Inventing the Schlieffen Plan

[salesie]

Belgium had a longstanding tradition of neutrality, so to break with that doctrine and join one alliance (read, France) would require both a consensus in the government that did not exist and a vested interest that did not exist. In 1870 London had broken with its own international doctrine on foreign policy and committed to specific actions based on future contingencies; in 1914 Belgium will have hoped for another 1870.

In terms of international precedent as of 1919 it certainly was not acceptable. What I think a little fuzzier is what international precedent thought of the question prior to 1914. In 1805 Austria and France had torn into one another, each violating the neutrality of a duchy or two along the way with scarcely a whimper. In the 1860's Prussia and Austria had fought a war against small Denmark, to international yawns. The United States routinely violated the neutrality of countries in Central and South America. The Entente violated the neutrality of China in August 1914. Russia marched across neutral Romania in the 1870's. Iran...is still bitter to this day about how its sovereignty was treated then.

Forget about comparisons, the bottom line is that Belgian neutrality was of vital strategic importance to Great Britain, and Germany's violation of that neutrality ultimately proved to be its nemesis.

Cheers-salesie.

[Terry Duncan]

In terms of international precedent as of 1919 it certainly was not acceptable.

It wasnt acceptable in 1914 either. The political damage was imense, even if the military thought the move vital. And of course, when it fails to deliver a vicotry it becomes even more unacceptable.

What I think a little fuzzier is what international precedent thought of the question prior to 1914.

Prussia/Germany had a treaty in force whereby she undertook not to violate Belgian neutrality, not to plan to violate Belgian neutrality, and not to aid another state planning to do likewise. This condition did not exist in any of the 'precedents' you cite. Germany could have withdrawn from the treaty prior to the war but did not do so, and in 1914 all she offered Belgium was the opportunity to violate Belgium in Germany's favour! For a precedent to exist you must find a state where an invader had promised to respect their neutrality, not just find a neutral state caught up in a larger war, or a minor transgression that met with no complaint.

In short Germany was wrong in her acts towards Beglium in 1914, and Bethmann openly admitted this fact. Maybe if they had won they could have spun if differently, but as they did not they must accept that their action was wrong.

[SteveMarsdin]

Because the space and the terrain on the Franco-German border are not adequate for the size of the force involved, some 60-70 divisions in each army.

Terence Zuber

So "our pitch isn't big enough, so we'll just use somebody else's"; why not change the game-plan ? Please don't take this as a flippant response, it's just I can't see why the option of not using Belgium wasn't considered more fully:

- Since 1911 Joffre had been left in no doubt that the French must not be the first into Belgium; the Plan XVII instructions issued to the army commanders in early 1914, expressly forbade it

- If Moltke had called his bluff the smaller size of the common border, as you rightly state, wouldn't have required all those divisions to defend it, allowing greater forces to be switched to the east from day one

- It may have restricted the British involvement

- It would have been easier to use German interior lines rather than relying on parts of the Belgian rail network

[Terry Duncan]

So "our pitch isn't big enough, so we'll just use somebody else's"; why not change the game-plan ? Please don't take this as a flippant response, it's just I can't see why the option of not using Belgium wasn't considered more fully:

All I can suggest is to look at the common frontier and the French fortress system along it. There is one 'weak spot' at Trouee des Charmes, but this seems to be perfectly deliberate and an attempt to funnel attacking forces into a killing ground. Certainly attacks can be made across the common border, but they are likely to be horrendously costly. I agree your question isnt really flippant, but the size of the armies in 1914 had outgrown the ability to deploy them on the common border, and unless stacking armies one behind the other they will have to seek a flank to achieve something.

You could say the German generals were determined not to throw away their men in futile or very costly attacks.

Terry

[SteveMarsdin]

Good morning,

I agree Terry, if the Germans go on the offensive.....but if the intention wasn't to fully defeat the French (as per the Schlieffen plan), just to stun them, then defeat the Russians; wouldn't the same end have been achieved if they'd adopted a shorter-front defensive position based around the Metz-Diedenhofen fortress complex. Letting the French attack them there or further south in Alsace. Surely on the defensive it would take less divisions to tie up the French ?

1.57pm Edited to add: In "The Real German War Plan" , the only plan I can see that came close was Aufmarsch 1912/13, which initially assumed French neutrality

[Glenn239]

Good morning,

I agree Terry, if the Germans go on the offensive.....but if the intention wasn't to fully defeat the French (as per the Schlieffen plan), just to stun them, then defeat the Russians; wouldn't the same end have been achieved if they'd adopted a shorter-front defensive position based around the Metz-Diedenhofen fortress complex. Letting the French attack them there or further south in Alsace. Surely on the defensive it would take less divisions to tie up the French ?

