Inventing the Schlieffen Plan

[Terry Duncan]

Terry

Back again.

The French were going to have the initiative because their deployment was more effective. They could concentrate quickly on their border wioth Germany. The Germans had to deploy on their border with Belgium, which was no secret (in 1905 Schlieffen said that even Americans recognized this), which meant two thinf=gs. First, the German raile net in the Eifel, oposite the Belgian Ardennes, was poor. More important, the Germans were faced with a long approach march across the Ardennes to get to the French border, which was along the Meuse, a significant terrain obstacle.

As far as the causes of German actions during the July Crisis, I would focus on a general atmosphere of fear among the German leadership elite. Domestically, the German Socialist Party was on the rise, and in 1914 the Socialists were unabashadely Marxist., which put the fear of God into the German aristocracy and bourgeoisie both. In the international sphere, Russia was rising demographically, industrially and militarily. The two worked in tandem: the Socialists would prevent Germany from matching the Russian military buildup. To make matters worse, Germany's sole reliable ally, Austria, seemed to be collapsing. Therefore, in 1914, better now than never.

Terence Zuber

Terence,

I agree there was a fear in the German leadership in 1914, and a degree of pessimism that might have influenced various people to a degree not many consider today. Jagow, who had just returned from honeymoon, was certainly getting himself tied in knots over exactly what Germany would do if Russia mobilized or partially mobilized, and Bethmann seemed anything but decisive towards the end, but few people allow for how the very recent death of his wife may have influenced his thoughts. The Socialists were certainly on the rise, though a lot of their rhetoric prior to the war about how they would go on strike proved just so much hot air in all nations, but I agree there were factors that entered into people’s minds on this score. #

With regards Austria, she certainly appeared to be in very poor state by 1914, clinging to Great Power status in many ways. Her military spending had not matched the other powers in any way, despite Conrad's often expressed desires for war with Italy or Serbia. In this area I think Hew Strachan has summed up the situation perfectly when he noted that if Austria were to be relied upon to support Germany in any war, it had to be a war that arose from a cause critical to Austria rather than a purely German quarrel. Many authors (Mombauer, Fromkin and possibly Herweg iirc) have recently noted that there could possibly be two distinct wars, the Third Balkan War (Austria vs Serbia) and the Great War (Germany vs France and Russia) that merged into one. It would be interesting to know your feelings on this.

With regards to the Stefan Schmidt work, I can read German a bit but it is something I really do need to learn properly, but French is a real problem sadly. I am sure I will be able to get by though given time. Thanks for the notification on this, it is always worth looking at new works. I will have to cut this a bit short here, but will get back to you later as it is quite late here now.

Cheers

Terry

[SteveMarsdin]

When Joffre took over in 1911 he told the government that he would have to enter Belgium. Ostensibly, the government refused to grant him permission to do so until the Germans had, but on 2 August 1914, the first day of mobilization and before war had been declared, Joffre implemented "Varaint 1" of Plan 17 which put three of five French armies on the Franco-Belgian border. The Franco-Russian alliance required an immediate French offensive: Joffre was going to enter Belgium, regardless. He just got lucky and Moltke made a completely unnecessary attack on Liege first.

Terence Zuber

It isn't surprising that Joffre acted in this way, when on 1st/2nd August German forces had entered Luxembourg, putting them a days march (at some points) from the Franco-Belgian border. Germany's involvement/investment in the Luxembourg rail system is also well documented, to allow transit both at the south and north (Troisvierges). All French 3rd, 4th and 5th Army were kept back from that frontier until the German army entered Belgium. Apart from French cavalry incursions, even after war was declared, the bulk of the three armies didn't enter Belgium until 21 August (engaging the German army on 22/23). If it was necessary for the "Franco-Russian pact" for them to engage by 15th day of mobilisation and they knew, as you say, that the main battle would have to be fought in Belgium, why the delay ?

[SWorrall]

I'm not going to involve my self with the proponents, or opponents, of the existence of a Schlieffen Plan.

The debate, whilst important, will never be conclusively resolved to anyone's satisfaction.

