Inventing the Schlieffen Plan

[Chris Boonzaier]

Chris,

This is not nitpicking and there are huge implications regarding the Moltke Plan in 1914 and what it was based on.As has

already been pointed Moltke did not try to execute the Schlieffen 1906 memorandum (=THE Schlieffen plan).

What he did do had aspects of Schlieffens other thinking and plans in it,the extent of that is in the detail if I understand correctly.

Thats the point I tried to make earlier.... to what Percentage WERE Schlieffens ideas present in the plan used?

If the lions share of it was based on Schlieffens Ideas... then whose plan is it?

[yelob]

If Moltke didn't attempt THE Schlieffen plan which hinged on an attempt to annihilate the French army the picture is radically changed is it not? There surely has to be a lot of implications in that alone,one of the biggest being to my mind the whole question of war guilt, if Moltke's actions are *possibly* defensive responses to Franco Russian aggression then the whole question of war guilt is now provisional to my mind at least.This is the reason I want to read the detail in TZ to determine some of this question.

The violation of Belgian neutrality proves nothing either way and as I've already said the strong right wing into Belgium is a very big red herring the full meaning of which is yet to be determined at least to my mind and of course assuming that's possible.

As TZ has pointed out there was nowhere else for the German armies to go considering their size and Joffre also

contemplated violating it too at some point IIRC.

Best/Liam

[Chris Boonzaier]

As TZ has pointed out there was nowhere else for the German armies to go considering their size and Joffre also

contemplated violating it too at some point IIRC.

Best/Liam

If I had a penny for every time I had considered doing something bad... but did not... I would be a rich man.

Noone can be condemned for what they are WILLING to do... or had thought of doing... or at a push, could have done.

Best

Chris

[Chris Boonzaier]

If Moltke didn't attempt THE Schlieffen plan which hinged on an attempt to annihilate the French army the picture is radically changed is it not?

Not unless he had a "Moltke Plan" that he had thought out on his own. If he had cobbeled together a rickety plan out of Schlieffens old ideas... then old schlieffen deserves the credit IM(as always)HO

Best

Chris

[bob lembke]

Back on September 24th Mike Skipman posted that he found General d. Inf. Dr. Freytag=Loringhoven's Generalfeldmarshal Graf von Schlieffen, Sein Leben und der Verwertung, better translated as General Field Marshal Count von Schlieffen, His Life and the Utilization.

For purposes of my own, I have just finished reading it. I am currently reading four books, as my poor eyes tire of one particular font, or in this case on the computer screen, and perk up when switched to another; Kaiser's Das Ehrenbuch der Deutschen Schweres Artillerie; Solf's Zwei Kriegesjahr einer 42 cm Batterie; von Falkenhayn's Die Oberste Heeresleitung 1914 bis 1916, and Freytag=Loringhoven's book.

I have been mostly reading it for my own purposes, trying to figure out the decision processes behind the development of the largest German siege guns (not made any easier by the fact that the project was extremely secret, with each participant officer required to swear to a special oath of secrecy on the issue), but have kept my eye out for insight into the topic of this thread. Let me observe that the reader is unlikely to find anything useful on the topic up to page 120, a bit of interest in the range pages 120-140, and a bit less from pages 141 to the end. Not a very productive source on the topic, and scarcely more on my own interests.

Bob

[Jack Sheldon]

Terence

Many thanks for the reference in Post 317. I must have skimmed over it when I looked at ITSP last week. However, I am not quite sure what you mean when you say that 'Ludendorff is supporting me, rather than you' - or similar words. You have quoted articles from 1929/30, written for a particular purpose, long after you allege that the historical fraud, the Schlieffen Plan, had been inflicted on an unsuspecting world. I believe that you date this institutional dishonesty to 1920, which is why I quoted from two books which predate that; my point being that men in a position to know had no doubt that the thinking of Schlieffen underpinned the plan with which the German army went war, even if that plan bore the name of Moltke.

It seems to me that there is a clear continuity in German war planning during the period which led up to 1914, that all involved built on the work of their predecessors and that all had to work with three constraints set against an evolving politico-military situation. The three constraints were:

First: Germany had to assume that it would be fighting on two fronts.