1.57pm Edited to add: In "The Real German War Plan" , the only plan I can see that came close was Aufmarsch 1912/13, which initially assumed French neutrality

Moltke might ask, but what if the French do come through the Ardennes? Given the nature of the terrain, Joffre’s armies might actually reach the German border before being detected. What is Moltke’s planning for that possibility?

Assuming British neutrality is guaranteed, then Germany by sea supply can make up for the loss of the Briey iron ore deposits and the course of action you outline could be made to work – say, 2 armies along the French frontier, 2 more guarding the Belgian border, 4 in the east.

[Glenn239]

It wasnt acceptable in 1914 either. The political damage was imense, even if the military thought the move vital. And of course, when it fails to deliver a vicotry it becomes even more unacceptable.

The point I was driving at is that Moltke might not have anticipated these future events – he might have judged the potential consequences from past examples, where the trampling of the neutrality of minors really hadn’t been such a fuss as would be over Belgium. One of the legacies of the Great War was how the invasion of Belgium altered how Great Powers looked at the neutrality issue.

[Glenn239]

Forget about comparisons, the bottom line is that Belgian neutrality was of vital strategic importance to Great Britain, and Germany's violation of that neutrality ultimately proved to be its nemesis.

British policy in 1870 was about Belgium exclusively, but in 1914 it also about friendship with France and Russia. In all fairness to Moltke, the German army had to decide for itself; which of those two mutually exclusive policies was more important to Britain? The friendship of her Entente partners or the neutrality of Belgium?

Joffre may have had a plan, amongst many, for a pre-emptive incursion into Belgium, but any such move was strictly forbidden by Joffre's political masters...

Joffre’s instructions were that he could plan to invade Belgium first only in reaction to something called a ‘positive menace’. What that was - Joffre indicates in memoires that he was never informed. This is a little hard to believe because buried deep in the British archives is a letter from Poincare to Grey in 1912 where Poincare makes a statement on the matter –significant German forces concentrating at Aachen could provoke a French invasion of Belgium in self-defense. AFAIK, Grey never replied to Poincare, but admitted the validity of Poincare’s definition independently by citing nearly verbatim this example as a reason for rejecting the German neutrality formula of March 1912.

Joffre proceeded with a plan that allowed him flexibility during mobilization. After a certain day, he was stuck with whatever plan he had picked. If this were for three armies to go to the Belgian border, and then the French government refused permission to move forward from there, Joffre’s army was basically sidelined save whatever forces Joffre chose to sacrifice along the common border; Russia would essentially fight the war on her own; as it became clear Belgium’s neutrality was sacrosanct, the Germans would send more and more forces east until Russia was crushed. Russian anger at the betrayal might actually have been so intense as to have seen her denounce the alliance with France. After Russia was dealt with one way or the other, Germany could thank France for her respect of Belgium in proper fashion; by coming around on her with the entire German (and a good chunk of the Austrian) army straight through Belgium.

[Wuerzburg]

British policy in 1870 was about Belgium exclusively, but in 1914 it also about friendship with France and Russia. In all fairness to Moltke, the German army had to decide for itself; which of those two mutually exclusive policies was more important to Britain? The friendship of her Entente partners or the neutrality of Belgium?

Joffre's instructions were that he could plan to invade Belgium first only in reaction to something called a 'positive menace'. What that was - Joffre indicates in memoires that he was never informed. This is a little hard to believe because buried deep in the British archives is a letter from Poincare to Grey in 1912 where Poincare makes a statement on the matter –significant German forces concentrating at Aachen could provoke a French invasion of Belgium in self-defense. AFAIK, Grey never replied to Poincare, but admitted the validity of Poincare's definition independently by citing nearly verbatim this example as a reason for rejecting the German neutrality formula of March 1912.

Joffre proceeded with a plan that allowed him flexibility during mobilization. After a certain day, he was stuck with whatever plan he had picked. If this were for three armies to go to the Belgian border, and then the French government refused permission to move forward from there, Joffre's army was basically sidelined save whatever forces Joffre chose to sacrifice along the common border; Russia would essentially fight the war on her own; as it became clear Belgium's neutrality was sacrosanct, the Germans would send more and more forces east until Russia was crushed. Russian anger at the betrayal might actually have been so intense as to have seen her denounce the alliance with France. After Russia was dealt with one way or the other, Germany could thank France for her respect of Belgium in proper fashion; by coming around on her with the entire German (and a good chunk of the Austrian) army straight through Belgium.

