or perhaps I missed something in his overall argument.

Maybe an easier way to ask the question (as I'm still confused on this point) is how many people were aware of the 1906

Memorandum before 1914,the impression I get from Strachan is it was intended for Moltke and the war minister.If as you say the blame game started in 1914 on the basis that Moltke didn't use the 1906 Memorandum the blamers obviously had to know of its existence and its outline to accuse him of not using it.

Also could the blamers (back then) not be easily refuted by the simple fact that Moltke didn't have the 96+ divisions in the first place?

Best/Liam

Liam,

The 1906 memo is a document dealing with a single front war only against France, so anyone wanting to blame Moltke for not following it in a two front war are clearly not really too aware of what is in it anyhow. Look at the panic in East Prussia in 1914 and then imagine if there wasnt even one army there. It really would be a danger cossacks in Berlin with all the army heading west and still short of troops.

To my mind one problem those blaming Moltke have always faced is that none of them could actually describe this fabulous plan in anything but the most basic detail, and if they knew so little about the details how on earth did they know it was sure to work!? Even Groener took several years to actually present his version of what the plan was, and his version doesnt explain how the logistics problems were to be solved or how an army is going to march and fight its way to Paris and still be in any shape to fight - or even still have much supply left. With masses of motorised transport then maybe, but on foot, with horses drawing the supplies? The ammo expenditure of one artillery battery in battle was more more than one wagon could carry, the fodder for the draught horses alone ran to hundreds of tons a day iirc - Terence can possibly be more precise on this. As the lines grow longer, the harder it gets, and if the French have avoided a decisive battle in the opening few weeks by retreating, sooner or later the Germans will be at the very limits of their limits, the French almost on top of depots and rail heads.

The same thing happened in WWII in North Africa, each side advancing until its supplies ran low, then the other counterattacking and forcing them to retreat again. Look at how many times places like Benghazi changed hands!

Terry

[Wuerzburg]

Thanks Terence again for the info,I suspect you are right and Hew Strachan is referring to its publication in 1956,however that's not entirely clear from the passage in question or perhaps I missed something in his overall argument.

Maybe an easier way to ask the question (as I'm still confused on this point) is how many people were aware of the 1906

Memorandum before 1914,the impression I get from Strachan is it was intended for Moltke and the war minister.If as you say the blame game started in 1914 on the basis that Moltke didn't use the 1906 Memorandum the blamers obviously had to know of its existence and its outline to accuse him of not using it.

Also could the blamers (back then) not be easily refuted by the simple fact that Moltke didn't have the 96+ divisions in the first place?

Best/Liam

Liam,

The blame game is pretty straightforward through 1919 (see Chapter 6 of Inventing the Schlieffen Plan). A big part of it consisted of Kuhl accusing Hentsch of ordering 1st Army to withdraw just as it was about to win a decisive victory on the Marne. Hentsch asked for an investigation which exonerated him. In September 1914 the head of the Kaiser's military cabinet accused the general staff in toto of having screwed the pooch. This was important - if such senior people are critical of the general staff, its future continuation is in doubt. Even before the war was over Mueller-Loebnitz wrote a book, which was printed in 1919, exonerating 3rd Army's mistakes. But these are arguments over garden-variety operational mistakes.

Nobody starts blaming Moltke for not having followed the Schlieffen plan until 1920; Moltke died in 1916.

The Reichsarchiv official history admitted that Moltke didn't have the force structure required by the Memorandum, though it was coy about stating the actual shortage. It disingenuously said that raising the extra forces was Moltke's problem - and failure. Ludendorff said outright that Moltke was short 24 divisions.

Why didn't anyone pick up on this? Lack of information - all the German war planning documents were under lock and key, and the 'Schlieffen school' used their access to them to shape the debate, revealing enough to be seen as experts while denying access to things they did not want known.

Terence Zuber

[Terry Duncan]

Liam,

The blame game is pretty straightforward through 1919 (see Chapter 6 of Inventing the Schlieffen Plan). A big part of it consisted of Kuhl accusing Hentsch of ordering 1st Army to withdraw just as it was about to win a decisive victory on the Marne. Hentsch asked for an investigation which exonerated him. In September 1914 the head of the Kaiser's military cabinet accused the general staff in toto of having screwed the pooch. This was important - if such senior people are critical of the general staff, its future continuation is in doubt. Even before the war was over Mueller-Loebnitz wrote a book, which was printed in 1919, exonerating 3rd Army's mistakes. But these are arguments over garden-variety operational mistakes.

Nobody starts blaming Moltke for not having followed the Schlieffen plan until 1920; Moltke died in 1916.

The Reichsarchiv official history admitted that Moltke didn't have the force structure required by the Memorandum, though it was coy about stating the actual shortage. It disingenuously said that raising the extra forces was Moltke's problem - and failure. Ludendorff said outright that Moltke was short 24 divisions.

Why didn't anyone pick up on this? Lack of information - all the German war planning documents were under lock and key, and the 'Schlieffen school' used their access to them to shape the debate, revealing enough to be seen as experts while denying access to things they did not want known.

Terence Zuber

Terence,

The same methods were used to hide the diplomatic side of events too, only the documents that could serve a certain line were allowed to be seen and only certain writers were allowed to examine the archives, oddly enough all in the pay of the Foreign Office! Hiding information is easy when everybody wants to believe something they are told and not look any further.