But, as Jack Sheldon reminds in his many excellent volumes, the single largest, most important, source of German documentation was destroyed in April 1945.

Given this gaping hole in the available documentation is it not possible that the definitive proof, either way, was simply blown to smithereens by the RAF?

Simon.

[Paul Hederer]

A perhaps less studied area is what alternatives, in any, the General Staff pursued in the last years of the prewar period. Could it be that the "vaunted" organisation was completely bankrupt of alternatives.

The General Staff launched a study in the last peacetime years, in conjunction with the Artillery commission, to determine the feasibility of breaking through the French fortification line. The plan called for capturing four barrier forts, followed by simultaneous attacks on Toul and Verdun. Both the fortress complexes were to be taken in six days. The conclusion drawn was that the needed resources would not be available until 1915/16.

This raises interesting questions about the intent of the super-heavy gun program. These were not intended for use against Liege and Namur, where their slow set up times and lack of mobility made them non players. The more mobile version of the 42cm gun only rolled out of the factory as the war began.

To add context to the concept of an end run through Belgium to avoid the fortifications I think its just as important to see what alternate concepts, if any, were in the works.

Germany was in a rough position by 1914. The older Moltke had decided to deal with the French fortifications by first letting the French advance out of them. This obviously wasn't a choice for later Chiefs who had a faster (and hostile) Russia to contend with.

Some of the debate back and forth is semantics. On one hand, you have a side contending that this was not a plan. I can see that to some degree. In the German military such adherence was an anathema. On the other side, it was obviously the concept used (with modification) to drive deployments and planning at war's outbreak.

Paul

[salesie]

Salesie'

German strategy, Schlieffen's strategy, was based on operations on interior lines, the same strategy Napoleon used in the Mantua campaign, the same strategy Lee used at Chancellorsville. I see no reason to rename "operatiions on interior lines" the "Schlieffen plan", aside from a "Schlieffen plan" idee fixe.

Schlieffen's sole contribution to operations on interior lines was to exploit the possibilities provided to Germany by rail mobility.

The "Schlieffen plan" Memorandum was not based on operations on interior lines, because it concerned an isolated one-front German-French war.

Terence Zuber

Perhaps, Terence, it should be called "The Frederic the Great, Napoleon, Lee, von Schlieffen (railway), von Moltke (24th August modified memorandum) plan?

Seriously though, I have to admit that I agree with you on at least one point i.e. what is commonly known as the Schlieffen plan is badly mis-titled and, thus, creates something of a red-herring vis-a-vis our understanding of the events of August 1914. I've been of the opinion for some time now that a more apt title could well be "The Failure Writ Large Plan" - or, perhaps, even more appropriately, "The German gross-overestimation of its own military prowess, whilst, at the same time, seriously under-estimating the capabilities of its enemies plan".

As for the discussions about the military/political situation in Germany in July 1914, before bowing out of the thread I'll just make one last point:

In Wilhelmine Germany, any differences that existed between the military and the civilian government at the start of Kaiser Bill's reign declined over time, so much so that by 1914 the military had virtually become the de-facto rulers of Germany (and totally so by 1916). Bismarck craftily used the military, when needed, as a means to a geo-political end, but by 1914 the German military had become, for all practical intents and purposes, the geo-political end in itself. A lesson for everyone, I think, that clearly demonstrates the sheer folly of allowing the military and the government to morph into one entity.

Cheers-salesie.

[lostinspace]

I hate to beat a very, very dead horse, but as you pointed out in an earlier post "details matter" - the Germans "were reluctant to commit themselves to the west bank" and the "cavalry divisions, in particular, were supposed to operate on the west bank and didn't"? The 2nd Cavalry Corps (2nd, 4th and 9th Cavalry Divisions) were the screening/scouting elements for 1st and 2nd Armies, 2nd and 4th Divisions 1st Army, 9th Division 2nd Army. 2nd and 4th Divisions began their advance on the 4th of August but were stymied by the blown bridges, they moved the next morning toward Lixhe (apparently a ford) and the leading elements crossed the Meuse, bridge building units arrived but Fort Pontisse slowed the process down with heavy artillery fire and the cavalry divisions were not able to send out their reconaissance patrols until the 6th. All of this is from von Poseck.