Second: It could not assume that it could cancel out numerical inferiority through qualitative superiority.

Third: That any plan would involve unprecedented numbers of troops, so any plan had to be realisable by a mass army and, for success, was dependent on a huge build up of the force structure.

The conventional view, as expressed by Stein, was that Schlieffen was the first man to confront these issues systematically and to devise a potentially workable plan to deal with them. His own voluminous writings contain numerous hints as to how he viewed the strategic problems he faced. One such instance appears at p 222 to Volume II of his Dienstschriften, Berlin 1937/1938. Unfortunately this does not appear, as far as I can tell, in the bibliography to ITSP,nor according to your primary sources, did you have access to the Generalstabsreise 1901 from which it is taken. Anyway,this is what he had to say:

"Germany has the advantage that it lies midway between France and Russia and divides these two allies from one another. It would forego this advantage as soon as it divided its army and so became numerically inferior to each individual enemy. Germany must ensure, therefore, that it disposes of one, whilst occupying the other; then, once one opponent is defeated, it must exploit the railway system to generate superiority in the other theatre of war, so as destroy the other enemy."

I shall post this while the going is good and continue it later.

Jack

[Wuerzburg]

As Moltke himself, backed by the Kaiser save on 1 August, rejected all attempts by the Foreign Office to seek out an arrangement with Great Britain after 1912 on the question of Belgium, and was noted by Albertini after 1 August as saying that British neutrality for the price of Belgium was too dearly bought, I am inclined to agree with your statement to a large extent; no attack through a neutral country brought about without exhausting all diplomatic options to avoid it can ever be qualified as purely defensive. On the other hand, the prospects to such a diplomatic venture have to be weighed against their chances of success versus the military consequences of a failure that robbed Germany of the intiative. In the end, the verdict falls with Moltke's assessment of British intentions, and whether this pessimism was realism, or an inaccurate crutch meant to justify his own actions.

Which brings up an interesting point was there a German war plan that could have better blended the diplomatic requirements to being a 'good' European citizens with the military requirements of unleashing a Cannae upon France? It is mentioned that France intended to invade Belgium. Wasn't the prospect of a crushing defeat of the French army in the Ardennes more in evidence if the Germans refused their right and let the French attack?

Glenn,

In Schlieffen's June 1905 General Staff Ride West, Schlieffen says that an invasion of Belgium can be considered "as an academic exercise, even if it is forbidden politically"

In his November-December 1905 war game - his last exercise - the French and Russians attack Germany. Holland and Belgium ally themselves with Germany, and the right flank of the great German counterattack uses Belgian (and probably Dutch) railways to stage out of Antwerp.

The attack on Liege was Moltke's very own contribution to the German war plan. You can't blame it on Schlieffen

Abset the attack on Liege, the German right wing does not need, indeed cannot, cross the Belgian border until much later.

Whether Joffre would then have crossed the Belgian border first is an open question, given the fact that he deployed three of five French armies on the Belgian border and his stated intent was to "attack as soon as the armies have assembled".

Monomaniacal emphasis on the 1906 Memorandum gives a distorted picture of everybody's planning: Joffre,Moltke and Schlieffen together.

Terence Zuber

[Wuerzburg]

Here's my guess.

Terry's point highlights the confusion I found with Myth of the Schlieffen Plan and the subsequent debates in War in History. When we talk of the Schlieffen Plan, what exactly is to be the definition of that? Mr. Zuber's argument I found somewhat difficult to extract in Myth. What I came away with is that if German planning for war against France were likened to a tree, the 1906 memo was a branch shooting off from the trunk about halfway up. It was not the roots of the tree, nor its trunk, nor its canopy. It just a structure that arose along the way and shot off to the side. Like a branch, it could be cut off altogether without undermining the structure of the tree. The opposing viewpoint seemed to be that the 1906 memo was, if not the roots, then certainly the trunk of the tree; so cut it off and the whole edifice falls.