Terry

[Glenn239]

A great thread. Thanks to Jon and Terry for giving me the heads up that it was underway and many thanks to Mr. Zuber for participating. I wish more historians did this type of thing!

I have quite a number of questions, but I would be interested to get Mr. Zuber’s opinions on these to start -

1 – Earlier it was mentioned that the French army implemented the ‘Belgian’ variant to its mobilization. In Joffre’s memoires, the situation maps from about 23 August show, if I recall correctly, two French divisions in the Ardennes attached to 4^th and 5^th armies that were originally part of 1^st and 2^nd Armies’ OOB slated for deployment along the common border. Do you know when the orders were cut detaching these divisions from 1^st and 2^nd armies and attaching them to 4^th and 5^th armies instead?

2 – In discussing Joffre’s memoires and what these indicated about French planning in Belgium, it has been suggested elsewhere that Joffre’s books were to some extent fabricated/altered by ghost writers, and therefore that the information in them is not reliable. Is there any merit to this argument?

3 – In discussions elsewhere, the Germans alleged in 1915 that French cavalry units had entered the Belgian Ardennes days prior to 3 August 1914 - and as early as 31 July if I recall correctly. From everything I’ve seen, I concluded this allegation was false. Is that conclusion correct?

4 – In the discussion, Mr. Zuber mentions that there was little prospect of success for the German plan, unless perhaps a ‘Tannenberg’ scale victory could have been inflicted via taking greater risks. Question - if the primary objective of the 1^st and 2^nd Armies had been, instead of turning the French flank, to pursue and destroy the British Expeditionary Force while (as much as possible) ignoring the French 5^th Army, do you think it possible (assuming complete success) that the British army would not soon return to the continent ?

[Wuerzburg]

A great thread. Thanks to Jon and Terry for giving me the heads up that it was underway and many thanks to Mr. Zuber for participating. I wish more historians did this type of thing!

I have quite a number of questions, but I would be interested to get Mr. Zuber's opinions on these to start -

1 – Earlier it was mentioned that the French army implemented the 'Belgian' variant to its mobilization. In Joffre's memoires, the situation maps from about 23 August show, if I recall correctly, two French divisions in the Ardennes attached to 4^th and 5^th armies that were originally part of 1^st and 2^nd Armies' OOB slated for deployment along the common border. Do you know when the orders were cut detaching these divisions from 1^st and 2^nd armies and attaching them to 4^th and 5^th armies instead?

2 – In discussing Joffre's memoires and what these indicated about French planning in Belgium, it has been suggested elsewhere that Joffre's books were to some extent fabricated/altered by ghost writers, and therefore that the information in them is not reliable. Is there any merit to this argument?

3 – In discussions elsewhere, the Germans alleged in 1915 that French cavalry units had entered the Belgian Ardennes days prior to 3 August 1914 - and as early as 31 July if I recall correctly. From everything I've seen, I concluded this allegation was false. Is that conclusion correct?

4 – In the discussion, Mr. Zuber mentions that there was little prospect of success for the German plan, unless perhaps a 'Tannenberg' scale victory could have been inflicted via taking greater risks. Question - if the primary objective of the 1^st and 2^nd Armies had been, instead of turning the French flank, to pursue and destroy the British Expeditionary Force while (as much as possible) ignoring the French 5^th Army, do you think it possible (assuming complete success) that the British army would not soon return to the continent ?

1) In general Joffre reenforced his left in the week preceding 23 August. It's pretty complex and the only place I know to find it is the French official history.

2) The argument that Joffre's memoirs were ghost-written derived from the fact that Joffre wasn't capable of writing such a polished memoir. Is it inaccurate? I doubt any memoir by a senior general officer in WWI is free of prejudice and self-interest. They all have to be evaluated and supplemented by whatever else the historian can dig up.

3) Each side set up what amounted to a cottage industry accusing the other of sending cavalry or even infantry foot patrols across the border before war was declared. I doubt that anybody intentionally did. Why bother? But given the mix of the superheated atmosphere the first days of August leading to all kinds of absurd rumors and reports (French aircraft over Nuremberg, French 'gold autos' trying to sneak othrough Germany to Russia) on the one hand and overzealous cavalry lieutenants on the other, anything was possible. It's militarily and politically irrelavent, except as cheap propaganda.

4) 1st Army was doing everything it could to destroy the BEF: just think what heroes that would have made of Kluck , the commander, and Kuhl, the chief of staff. Tannenberg would have been a minor accomplishment in comparison. The problem was that Kuhl wasn't very bright. Kuhl was the author of the pre-war intelligence estimate and was absolutely convinced that the British were going to concentrate at Lille. At Mons he therefore delayed the III Corps attack for four hours until he was convinced that the there weren't any British at Lille. Given another four hours of daylight, III Corps would have completely smashed the British II Corps position and penetrated it to operational depth. Then on 25 August Kuhl comes to the absurd conviction that the BEF is at Maubeuge, so he turns the entire 1st Army southeast while the BEF is escaping southwest. At Le Cateau, instead of attacking British II Corps with the German II and IV Corps (eight brigades), with Cavalry Corps 2 turning the BEF left flank, which surely would have led to the destruction of II Corps at least, and maybe the entire Entente left flank, on 26 August 1st Army can only attack with three brigades and the cavalry is attacking frontally. After that the BEF decided to seriously vacate the area and the Germans had no hope of catching them. See my The Mons Myth.