Regards,

Dave

[cdr]

Just some things

- the description of the document comes from Michael Epkenhans

- the promise of territorial expansion for Belgium concerned the areas in France known as French Flanders. The idea was apparently sold to Leopold II as a reconstruction of " Burgundy in the period of Duke Charles the Bold" The original draft of the ultimatum to Belgium as written by von Moltke ( which i found strange ) also included the bribe of territorial expansion This part was scrapped after intervention by Bethmann. The German proposal for a peace treaty between Germany and Belgium (dated 09/08/1914) did no longer include this.

- Concerning the railways

Belgium accepted in 1903 the construction of a railway connecting Malmedy and Eupen and further to the Rhineland In 1907 a direct link between Aachen and Louvain/Leuven was built. I think you also have to see the construction of the German military camp at Elsenborn as having an impact on this

- Concerning the cavalry I think only 2 and 4 cavalry divisions were due to operate on the west bank of the Meuse (advance elements forming temporary division von Garnier) Local belgian commander Collijns (with a bataillon of the 12th line regiment, Gendarmerie and the garde civique à cheval de Liège, and artillery support from fort Pontisse) was able to destroy the bridge and halt the advance till the 5th. German cavalry passed the ford later and entertained itself by executing civilians in Visé.

9th cavalry division was due to support the advance on the east bank but came to a halt after the suicide of its commanding officer von Bülow.

Carl

[Pete1052]

Terence,

Until such time that I have read your book there is a limit to what I could say in this thread that might advance the discussion in a productive direction.

However, this may be one of those occasions when the indirect approach may be more successful at winning people over rather than a frontal assault on what many regard as being the received truth brought down as Tablets from Mount Sinai. To wit, instead of saying there was never such a thing a "Schlieffen Plan," it might be more persuasive to say that Schlieffen was but one of many German staff officers, perhaps 200 or 300 of them, who contributed to the various operational concepts and schemes of manuever that influenced the plan used in 1914.

As long as there are documents in the archives written by Schlieffen there are those who will cite them as evidence that the "plan" actually existed.

In terms of writing history your concept and strategy have merit but your tactics are flawed. You continually tell people to read the detail in your book and its endnotes when a succinct summary of all that stuff might just win the day. In closing, it would be better to undermine the Schlieffen truism rather than to hit it head-on.

Pete Eisen

[Terry Duncan]

Terence,

In your last reply to me you said;

Therefore, in 1914, better now than never.

This could be said to be true with regards how some in Germany saw things, especially with the Great Program having just been implemented in Russia, but there was also the chance that no war at all would happen in the future. However, from your latest book, on pages 176-177 the section 'If War Had Not Come In 1914' you note a future for Germany that was not at all that gloomy and even note;

"The strategic situation in 1914 was optimal for the Entente. The German strategic position was nearing a 'worst possible case' scenario. It was very much in the Franco-Russian interest to fight in 1914 when Germany was still faced with the prospect of being outnumbered on both fronts. In the near future that might no longer have been true."

Obviously you are in a position of having to predict events if what did not intervene, but do you think that IF Austria had decided not to push for war after Sarajevo and the crisis had ended quietly, that Austria would have survived as a state cohesive enough to still be a viable ally for Germany in a future war? With regards to France I agree that she would have been unlikely to retain the Three Year Law if there was no immediate external threat, so I would imagine a return to the style of earlier French war plans that were more defensive in nature, so maybe the threat of a French offensive in the west would diminish at the same time the Russian threat increased.

