Inventing the Schlieffen Plan

[SiegeGunner]

I think a fair-minded arbiter would have to declare this debate an honourable draw. A court of law would almost certainly acquit von Schlieffen of sole responsibility for the operations actually carried out in 1914, and yet they have his fingerprints all over them. As a former civil servant, I would conceptualise it by saying that von Schlieffen 'opened the file' labelled 'War with France' and all subsequent plans, proposals and operations were then slotted into the same folder, leading to the situation where the German manoeuvres and deployments in 1914 will be forever known as 'The Schlieffen Plan', come what may.

Having tested the waters and, hopefully, found forum members to be serious, well-informed and courteous, I hope Terence Zuber will now stick around and, in due course, engage in a new debate about Mons, where I suspect that there are rather more issues capable of differing evidence- (rather than faith-) -based interpretations.

[Terry Duncan]

So the "Schlieffen plan" is document-free, content-free. It is faith-based.

I can't argue rationally with that. For advocates of the "Schlieffen plan", either you Believe in the Holy Schlieffen Plan or you don't.

Terence Zuber

I agree that there are large holes in the traditional "Schlieffen Plan" concept, and it would be nice to know what you think the long term German objectives were? In your latest book you claim the German's should have switched more troops to the east earlier and not advanced so far, presumably also moving to a more active stance in the east at this point too. However, as the calculations of Moltke the Elder, Waldersee, Schlieffen, and Moltke the Younger all seemed to indicate Germany would be unable to win a long war scenario, where would the position you suggest should have been adopted in September 1914 have left Germany? There was general agreement that a political settlement with France would be impossible - I believe this was part of the original reasoning behind favouring the west for the initial heavy military strike - and that it would not be easy or quick to force Russia to negotiate. It looks somewhat as though the 'sooner rather than later' thoughts of Moltke might have been misguided as even sooner offered little actual chance of any significant victory that would leave Germany in a position to actually win.

Terry

[Wuerzburg]

I agree that there are large holes in the traditional "Schlieffen Plan" concept, and it would be nice to know what you think the long term German objectives were? In your latest book you claim the German's should have switched more troops to the east earlier and not advanced so far, presumably also moving to a more active stance in the east at this point too. However, as the calculations of Moltke the Elder, Waldersee, Schlieffen, and Moltke the Younger all seemed to indicate Germany would be unable to win a long war scenario, where would the position you suggest should have been adopted in September 1914 have left Germany? There was general agreement that a political settlement with France would be impossible - I believe this was part of the original reasoning behind favouring the west for the initial heavy military strike - and that it would not be easy or quick to force Russia to negotiate. It looks somewhat as though the 'sooner rather than later' thoughts of Moltke might have been misguided as even sooner offered little actual chance of any significant victory that would leave Germany in a position to actually win.

Terry

It is clear from Schlieffen's General Staff rides and war games from 1894 to 1905 that Schlieffen wanted to employ the interior-lines strategy of Frederick the Great in the Seven Year's War. A decisive victory on one front could take out that opponent almost entirely: after Rossbach (5 Novemnber 1757) the French were hardly a factor against Prussia for the rest of the war. Old Fritz then shifted his army east and hammered the Austrians at Leuthen (5 December 1757). These were the two greatest victories of Prussia's most successful general: every German officer was aware of Fritz's system. The only time Fritz got into trouble was when he tried to invade Bohemia.

In a like manner, had Moltke shifted 12 divisions east on 24 August (as he had originally intended), it is hard to see how Russian 1st Army would have avoided destruction. By mid-September 1914 the Germans would have had 20 divisions - two armies - free to send west. The "race to the sea" was on in the west and these two German armies would have collapsed the French left flank. French losses in August 1914 were awful. A repetition of the August disaster in September would have crippled not only the French army but France itself. Even if the front stabilized, say on the Somme, the Entente military position would have been poor.