A German advance via Belgium could in theory have the objective the French army, Paris, or the British army. A 'Schlieffen' plan by definition seems one aimed at the French army and not the other two. The Zuber version suggests Moltke advances with no fixed idea of where or when the decisive battle will occur. The 1906 version makes it clear that it will be on the right. The Zuber version suggests Moltke's immediate operational objectives were limited in focus; to defeat the French army sufficiently to retain the strategic initiative into the next period of the war. The 1906 version makes it clear the objectives were unlimited – the elimination altogether of the French army and the defeat of France. The Zuber version measures the Schlieffen Plan against the material requirements of continental war. The 1906 memo ignores Russia and Austria-Hungary.

My guess is that Schlieffen wrote the memo as the capping stone to his carreer, not either as a war plan or for the mundane burocratic motive of making a case for a bigger army. Rather as a scientific statement, the evolutionary culmination of the principles he had made his lifework. If so, both sides of the debate are right; the 1906 memorandum can be indeed be called a master plan because it was written with the intention of expressing the ultimate evolutionary form to a Belgian offensive against France. Mr. Zuber also is right that it was not a warplan, because Schlieffen's purpose was theoretical military scientific expression. That would be why Russia is ommitted; it's completely irrelevant in expressing the principles to a fully evolved attack upon France.

Glenn,

War planning isn't metaphysics. You can't have the 'idea' of the plan unless you have the forces to carry it out.

Nor can the 'idea' of the plan be written in the conditional (contrary to fact) as - ' if only we had a one front war against France, and not the two-front war against France and Russia that is actually facing us, this is what I would do...'

Terence Zuber

[Wuerzburg]

Just what are these far-reaching implications ? On the issue of "war guilt" all the plans, including the one pursued, involved an aggressive violation of Belgian neutrality. If German 2nd Army was meant to be the lead army and 1st Army only a flank guard, it still advanced through Belgium. Whilst I could be convinced that the "original" Schlieffen plan wasn't implemented, the plan used was still an aggressive one.

Glenn has raised the point of was there a plan that didn't involve the German Army advancing into Luxembourg/Belgium(Holland) ? If the German intent was to "stun" rather than completely defeat the French, then use German interior lines to move forces east, why did every plan involve Belgium ?

Steve,

Because the space and the terrain on the Franco-German border are not adequate for the size of the force involved, some 60-70 divisions in each army.

This was clear to everyboy who looked at the problem since 1905 at the latest.

A Franco-German war was going to be fought in Belgium.

Terence Zuber

[Guest]

Back on September 24th Mike Skipman posted that he found General d. Inf. Dr. Freytag=Loringhoven's Generalfeldmarshal Graf von Schlieffen, Sein Leben und der Verwertung, better translated as General Field Marshal Count von Schlieffen, His Life and the Utilization.

Bob

Thanks for going through that Bob. Sorry it wasn't more productive. I thought just as well to post it, and some 'sucker' will go through it Give your poor eyes a rest now, and gut gemacht

Mike

[Wuerzburg]

Terence

Many thanks for the reference in Post 317. I must have skimmed over it when I looked at ITSP last week. However, I am not quite sure what you mean when you say that 'Ludendorff is supporting me, rather than you' - or similar words. You have quoted articles from 1929/30, written for a particular purpose, long after you allege that the historical fraud, the Schlieffen Plan, had been inflicted on an unsuspecting world. I believe that you date this institutional dishonesty to 1920, which is why I quoted from two books which predate that; my point being that men in a position to know had no doubt that the thinking of Schlieffen underpinned the plan with which the German army went war, even if that plan bore the name of Moltke.

It seems to me that there is a clear continuity in German war planning during the period which led up to 1914, that all involved built on the work of their predecessors and that all had to work with three constraints set against an evolving politico-military situation. The three constraints were:

First: Germany had to assume that it would be fighting on two fronts.

Second: It could not assume that it could cancel out numerical inferiority through qualitative superiority.

Third: That any plan would involve unprecedented numbers of troops, so any plan had to be realisable by a mass army and, for success, was dependent on a huge build up of the force structure.