Many years ago I first found the 'orthodox' views on the Schlieffen Plan to not make too much sense, maybe simply from schoolboy over-enthusiasm for my own ideas and thoughts that nobody had noticed things I had found, but the inclusion of cavalry units and heavy artillery on the German left flank armies always struck me as out of place if these armies were not intended to advance at all, or at least curious when there would have appeared a better opportunity to use them on the right wing. The subject of Paris was always a problem for me too, as a nice arrow going around it just didn’t seem to make any sense at all, cutting inside to the east and leaving the largest fortress in the world made little sense to me too, which rather meant the entire thing bogged down somewhere near Paris and that this should be obvious to anyone. My teacher did not like my reasoning, and ended up with them saying 'because it did' as a reason, which failed to convince me and about half the class by that point. In your latest book you claim the German's should have switched more troops to the east earlier and not advanced so far. Now this does make some sense, but surely this leaves Germany in the position of having to fight the long term two front war that it seems Moltke the Elder, Waldersee, Schlieffen and Moltke the Younger all felt left Germany in a position she could not win from and had little way of achieving a political settlement from also. War on interior lines might well make Germany secure to a degree, but would she be now simply waiting for her enemies to exhaust themselves and give up the war, which seems out of line with the fashionable doctrines of the day?

Cheers,

Terry

[bob lembke]

This raises interesting questions about the intent of the super-heavy gun program. These were not intended for use against Liege and Namur, where their slow set up times and lack of mobility made them non players. The more mobile version of the 42cm gun only rolled out of the factory as the war began.

Paul

A research/writing partner and I am studying the super-heavy gun program quite intensely. I have a few comments that might be of interest; they are generally fairly narrow, but may be of interest.

We think that we have a fairly good handle on the decision/design process and the major actors. I never have seen any mention of a particular gun improvement being matched to a particular fort, but rather to the general state of modern forts at that point in time, which was steadily improving. The generally accepted standard for a heavy gun was the 21 cm gun (generally a howitzer), whose capability took a big leap forward in the mid 1880's by the adoption of a new generation of seriously improved high-explosive shells. Studying the Belgian/French standards for desired fort performance, they were designed to withstand an almost unlimited amount of 21 cm shelling, and to be able to hold out for three months.

In the early 1890's the Germans came out with a 30.5 cm siege mortar, which testing showed was capable of quickly breaking up modern forts. The model developed then had to be brought into its firing position on a field (60 cm) railway, and in fact the standard standard gauge rail train configured to carry these guns was set up to not only carry the guns, carraiges, and ammunition, but also a field railway set sufficient to perhaps provide 1/3 mile of field railway from the standard gauge railhead to the firing position.

In the mid-1900s (mid-first decade) it was decided that fort design had advanced further, and that a 42 cm howitzer would be decisive. The first design had to have its components brought into the firing position by a full (standard) gauge railway, and the gun was basically set into a poured concrete base, this model weighed something like 175 tons, and took at least a day and a half to set up. About this time the 30.5 cm gun was developed into a lighter model that was marginally more mobile, and then a new model of a 42 cm howitzer was developed that was much lighter and was set on a wheeled carriage that was sort of a scaled-up 21 cm howitzer carriage. In order to make this work, the gun had to fire a somewhat lighter shell, and the maximum range was somewhat less. However, its mobility was much greater, and could be pulled down a road with heavy agricultural tractors.

As per the last sentence of Paul's, as cited above, the first battery of the more mobile "M-Model" 42 cm gun had undergone firing trials and tests on the proving ground, and in August they had been returned to Krupp with a list of desired improvements to the design, and were in the middle of the specified upgrades when the war started, causing Krupp to start maddened activity to put the two guns into a servicable state. The battery personnel were scattered over Germany at other duties, in particular with the Research Battery of the Artillery Proofing Commission (APK), and the other gear of the battery had to be hurredly collected, much of the gear coming out of the Krupp Museum, the Krupp Foodstuff Cooperative, and horses and cars out of the Krupp family's personal garage and stables, and the Krupp Works Fire Department. Additionally, its tractor park had to be borrowed and assembled from private owners. In fact, this very important battery did not exist as an operational unit on August 2nd.

Certainly, that state of affairs is a good indication that Germany did not plan to go to war in August 1914. I think that there is evidence that it was planned to have the new super-heavy siege train completed in 1916. I do not think that a single German super-heavy siege gun battery was on active duty status on August 2, 1914; they were mostly manned with called-up reservists, many of the guns were in depots and fortresses under tarps. Von Moltke wrote his Austo-Hungarian counterpart to borrow two half-battalions of the highly mobile Skoda 30.5 cm Motor=Moerser for use against the west front forts.