Joffre implemented the 'variant' of Plan XVII which put three of his five armies on the Franco-German border on 2 August 1914, the 1st day of mobilization, before either Germany or France had declared war

Terence Zuber

[Wuerzburg]

I find the question curious. German generals were (1) fascinated by Cannae and (2) made every plan on the assumption France would advance to the attack through Belgium. Hannibal's victory at Cannae also required the Romans to advance – it would have never worked if the Romans had stayed on the defensive. A true Cannae in 1914 is the envelopment of the French left as it advances north of Metz into Germany. The outline to the German plan I have in my head is; mobilize in a fashion that 'spooks' Russia into its defensive deployment, (note that a German commitment to Britain not violate Belgium in and of itself might have caused the Russian army to conclude the main blow was coming east) then concentrate the historical 7 armies in the west by about the 3rd week of the campaign. The French left, advancing through the Ardennes against the resistance of two armies, reaches the German border from a line north of Metz (3rd Army) to around Aachen (BEF). The German right then moves through Holland northwest of Liege while the second pincer emerges from the direction of Metz-Thionville. The French left is fixed east of the Belgian Ardennes by the two German armies already in contact, then surrounded from two directions.

Could that have worked?

Glenn,

Schlieffen thought so. What you have described, with some variation (the northern counterattack came from Antwerp) is Schlieffen's November-December 1905 wargame.

See The Real German War Plan p. 44.

Terence Zuber

[Wuerzburg]

In light of the "Schlieffen plan" discussion, I need to point out that the decision to attack Belgium early-on was Moltke's, not Schlieffen's.

There is plenty of evidence from Schlieffen's war games, especially his last, huge, two-front November-December 1905 war game, that Schlieffen was in no hurry to rush into Belgium or France. He much preferred to allow the French to approach the German border, something he was certain they would do. This would put them closer to his railheads, which would add speed and surprise to his counterattack and facilitate subsequent transfer of forces east.

The monomaniacal emphasis on the 1906 Memorandum distorts a clear appreciation of the history of German war planning.

It is important to determine what Moltke was trying to do, and why, and the 1906 Memorandum adds nothing to this understanding.

Terence Zuber

[Terry Duncan]

There is plenty of evidence from Schlieffen's war games, especially his last, huge, two-front November-December 1905 war game, that Schlieffen was in no hurry to rush into Belgium or France. He much preferred to allow the French to approach the German border, something he was certain they would do. This would put them closer to his railheads, which would add speed and surprise to his counterattack and facilitate subsequent transfer of forces east.

This would make a great deal of sense to me, and possibly others, as many campaings have since shown the benefits of being close to supplies and railheads. The question her becomes when did planning shift to an all out move through Belgium from the outset? Does this date from the same time as the Liege coup, which is after Moltke conducted his review of Schlieffen's planning. Did Moltke find something in Schlieffen's planning that led to this shift?

Terry

[salesie]

British policy in 1870 was about Belgium exclusively, but in 1914 it also about friendship with France and Russia. In all fairness to Moltke, the German army had to decide for itself; which of those two mutually exclusive policies was more important to Britain? The friendship of her Entente partners or the neutrality of Belgium?

Joffre’s instructions were that he could plan to invade Belgium first only in reaction to something called a ‘positive menace’. What that was - Joffre indicates in memoires that he was never informed. This is a little hard to believe because buried deep in the British archives is a letter from Poincare to Grey in 1912 where Poincare makes a statement on the matter –significant German forces concentrating at Aachen could provoke a French invasion of Belgium in self-defense. AFAIK, Grey never replied to Poincare, but admitted the validity of Poincare’s definition independently by citing nearly verbatim this example as a reason for rejecting the German neutrality formula of March 1912.

Joffre proceeded with a plan that allowed him flexibility during mobilization. After a certain day, he was stuck with whatever plan he had picked. If this were for three armies to go to the Belgian border, and then the French government refused permission to move forward from there, Joffre’s army was basically sidelined save whatever forces Joffre chose to sacrifice along the common border; Russia would essentially fight the war on her own; as it became clear Belgium’s neutrality was sacrosanct, the Germans would send more and more forces east until Russia was crushed. Russian anger at the betrayal might actually have been so intense as to have seen her denounce the alliance with France. After Russia was dealt with one way or the other, Germany could thank France for her respect of Belgium in proper fashion; by coming around on her with the entire German (and a good chunk of the Austrian) army straight through Belgium.