Terence Zuber

[SteveMarsdin]

Good morning,

Just to add to Terence Zuber's comments re the switch of French divisions; as he intimates it wasn't just a question of moving the Moroccan Division from 2e army to 4e Army or XVIII Corps from 2e Army to 5e Army; as 5e Army orientated further north and 4e Army moved into the gap between it and 3e Army, many units stayed in place but moved command (e.g II Corps passed from 5e Army to 4e Army) and 3e, 4e and 5e Armies were further strengthened by reserve divisions and/or divisions from Africa.

The BOH Vol 1 states the orders were issued in response to German troop movements in Belgium, on 15th August

[Chris Boonzaier]

Why didn't anyone pick up on this? Lack of information - all the German war planning documents were under lock and key, and the 'Schlieffen school' used their access to them to shape the debate, revealing enough to be seen as experts while denying access to things they did not want known.

Terence Zuber

Then why did the "Schlieffen School" taint his name by bringing it into the discussion at all?

I assume Moltke had something to do with the elusive 1906 plan.... why not jsut say "if Moltke had used schlieffens plan, instead of the one he cobbeled up in 1906... we would have won!"

Would have been easier and more logical.

I really have trouble believing in a huge lie and complicated plot to shift the blame. There was so much going on after the war, so much political turmoil and rivalry... I really cannot believe noone would have said .."Ermmm... actually John made the plan up...."

TZ argues his points eloquently, personally I disagree with a portion (Obviously)and believe that the whole issue is a bit like an exciting conpiricy theory, sounds really "hieb und Stichfest"... but would only really be proved if the elusive 1906 plan was found, or period documents showed correspondence confirming that all Schlieffens ideas were dropped.

Best

Chris

[Chris Boonzaier]

.. and although noone is going to convince anyone on the thread...

I do belive that if your argument is "Everyone over the last 90 years is just plain WRONG!"...

... then the Burden of prrof must be concrete, in your face smoking gun kinda stuff.

"Here! Plan 1906!" Whammo... and everyone goes "Wow! Homerun for TZ"

Here we have 13 pages af arguments that impress, number of divisions, arguments between leaders/Generals, plots, sources praised and dismissed according to which side of the argument people are on, many of the arguments made by both sides ignored or glossed over...

it almost becomes like watching insurance salesmen, the slicker the presentation and the ability to toss around facts and figures makes the buyer sure the produkt is the best...

But the bottom line is... the people who were there seem to agree Schlieffen's plan was the base, 90 years of Historians agree ... I assume much of all this is based on the interpretation of what happened as opposed to Smoking Gun evidence...

For me there is still a lot lacking to convince me all these 90 years of Generals and historns are wrong....

Best

Chrif

[Jack Sheldon]

I should just like to comment on Posts 303 and 270. Terence mentions in 303 that Ludendorff stated 'outright that Moltke was 24 Divisions short.' I do not recognise the quotation. I am afraid. Could you say where it appears, please? Even if he did state that, or something similar, he seems to have been in no doubt about the inspiration behind the way events unfolded in 1914.

Meine Kriegserinnerungen pp 19-20

"The Aufmarsch which took place in August 1914 originated in the thinking of General Graf von Schlieffen, one of the greatest soldiers who ever lived. It was designed by him on the assumption that Belgian's neutrality would not be respected by France, or that Belgium would go in with France. Based on this assumption the march through Belgium by the main German forces followed naturally. Any other operation would have been paralysed by the constant risk to the German army right flank from Belgium and this would have ruled out a swift decision against France. This, however, was necessary in order to be able to counter in a timely manner the enormous risk of a Russian thrust into the heart of Germany. Attack against Russia and defence against the West meant from the outset, in the context of the assumed war situation - and this [view] was strengthened through countless war games - a lengthy war and this was condemned by Graf von Schlieffen ... We all believed in the rightness of this Aufmarsch. Nobody believed in the neutrality of Belgium."

I shall return to this later - I do not trust my computer not to crash at regular intervals at the moment.

Jack

[yelob]

Chris,

I think some of what you are saying boils down to the question I raised earlier ie how Schlieffenesque was the Moltke Plan

(lets call it that TZ does as well) that he actually used in 1914 and by that you have to encompass not only the 1906 Schlieffen Memorandum

but the 14 other war plans devised by Schlieffen and tested between 1891 and 1905.

The answer to that I believe is in the detail and not easily answered or reducible and may never be known.

What does seem clear to me form this thread and Strachan is the Moltke Plan in 1914 owed no allegiance to the 1906 Memorandum in any respect as that memorandum called for 96 Divs Moltke didn't have plus we know that Moltke didn't

think much of the 1906 memorandum or its main idea an annihilation of the French in 6 weeks.

My summary therefore is Moltke clearly did not attempt to execute the 1906 Schlieffen memorandum in 1914 but may perhaps

have used other Schlieffen ideas such as the interior rail network etc.borrowed from all or any of Schlieffens other 14 plans.

The strong right wing into Belgium is indicative of nothing in particular from what I can see so far and is shaped by the

fact that there was no where else for the German army to go.I also believe the strong right wing is the cause of the problem in all of this debate because what seems to have become written in stone is strong right wing into Belgium=Schlieffen 1906 Memorandum=Schlieffen plan and clearly that's not the case.