The conventional view, as expressed by Stein, was that Schlieffen was the first man to confront these issues systematically and to devise a potentially workable plan to deal with them. His own voluminous writings contain numerous hints as to how he viewed the strategic problems he faced. One such instance appears at p 222 to Volume II of his Dienstschriften, Berlin 1937/1938. Unfortunately this does not appear, as far as I can tell, in the bibliography to ITSP,nor according to your primary sources, did you have access to the Generalstabsreise 1901 from which it is taken. Anyway,this is what he had to say:

"Germany has the advantage that it lies midway between France and Russia and divides these two allies from one another. It would forego this advantage as soon as it divided its army and so became numerically inferior to each individual enemy. Germany must ensure, therefore, that it disposes of one, whilst occupying the other; then, once one opponent is defeated, it must exploit the railway system to generate superiority in the other theatre of war, so as destroy the other enemy."

I shall post this while the going is good and continue it later.

Jack

Jack,

The short answer to this is that you are now talking about Schlieffen's real war planning.

Were does any of this appear in the 1906 Memorandum?

In particuar, where in the1906 Memorandum say: "Germany has the advantage that it lies midway between France and Russia and divides these two allies from one another. It would forego this advantage as soon as it divided its army and so became numerically inferior to each individual enemy. Germany must ensure, therefore, that it disposes of one, whilst occupying the other; then, once one opponent is defeated, it must exploit the railway system to generate superiority in the other theatre of war, so as destroy the other enemy." ?

Nowhere, because the 1906 Memorandum concerns "War with France".

I return to my question: if the 1906 Memorandum is a real war plan what are the Russians doing while the entire German army (plus 24 nonexistant divisions) spends about three months wandering through France?

It is not too much to say that the central problem facing Schlieffen - and Moltke - was that there was was never a 'huge buildup of the force structure".

The nonexistant 24 divisions in the 1906 Memorandum are a fond hope that was never realized.

You can't write a war plan using fantasy units.

When Ludendorff wrote his 1929/1930 articles, Ludendorff was making the first clear statement of the nonexistant forces ithe 1906 memorandum required. Up until that time the "Schlieffen School" kept the force structure intentionally vague. These two articles were groundbreaking, but like the Wenninger controversy appear to have gotten lost in the German crisis of the early 1930s.

Terry

[yelob]

This was clear to everyboy who looked at the problem since 1905 at the latest.

A Franco-German war was going to be fought in Belgium.

Terence,

I was always curious on this point as to why Belgium didn't involve itself in a military alliance with someone (I assume the Entente powers would be their preference) if it was obvious for a long time that their country was going to be either invaded or the scene of a gigantic conflict,did they really think they could remain politically pure when their country had such strategic significance?

Best/Liam

[Jack Sheldon]

It seems clear from much of Schlieffen's writing that he had no time for head on attritional struggles; these would only lead to indecisive outcomes he felt. Instead manoeuvre in mass, designed to overwhelm locally and for limited periods of time was the route to decisive success - that and encircling movements which, as a minimum, would produce operational success. It also seems clear that he could envisage this applying at theatre level - See his Schlussbesprechung 1903 quoted in Dienstschriften Volume I p 108.

"The same rule applies at the strategic as well as the tactical level: He who wishes to encircle must attack frontally in force, so as to deny the enemy all chance of manoeuvre and, in so doing, make it possible for the encircling wing to become effective."

This refrain is repeated throughout his writings and, when out of office and in retirement he sought proof of his ideas through military history and published them in various ways, there can be little doubt that he convinced his professional colleagues of the basic rightness of his ideas. Whatever we may think of Moltke who succeeded him, his thinking and subsequent actions were patently influenced by Schlieffen. Kuhl quotes him in Der Weltkrieg, Berlin 1929, Volume I p 11 thus: "In his memoirs, the General [Moltke] states expressly that he, 'retained, with total conviction, the Aufmarsch of the main forces against France, which he had taken over from Graf Schlieffen'."