Terence Zuber

[Wuerzburg]

I think a fair-minded arbiter would have to declare this debate an honourable draw. A court of law would almost certainly acquit von Schlieffen of sole responsibility for the operations actually carried out in 1914, and yet they have his fingerprints all over them. As a former civil servant, I would conceptualise it by saying that von Schlieffen 'opened the file' labelled 'War with France' and all subsequent plans, proposals and operations were then slotted into the same folder, leading to the situation where the German manoeuvres and deployments in 1914 will be forever known as 'The Schlieffen Plan', come what may.

Having tested the waters and, hopefully, found forum members to be serious, well-informed and courteous, I hope Terence Zuber will now stick around and, in due course, engage in a new debate about Mons, where I suspect that there are rather more issues capable of differing evidence- (rather than faith-) -based interpretations.

Schlieffen's wargames and General Staff rides during the 14 years from 1891, when he became chief of the General Staff, and 1905, when he retired, have the same general themes, which have nothing in common with the 1906 "Schlieffen plan" Memorandum. In the two-front exercises, the French and Russians were attacking. Schlieffen used Germany's interior position and rail mobility to counterattack agaist one front, then used rail mobility to shift forces for a counterattack on the other front. The key was to fight near the German border - and German railheads. The initial battles in the west were fought in German Lorriane or Belgium, in the east in East Prussia or the border with West Prussia. Even one-front wargames were fought as counterattacks against French or Russian offensives.

None of this has anything in common with the 1906 Memorandum, which did not provide a war plan using 24 non-existent divisions, but was an argument for expanding the German army.

Moltke was using Schlieffen's mobile-warfare doctrine up to 24 August 1914. The initial battles were fought as counterattacks against the French offensive into Lorraine and the Russian offensive into East Prussia: Tannenberg was a carbon-copy of Schlieffen's 1894 General Staff ride East. When, on 23 August, Moltke knew he had won the Batle of the Frontiers in the west, his initial reaction was to send 12 divisions east - pure Schlieffen. Only on 24 August did he decide to penretrate into France with only 70 divisions (instead of the 96 used in the Memorandum), a maneuver that Schlieffen said in the Memorandum was sure to fail.

Terence Zuber

[Terry Duncan]

Terence

It is clear from Schlieffen's General Staff rides and war games from 1894 to 1905 that Schlieffen wanted to employ the interior-lines strategy of Frederick the Great in the Seven Year's War.

That would make sense under some circumstances but what if the French and Russians held back? For example, what if when the troops transfered from the west found that the Russians had pulled back inside Russia in order to avoid action? They can now achieve little in a short time, and the French can use the time gained to stabilise their front. In turn, if the Germans look to transfer the troops from the east back to the west, the Russians can now advance in the east and so on. As I noted, it can work if the enemies fail to adapt, but it certainly seems a risky proposition.

Only on 24 August did he decide to penretrate into France with only 70 divisions (instead of the 96 used in the Memorandum), a maneuver that Schlieffen said in the Memorandum was sure to fail.

I am glad you posted this. I have had in notes for many years that Schlieffen had concluded an army roughly the same size as penetrated deep into France would be unable to win, but never what document it had been translated from - a lot of scribbling in an archive while on holiday many years ago where some of the notes later got lost - but I did have that the comment did originate from Schlieffen. One question does arise though. What scale of victory - the decisive battle Moltke and Schlieffen both sought in their plans - would have justified a deeper invasion of France by Germany? Would any possible vicotry have presented the chance to knock out France in a few weeks?

Terry

[Wuerzburg]

Terence

It is clear from Schlieffen's General Staff rides and war games from 1894 to 1905 that Schlieffen wanted to employ the interior-lines strategy of Frederick the Great in the Seven Year's War.

That would make sense under some circumstances but what if the French and Russians held back? For example, what if when the troops transfered from the west found that the Russians had pulled back inside Russia in order to avoid action? They can now achieve little in a short time, and the French can use the time gained to stabilise their front. In turn, if the Germans look to transfer the troops from the east back to the west, the Russians can now advance in the east and so on. As I noted, it can work if the enemies fail to adapt, but it certainly seems a risky proposition.