Why would Britain's friendship with its Entente partners and its guarantee of Belgium neutrality be mutually exclusive interests? They could only be so if one takes the view that Britain would not have objected if France had violated said neutrality as an act of self-defence (instead of Germany). This view would have some validity if accepting at face value the "Poincare letter" you mention - I don't.

I have no knowledge of such a letter being sent, but even if it had been sent how can it be viewed as anything but a specious point on your part i.e.

1) You say that Grey never replied to this letter - really? Would you not say that the diplomatic telegram sent to both France and Germany in early August 1914, asking for clarification of their intentions towards Belgian neutrality, was a clear and concise reply? If Grey, and I emphasise the if, had received such a letter in 1912, why ask such a question in 1914 if France's position as outlined, you say, in Poincare's letter was already known to Grey? It seems to me that Britain's position on Belgian neutrality couldn't have been any clearer, otherwise why ask both France and Germany the same question - if willing to turn a blind-eye to any "friendly" violation why ask for clarification of said "friend's" intentions? It also seems pretty clear from France's immediate reply what its intentions actually were (just as clear as Germany's were when it eventually replied)

It seems to me that a letter of such magnitude would have a profound effect on Britain's stance i.e. The Liberal cabinet of Campbell-Bannerman inherited in December 1905, from its Conservative predecessor, a commitment to France. This commitment was embodied in Article IX of the Anglo-French Agreement of April 1904. The text of Article IX was, "The two Governments agree to afford to one another their diplomatic support, in order to obtain the execution of the clauses of the present declaration regarding Egypt and Morocco." And until November 1912 this was the only British obligation towards France. In November 1912 the Asquith cabinet authorised the foreign secretary (Grey) to write to the French ambassador that "if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatens the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common." This was the only additional commitment made until 2 August 1914, when the cabinet authorised the foreign secretary "to give an assurance that if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against the French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power."

Not an inviolate pact as such, more a loose understanding (until 2nd August 1914, that is, when naval backing was promised by Britain but only in the event of a certain scenario developing). However, as early as November 1908 the question of Belgian neutrality became an issue within the Liberal Government (during the second war-in-sight crisis). In November 1908, Grey was faced with two questions, namely "How far would England's liability under the Treaty guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium be affected if (1) Belgium acquiesced in a violation of her neutrality; (2) if the other guaranteeing Powers or some of them acquiesced?". Thus, a memorandum produced by Sir E.A.Crowe, one of Greys officials, provided the answers saying there was no escaping intervention: "Great Britain is liable for the maintenance of Belgian neutrality whenever either Belgium or any of the guaranteeing Powers are in need of, and demand, assistance in opposing its violation." This memorandum in its turn was reprinted by the Foreign Office in September 1911, during the Agadir crisis, it was also amongst the material placed before the Cabinet in July 1914.

Now, it is clear that Crowe's memorandum makes no distinction between any power i.e. Belgium and/or any of the guaranteeing powers can demand intervention and Britain has a liability to respond. So Grey was well-aware of Britain's liabilities well before any supposed letter from Poincare, and no reply to such a letter would seem to be a gross dereliction of duty on Grey's part, and as far as I'm aware no one has ever accused Sir Edward Grey of that.

You also say that Grey used the scenario of a french pre-emptive strike through Belgium, as outlined you say by Poincare, as a reason for his refusal to accept the proposed German neutrality formula of 1912. Again, I have no knowledge of this - but I do know that before refusing to accept the wording of Germany's proposed neutrality pact Grey made the following draft counter proposals, approved by the cabinet, as the basis for an Anglo-German agreement:

“England will make no unprovoked attack upon Germany, and pursue no aggressive policy towards her. Aggression upon Germany is not the subject, and forms no part of any treaty, understanding or combination to which England is now a party, nor will she become a party to anything that has such an object.”

Then, when Germany refused to accept this wording, the talks broke down and Grey gave his reasons for refusing to accept the original German wording i.e. “It is obvious that the real object of the German proposal is to obtain the neutrality of England in all eventualities. Our proposals are sufficient. If Germany desired to crush France, England might not be able to sit still. Though if France were aggressive or attacked Germany, no support would be given by His Majesty’s Government or approved by England.”

I can see no evidence at all that would lead anyone to believe that Britain's friendship with its Entente partners and its guarantee of Belgium neutrality were mutually exclusive interests? It seems to me that if Moltke was faced with such a dilemma then that dilemma was one of his own making.

As for your “armchair generalship” vis-à-vis the way for Germany to win a two-front war in 1914, all I can say is what I said earlier in the thread - I don’t deal in Whatifs. Especially ones as fanciful as you seem to enjoy invoking.