Finally, for the time being, Generaloberst Alexander von Kluck, sought to defend himself and his actions in autumn 1914 in his autobiographical book Wanderjahre - Kriege - Gestalten Berlin 1929. Naturally this contains a great deal of special pleading, which is not strictly germane to our current discussion about whether there was or was not a Schlieffen Plan, but in criticising Moltke on pp 175 - 177 for not arranging for the transfer of forces in a timely manner 'auf dem rechten (Schlieffenenschen) Fluegel' [to the right 'Schlieffen' wing], he goes on to state that had his scheme for a rapid attack towards the northeast of Paris been accepted and the extra forces been made available, 'so haette dadurch der Schlieffensche Gedanke wiederhergestellt werden koennen.' [it would have been possible to have got Schlieffen's concept back on track] N.B. Gedanke has several meanings - design, concept, or, dare I mention it, plan. He also provides a sketch map of the encircling manoeuvre which would have resulted around Paris on p 177, suggesting to me that at least one prominent figure was in no doubt that he had been called on to enact a concept designed by Schlieffen.

Jack

Jack

[Wuerzburg]

It seems clear from much of Schlieffen's writing that he had no time for head on attritional struggles; these would only lead to indecisive outcomes he felt. Instead manoeuvre in mass, designed to overwhelm locally and for limited periods of time was the route to decisive success - that and encircling movements which, as a minimum, would produce operational success. It also seems clear that he could envisage this applying at theatre level - See his Schlussbesprechung 1903 quoted in Dienstschriften Volume I p 108.

"The same rule applies at the strategic as well as the tactical level: He who wishes to encircle must attack frontally in force, so as to deny the enemy all chance of manoeuvre and, in so doing, make it possible for the encircling wing to become effective."

This refrain is repeated throughout his writings and, when out of office and in retirement he sought proof of his ideas through military history and published them in various ways, there can be little doubt that he convinced his professional colleagues of the basic rightness of his ideas. Whatever we may think of Moltke who succeeded him, his thinking and subsequent actions were patently influenced by Schlieffen. Kuhl quotes him in Der Weltkrieg, Berlin 1929, Volume I p 11 thus: "In his memoirs, the General [Moltke] states expressly that he, 'retained, with total conviction, the Aufmarsch of the main forces against France, which he had taken over from Graf Schlieffen'."

Finally, for the time being, Generaloberst Alexander von Kluck, sought to defend himself and his actions in autumn 1914 in his autobiographical book Wanderjahre - Kriege - Gestalten Berlin 1929. Naturally this contains a great deal of special pleading, which is not strictly germane to our current discussion about whether there was or was not a Schlieffen Plan, but in criticising Moltke on pp 175 - 177 for not arranging for the transfer of forces in a timely manner 'auf dem rechten (Schlieffenenschen) Fluegel' [to the right 'Schlieffen' wing], he goes on to state that had his scheme for a rapid attack towards the northeast of Paris been accepted and the extra forces been made available, 'so haette dadurch der Schlieffensche Gedanke wiederhergestellt werden koennen.' [it would have been possible to have got Schlieffen's concept back on track] N.B. Gedanke has several meanings - design, concept, or, dare I mention it, plan. He also provides a sketch map of the encircling manoeuvre which would have resulted around Paris on p 177, suggesting to me that at least one prominent figure was in no doubt that he had been called on to enact a concept designed by Schlieffen.

Jack

Jack

Jack,

You just got through criticizing me for using a 1929 source.

See Kluck, Der Marsch auf Paris und die Marneschlacht (Berlin, 1920). Surprise, surprise! No Schlieffen plan! No Schlieffen plan map! He says that the great envelopement might (!) have to go as far as Picardie - that's north France - Arras/Amiens.

No extratour around Paris to Switzerland.

Not only that, but even in in the text of the 1929 work you cite there is no mention of the Schlieffen plan either, and Kluck talks about the pre-war German army in some detail.

Terry

[Wuerzburg]

This was clear to everyboy who looked at the problem since 1905 at the latest.

A Franco-German war was going to be fought in Belgium.

Terence,

I was always curious on this point as to why Belgium didn't involve itself in a military alliance with someone (I assume the Entente powers would be their preference) if it was obvious for a long time that their country was going to be either invaded or the scene of a gigantic conflict,did they really think they could remain politically pure when their country had such strategic significance?

Best/Liam

Liam,

The Belgians were neutral and they liked it that way.

The Belgians had no dog in a fight between the Entente and Germany, no way to change the outcome of the war, no interest in seeing WWI fought out in their country, nor in taking heavy casualties.

Belgium was never an ally of France or Britain. Like the US, it was an Associated Power.

