Inventing the Schlieffen Plan

[Guest]

I have been following this excellent thread, and learning much. I found Forty days in 1914 by by Major-General Sir F Maurice. I'm sure many of you are familiar with it. I have yet to read it, but he seems to have been well ahead of many, in seeing the big picture.

I found this article in the Scotsman, that may be of interest.

The Scotsman Friday 31st January 1919, page 5

How The Marne Was Won

General Maurice's View On The First " Forty Days "

Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice, formerly Director of Military Operations at the War Office, in a volume published today, gives a remarkably lucid and convincing exposition of the opening phase of the war on the Western front to the close of the Marne. The novelty of his treatment is that he attempts to put himself in the position of the Germans and to discover what they were planning and doing during the retreat from Mons. " The information obtained in this way " threw what has been to me an entirely new light upon the campaign and made clear what had been previously been dark. " The German plan proceeded on the theory, derived from the elder Moltke, that the surest road to victory was that which led round the enemy's flank. The man responsible for perfecting it and carrying it out was von Schlieffen, the predecessor of the younger Moltke as the Kaiser's chief military adviser.

" Von Schlieffen " General Maurice writes, " who was much interested at the time in events of the South African War, sent for me while I was in Berlin, and after asking me a number of questions ended by saying:- ' Well you have found in Roberts a General who understands envelopment, and that is why you succeeded. ' Von Schlieffen was a very able man, and a profound thinker, but his successor was little more than a well trained German General Staff Officer, with the advantage of a great name, a tactful manner, and the faculty of getting on with the Emperor. I am convinced that the secret of much that happened in the early phases of the war lies in the fact that an inherited theory which had been elevated into a gospel, was applied by an individual of but ordinary capacity "

There was a two-front problem to be faced. Russia had to be held in check, while France was being quickly beaten to her knees. For this purpose more than two thirds of the enemy's available forces were to be concentrated in the West, comprising 63 divisions in all. The German armies were arranged in two groups; the first drawn up along the Belgian frontier, was to be the principal means of obtaining the quick decision; the second was to meet and counter the probable French invasion of Lorraine and pin the main French forces in the south. The Allies' numbers as a whole were not inferior, and Joffre intended to employ 30 out of his available 60 divisions for an offensive across the Franco-German frontier. He was forced to weaken the attack by reason of the enemy's concentration in the north, and to bring his central reserve towards the Ardennes, but even as late as 22nd August the full strength which the enemy was bringing through Belgium was not known, and it was still thought possible to envelop the Germans north of the Meuse by an advance of the British Army. It was with this general idea that the British marched to Mons. General Maurice is of the opinion that the military effect of the splendid Belgian resistance at Liège was greatly exaggerated. So far from holding the enemy up for a fortnight, in effect it delayed him only forty-eight hours. Several of von Kluck's corps had to be brought from Eastern Germany, and it is improbable in any case that his main bodies, which were to envelop the Allied left, could have been ready to march across the frontier before the 12th at the earliest. They got going two days later, but these two days were invaluable to Joffre, who otherwise might not have been in a position to hold the German onrush in check.

Neither the British nor the French had intended fighting in the mining region of Mons and Charleroi, defensively or otherwise, but they were forestalled by the enemy. By the morning of the 23rd, when the battle of Mons opened, the French had already been driven across the Sambre, and were even to the south of the British right flank. Von Kluck appears to have been imperfectly informed as to the British dispositions. He committed himself to a direct frontal attack before he was in a position to effect envelopment, and allowed the British time to escape from the toils? * Fortune gave him a second chance at Le Cateau, and again he was too slow. Yet he and the German General Staff imagined that the British Army had been as good as put out of action. His general instructions were apparently to march south-west until he overlapped the Allied left, " and so south-westward he went, without regard to the direction of our retreat, " which was latterly due south. General Maurice holds that the enemy's decision to give up the march towards Paris and to move against the flank of the French Fifth Army was reached about the last day of August, and not as has been generally stated, on 4th September. Joffre had intended to take the offensive with Manoury's Sixth Army on the Somme, but the latter had to fall back, and the French Generalissimo ordered the formation of the Ninth Army, under Foch. Meantime, the German plans also underwent change. The enemy was under the delusion that the main French forces were still in French Lorraine before Nancy, whereas the bulk of them had gradually been swung round to the Allied left, and therefore he maintained fruitless attacks before Nancy. When it became clear that von Kluck would not be able to cut off the French Fifth Army on the Marne, the envelopment plan was apparently discarded in favour of a break-through in the French centre, the attack on Nancy being intended to complete the encirclement of the Allied Armies. But von Kluck found himself faced by an increasing menace to his flank and rear, and had to draw assistance from the neighbouring Army of von Bulow on his left. So a gap was left in the centre of this Army betweenLa Fère-Champenoise and the marshes of St Gond where Foch launched his famous counterstroke.