Only on 24 August did he decide to penretrate into France with only 70 divisions (instead of the 96 used in the Memorandum), a maneuver that Schlieffen said in the Memorandum was sure to fail.

I am glad you posted this. I have had in notes for many years that Schlieffen had concluded an army roughly the same size as penetrated deep into France would be unable to win, but never what document it had been translated from - a lot of scribbling in an archive while on holiday many years ago where some of the notes later got lost - but I did have that the comment did originate from Schlieffen. One question does arise though. What scale of victory - the decisive battle Moltke and Schlieffen both sought in their plans - would have justified a deeper invasion of France by Germany? Would any possible vicotry have presented the chance to knock out France in a few weeks?

Terry

Terry,

Problems with the Russians withdrawing. The doctrinal counter to an army such as the German operating on interior lines is for the exterior armies (France and Russia) to attack first, and simultaneously, on both fronts. Look what happened in 1915. The French were not able to pin enough Germans in France, and the Germans had forces available to pound the Russians at Gorlice-Tarnow.

How far did the Russians have to withdraw to get away from the Germans? Evacuate Poland, surely. That meant that the Russians could not put pressure on the Austrians. And the French have to go on the defensive, too. The entire Entente position begins to unravel, while the Germans have the initiative.

Then there is also the practical problem that the Russian army was not that flexible - a function of the terrain, poor road and rail net and bad command-and-control. Again, see Gorlice-Tarnow.

As to your second point: In Moltke's 1908 General Staff Ride West the Germans won in Belgium and Lorraine, but by no means destroyed the French Army. Moltke said that this meant that the Germans were faced with a second campaign into the interior of France. Moltke was convinced that the next war would be long and bloody. There were no guarantees of victory.

Terence Zuber

[SWorrall]

May I just say that following this thread has been a real pleasure.

When people with different, perhaps conflicting, points of view meet in a scholarly and reasonable debate, like this one, the result is educating and illuminating for the bystander like me.

Thank you.

Simon.

[SteveMarsdin]

In Moltke's 1908 General Staff Ride West the Germans won in Belgium and Lorraine, but by no means destroyed the French Army. Moltke said that this meant that the Germans were faced with a second campaign into the interior of France. Moltke was convinced that the next war would be long and bloody. There were no guarantees of victory.

Terence Zuber

As this approximates to what happened in reality, was Moltke overcome by the initial victories on 22-23 August which he thought were quicker or more complete than anticipated, therefore he thought there was a good chance he could get that quick victory, rather than the "long and bloody" war with "no guarantee of victory" ?

[Wuerzburg]

As this approximates to what happened in reality, was Moltke overcome by the initial victories on 22-23 August which he thought were quicker or more complete than anticipated, therefore he thought there was a good chance he could get that quick victory, rather than the "long and bloody" war with "no guarantee of victory" ?

Steve,

What Moltke was thinking is an interesting question. From 24-27 August the Germans conducted what could only be considered an a tactical pursuit, without higher direction. On 27 August Moltke issued his first operations order since the order on 17 August directing the right wing to advance. On 27 August he directed the right wing to occupy French territory to prevent the French from reconstituting their units: not very dramatic. This order was going to be effective for about three or four days, because then the Germans were going to run up against Paris, which was a giant fortress. In any case, on 29 August the French 5th Army attacks the German 2nd Army on the Oise, so Moltke's 27 August order is OBE. On 31 August the 1st Army turns south. On 2 September Moltke issues an order to the 1st and 2nd Armies, directing 1st Army to guard against Paris, which 1st Army blithely ignores, while 2nd Army is to turn the French left, which is pretty much impossible. On 5 September Moltke orders both the 1st and 2nd Armies to guard against Paris, which 1st Army ignores too, while 5th Army is to try to open a corridor south of Verdun for 6th Army. The French counterattack on the Marne makes this order OBE, too.

I think two things come out of this hash.

First, Moltke never had control of his armies, which pretty much did what they wanted.