The Belgians did well in a bad situation: they retained their independence, had some of the lowest casualties of any European belligerent and did not suffer devastating destruction.

Terence Zuber

[Terry Duncan]

This was clear to everyboy who looked at the problem since 1905 at the latest.

A Franco-German war was going to be fought in Belgium.

Terence,

I was always curious on this point as to why Belgium didn't involve itself in a military alliance with someone (I assume the Entente powers would be their preference) if it was obvious for a long time that their country was going to be either invaded or the scene of a gigantic conflict,did they really think they could remain politically pure when their country had such strategic significance?

Best/Liam

Liam,

Belgium seems to have taken her neutrality very seriously, and refused talks several times from the feeling that association with one side would encourage the other to attack her in a war. Do you have access to Albertini, as he does document this to some length. If anything, Belgium had been considered as rather more pro-German in 1914 by many observers, and the Belgians themselves clearly held great hopes that everyone would respect her wishes to remain neutral.

The German move was entirely cynical and pragmatic, and in the terms of international law it cannot be acceptable. However, there are claims France would have acted in just the same manner even if Germany had not done so. These may well be correct, though we lack definitive evidence as far as I have seen. Certainly the French were willing to fight in Belgium, as it turned out it was a response to a German first move, but as the German consideration of attacking through Belgium had been known for about a decade by 1914, it is not impossible the French to have planned their own invasion. My own feeling is that the French had such a good idea Germany was going to invade Belgium that they made their own plans revolve around that action, simply waiting for the Germans to commit themselves first in order to secure British support from the outset. In the end the Germans did violate Belgum, the French may well have thought about it but came second in the race to do so.

Jack,

"The same rule applies at the strategic as well as the tactical level: He who wishes to encircle must attack frontally in force, so as to deny the enemy all chance of manoeuvre and, in so doing, make it possible for the encircling wing to become effective."

I would agree that this makes perfect military sense, but the Schlieffen Plan as it is taught involves the requirement that the left wing remain defensive and that the prime error committed was allowing this force to attack. So you have an encircling force but nothing to prevent the French reacting by transferring troops to their left wing. It seems to be an area where common sense and logic are replaced by a diktat that this is what has been written and therefore this is how it must work. It may well be that Terence Zuber has taken an extreme stance, but a similar but opposing extreme exists and is at least just as questionable.

Terry

[bob lembke]

Oh, one practical finding from reading Freytag=Loringhoven's biography of von Schlieffen. In regard to the story that his last words were: "Don't weaken the right wing!", the bio states that he was feverish at the time of death, and that his last words were "Kleine Ursachen, grosse Wirkungen.", which I think is somewhat idiomatic, but sort of means: "Little cause, great effect." A bit more puzzling than the alleged last words. Maybe someone gave him an ice chip.

Bob

[Jack Sheldon]

Terence

You make an entirely fair point about the 1929 book. I only mentioned it as something of a curiosity and, for the same reason, I shall scan and post his map. I do not buy his argument, by the way. I was just interested that he linked the idea to a return to Schlieffen.

Jack

[Glenn239]

War planning isn't metaphysics. You can't have the 'idea' of the plan unless you have the forces to carry it out.

Except that your main point is Schlieffen created a plan when he did not have the forces to execute it; so obviously he did have the idea without having the forces to carry it out.

Since 24 divisions did not exist, the memorandum at some level was a theoretical exercise. The question we are wondering at is to what purpose Schlieffen pens a memo as he retires requiring non-existent divisions and completely ignoring the reality of coalition warfare. Some suggest a sales pitch for needing a larger army – which in itself would be a touch metaphysical, and certainly a little mundane given the occassion. I think Schlieffen was attempting to dominate future planning by taking his invasion to its logical culmination point using the scientific methods he spent his career honing.

If this interpretation were true, then Schlieffen’s intention was to influence future planning, to guide the disciples as it were, and the criticisms launched against Moltke later hold an element of truth. But at the same time, since the material conditions of the 1906 memo were never realized and Moltke never had a practical option, it never went from theoretical to real. Therefore, my guess would be the memo should largely be ignored when assessing the 1914 campaign.