Cheers-salesie.

[Paul Hederer]

The point I was driving at is that Moltke might not have anticipated these future events – he might have judged the potential consequences from past examples, where the trampling of the neutrality of minors really hadn’t been such a fuss as would be over Belgium. One of the legacies of the Great War was how the invasion of Belgium altered how Great Powers looked at the neutrality issue.

Glenn,

How do you mean? The race to invade Norway in 1940 is in my mind.

Paul

[Terry Duncan]

Moltke might ask, but what if the French do come through the Ardennes? Given the nature of the terrain, Joffre’s armies might actually reach the German border before being detected. What is Moltke’s planning for that possibility?

We could ask what was Moltke's planning should the French come through Switzerland too maybe? Seriously though, this has been discussed at length on many sites, and as you know it is somewhat hard to answer. The military 'fashion' of the time was for the offensive, rightly or wrongly. Maybe Terence can shed some light onto later plans for a German defensive in the west?

[Glenn239]

Glenn,

How do you mean? The race to invade Norway in 1940 is in my mind.

Paul

I mean that when I look at history before 1914 I don't see any 'Belgium's' jumping out; i.e., in terms of Great Powers being held accountable after a war for their aggressive behavior towards the neutrality of minor nations. How can Moltke in 1912 accurately predict the consequences to Germany's aggression towards Belgium when he has no precedent in the previous 100 years showing that Germany could be held severely accountable? I think he made a huge mistake, but I can also see how he underestimated the situation.

[Glenn239]

Why would Britain's friendship with its Entente partners and its guarantee of Belgium neutrality be mutually exclusive interests?

Because Germany can and will use the neutrality of Belgium as a shield against France, to finish off Russia with France more or less helpless to intervene on account of the impossibility of an offensive across the common border. With Russia eliminated (or having switched sides to Germany out of disgust), Germany is free to come through Belgium at France, and if Great Britain then wishes to send its 6 division BEF to the continent to stop 150 German and 30 Austrian divisions coming on like a tidal wave, then so be it.

Note this scenario occurred 1939/1940, where Poland was dismembered by Germany with Belgian neutrality shielding the Ruhr, then Germany 'thanked' France for her restraint in May 1940 with an all-out attack through Belgium.

[Glenn239]

There is plenty of evidence from Schlieffen's war games, especially his last, huge, two-front November-December 1905 war game, that Schlieffen was in no hurry to rush into Belgium or France. He much preferred to allow the French to approach the German border, something he was certain they would do. This would put them closer to his railheads, which would add speed and surprise to his counterattack and facilitate subsequent transfer of forces east.

That makes a great deal of sense, especially as it pertains to Schlieffen's extension of the German right beyond Liege to the north. My hunch is that if France violated Belgium, Germany could get away with a ‘cut’ across the Maastricht appendix without war with the Netherlands; The Hague could declare the German move was as a guarantor of Belgium and therefore not an infringement upon her neutrality. So my question is; if not for Schlieffen’s design, what accounts for Moltke’s moving away from Germany’s logical plan (counterattack after a French rupture of Belgium) to something that looks more like the 1906 memo you say had no influence?

Also, there is another matter that I find incongruent. The German army concluded an eastern offensive was undesirable because the Russian army would mobilize deep in its interior. The German army also concluded that if it attacked France, the Russian army would mobilize on the German frontier to attack. My question is; why did the Germans never consider forcing the Russians to mobilize deep in their interior with more units going east in the first week, and then use their superior rails to concentrate these back on France? This would leave the Germans well set to hit a French attack coming through the Ardennes, while leaving the Russians far from the border.

[salesie]

Because Germany can and will use the neutrality of Belgium as a shield against France, to finish off Russia with France more or less helpless to intervene on account of the impossibility of an offensive across the common border. With Russia eliminated (or having switched sides to Germany out of disgust), Germany is free to come through Belgium at France, and if Great Britain then wishes to send its 6 division BEF to the continent to stop 150 German and 30 Austrian divisions coming on like a tidal wave, then so be it.

Note this scenario occurred 1939/1940, where Poland was dismembered by Germany with Belgian neutrality shielding the Ruhr, then Germany 'thanked' France for her restraint in May 1940 with an all-out attack through Belgium.

This doesn't "prove" your point about mutual exclusivity - it simply proves that you are prone to increasingly desperate flights of fantasy. Not only is your analogy with 1939/40 factually incorrect (the main German attack in 1940 came across the common Franco/German border, with a feint through Belgium), but it also puts the supposed defeat of Russia in 1914 on a par with the defeat of Poland in 1939, which is so ludicrous a comparison it defies any sort of reasoned response in a serious debate.