With regards to Liege, von Moltke attempted to capture it and the bridges at Vise by a Handstreich, a surprise attack with the light forces Professor Zuber mentioned, which only included two batteries of medium howitzers, and no true heavy artillery at all, never mind super-heavy; the gamble failed, and Ludendorff, in Liege, at the captured Citadel (the Germans had captured Liege itself, but the forts commanding the lines of communication thru Liege did not fall) went to a group of captured Belgian soldiers and asked if anyone would drive him to Aachen in a captured Belgian car; several volunteered, and did so. (I wonder what Carl thinks of this story, which is from German sources.) At Aachen, Ludendorff pleaded with the army commander for reenforcements and heavy artillery.

Bob

[Paul Hederer]

Since it seems this is winding down a bit, I would like to make an observation that I introduced (perhaps a bit too indirectly) a few posts back. I think to some degree this debating back and forth about whether there was a Schlieffen plan or not is perhaps a bit of tail chasing--it fails to address more important concept of "The German way of war," at the risk of using a hackneyed expression.

Whether or not there was a "Schlieffen Plan," is to a large degree irrelevant. Strict adherence to such a detailed and complex "plan," in terms of the number of variables involved in it proceeding as "planned," violated every concept of German military thinking since the time of Clausewitz.

There was a "Moltke the Elder Plan" in 1870 as well. There is a paper trail leading up to the war, various Denkschriften reflecting the general concepts and thinking of the Chief of the General Staff (CGS). I'm sure if Prussia and its allies had lost the war there may have been some type of debate that had raged around the "Moltke Plan."

The plan in 1870 was pretty simple--outside of the various details of concentration areas and concepts the directive is "The direction is Paris." Moltke's own dictum of a plan not surviving first contact with the enemy is plain to see here-the "plan" was to advance on Paris, and as events unfolded bring the French Army to battle and destroy it. There was no planned siege of Metz (which came as a surprise) and no detailed plans for the sieges of Strasbourg or Belfort, though it was recognised that taking control of these provinces was an important objective. There was not even any planned siege of Paris--the Germans found themselves spread pretty thin when that developed!

The thinking of Clausewitz and Moltke was ingrained in the German General Staff. In the pantheon of German military figures if Schlieffen was a god, he is Apollo, and Moltke or Clausewitz is Zeus.

This style of strategic thinking is illustrated by Ludendorff's 1918 offensives. He would launch a series of large attacks up and down the front and see what developed. His offensives have been criticised as lacking direction and unity of purpose. This criticism reflects more a lack of understanding of German military thinking.

It's also reflected, and I think this is less recognised, in Falkenhayn's plan for 1916. Though it never came to fruition, as the first step (Verdun) was allowed to suck in every increasing resources, the concept was very much like that of Ludendorff's in 1918. This is shown by the series of other attacks Falkenhayn was investigating as follow-ons to the Verdun offensive. His plan and concept was even praised by German military writers as displaying clear "Clausewitzian" thinking.

The concept that all three of these plans reflect (1870, 1916, 1918) is that they are open ended and have more the character of guidance to simply putting events in motion to be evaluated as they develop. In the "German way of war," the commander communicates his concept and assigns objectives--the method of achieving the mission is left to the subordinates.

So what happened in 1914? Were the deepest held beliefs of German military thinking and tradition suspended just in 1914? I think not. Wheel west of Paris, wheel east of Paris--ridiculous. Such rigidity goes against every principal of German military thought.

I agree with Dr. Zuber that there was no "Schlieffen Plan." There was a German deployment plan based on the concept of an initial end run through Belgium to avoid the French fortification lines. It's important not to confuse the complexity of the mobilisation plans, which of course had to be detailed to the nth degree (they were in 1870 was well), with a continued "clock-like" running of a pre-set plan.

The German General Staff didn't think in such terms of rigidity in 1870, and neither did it in 1916 or 1918. What I honestly believe is being interpreted as rigidity to the "plan" is reflecting the weak leadership of Moltke the Younger in 1914.