" Much has been written about the miricale of the Marne " General Maurice says " and I yield to no one in my admiration for Foch's Generalship and the cool judgement which after days of almost intolerable strain, he displayed, in seizing at once upon the wek spot of the enemy's line and aiming it, at exactly the right time, a blow which changed what would otherwise have been a limited success into complete victory. Contemporary opinion has already done justice both to Foch's leadership and to the endurance and valour of his troops. Nor has there been any failure to recognise the splendour of Manoury's resistance in face of von Kluck's desperate efforts, or Gallieni's resource, which contributed so much to the final victory. But nowhere yet, so far as I am aware, has justice been done to the part played by the British in this glorious episode... I am convinced that history will decide that it was the crossing of the Marne in the early hours of 9th by the British Army which turned the scale against von Kluck... It is not possible to arrive at any other conclusion than that it was the menace of the British advance to his flank and rear which precipitated von Kluck's decision, caused the Germans to begin their retreat, and saves Manoury at a time when he was in grave danger "

toils? *

Mike

[squirrel]

That's a nice find Mike. I am also enjoying and being educated by this thread. Thanks to all the contributors.

[Guest]

Also from the Scotsman Saturday, 23rd March 1940, page 11

Unfortunately for Germany, the lesser von Moltke so changed and weakened the Schlieffen plan that it was known to members of his staff as " Schlieffen and soda " It does not give the source of this quote. Do you reckon this is fabricated, or did Moltke's staff really believe that?

Mike

[Wuerzburg]

Also from the Scotsman Saturday, 23rd March 1940, page 11

Unfortunately for Germany, the lesser von Moltke so changed and weakened the Schlieffen plan that it was known to members of his staff as " Schlieffen and soda " It does not give the source of this quote. Do you reckon this is fabricated, or did Moltke's staff really believe that?

Mike

Fabrication

Terence Zuber

[Guest]

Fabrication

Terence Zuber

Thanks Terence.

Mike

[Chris Boonzaier]

Fabrication

Terence Zuber

Do you believe... or know? If the latter, how?

Best

Chris

[Wuerzburg]

Do you believe... or know? If the latter, how?

Best

Chris

Schlieffen wrote the Memorandum in January and February 1906, after he had retired (1 January 1906). The first and only record in the German archives or German literature discussing the Memorandum before 1919 was Moltke's typed copy and marginal notes dated 1911. It is clear from the comments that Moltke was not particularly impressed by the maneuver outlined in the Memorandum. In 1919 we have the first reference, in Groener's papers, of the "Schlieffen plan" as we currently understand it, but not before. It is clear from Groener's comments that his principal interest in the "Schlieffen plan" was as an excuse for the General Staff's failure in 1914.

The German army then refused to release the text of the Memorandum, which destroys the argument that before 1914 everyone was aware of it. In the 1920s Hans Delbrueck expressly drew notice to the fact that the Memorandum was being treated as a secret document. In fact, perhaps four or five people knew anything of the text until Ritter published it in the 1950s.

There are several references to Moltke's failute to follow Schlieffen, but if you look at what they're talking about, it's not the great right-wheel swing around Paris, etc, but the war games Schlieffen played in the 14 years from 1891 to 1905 that he actually was chief of staff.

When Wenninger, the Bavarian LNO to OHL discusses a "Schlieffen plan" in September 1914, he describes what he meant: the Germans would swing west of the French fortress line and link up the two halves by a concentric attack on the 'Trouee de Charmes' between Toul and Belfort. The interesting thing about this is that, to my knowledge, Schlieffen never advocated any such thing, and the only evidence I can find of a similar operation was written by Beseler, who was an Oberquartiermeiseter in 1900.

Terence Zuber

[Chris Boonzaier]

None of that means that his staff did not refer to it as Schlieffen with Soda.

Have you read the statement by Reichstagsabgeordnete Joh. Viktor Bredt that the Reichstag had considered the Schlieffen Plan as the only plan that could lead to a victorius peace? I had the article somewhere.