Thanks to Terry and TZ again for your specific answers.

Best to all,Liam

[Wuerzburg]

Then why did the "Schlieffen School" taint his name by bringing it into the discussion at all?

I assume Moltke had something to do with the elusive 1906 plan.... why not jsut say "if Moltke had used schlieffens plan, instead of the one he cobbeled up in 1906... we would have won!"

Would have been easier and more logical.

I really have trouble believing in a huge lie and complicated plot to shift the blame. There was so much going on after the war, so much political turmoil and rivalry... I really cannot believe noone would have said .."Ermmm... actually John made the plan up...."

TZ argues his points eloquently, personally I disagree with a portion (Obviously)and believe that the whole issue is a bit like an exciting conpiricy theory, sounds really "hieb und Stichfest"... but would only really be proved if the elusive 1906 plan was found, or period documents showed correspondence confirming that all Schlieffens ideas were dropped.

Best

Chris

"if the elusive 1906 plan was found, or period documents showed correspondence confirming that all Schlieffens ideas were dropped."

I used Dieckmann's summary of German war planning from 1891-1904, plus a raft of hitherto unknown Schlieffen war games, in Inventing the Schlieffen Plan.

I translated the entire "elusive 1906 plan" in German War Planning 1891-1914.

I translated, summarized and analyzed all the German war plans prior to the war for the first time in The Real German War Plan 1904-1914 .

So, I've got the documents.

From 1920 until 1991 or so they were kept secret first by the Reichsarchiv and then the East German military archive.

On the other hand, you have what historians call "The argument from authority". If back in 1921 Groener and Kuhl said "There was a Schlieffen plan. That's all you need to know", and afterwards all these important historians played bobble-head doll and agreed, that's good enough for you.

Terence Zuber

[Glenn239]

Thanks for the answers. I didn’t see where anyone has taken a stab at the original questions posed to the forum by Mr. Zuber - which doesn't strike me as quite fair. I am by no means an expert on the subject like others here, but I’ll take a stab at trying to answer all of them in the spirit of the thread.

The first three words in the Schlieffen plan memorandum, which can be found in the archive in Freiburg, are 'Krieg gegen Frankreich' (War against France). The only mention of Russia in the entire memorandum is that the Russians would not support the French. Why do you maintain that the "Schlieffen plan" was applicable in a two -front war?

The debate in the German army arose over the failure in 1914 to deliver immediate victory in France, and whose “fault” that was. It was intimated that Moltke, now conveniently dead, ignored the details of a master plan that would have delivered a victory over France had he followed through with it. Normally it would not be the case that this type of exchange within a small professional industry would resonate elsewhere. However, in the West there was a deeper desire to find meaning – more specifically, blame - in what had become the most destructive man-made event in human history. If Germany were guilty of aggressive war, then Germany required a war plan which anticipated immediate victory. If Germany’s plan was more along the lines of a defensive haymaker thrown in the parking lot against two drunken brutes pressing in, the link between Germany and a deliberate bid for hegemony becomes impossible to establish. Hence, much of the longstanding emotional commitment to the Schlieffen Plan in the English speaking world related not to its military merits, but its necessity in the political game of blame. Also very important I would think is what I would coin as historical inertia, which is the momentum, the tradition of history, not directly related to deeper questions of war guilt.

The usual explaination of the "Schlieffen plan" is that the Germans would utterly defeat the French "quickly" (usually 40 days). Please cite your proof from the actual Schlieffen plan memorandum.

Was there a paragraph about sharks with laser beams attached to their heads? Because otherwise, it appears outright impossible to me that any German staff could possibly conclude a foe taking a year to defeat in 1870 could be finished in 40 days with an army four times larger, with perhaps quadruple the firepower per man, and with two Great Power allies.

The Schlieffen plan myth then maintains that the plan counted on a slow Russian mobilization which would allow the transfer of German forces east. Please provide proof from the actual Schlieffen plan memorandum.

If I recall correctly, the memo called for no forces to be deployed in the east. Therefore, Schlieffen’s condition is that Russia must be neutral and the question of her mobilization thereby made irrelevant. An alternative explanation, quite farfetched, might be that Schlieffen had in his own mind earmarked an additional army composed of about 8 divisions for the east, raising the required total of divisions to 104.

The usual (Wikipedia) Schlieffen plan map (which is all the proof the average armchair general needs for the "Schlieffen plan") bears little relationship to the actual Schlieffen plan map in the archive at Freiburg. See pages 56-7 of my The Real German War Plan 1904-14. In particular, in the actual map, the Germans do not pass east of Paris. How do you explain this discrepancy?

Because the emphasis was on political interpretation and not military accuracy, postwar accounts of the 1906 plan have emphasized the barely mentioned sweep around Paris (ie, the most aggressive move possible) whereas the original paper did not dwell on it. The discrepancy arises from the political ‘lens’ the original memo has been filtered through, which distorted the emphasis of the original.

The Schlieffen plan memorandum requires 96 divisions. In January-February 1906, when Schlieffen actually wrote the memorandum, the entire German army had 72. How would you execute the plan using 24 'ghost divisions'? In 1914 the Germans initially had 68 divisions. How do you explain this discrepancy?