[Terry Duncan]

Therefore, my guess would be the memo should largely be ignored when assessing the 1914 campaign.

The memo itself deals with something very different to the circumstances of 1914, except maybe as a conceptual expression of how best to effect the defeat of France alone. Many feel that it was this outline that was followed in order to arrive at the 1914 war plan. You could ignore it for fine detail, but it does outline a right wing heavy attack into France, so it does have a superficial similarity to the plan of 1914.

[Glenn239]

Glenn has raised the point of was there a plan that didn't involve the German Army advancing into Luxembourg/Belgium(Holland) ? If the German intent was to "stun" rather than completely defeat the French, then use German interior lines to move forces east, why did every plan involve Belgium?

I find the question curious. German generals were (1) fascinated by Cannae and (2) made every plan on the assumption France would advance to the attack through Belgium. Hannibal’s victory at Cannae also required the Romans to advance – it would have never worked if the Romans had stayed on the defensive. A true Cannae in 1914 is the envelopment of the French left as it advances north of Metz into Germany. The outline to the German plan I have in my head is; mobilize in a fashion that ‘spooks’ Russia into its defensive deployment, (note that a German commitment to Britain not violate Belgium in and of itself might have caused the Russian army to conclude the main blow was coming east) then concentrate the historical 7 armies in the west by about the 3rd week of the campaign. The French left, advancing through the Ardennes against the resistance of two armies, reaches the German border from a line north of Metz (3rd Army) to around Aachen (BEF). The German right then moves through Holland northwest of Liege while the second pincer emerges from the direction of Metz-Thionville. The French left is fixed east of the Belgian Ardennes by the two German armies already in contact, then surrounded from two directions.

Could that have worked?

[Glenn239]

The memo itself deals with something very different to the circumstances of 1914, except maybe as a conceptual expression of how best to effect the defeat of France alone. Many feel that it was this outline that was followed in order to arrive at the 1914 war plan. You could ignore it for fine detail, but it does outline a right wing heavy attack into France, so it does have a superficial similarity to the plan of 1914

Overall I think the Zuber approach is the correct one; pitch the 1906 memo and go with the documents from later. You arrive at nearly the same thing, but without the erroneous baggage that can be misleading.

[Glenn239]

I was always curious on this point as to why Belgium didn't involve itself in a military alliance with someone (I assume the Entente powers would be their preference) if it was obvious for a long time that their country was going to be either invaded or the scene of a gigantic conflict,did they really think they could remain politically pure when their country had such strategic significance?

Belgium had a longstanding tradition of neutrality, so to break with that doctrine and join one alliance (read, France) would require both a consensus in the government that did not exist and a vested interest that did not exist. In 1870 London had broken with its own international doctrine on foreign policy and committed to specific actions based on future contingencies; in 1914 Belgium will have hoped for another 1870.

The German move was entirely cynical and pragmatic, and in the terms of international law it cannot be acceptable.

In terms of international precedent as of 1919 it certainly was not acceptable. What I think a little fuzzier is what international precedent thought of the question prior to 1914. In 1805 Austria and France had torn into one another, each violating the neutrality of a duchy or two along the way with scarcely a whimper. In the 1860's Prussia and Austria had fought a war against small Denmark, to international yawns. The United States routinely violated the neutrality of countries in Central and South America. The Entente violated the neutrality of China in August 1914. Russia marched across neutral Romania in the 1870's. Iran...is still bitter to this day about how its sovereignty was treated then.

[Glenn239]

However, there are claims France would have acted in just the same manner even if Germany had not done so. These may well be correct, though we lack definitive evidence as far as I have seen.

Inside the German government, the planner responsible for deciding the merits to things such as neutrality and preemptive wars was the chief of staff. We, having nothing at stake, can assume a German non-violation works out for Germany, and then we go off and watch Two and a Half Men without a second thought. Moltke, with no NATO allies or any other force in the universe to appeal to, had to assess the consequences to Germany should he refrain from invading Belgium while France proceeded through the Ardennes. Frankly, given the potential consequences to the worst case, I can see why Moltke decided independent of any dreams of hegemony that immediate attack was within Germany's interests.

If Moltke didn't attempt THE Schlieffen plan which hinged on an attempt to annihilate the French army the picture is radically changed is it not?