Best

Chris

[Wuerzburg]

None of that means that his staff did not refer to it as Schlieffen with Soda.

Have you read the statement by Reichstagsabgeordnete Joh. Viktor Bredt that the Reichstag had considered the Schlieffen Plan as the only plan that could lead to a victorius peace? I had the article somewhere.

Best

Chris

Chris,

If practically nobody knew of the Memorandum before 1919, then it wasn't common knowledge before 1914.

You're probably referring to Bredt's book: Die belgische Neutralitaet und der Schlieffensche Feldzugsplan (Berlin, 1929). I read it 20 years ago, so the details escape me, but as I recall Bredt's point was that the Schlieffen plan couldn't have been the real German war plan. I don't remember any reference to the point you just made.

In any case, given the structure of Wilhelmine Germany, with military command authority clearly and solely the prerogative of the Kaiser, the Reichstag was completely left in the dark concerning military planning, the more so because one of the strongest parties was the German Socialists (SPD) which hated the army, an emotion that the army heartily returned.

The only thing I can think of is that the Reichstag committee that held hearings after the war on the conduct of the war might have been impressed by the Schlieffen plan, but then again, the Reichsarchiv wouldn't have let them see the original Memorandum, so they were a bunch of politicians with an opinion about something of which they were compeletely ignorant - some things never change.

Terence Zuber

[Terry Duncan]

that the Reichstag had considered the Schlieffen Plan as the only plan that could lead to a victorius peace?

I would be interested in knowing more of this, as Terence has said, the Reichstag didnt discuss such things as they had no control over them. It is certainly something I have never seen anywhere previously.

[Chris Boonzaier]

Chris,

You're probably referring to Bredt's book: Die belgische Neutralitaet und der Schlieffensche Feldzugsplan (Berlin, 1929). I read it 20 years ago, so the details escape me, but as I recall Bredt's point was that the Schlieffen plan couldn't have been the real German war plan. I don't remember any reference to the point you just made.

Terence Zuber

I have to look for the article, its floating around on one of my hard drives.

I seem to remember something about the plan being so large and complex that it defies imagination... and that no other plan could have been that huge and complicated etc. etc.

I cannot remember him coming to the conclusion that the plan was not used...

Will dig it up asap.

[Wuerzburg]

that the Reichstag had considered the Schlieffen Plan as the only plan that could lead to a victorius peace?

I would be interested in knowing more of this, as Terence has said, the Reichstag didnt discuss such things as they had no control over them. It is certainly something I have never seen anywhere previously.

Terry,

The Reichstag commission was held after the war was over, in 1919-20.

Before the war the only say the Reichstag over the military had was the budget

.

Terence Zuber

[Wuerzburg]

I have to look for the article, its floating around on one of my hard drives.

I seem to remember something about the plan being so large and complex that it defies imagination... and that no other plan could have been that huge and complicated etc. etc.

I cannot remember him coming to the conclusion that the plan was not used...

Will dig it up asap.

Chris,

I've seen what is left of the Aufmarschanweisungen (deployment orders) of the German 5th, 6th and 7th Armies in 1914, and they aren't that massive or complex. The operational part is quite short and simple, the largest element being the intelligence estimate. What takes up most of the space is the typical military administrative stuff. The chief of staff of 6th Army wrote his analysis of the situation in August 1914, and its only nine typed pages long.

Terence Zuber

[bob lembke]

Also from the Scotsman Saturday, 23rd March 1940, page 11

Unfortunately for Germany, the lesser von Moltke so changed and weakened the Schlieffen plan that it was known to members of his staff as " Schlieffen and soda " It does not give the source of this quote. Do you reckon this is fabricated, or did Moltke's staff really believe that?

Mike

I have a different take on this. Would Germans drink "whiskey and soda" or "anything and soda"? A cultural take, not based on the documents.

I consider myself somewhat German in culture, but have actually spent little time there, but in almost 72 years I have never heard of a Hun drinking "anything and soda". So I have a cultural basis for calling it an Anglo-Saxon fabrication.

Bob

[Guest]

" I have never heard of a Hun drinking "anything and soda "Radler

It does sound like something a journalist might have dreamt up, but who knows?

I will check the Scotsman for any more references.

Cheers Mike

[Chris Boonzaier]

I have a different take on this. Would Germans drink "whiskey and soda" or "anything and soda"? A cultural take, not based on the documents.