There are only two explanations; either the 1914 plan was not the Schlieffen Plan, or else it was intended to create 24 divisions ad hoc. If the latter, then the German archives should be be chalk full of documents showing Moltke’s feverish efforts from 1906-1914 to arrange the creation of 24 ersatz divisions during and after mobilization. If none exists, then it is no more possible that the 1906 plan was the actual war plan than it would be if a paper for Barbarossa was uncovered detailing the invasion of Russia using 90 divisions.

In the actual memorandum, Schlieffen says that the Germans will be stopped if they advance between Paris and the eastern French fortifications. They will therefore need to go west of Paris to outflank the French, and for that they will need 96 divisions. How do you square this with Moltke's decision to attack east of Paris in late August/early September 1914 with some 70 divisions?

Either by way of the Moltke rejecting the possibility of sweeping northwest of Paris, or his intention to increase the frontage of his divisions to account for the greater front. (The latter intention should also show some archival documentation, I would think, especially concerning the problem of Paris).

In August 1914, when the "Schlieffen plan" was supposed to have been implemented, Schlieffen was dead and the original draft of the memorandum, plus Moltke's 1911 typed copy and marginal comments, were in the possession of Schlieffen's daughters (see the first page of the actual Schlieffen plan file in Freiburg and subsequent inventories). Why?

I would assume that Schlieffen’s private papers passed to his immediate family upon his death, while his military papers were retained by the general staff. Therefore, a quick and dirty method to discovering which of his papers were of military importance and which were not would be to establish where they were located in August 1914.

[Terry Duncan]

it almost becomes like watching insurance salesmen, the slicker the presentation and the ability to toss around facts and figures makes the buyer sure the produkt is the best...

But the bottom line is... the people who were there seem to agree Schlieffen's plan was the base, 90 years of Historians agree ... I assume much of all this is based on the interpretation of what happened as opposed to Smoking Gun evidence...

Chris,

The problem is that many historians checked nothing themselves and simply quoted other previous authors. Ritter published a lot, and since then almost everyone follows Ritter without checking etc. Insurance works the same way. They have a finding and present that to justify a price rise. It doesnt matter if it is their finding, indeed it is easier and far less expensive to use another company's findings, and then say Area X is a bad crime area therefore we are increasing our prices there. It doesnt matter if they have experienced claims in Area X, somebody else has said it is a risky area. This happened in Britain a few years ago. A major company used satelite data for elevation and linked it with postcodes, which led to a decision that large areas of Bath were at serious flood risk. All the others followed suit and increased prices. Then it turned out the river in Bath that had been the source of the risk ran through several housing estates but not under any of the actual bridges because somebody had not matched the data up correctly and plotted it through several postcodes it didnt run through. The upshot was everyone paid almost double the premium for two years, and then had their areas 'reassessed' and saw premiums drop again. No refunds, no apologies, but almost every company in the country had followed this one major firms research and increased prices despite there having been no actual floods in that area during the time in question. History works the same way. If one of the 'big boys' writes something, the others tend to follow and cite them as their evidence, further checking is not needed as the source they copied is reputable.

When Terence Zuber published his first work, people struggled to find any direct counter for this reason, they were all citing each other and had not researched it themselves. The same thing happened to Jon Sumida when John Brooks published almost the opposite conclusions about fire control in naval warfare. Everyone had cited Sumida until that point, and he was the only person to research that subject. When Sumida argued back he had to cite himself as his own notes on document had not been as extensive as Brooks, but nobody else had actually done any firsthand research to that depth.

For example, if Herweg says Zuber is wrong, and cites Ritter who in turn cites Groener, all you really have is that Groener says Zuber is wrong, nobody in between has researched it other than to trust the previous source. Obviously this does not make Zuber correct on its own, but it does show that 90 years of history can comprise of very little study and a lot of copying.

Liam,

I think some of what you are saying boils down to the question I raised earlier ie how Schlieffenesque was the Moltke Plan

That indeed seems to be the critical factor to many. The idea of major attack through Belgium will possibly always be associated with Schlieffen, rightly or wrongly.

The answer to that I believe is in the detail and not easily answered or reducible and may never be known.

Quite possible. It is likely the claim that German planning was inflexible will be dropped by all as it appears at least that this cannot be sustained. Exactly what was being attempted during 1914 may well be discussed for many years yet though.

My summary therefore is Moltke clearly did not attempt to execute the 1906 Schlieffen memorandum in 1914 but may perhaps have used other Schlieffen ideas such as the interior rail network etc.borrowed from all or any of Schlieffens other 14 plans.

This would seem reasonable to me. The rest of your conclusions are similar to my own.

Terry

[Jack Sheldon]

Sorry about the delay. I suppose that I should be grateful that I have any sort of broadband at all here in the mountains. I want to return now to Stein, whose thoughts were dismissed by Terence in Post 270 thus: 'Stein makes it quite clear that it was Schlieffen who professionalised the planning process - that's it.' With respect, he has more to say than that about where Schlieffen stood in terms of continuity within the long term operational planning process and he is quite explicit about the geo-strategic constraints which applied throughout the period leading up to 1914.

Stein pp 62-63

"When France was the only enemy, old Moltke could march into Lorraine and there wait for the enemy to attack. When Russia threw in her lot with France, Waldersee could not afford to wait until the enemy had completed their preparations for a concerted attack, but was obliged to attack France, who was most easily accessible and where preparations were farthest advanced, and that before Russia could intervene, so that he had no choice but to take the shortest way in, in spite of the forts that barred the way. As this possibility had been excluded by the development of the French system of fortifications, Schlieffen had to seek other methods.