The coup de main on Liege, which failed miserable, knocked a full week off diplomatic efforts to solve the crisis. The Schlieffen Plan itself probably knocked off two more. If Germany implements something other than the Schlieffen Plan, she has three weeks of diplomacy. The problem is that Great Power relations in the past 200 years are not exactly replete with examples where one Great Power mobilized its entire armed forces and then a conflict didn't follow. About the nearest example of that was in 1859 when Prussia made a partial mobilization (but not concentration) during the 1859 war between Austria and France. Otherwise the trend was mobilization followed by war.

[salesie]

This was clear to everyboy who looked at the problem since 1905 at the latest.

A Franco-German war was going to be fought in Belgium.

Terence,

I was always curious on this point as to why Belgium didn't involve itself in a military alliance with someone (I assume the Entente powers would be their preference) if it was obvious for a long time that their country was going to be either invaded or the scene of a gigantic conflict,did they really think they could remain politically pure when their country had such strategic significance?

Best/Liam

Why wouldn't Belgium expect to remain neutral, and expect their neutrality to be respected by all sides? After all, it was guaranteed by treaty - with the main European powers (Germany included) being guarantors of said neutrality.

Much is being made of Joffre's possible (some say probable) intention to enter Belgium with a French army in a German style pre-emptive strike - this is pure academic speculation at best, and at worst it is a cynical attempt at moral equivalence in order to bolster the wholly fanciful notion that Germany had no choice but to enter Belgium as an act of self defence. Such notions, in my opinion, are nothing more than lame-excuse making for German aggression.

Joffre may have had a plan, amongst many, for a pre-emptive incursion into Belgium, but any such move was strictly forbidden by Joffre's political masters. Indeed, in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870/71, a French army found itself trapped up against the Belgian border by Prussian forces, and its escape route lay through Belgian territory - this French army chose defeat rather than violate Belgian neutrality. Not until Germany decided that the treaty it was a guarantor of was nothing more than a "mere scrap of paper" to be tossed into history's litter bin because it no longer suited German interests was Belgian's neutrality violated. And, prior to declaring war, Britain sent out two diplomatic telegrams, one to France and one to Germany, asking what each country's intentions were towards Belgian neutrality; France replied immediately that it would respect it unconditionally, whereas Germany delayed for almost a day before replying, and then said it would respect said neutrality once hostilities were over. (I've paraphrased these replies, of course)

Once hostilities were over was Germany's reply - its intentions were crystal clear. As clear as they had been for some time i.e. Holger Herwig noted from Le Roi Albert au travers de ses lettres inédites, 1882-1916 by Thielemans and Vandewoude (1982), that in November 1913: "During a state visit [by King Albert of Belgium] to Berlin... Wilhelm II and Moltke warned Albert that 'small countries, such as Belgium, would be well advised to rally to the side of the strong if they wished to retain their independence."

Seeing as Belgian independence/neutrality was guaranteed by treaty, with Germany supposedly being one of the guarantors of said neutrality, would this not suggest an attempt was made by Germany to ensure "free-passage" through Belgium for any German forces attacking northern France, as per the revised von Schlieffen plan, some nine months prior to Germany's invasion? (note I said revised von Schlieffen plan)

In other words, does this not suggest prior intent on the part of von Moltke and Kaiser Bill? After all, if acting as one of the guarantors of Belgian independence/neutrality, and your intentions to that end were honourable, why would you, almost a year prior to the opening of hostilities, advise the King of the Belgians to rally to your side, the side of the strong, if not wishing to ensure free-passage for an invasion of France? Why risk forming an alliance with Belgium in 1913, which if successful would undoubtedly have increased international tensions to fever pitch? Is this not one sign (amongst many) of German geo-political stupidity and prior intent to follow a certain course of action?

Much has been said on this thread about the great mistakes made by the German General Staff (virtually the de-facto rulers of Germany by 1914); whether it was a Schlieffen plan, a Moltke plan, or Uncle Fritz Cobley's plan, such things pale into insignificance when we consider the monumental mistake made by Germany when it sent its jackbooted hordes across the Belgian border.

Cheers-salesie.