I consider myself somewhat German in culture, but have actually spent little time there, but in almost 72 years I have never heard of a Hun drinking "anything and soda". So I have a cultural basis for calling it an Anglo-Saxon fabrication.

Bob

I dont agree at all, patently 100% wrong. :-)

Further... Obviously, if this was said, it was said in german. and not just "Ve zink it vos schlieffen wiz zoda!"

A sentence implying it was watered down with Soda, Selters or whatever would have been translated to the point where you will have little hope finding the original by googling "Schlieffen und Soda"

Best

Chris

[Chris Boonzaier]

Chris,

I've seen what is left of the Aufmarschanweisungen (deployment orders) of the German 5th, 6th and 7th Armies in 1914, and they aren't that massive or complex. The operational part is quite short and simple, the largest element being the intelligence estimate. What takes up most of the space is the typical military administrative stuff. The chief of staff of 6th Army wrote his analysis of the situation in August 1914, and its only nine typed pages long.

Terence Zuber

I think it obvious that the nuts and bolts Operational part of such a plan is the smallest part. It is the reason that the Greatest combat leaders are often not the Greatest commanders. What seperates a Patton from an Eisenhower.

Its like playing war games and leaving out the Supply part, because it makes the game to complicated and boring.

I found the article, it can be found if you google the following...

karl mayr der deutsche einmarsch in belgien

best

Chris

P.S. there was an intersting point there, I dont know if you covered it in your book... The Germans initially expecting the Austrians to help, which would have made up for some of the troops that you claim would have been needed for the Schlieffen plan.

Best

Chris

[Terry Duncan]

Terry,

The Reichstag commission was held after the war was over, in 1919-20.

Before the war the only say the Reichstag over the military had was the budget

.

Terence Zuber

I agree, but the implication is that they discussed it prior to the war, saying it would lead to a victorious conclusion to the war or a good peace settlement seems very strange as a conclusion after the war, especially from a document nobody seems to have seen at that time. Did they actually discuss anything or is that a myth? If they did discuss it, were any details given?

Terry

[Wuerzburg]

I think it obvious that the nuts and bolts Operational part of such a plan is the smallest part. It is the reason that the Greatest combat leaders are often not the Greatest commanders. What seperates a Patton from an Eisenhower.

Its like playing war games and leaving out the Supply part, because it makes the game to complicated and boring.

I found the article, it can be found if you google the following...

karl mayr der deutsche einmarsch in belgien

best

Chris

P.S. there was an intersting point there, I dont know if you covered it in your book... The Germans initially expecting the Austrians to help, which would have made up for some of the troops that you claim would have been needed for the Schlieffen plan.

Best

Chris

Chris,

If you want to see what the real German deployment orders looked like, see my German War Planning 1891-1914. There are 25 paragraphs under 'General Instructions' (which I don't translate). Contrary to popular opinion, in 1914 the Germans did consider logistics, and the only logistic problem they had was a shortage of artillery ammunition about 7 September or so.

Every time I talk about the German two-front war plan I mention the fact that the situation in the east was catastrophic - for the Austro-Germans, who would be outnumbered 2-1, in addition to which the Austrian Army was by far the worst-equipped of the four great land powers, especially in field artillery

And it was clear that sooner or later the Austrians were going to be fighting the Russians, Serbs and Italians.

Get The Real German War Plan 1904-1914. It's really cheap on Amazon.

I'll see if I can find Meyer's article

Terence Zuber

[Wuerzburg]

I agree, but the implication is that they discussed it prior to the war, saying it would lead to a victorious conclusion to the war or a good peace settlement seems very strange as a conclusion after the war, especially from a document nobody seems to have seen at that time. Did they actually discuss anything or is that a myth? If they did discuss it, were any details given?

Terry

Terry,

Nobody, with the exception of a few highly-trusted officers, saw the 'Schlieffen plan' Memorandum until Ritter found it in 1954 or so.

Before the Great War the Kaiser and General staff did not discuss war planning with the Reichstag. The Chancellor was briefed, but apparently not in detail.

The Socialists tried to raise questions in the Reichstag concerning German intentions of entering Belgium, but they were ignored.

Since 1906 or so the fact that the Germans were going to enter Belgium was an open secret. anyway.

Terence Zuber

[yelob]

This has been a great thread and I'm thankful to all the contributors especially Terence for all his valuable insights.I have read this thread in conjunction with the relevant section in Strachan's To Arms which to my mind offers some clarification of what are very muddy waters.