"It was to be expected that the Russian attack would be made without loss of time, for she had already concentrated large forces near to the frontier and these could be quickly reinforced by means of the recently developed railway system ... Schlieffen, therefore, was faced with the necessity of scoring a rapid success against one of the enemies. It could not be Russia, for the Russians would have had no hesitation about retreating further and further into their vast country and so avoiding a decisive issue until their allies were able to make themselves felt. The only course that remained open, then, was an attack on France and the march through Belgium."

What I find interesting about these contributions is that they were both made straight after the war and not in the context of criticising Moltke for getting it wrong. They are simply saying that given the prevailing situation, the inevitability of war on two fronts, Schlieffen designed a method intended to deal with it. That being the case, the fact that certain maps were marked 'War against France' proves absolutely nothing. War for Germany meant war on two fronts and that inescapable fact loomed over everything that Schlieffen ever produced. How could it possibly be otherwise? Now the scheme did not work, as we know, but that has everything to do with the timing of the war. Had the build up of the size of the army, which began with the ditching of the 1% rule and the increased funding from 1912 been given sufficient time to come to maturity, at least some of the difficuties would have been overcome. As it was, because the move forward of these massive forces could not be improvised, they had to go with what they had, what they had prepared over many years with, for example, the huge investment in a large increase in railway capacity trans-Rhine and on the approaches to the frontiers. Naturally work must have continued during the years leading up to 1914 and it seems obvious that the actual plan was finalised under Moltke, but the two men I have quoted attribute to Schlieffen the credit for its principles. Who am I to say that they were wrong?

Jack

[Wuerzburg]

Sorry about the delay. I suppose that I should be grateful that I have any sort of broadband at all here in the mountains. I want to return now to Stein, whose thoughts were dismissed by Terence in Post 270 thus: 'Stein makes it quite clear that it was Schlieffen who professionalised the planning process - that's it.' With respect, he has more to say than that about where Schlieffen stood in terms of continuity within the long term operational planning process and he is quite explicit about the geo-strategic constraints which applied throughout the period leading up to 1914.

Stein pp 62-63

"When France was the only enemy, old Moltke could march into Lorraine and there wait for the enemy to attack. When Russia threw in her lot with France, Waldersee could not afford to wait until the enemy had completed their preparations for a concerted attack, but was obliged to attack France, who was most easily accessible and where preparations were farthest advanced, and that before Russia could intervene, so that he had no choice but to take the shortest way in, in spite of the forts that barred the way. As this possibility had been excluded by the development of the French system of fortifications, Schlieffen had to seek other methods.

"It was to be expected that the Russian attack would be made without loss of time, for she had already concentrated large forces near to the frontier and these could be quickly reinforced by means of the recently developed railway system ... Schlieffen, therefore, was faced with the necessity of scoring a rapid success against one of the enemies. It could not be Russia, for the Russians would have had no hesitation about retreating further and further into their vast country and so avoiding a decisive issue until their allies were able to make themselves felt. The only course that remained open, then, was an attack on France and the march through Belgium."

What I find interesting about these contributions is that they were both made straight after the war and not in the context of criticising Moltke for getting it wrong. They are simply saying that given the prevailing situation, the inevitability of war on two fronts, Schlieffen designed a method intended to deal with it. That being the case, the fact that certain maps were marked 'War against France' proves absolutely nothing. War for Germany meant war on two fronts and that inescapable fact loomed over everything that Schlieffen ever produced. How could it possibly be otherwise? Now the scheme did not work, as we know, but that has everything to do with the timing of the war. Had the build up of the size of the army, which began with the ditching of the 1% rule and the increased funding from 1912 been given sufficient time to come to maturity, at least some of the difficuties would have been overcome. As it was, because the move forward of these massive forces could not be improvised, they had to go with what they had, what they had prepared over many years with, for example, the huge investment in a large increase in railway capacity trans-Rhine and on the approaches to the frontiers. Naturally work must have continued during the years leading up to 1914 and it seems obvious that the actual plan was finalised under Moltke, but the two men I have quoted attribute to Schlieffen the credit for its principles. Who am I to say that they were wrong?

Jack

Jack,

Stein is merely restating what had been obvious in the German army since the Russo-French alliance 1892-4. Nothing original here.

The fallacy in your argument is that you explicitly assume that "any plan Schlieffen wrote was the Schlieffen plan", i.e., the 1906 Memorandum.

The 1906 Memorandum was written after Schlieffen retired.

As the chief of the general staff Schlieffen wrote war plans for 14 years. Between Inventing the Schlieffen Plan and The Real German War Plan 1904-1914 I show what each of those plans looked like in detail, and none of them bear any resemblance whatsoever to the 1906 Memorandum.

Moltke was following in Schlieffen's footsteps - at least until 24 August 1914 - but the path Schlieffen laid out was in his actual war plans and war games, and not the 1906 Memorandum.

Moltke didn't even look at the Memorandum until 1911.

'War against France' meant absolutely nothing because any war was a two-front war? "War against France' wasn't written on 'certain maps': these are the first three words of the Memorandum itself, all alone on the top left of the first page.