Second, the only precedent for what Moltke was trying to do comes not from Schlieffen, but from his uncle, the Elder Moltke, in 1870/71, and his war plans against France after 1871. This is only logical. Moltke and Schlieffen were never close, but the Elder Moltke was the uncle of the Younger, and the Younger had been adjutant to the Elder for some time. After Sedan, the Elder marched on Paris, though he really had no idea what he was going to do once he got there. And the war ended in 1871 when Werder defeated Bourbaki on the Lisaine and drove him into Switzerland. After 1871 the Elder generally intended to march to the east of Paris and then see what happened. What the Younger learned form the Elder was that you "wing it" using a "system of expedients".

Terence Zuber

[Paul Hederer]

post #168

Terrence Zuber wrote:

"Your characterization of "The German Way of War as,essentially, "winging it" is 180 Degrees off. German practise in the 20th century was based on Auftragstaktik, the foundation of which is thorough training in German doctrine at all levels..."

post #184

Terrence Zuber wrote:

"After 1871 the Elder generally intended to march to the east of Paris and then see what happened. What the Younger learned form the Elder was that you "wing it" using a "system of expedients".

Terry!

[Terry Duncan]

Terence

The doctrinal counter to an army such as the German operating on interior lines is for the exterior armies (France and Russia) to attack first, and simultaneously, on both fronts.

But attacking before co-ordination or even consolidation can be achieved is also militarily desirable. Certainly the Russians could give up lots of ground, one of the reasons a first attack in the west had been preferred after all, and what do the Germans do if this is what the Russians do in 1914? They have taken the pressure off the French and cannot make use of it against the Russian armies. The Russians have lost East Poland, but this was always a good possibility given the strategic position.

As to your second point: In Moltke's 1908 General Staff Ride West the Germans won in Belgium and Lorraine, but by no means destroyed the French Army. Moltke said that this meant that the Germans were faced with a second campaign into the interior of France. Moltke was convinced that the next war would be long and bloody. There were no guarantees of victory.

I fully agree nothing is guaranteed, and that Moltke thought that the war would be a lon one. This is possibly why he felt able to take the gamble of a deeper penetration into France when his army commanders reported great victories in August, as it might have appeared that this was a genuine chance of ending the two front war at a stroke?

This order was going to be effective for about three or four days, because then the Germans were going to run up against Paris, which was a giant fortress.

This was always my problem with the Schlieffen Plan as presented, as soon as it reached the vacinity of Paris it failed, and quite likely in a very bad way for the German army. Have you ever seen any document to indicate any idea of how to solve the problem during a two front war and involving a German army of around its actual size rather than the addition of 250,000 men that Moltke's study indicated?

I think two things come out of this hash.

First, Moltke never had control of his armies, which pretty much did what they wanted.

From my opinion, one of the major mistakes was allowing Bulow and Kluck to occupy positions where they needed to co-operate with each other, as they seemed to dislike each other almost as much as the enemy, and hardly acted well together during the advance. How much control did Moltke have over the appointment of army commanders? Who would you have thought best suited to command the right wing in 1914?

IIRC - working from memory alone as away from all books at present - In your book Inventing the Schlieffen Plan, you indicated that Falkenheyn and Tappen were not favoured by Schlieffen due to their preferrence for a central breakthrough, is there any detail of their ideas along this line that survives?

Terry

[Wuerzburg]

post #168

Terrence Zuber wrote:

"Your characterization of "The German Way of War as,essentially, "winging it" is 180 Degrees off. German practise in the 20th century was based on Auftragstaktik, the foundation of which is thorough training in German doctrine at all levels..."

post #184

Terrence Zuber wrote:

"After 1871 the Elder generally intended to march to the east of Paris and then see what happened. What the Younger learned form the Elder was that you "wing it" using a "system of expedients".

Terry!

Paul,

Modern, 20th-century German doctrine, Auftragstaktik in particular, was not operative until after Moltke was gone. It had its basis in the 1888 and 1906 Exerzierreglementer and Schlieffen's war games.