The pertinent question still remains as to what plan Moltke actually used in August 1914 and it would seem obvious that the answer is the Moltke Plan, there is even a chapter called this in Terence's own book (I have not read it).To my mind therefore

the discussion can only move forward by a clearer and preferably succinct synopsis of what this was and what it was based on.

I'd like to offer the following summary based on Strachan's relevant chapter in an attempt to put some platform in place

that might move this out of the fog.

Schlieffen was CGS from 1891 to 1905 and conducted many war games and staff rides involving many different scenarios but

for reasons that remain to be explored/explained his 1905 memorandum,never tested and needing manpower that didn't exist became somehow his last word and apparent solution to a 2 front war.This memorandum is at variance with all previous staff rides and games conducted by Schlieffen most of which resulted in stalemate or a win for the other side.It was also published unlike his previous war games and staff rides.

Moltke takes over in 1906 conducts his own war games and eventually develops a plan called the Moltke Plan which is based

on his own war games and rides and Schlieffen's war games/rides of 1904 and 1905 (NOT the 1905 memorandum)

Moltke's plan and the previous war games/rides done by Schlieffen are either not published,are unavailable or destroyed by allies in WW2,but fragments and secondary sources exist which can reconstitute some of Moltke's thinking and the Schlieffen war games.

This I hope is an accurate summary of my reading of Strachan and this thread and leads then to 2 seperate questions

-What was Moltke's plan in 1914 and how much of it was based on Schlieffen's concepts extolled in the war games between 1891 and 1905 and was any of it based on the 1905 memorandum?

-Why did Schlieffen publish and promote his 1905 memorandum with such vehemence and not admit that he had no solution

to a 2 front war?How did this memorandum/solution gain currency before 1914 and also after the war?

-What similarities are there between what happened in August 1914 and the 1905 Memorandum? a cross table here might explain how what happened might seem to be Moltke adapting the Schlieffen memorandum of 1905 and likewise how did Moltke actually differ from the memorandum?

As always I am open to enlightenment/correction and have enjoyed this thread immensely but I would like to see the discussion move forward to take in the above questions which seem to me the most relevant.

Best/Liam

[Wuerzburg]

I think it obvious that the nuts and bolts Operational part of such a plan is the smallest part. It is the reason that the Greatest combat leaders are often not the Greatest commanders. What seperates a Patton from an Eisenhower.

Its like playing war games and leaving out the Supply part, because it makes the game to complicated and boring.

I found the article, it can be found if you google the following...

karl mayr der deutsche einmarsch in belgien

best

Chris

P.S. there was an intersting point there, I dont know if you covered it in your book... The Germans initially expecting the Austrians to help, which would have made up for some of the troops that you claim would have been needed for the Schlieffen plan.

Best

Chris

Chris,

OK, I found Meyr, 'Der deuteche Einmarsch in Belgien'.

Did you read it?

For the benefit of the group, it appeared in Sozialistische Monatshefte (Socialist Monthly) Nr. 34, Issue 3, 19 March 1928. It's four and a half pages long and does two things:

Summarize the literature on German war planning to get good Socialists up to speed.

Criticize the German General Staff for violating Belgian neutrality: the Germans and Austrians should have attacked Russia (Hans Delbrueck made this argument in 1921.)

No great revelations.

Terence Zuber

[Wuerzburg]

This has been a great thread and I'm thankful to all the contributors especially Terence for all his valuable insights.I have read this thread in conjunction with the relevant section in Strachan's To Arms which to my mind offers some clarification of what are very muddy waters.

The pertinent question still remains as to what plan Moltke actually used in August 1914 and it would seem obvious that the answer is the Moltke Plan, there is even a chapter called this in Terence's own book (I have not read it).To my mind therefore

the discussion can only move forward by a clearer and preferably succinct synopsis of what this was and what it was based on.

I'd like to offer the following summary based on Strachan's relevant chapter in an attempt to put some platform in place

that might move this out of the fog.

Schlieffen was CGS from 1891 to 1905 and conducted many war games and staff rides involving many different scenarios but

for reasons that remain to be explored/explained his 1905 memorandum,never tested and needing manpower that didn't exist became somehow his last word and apparent solution to a 2 front war.This memorandum is at variance with all previous staff rides and games conducted by Schlieffen most of which resulted in stalemate or a win for the other side.It was also published unlike his previous war games and staff rides.