If any war is a two-front war then why does the first paragraph of the plan say that Russia won't support France? You're arguing that Schlieffen doesn't really mean what he swrote, he meant exactly the opposite of what he wrote.

OK, so how does the Memorandum propose to deal with the Russians while the German army is marching from Belgium around Paris to your house in the Alps? How long does that little stroll take? Three months? More if there's any fighting.

Schlieffen said that the maneuver in the 1906 Memorandum required 96 divisions. You maintain that Moltke didn't really believe him: Moltke was 26 divisions (25%) short, but not to worry.

Moltke was 26 divisions short but yet he 'finalized' the plan?

Really?

Terence Zuber

[Wuerzburg]

I should just like to comment on Posts 303 and 270. Terence mentions in 303 that Ludendorff stated 'outright that Moltke was 24 Divisions short.' I do not recognise the quotation. I am afraid. Could you say where it appears, please? Even if he did state that, or something similar, he seems to have been in no doubt about the inspiration behind the way events unfolded in 1914.

Meine Kriegserinnerungen pp 19-20

"The Aufmarsch which took place in August 1914 originated in the thinking of General Graf von Schlieffen, one of the greatest soldiers who ever lived. It was designed by him on the assumption that Belgian's neutrality would not be respected by France, or that Belgium would go in with France. Based on this assumption the march through Belgium by the main German forces followed naturally. Any other operation would have been paralysed by the constant risk to the German army right flank from Belgium and this would have ruled out a swift decision against France. This, however, was necessary in order to be able to counter in a timely manner the enormous risk of a Russian thrust into the heart of Germany. Attack against Russia and defence against the West meant from the outset, in the context of the assumed war situation - and this [view] was strengthened through countless war games - a lengthy war and this was condemned by Graf von Schlieffen ... We all believed in the rightness of this Aufmarsch. Nobody believed in the neutrality of Belgium."

I shall return to this later - I do not trust my computer not to crash at regular intervals at the moment.

Jack

Jack,

E. Ludendorff, 'Der Aufmarsch 1914' in: Ludendorff's Volkswarte Folge 31 vom 24. Dezember 1929 and also Deutsche Wehr (4. Januar 1930) 3-4.

Cited in my Inventing the Schlieffen Plan 35-6.

The Aufmarsch Ludendorff is talking about in Mein militaerischer Werdegang clearly the real war plan and not the 'Schlieffen plan' Memorandum. Annex 7 makes that clear: the German army has 72 divisions, not the 96 in the Memorandum.

Ludendorff is supporting me, not you.

Terry Zuber

[Terry Duncan]

The Aufmarsch which took place in August 1914 originated in the thinking of General Graf von Schlieffen

All Ludendorff says here really is that the plan put into practice in 1914 originated with Schlieffen's thinking, not planning, not that it was his or even that it followed an outline he had given, nor does he state that there was any deviation from some great plan left by Schlieffen. That does seem strange, especially as Ludendorff was closely associated with the plan in 1914. This could be as basic as saying any move through Belgium is the Schlieffen Plan.

Terry

[SteveMarsdin]

If Germany's plan was more along the lines of a defensive haymaker thrown in the parking lot against two drunken brutes pressing in, the link between Germany and a deliberate bid for hegemony becomes impossible to establish. Hence, much of the longstanding emotional commitment to the Schlieffen Plan in the English speaking world related not to its military merits, but its necessity in the political game of blame. Also very important I would think is what I would coin as historical inertia, which is the momentum, the tradition of history, not directly related to deeper questions of war guilt.

Most of the plans that have been discussed (and let us not forget what happened) involved an aggressive violation of Belgian neutrality; whichever name you give the plan would put it it beyond a "defensive haymaker".

I have no strong feelings as to the specific plan used (or indeed the name given it) as so long after the event, with no witnessess or particpants to interview, cases can be built for the various points of view. What actually happened was that Germany invaded Belgium, the French didn't. The German plans all seem to rather matter of factly involve fighting in or through Belgium; the sheer geo-political naivety of this staggers me.

[Glenn239]

Most of the plans that have been discussed (and let us not forget what happened) involved an aggressive violation of Belgian neutrality; whichever name you give the plan would put it it beyond a "defensive haymaker".

I have no strong feelings as to the specific plan used (or indeed the name given it) as so long after the event, with no witnessess or particpants to interview, cases can be built for the various points of view. What actually happened was that Germany invaded Belgium, the French didn't. The German plans all seem to rather matter of factly involve fighting in or through Belgium; the sheer geo-political naivety of this staggers me.

As Moltke himself, backed by the Kaiser save on 1 August, rejected all attempts by the Foreign Office to seek out an arrangement with Great Britain after 1912 on the question of Belgium, and was noted by Albertini after 1 August as saying that British neutrality for the price of Belgium was too dearly bought, I am inclined to agree with your statement to a large extent; no attack through a neutral country brought about without exhausting all diplomatic options to avoid it can ever be qualified as purely defensive. On the other hand, the prospects to such a diplomatic venture have to be weighed against their chances of success versus the military consequences of a failure that robbed Germany of the intiative. In the end, the verdict falls with Moltke’s assessment of British intentions, and whether this pessimism was realism, or an inaccurate crutch meant to justify his own actions.