What next, if Sauron hadn't sent the Ringwraiths across the border into the Shire, he could have had an easy victory in Mordor before sending his massed Orks sweeping like a tidal-wave through the Shire to capture the whole of Middle-Earth?

Cheers-salesie.

[Glenn239]

This view would have some validity if accepting at face value the "Poincare letter" you mention - I don't.

Found Albertini, The Origins of the War, Vol 1, pp 338. Poincare's telegram runs,

"The essential thing is that England shall not undertake to remain neutral between France and Germany even in the hypothesis of the attack seeming to come from our act. To take but one example, could the responsibility for aggression be legitimately imputed to us if a concentration of German forces in the Aix-la-Chapelle region compelled us to cover our northern frontier by penetrating into Belgian territory."

Here now in March 1912 is the tangible definition to positive menace that Joffre claims he never received, sent instead to London for casual discussions. This would require that Poincare would share military planning definitions with his ambassadors and the British, but not with his own general staff. Albertini drops the narrative there. But you can pick up the thread of it in British Documents, Vol VI, no. 559, page 731. Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie of the next day,

...If we were to promise Germany that we would remain neutral in the event of aggression against her, our hands might be tied when Germany was not really the victim of aggression. If, for instance, at a time when there was diplomatic tension between Germany and France, Germany concentrated troops upon Aix-la-Chapelle with the obvious intention of entering Belgium, France might be compelled to take the initiative. Germany was quite clever enough to make it appear that she was the victim, just as she was now making it appear that it was England who was intending to attack her, though it was absolutely true that neither England nor France was aggressive towards Germany... <BR style="mso-special-character: line-break"><BR style="mso-special-character: line-break">

Given that Grey admits the force to Poincare's argument, then naturally Germany was wise to concentrate strong forces upon Aachen even as a precautionary measure. But the act of doing that could trigger Poincare's doctrine of 'positive menace', and so reduces to naught the prospects of Belgian neutrality. What would a German general make of these things, save to conclude the neutrality of Belgium was impossible and diplomats were prone to self-assuaging gibber-jabber?

It seems to me that a letter of such magnitude would have a profound effect on Britain's stance i.e. The Liberal cabinet of Campbell-Bannerman inherited in December 1905, from its Conservative predecessor, a commitment to France. This commitment was embodied in Article IX of the Anglo-French Agreement of April 1904. The text of Article IX was, "The two Governments agree to afford to one another their diplomatic support, in order to obtain the execution of the clauses of the present declaration regarding Egypt and Morocco." And until November 1912 this was the only British obligation towards France. In November 1912 the Asquith cabinet authorised the foreign secretary (Grey) to write to the French ambassador that "if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatens the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common." This was the only additional commitment made until 2 August 1914, when the cabinet authorised the foreign secretary "to give an assurance that if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against the French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power."

Not an inviolate pact as such, more a loose understanding (until 2nd August 1914, that is, when naval backing was promised by Britain but only in the event of a certain scenario developing).

The Grey Cambon note includes another sentence,

"If these measures involved action, the plans of the General Staffs would at once be taken into consideration, and the Governments would decide what effect should be given to them."

The British government agrees in advance to examine the plans of the General "Staffs" plural and implement a commonly agreed policy. That means the British are committing themselves in 1912, in the first days of a war crisis in 1914, to receive into cabinet for discussion the French Army's war plan.

Question - where in the Grey-Cambon letter, (as you say, the only binding document) is it specifically detailed that any such French staff plan calling for the violation of Belgian would be inadmissible?

[Glenn239]

This doesn't "prove" your point about mutual exclusivity - it simply proves that you are prone to increasingly desperate flights of fantasy. Not only is your analogy with 1939/40 factually incorrect (the main German attack in 1940 came across the common Franco/German border, with a feint through Belgium), but it also puts the supposed defeat of Russia in 1914 on a par with the defeat of Poland in 1939, which is so ludicrous a comparison it defies any sort of reasoned response in a serious debate.

What next, if Sauron hadn't sent the Ringwraiths across the border into the Shire, he could have had an easy victory in Mordor before sending his massed Orks sweeping like a tidal-wave through the Shire to capture the whole of Middle-Earth?

Cheers-salesie.