Moltke takes over in 1906 conducts his own war games and eventually develops a plan called the Moltke Plan which is based

on his own war games and rides and Schlieffen's war games/rides of 1904 and 1905 (NOT the 1905 memorandum)

Moltke's plan and the previous war games/rides done by Schlieffen are either not published,are unavailable or destroyed by allies in WW2,but fragments and secondary sources exist which can reconstitute some of Moltke's thinking and the Schlieffen war games.

This I hope is an accurate summary of my reading of Strachan and this thread and leads then to 2 seperate questions

-What was Moltke's plan in 1914 and how much of it was based on Schlieffen's concepts extolled in the war games between 1891 and 1905 and was any of it based on the 1905 memorandum?

-Why did Schlieffen publish and promote his 1905 memorandum with such vehemence and not admit that he had no solution

to a 2 front war?How did this memorandum/solution gain currency before 1914 and also after the war?

-What similarities are there between what happened in August 1914 and the 1905 Memorandum? a cross table here might explain how what happened might seem to be Moltke adapting the Schlieffen memorandum of 1905 and likewise how did Moltke actually differ from the memorandum?

As always I am open to enlightenment/correction and have enjoyed this thread immensely but I would like to see the discussion move forward to take in the above questions which seem to me the most relevant.

Best/Liam

Liam,

I address all these points in The Real German War Plan 1904-1914. The damn thing is really cheap and only 187 pages long and has so many maps it is practically a graphic novel. There is no risk that the 5% of the purchase price that I get in royalties is going to make me rich.

The really short answers are:

The German 1914 plan was based on the concept of utilizing interior lines in a two-front war. This was the concept of most of Schlieffen's east front war games as well as his last war game in November-December 1905.

The 1914 war plan could not be based on the 1906 Memorandum because the Memorandum posited an army of 96 divisions and the Germans in 1914 had 68 in the west.

In the 1906 Memorandum Schlieffen said that an attack bertween Paris and the Verdun-Toul-Epinal-Belfort fortress line with less than 96 divisions was not going to work. Moltke tried it anyway. It didn't work.

Schlieffen did not 'publish and promote' the 1906 Memorandum.

Schlieffen had a solution to the two-front war problem - operations on interior lines.

The Schlieffen plan gained prominence because in 1919 the 'Schlieffen School' (Groener, the last chief of the general staff, Kuhl, chief of staff of the right-wing 1st Army, Foerster, Reichsarchiv historian, Cochenhausen, etc.) needed to explain why the Germans lost the Marne campaign. Their answer was to blame Moltke (who was dead) who had allegedly failed to follow the brilliant 'Schlieffen plan'. (See Inventing the Schlieffen Plan, chapter 1)

Terence Zuber

[yelob]

Thanks Terence I will of course be buying that book and also the one on the Ardennes as I'm really interested in the early phases of the war.

As regards Schlieffen promoting/publishing his 1906 memorandum Hew Strachan says the following p170 'To Arms'

His (Schlieffen) more excessive statements about the decisive nature of envelopment and the strength of the right wing date from this period.And unlike his war plans they were published.

Strachan also goes on to say that Schlieffen devoted much of his energy leading up to and just after his retirement acquiring evidence to support these assumptions.

So it does seem that the central aspects of the 1906 memorandum were published at some point (I assume before 1914 unless I am badly misunderstanding the quote above) and Schlieffen was active in acquiring evidence to support them.

As always open to correction and enlightenment and thanks again for informing this thread with your great knowledge of the subject.

Best/Liam

[Chris Boonzaier]

Chris,

OK, I found Meyr, 'Der deuteche Einmarsch in Belgien'.

Did you read it?

For the benefit of the group, it appeared in Sozialistische Monatshefte (Socialist Monthly) Nr. 34, Issue 3, 19 March 1928. It's four and a half pages long and does two things:

Summarize the literature on German war planning to get good Socialists up to speed.

Criticize the German General Staff for violating Belgian neutrality: the Germans and Austrians should have attacked Russia (Hans Delbrueck made this argument in 1921.)

No great revelations.

Terence Zuber

There is a terrible habit of dismissing anything written by a socialist offhand... about the same as OJ Simpson getting off because the testimony of one of the wirnesses was discounted because he was considered a racist.

You dont tackle the issue of the reischstag agreeing that it was the bees knens plan. If that was so, then it is true whether this appeared in a socialist publication or not.

Best

Chris