Which brings up an interesting point – was there a German war plan that could have better blended the diplomatic requirements to being a ‘good’ European citizens with the military requirements of unleashing a Cannae upon France? It is mentioned that France intended to invade Belgium. Wasn’t the prospect of a crushing defeat of the French army in the Ardennes more in evidence if the Germans refused their right and let the French attack?

[Glenn239]

All Ludendorff says here really is that the plan put into practice in 1914 originated with Schlieffen's thinking, not planning, not that it was his or even that it followed an outline he had given, nor does he state that there was any deviation from some great plan left by Schlieffen. That does seem strange, especially as Ludendorff was closely associated with the plan in 1914. This could be as basic as saying any move through Belgium is the Schlieffen Plan.

Here’s my guess.

Terry’s point highlights the confusion I found with Myth of the Schlieffen Plan and the subsequent debates in War in History. When we talk of the Schlieffen Plan, what exactly is to be the definition of that? Mr. Zuber’s argument I found somewhat difficult to extract in Myth. What I came away with is that if German planning for war against France were likened to a tree, the 1906 memo was a branch shooting off from the trunk about halfway up. It was not the roots of the tree, nor its trunk, nor its canopy. It just a structure that arose along the way and shot off to the side. Like a branch, it could be cut off altogether without undermining the structure of the tree. The opposing viewpoint seemed to be that the 1906 memo was, if not the roots, then certainly the trunk of the tree; so cut it off and the whole edifice falls.

A German advance via Belgium could in theory have the objective the French army, Paris, or the British army. A ‘Schlieffen’ plan by definition seems one aimed at the French army and not the other two. The Zuber version suggests Moltke advances with no fixed idea of where or when the decisive battle will occur. The 1906 version makes it clear that it will be on the right. The Zuber version suggests Moltke’s immediate operational objectives were limited in focus; to defeat the French army sufficiently to retain the strategic initiative into the next period of the war. The 1906 version makes it clear the objectives were unlimited – the elimination altogether of the French army and the defeat of France. The Zuber version measures the Schlieffen Plan against the material requirements of continental war. The 1906 memo ignores Russia and Austria-Hungary.

My guess is that Schlieffen wrote the memo as the capping stone to his carreer, not either as a war plan or for the mundane burocratic motive of making a case for a bigger army. Rather as a scientific statement, the evolutionary culmination of the principles he had made his lifework. If so, both sides of the debate are right; the 1906 memorandum can be indeed be called a master plan because it was written with the intention of expressing the ultimate evolutionary form to a Belgian offensive against France. Mr. Zuber also is right that it was not a warplan, because Schlieffen’s purpose was theoretical military scientific expression. That would be why Russia is ommitted; it’s completely irrelevant in expressing the principles to a fully evolved attack upon France.

[Terry Duncan]

the 1906 memorandum can be indeed be called a master plan because it was written with the intention of expressing the ultimate evolutionary form to a Belgian offensive against France.

If this were correct, the criticism aimed at Motlke by Groener is completely wrong as he accuses Moltke of deviating from the plan in 1914, not of not having secured enough men to impliment it. Groener's charge was specific, there was a war winning plan that Moltke had violated in 1914, and if he had stuck to it Germany would have won against France very quickly. Sadly, the plan as described by Groener does not work when examined, and oddly enough for reasons that seem to have been outlined by Schlieffen many years earlier.

It is a strange situation where you see Schlieffen able to be cited as evidence why the Schlieffen Plan as outlined by Groener will not work!

Terry

[Chris Boonzaier]

"The fallacy in your argument is that you explicitly assume that "any plan Schlieffen wrote was the Schlieffen plan", "

IMHO thats nit picking to the degree one of your ex Presidents did... :-)

"It depends on what the meaning of the words 'is' is." (Bill Clinton)

Would you then agree that the Invasion Plan of 1914, if not THE Schlieffen plan, was based largley on A Schlieffen plan? If so we can all go home and enjoy a cup of tea.

Best

Chris

[yelob]

Chris,

This is not nitpicking and there are huge implications regarding the Moltke Plan in 1914 and what it was based on.As has

already been pointed Moltke did not try to execute the Schlieffen 1906 memorandum (=THE Schlieffen plan).

What he did do had aspects of Schlieffens other thinking and plans in it,the extent of that is in the detail if I understand correctly.

The fact that Moltke didn't attempt THE Schlieffen plan has far ranging implications and is not trivial as you seem to be suggesting.

If I was to have a cup of tea and I may do so now shortly :)I will be reflecting on the fact that one of the biggest red herrings in military history is finally being debunked.

Thanks again to Terry and especially Terence Zuber for the detailed responses and the education,drinks are on me whenever you're in Ireland

Best to all/Liam

[SteveMarsdin]

The fact that Moltke didn't attempt THE Schlieffen plan has far ranging implications and is not trivial as you seem to be suggesting.

Best to all/Liam

Just what are these far-reaching implications ? On the issue of "war guilt" all the plans, including the one pursued, involved an aggressive violation of Belgian neutrality. If German 2nd Army was meant to be the lead army and 1st Army only a flank guard, it still advanced through Belgium. Whilst I could be convinced that the "original" Schlieffen plan wasn't implemented, the plan used was still an aggressive one.

Glenn has raised the point of was there a plan that didn't involve the German Army advancing into Luxembourg/Belgium(Holland) ? If the German intent was to "stun" rather than completely defeat the French, then use German interior lines to move forces east, why did every plan involve Belgium ?