Mr Zuber - in your opinion, if Belgium had remained neutral, guaranteed by Great Britain such that the French army dared not move into the Ardennes, and the Germans were then able to concentrate their main strength upon Russia. Was the scenario I outline - of finishing first with Russia then coming around on France with the whole strength of the Central Powers' armies - is that a possibility that France would have to reckon with?

[Wuerzburg]

Moltke might ask, but what if the French do come through the Ardennes? Given the nature of the terrain, Joffre's armies might actually reach the German border before being detected. What is Moltke's planning for that possibility?

We could ask what was Moltke's planning should the French come through Switzerland too maybe? Seriously though, this has been discussed at length on many sites, and as you know it is somewhat hard to answer. The military 'fashion' of the time was for the offensive, rightly or wrongly. Maybe Terence can shed some light onto later plans for a German defensive in the west?

The pure defense was considered not appropriate in the German army, which relied on its superior maneuverability and offensive combat power.

In both Schlieffen's and Moltkes wargames the French always attacked first. The Germans then maneuvered to counterattack against the flanks of the French penetration, using the maximum degree of rail mobility, particularly to send forces from the right wing to the left. Fortresses Metz-Diedenhofen and Strasbourg served as protected areas which concealed German concentrations, and as lines of departure for the attack.

Even in the plans for an Ostaufmarsch, a concentration against Russia, in which the Germans in the west were to be seriously outnumbered, the concept was for the Germans to use rail mobility to attain local superiority, preferably against a French flank, and counterattack.

I'd be very interested in the financial statistics you wrote me about.

Terence Zuber

[salesie]

Found Albertini, The Origins of the War, Vol 1, pp 338. Poincare's telegram runs,

"The essential thing is that England shall not undertake to remain neutral between France and Germany even in the hypothesis of the attack seeming to come from our act. To take but one example, could the responsibility for aggression be legitimately imputed to us if a concentration of German forces in the Aix-la-Chapelle region compelled us to cover our northern frontier by penetrating into Belgian territory."

Here now in March 1912 is the tangible definition to positive menace that Joffre claims he never received, sent instead to London for casual discussions. This would require that Poincare would share military planning definitions with his ambassadors and the British, but not with his own general staff. Albertini drops the narrative there. But you can pick up the thread of it in British Documents, Vol VI, no. 559, page 731. Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie of the next day,

...If we were to promise Germany that we would remain neutral in the event of aggression against her, our hands might be tied when Germany was not really the victim of aggression. If, for instance, at a time when there was diplomatic tension between Germany and France, Germany concentrated troops upon Aix-la-Chapelle with the obvious intention of entering Belgium, France might be compelled to take the initiative. Germany was quite clever enough to make it appear that she was the victim, just as she was now making it appear that it was England who was intending to attack her, though it was absolutely true that neither England nor France was aggressive towards Germany... <BR style="mso-special-character: line-break"><BR style="mso-special-character: line-break">

Given that Grey admits the force to Poincare's argument, then naturally Germany was wise to concentrate strong forces upon Aachen even as a precautionary measure. But the act of doing that could trigger Poincare's doctrine of 'positive menace', and so reduces to naught the prospects of Belgian neutrality. What would a German general make of these things, save to conclude the neutrality of Belgium was impossible and diplomats were prone to self-assuaging gibber-jabber?

The Grey Cambon note includes another sentence,

"If these measures involved action, the plans of the General Staffs would at once be taken into consideration, and the Governments would decide what effect should be given to them."

The British government agrees in advance to examine the plans of the General "Staffs" – plural – and implement a commonly agreed policy. That means the British are committing themselves in 1912, in the first days of a war crisis in 1914, to receive into cabinet for discussion the French Army's war plan.

Question - where in the Grey-Cambon letter, (as you say, the only binding document) is it specifically detailed that any such French staff plan calling for the violation of Belgian would be inadmissible?

That's better, Glen239, the fantasies are left where they belong - in the mind of those who allot a greater importance to them than historical reality.

It seems pretty clear that the "casual discussions" you highlight did not lead to the "understanding" between Britain and France vis-a-vis Belgian neutrality that you strongly imply stemmed from said discussions i.e. you say that in 1912 Britain agreed not object if a scenario such as that highlighted in Poincare's letter came to fruition.

If such an "understanding" had been reached then there would have been no need for Britain to send diplomatic telegrams to both France and Germany in very early August 1914; Britain actually asked France its intentions towards Belgian neutrality, and France responded immediately by saying it would respect it unconditionally. Consequently, although Poincare may have asked for British acquiescence towards French pre-emptive violation in 1912 and Grey may have acknowledged such a request, the later telegram from Britain, and France's rapid reply to it ,clearly shows that the true "understanding" between the powers was in fact the very opposite of what you imply - no diplomatic self-assuaging jibber-jabber in the diplomatic telegrams of early Aug 1914.