Moltke could get away with "winging it" in 1870/71 because he enjoyed massive numerical superiority over the French as well as artillery that was superior in guns and doctrine. It didn't hurt that the French were incompetent. Then again, Moltke's failure to properly employ cavalry reconnaissance meant he never knew where the French were, his guesses as to their location were always wrong, and "winging it" was literally his only option.

I would not hold up the Younger Moltke as a sterling example of "best practise" implementation of German 20th-century doctrine - quite the contrary. It would appear that he was reaching back to his uncle's procedures far more than those which had developed after his uncle was dead.

Terence Zuber

[cdr]

Mr. Zuber

I've enjoyed the way in which you put forward your opinions very much. Am I wrong in thinking that a very important part of wathever the German plan was, is the 'liebesdienst' by the French?

Carl

and just to be cheeky oberstleutnant G.G. on the plan (sorry only in German)

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R8HzuzXF1EE

[salesie]

Sorry, Gents, the way this thread is going I just couldn't resist writing this:

Whatifs?

Last night, whilst dreaming deep,

Some Whatifs crawled inside my sleep.

They danced and partied all night long,

Singing their dreadful Whatif song:

Whatif Schlieffen was never born?

Whatif Moltke only tended corn?

Whatif Joffre never learnt to regroup?

Whatif Sir John never flew the coop?

Whatif they realise I can’t be proved wrong?

What will happen to my Whatifs' song?

© John Sales 2011.

Cheers-salesie.

[SteveMarsdin]

What Moltke was thinking is an interesting question. From 24-27 August the Germans conducted what could only be considered an a tactical pursuit, without higher direction. On 27 August Moltke issued his first operations order since the order on 17 August

Terence Zuber

Yet on the 24 August he'd decided "to penetrate into France" and not to switch the 12 divisions to the east "as originally intended". I know the German units also suffered heavy casualties as well (although nowhere near the levels of some of the French units) but that "tactical pursuit" allowed the French to complete a largely orderly withdrawal out of the Ardennes; from your research do you feel it was that lack of direction, over the following few days, that was the sole reason for that level of "pursuit"?

[Wuerzburg]

Yet on the 24 August he'd decided "to penetrate into France" and not to switch the 12 divisions to the east "as originally intended". I know the German units also suffered heavy casualties as well (although nowhere near the levels of some of the French units) but that "tactical pursuit" allowed the French to complete a largely orderly withdrawal out of the Ardennes; from your research do you feel it was that lack of direction, over the following few days, that was the sole reason for that level of "pursuit"?

Steve,

It was going to be nearly impossible for the Germans to catch up with the French. In almost every case during the Battle of the Frontiers, after the French had lost the fight they broke contact and retreated all night. After Delme on 20 August the Bavarian III Corps put on as determined a pursuit as you are ever likely to see, marching until midnight - and they still couldn't catch the French. Once the French had their big lead, they kept it. French artillery rear guards were very effective.

For the Germans things weren't simple. The initial problem was recognizing that they'd won the battle - not as easy as one might think. Then, the Germans were painfully aware that French doctrine called for counterattacks by large reserves - the Germans had to watch out for that, too (though in fact it almost never happened). The troops were in their first fight and nearly in a state of shock, as well as being tired and disorganized; key leaders had been lost. Hard to get everyone motivated again.

What the Germans needed was more battles like Rossignol, where an entire French division was surrounded and annihilated on 22 August. The big missed opportunity was when the German XIII Coprs, a first-rate unit, had smashed the French units in sector by noon and had the rest of the day to penetrate deep into the French rear area. But this wasn't German doctrine in 1914, and anyway the corps leadership was so uncertain of the situation that they played "safety first". It seems certain that the Germans learned from such missed opportunities.

Terence Zuber

[Wuerzburg]

Mr. Zuber

I've enjoyed the way in which you put forward your opinions very much. Am I wrong in thinking that a very important part of wathever the German plan was, is the 'liebesdienst' by the French?