In other words, the actuality of events completely overtake any conclusions stemming from prior casual discussions. Casual discussions and requests are one thing, reality in this instance is a completely different thing, and blatantly so.

That said, I can understand why Germany would misread such things - by 1914 they had become geo-political incompetents of the highest order.

Kaiser Bill's succession, followed by Bismarck’s fall from grace, started the chain of German geo-political disasters that ended with it having ambitions much bigger than its wallet, being almost diplomatically isolated with very few friends, being hemmed-in on land, outgunned at sea, and chained to a corpse. Then Germany had the gall to claim that it had no choice but to invade a neutral country, despite being a guarantor of said neutrality, on the grounds of self-defence.

Wilhelmine, post-Bismarck, Germany came to regard treaties as "mere scraps of paper" to be thrown into history's rubbish bin when they no longer suited German self-interest. German policies in the two decades prior to 1914 were woefully lacking in geo-political nous; the powers-that-be in Germany had an unerring knack of painting themselves into a geo-political corner. Through it own policies, by 1914 Germany felt threatened militarily (by an encirclement all of its own making), felt threatened economically (for all its industrial power, it had financial problems stemming from its massive investment in growth over the previous few decades, and its liquidity was in dire straits - in other words, its ambitions were far bigger than its wallet by 1911), felt threatened politically (its policy of Weltpolitik was failing because of cost and thus causing internal political strife - and, as in all countries, heavy socialist sentiment began to spring from the industrialised cities).

Consequently, in my opinion, when the July crisis arose in 1914, Germany was totally incapable of dealing with it with any geo-political insight/foresight at all, and by late July it had convinced itself that it had no choice but follow its militaristic instincts - and just like many of those who fall prey to their own failings, it didn't take much to convince itself that it was in fact the victim, and had no choice but to attack before being attacked (a sentiment that even to this day still seems to hold sway in some quarters).

Cheers-salesie.

[Wuerzburg]

That makes a great deal of sense, especially as it pertains to Schlieffen's extension of the German right beyond Liege to the north. My hunch is that if France violated Belgium, Germany could get away with a 'cut' across the Maastricht appendix without war with the Netherlands; The Hague could declare the German move was as a guarantor of Belgium and therefore not an infringement upon her neutrality. So my question is; if not for Schlieffen's design, what accounts for Moltke's moving away from Germany's logical plan (counterattack after a French rupture of Belgium) to something that looks more like the 1906 memo you say had no influence?

Also, there is another matter that I find incongruent. The German army concluded an eastern offensive was undesirable because the Russian army would mobilize deep in its interior. The German army also concluded that if it attacked France, the Russian army would mobilize on the German frontier to attack. My question is; why did the Germans never consider forcing the Russians to mobilize deep in their interior with more units going east in the first week, and then use their superior rails to concentrate these back on France? This would leave the Germans well set to hit a French attack coming through the Ardennes, while leaving the Russians far from the border.

I spend about 140 pages discussing Moltke's planning in The Real German War Plan 1904-1914. The short answer is that in thais period Germany's strategic position was going to hell in a handbasket, and Moltke didn't think he had the luxury of being as cool and collected as Schlieffen, added to the fact that temprementally Moltke wasn't as self-confident as Schlieffen.

For the Germans, the essential problem is the same on both fronts - an offensive into either France or Russia pulls the units away from the German railheads. This is especially serious in the east. Where does a two-week advance into Russia get you? Nowhere important. But you've just doubled the amount of time it would take you to shift forces back west, and halved your force multiplier.

Terence Zuber

[Wuerzburg]

Mr Zuber - in your opinion, if Belgium had remained neutral, guaranteed by Great Britain such that the French army dared not move into the Ardennes, and the Germans were then able to concentrate their main strength upon Russia. Was the scenario I outline - of finishing first with Russia then coming around on France with the whole strength of the Central Powers' armies - is that a possibility that France would have to reckon with?

There are a bunch of "ifs" involved here, the biggest and least likely being that the British would want to guarantee Belgian neutrality against the French.

In any case, the Germans never thought that the French would respect Belgian neutrality, and Moltke was certain that the Belgians would side with the French, regardless of what the Germans did.

Nobody thought the Germans could "finish first with Russia". The country was too big and the communications net too underdeveloped.

From August to October 1914 the Germans could best-case have advanced to Smolensk and then it begins to snow and where are they?

Terence Zuber