Carl

and just to be cheeky oberstleutnant G.G. on the plan (sorry only in German)

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R8HzuzXF1EE

Carl,

The 'liebesdienst' applies only to the specific scenario in the 1906 Memorandum: a one-front war in which the French are on the defensive and nevertheless do something stupid - like attacking.

In all of the surviving German war games that I have seen from 1894 to 1908 (and I think I've seen all of them) the French are attacking.

As the German 1912-14 west front intelligence estimate said, it was the French who had the positive goals in mind: if they wanted Alsace-Lorraine back (and they did), they were going to have to attack to get it. The same estimate said that Germany could gain nothing from a European war - Germany's political goals were in overseas influence and expansion (becoming a World Power, like Britain).

Terence Zuber

[SteveMarsdin]

The big missed opportunity was when the German XIII Coprs, a first-rate unit, had smashed the French units in sector by noon and had the rest of the day to penetrate deep into the French rear area. But this wasn't German doctrine in 1914, and anyway the corps leadership was so uncertain of the situation that they played "safety first". It seems certain that the Germans learned from such missed opportunities.

Terence Zuber

In the end though as you say "safety first" and they didn't manage to even close the noose at Gomery and let the remnants of the French 7eDI escape, perhaps symptomatic of the whole Battle of the Frontiers: an undisputed victory but not as decisive as it perhaps could have been. That same 7e DI, reinforced from reserves, been transported two weeks later by the iconic "taxis of the Marne".

[SteveMarsdin]

Steve,

What the Germans needed was more battles like Rossignol, where an entire French division was surrounded and annihilated on 22 August.

Terence Zuber

One of the occasions in military history when excellent training was shown to be better than actual combat experience. Of all the badly led French units that day, the soldiers of the 3eDIC deserved better.

Again though de Beaulieu didn't feel able to advance out of the Semois valley until the 24th

[Wuerzburg]

In the end though as you say "safety first" and they didn't manage to even close the noose at Gomery and let the remnants of the French 7eDI escape, perhaps symptomatic of the whole Battle of the Frontiers: an undisputed victory but not as decisive as it perhaps could have been. That same 7e DI, reinforced from reserves, been transported two weeks later by the iconic "taxis of the Marne".

XIII Corps had the chance to turn the German victory into a French disaster: it had no organized enemy to its front or on both flanks and a half-day of daylight. There was nothing to stop it from getting into the French rear areas and in the next two days bouncing all the river lines as far as maybe even the Meuse

The entire French front would have been unhinged from Verdun.

And XIII Corps was a great outfit, with guys like Rommel to get the job done.

You think Rommel remembered this lost opportunity in 1940? Betcha.

XVI Corps and HKK 4 had a similar opportunity on the far left flank: nothing in front of them but open country all the way to the Meuse. But the German leadership was mesmerized by the possibility of a French counterattack out of Verdun. "Safety first". Schlieffen must have been turning in his grave.

Given two aggressive corps commanders at the right place, and France 1914 becomes France 1940.

Terence Zuber

[salesie]

XIII Corps had the chance to turn the German victory into a French disaster: it had no organized enemy to its front or on both flanks and a half-day of daylight. There was nothing to stop it from getting into the French rear areas and in the next two days bouncing all the river lines as far as maybe even the Meuse

The entire French front would have been unhinged from Verdun.

And XIII Corps was a great outfit, with guys like Rommel to get the job done.

You think Rommel remembered this lost opportunity in 1940? Betcha.

XVI Corps and HKK 4 had a similar opportunity on the far left flank: nothing in front of them but open country all the way to the Meuse. But the German leadership was mesmerized by the possibility of a French counterattack out of Verdun. "Safety first". Schlieffen must have been turning in his grave.

Given two aggressive corps commanders at the right place, and France 1914 becomes France 1940.

Terence Zuber

You say, "Schlieffen must have been turning in his grave", Terence? But how can that be? I thought your whole premise is based on the notion that Schlieffen's plan was to fight a two-front war along internal lines, to defeat the French close to the German railheads then transport enough divisions east to likewise defeat the Russians, and so on and so forth. Schlieffen didn't intend, so you say in your earlier posts, to penetrate into France at this stage because the German Army was tens of divisions short for a pursuit into France (pursuit was purely Moltke's decision on the 24th August you say) - so why would Schlieffen be turning in his grave if the German Army was following the plan you say was his and not pursuing into France (in line, you also say, with German Staff thinking of the previous decades)?

Those damned Whatifs partying and dancing around in your head, Terence?

Cheers-salesie.

[cdr]

Just this

concerning the belief that Belgium would side with Germany and had a secret deal , the final document I've found is a telegram between Grey and Cambon dated from the 2nd of August 1914 (so just before the invasion); (Documènts Diplomatiques Français 3ieme serie, tome XI, document 612)

Carl

[SteveMarsdin]

Given two aggressive corps commanders at the right place, and France 1914 becomes France 1940.

Terence Zuber

Yes, when Guderian advanced up the Semois valley with the 10th Armoured Division and the "Grossdeutschland" in May 1940 he was unexpectedly held up by the Belgian Chasseurs Ardennais and (mainly) the French 2nd Light Cavalry Division. After just 10 hours he merely changed direction (against the wishes of Von Kleist and army staff), looping to the North then on to Sedan, which then fell in days. (Coincidentally units of the 3eDIC also took part in the fighting around Jamoigne but without the same casualty rates as 1914)

[SteveMarsdin]

XIII Corps had the chance to turn the German victory into a French disaster: it had no organized enemy to its front or on both flanks and a half-day of daylight.

Terence Zuber

I know the thread is perhaps deviating from the original "Inventing the Schlieffen Plan" remit and yes (with deference to my fellow Yorkshireman Salesie) it is a bit "what-iffy" (but then isn't that a central plank of all military planning - examining the "what if" )

"it had no organised enemy " - but there was still a lot of French artillery in the (delayed) II Corps column and with IV Corps to the west and south-west of Virton. As you say in your book, it hadn't supported the advancing French infantry particularly well, with some batteries not engaging targets until late morning but it was then able to successfully engage targets advancing out over the plateau to the north of Virton and similarly to the east. The French may not have made the best use of their artillery but the German forces were still very wary of it.

The main river valleys and communications run east-west not north-south here, it isn't until you pass Montmedy/Stenay that the axis changes north-south along the Meuse valley. If XIII Korps had advanced as you suggest, if the Korps to the north hadn't kept up, at some stage it's right flank would have been exposed.The French didn't have enough roads to effectively send their forces north through the great forested belt to the south of the Semois, wouldn't the German Korps to the north have had the same problem hurrying south ? I remain to be convinced of that particular "what if" !

[salesie]

I know the thread is perhaps deviating from the original "Inventing the Schlieffen Plan" remit and yes (with deference to my fellow Yorkshireman Salesie) it is a bit "what-iffy" (but then isn't that a central plank of all military planning - examining the "what if" )

With respect, Steve, we're not military planners (nor planners in any other field), but we are, with the exception of two or three professional historians, amateur historians trying to make sense of what actually happened not what may have happened if a whole lot of Whatifs had occurred. In other words, and speaking purely for myself, trying to understand the realities not the fantasies of the past.

Whatifs, in this context, are nothing more than "Armchair Generalship", where said "Armchair Generals" can pose Whatif questions, making themselves appear highly knowledgeable but with the certainty that no one can definitively disprove their Whatifs because they never happened. No wonder that Terence, in his opening post, strongly de-cried those of the "Armchair-Generalship" persuasion (though he seems to be doing a pretty good impression at the moment of being one himself).

In this particular thread we are dealing with Terence's "Schlieffen plan" premise, a premise which attempts to overturn perceived realities, and I for one would like to see cogent answers from him about what I see as inconsistencies in his train of thought. For example, a cogent answer to the question I posed in my last post would be welcome; a welcome dose of reality in a thread that's rapidly sinking into a sea of fanciful Whatifs.

Cheers-salesie.