To debate the year of the last Schlieffen Denkschrift or the exact number of divisions it detailed is moot. It was a concept, an appraisal, a thought paper, but it was no "plan." Did it drive German actions in 1914--absolutely. But to call it a plan is to misunderstand the "German way of war."

Paul

[Paul Hederer]

Bob wrote:

"I never have seen any mention of a particular gun improvement being matched to a particular fort, but rather to the general state of modern forts at that point in time, which was steadily improving. The generally accepted standard for a heavy gun was the 21 cm gun (generally a howitzer), whose capability took a big leap forward in the mid 1880's by the adoption of a new generation of seriously improved high-explosive shells. Studying the Belgian/French standards for desired fort performance, they were designed to withstand an almost unlimited amount of 21 cm shelling, and to be able to hold out for three months."

Bob, I agree with you 100 percent. The thought that the "heaviest" guns were designed for use against the Belgian forts is incorrect. They were too slow to be used in a plan as quick moving as the coup de main at Liege. The thought of using super heavy (and super slow) artillery in a coup de main or any other fast moving action to capture the forts blocking the rail lines goes against logic.

The Germans had a pretty traumatic experience with the French fortifications in 1870-71. This is lost a bit in the afterglow of victory. They were very lucky that most of the French garrisons had little stomach to fight. If they had all resisted as at Belfort the war could well have had another outcome--and that is also the opinion of German writers after the war.

Pal

[bob lembke]

Paul's summary in post #161 is masterly. I myself for the first several years of my serious WW I study believed the stereotypes about rigid Prussian dicipline, the sort of discipline that enlightened German officers called "Kadaverdisziplin", or "the discipline of the corpse". One aspect of this was the freedom given small and medium-sized unit commanders to alter or totally ignore even formal written orders, if his perception "on the ground" called for him to ignore or modify his orders. I'm sure that this freedom extended to higher-level units.

Of course, for the actual mobilization and initial conveyance to the fronts, there existed extremely detailed and well-worked out mobilization plans, and these at first were carried out to the "t". Enormous confusion on the lines of communication would have occurred if it had not been followed carefully. But to think that, after say 40 days of combat, and the thousands of variables, big and small, that would have materialized, that a rigid plan written up years before could even relate to the facts on the ground is silly, to say: "Wheel left on Day 38".

Incidentally, the initial Handstreich plan for a quick strike at Liege included quickly assembling 150 privately owned trucks at Aachen, and speeding a considerable force of infantry to the vital bridges at Vise on the Meuse north of Liege, far sooner than cavalry could have made the trip, to seize them with a mini-Handstreich before the Belgians could blow them. But, even on about Day 2, these trucks did not materialize, the bridges were blown (fortunately, here, as elsewere, the Belgians blew one or more spans, but neglected to blow the piers, so the German Pioniere were able to temporarily repair the bridges in 2-3 days, not weeks or months. This happened at several locations.) and the Handstreich plan (or lack of plan) had to be modified on the run. The whole Handstreich plan was one of extreme opportunism, and even during the first phases the Germans "lost" two army corps, and again a General Staff captain was sent out with a Belgian driver who know the region to find the lost army corps; the knowledgeable Belgian was able to correctly suggest where these two corps could be found and again brought under command. The Handstreich was a reasonable gamble, but the major flaw was his surprising assumption that if the Germans were able to infiltrate between the forts and capture the weakly defended core city (which they did, rather easily, after a day of very stiff resistance), the forts that commanded the vital transportation routes to the west would simply fall. (I think that this was expressed in his marginal notes on the 1911 typed copy of the "Schleiffen Plan") When this failed to happen, Ludendorff had to make his dash to Aachen to plead for more troops and the then required big guns.

Bob wrote:

"I never have seen any mention of a particular gun improvement being matched to a particular fort, but rather to the general state of modern forts at that point in time, which was steadily improving. The generally accepted standard for a heavy gun was the 21 cm gun (generally a howitzer), whose capability took a big leap forward in the mid 1880's by the adoption of a new generation of seriously improved high-explosive shells. Studying the Belgian/French standards for desired fort performance, they were designed to withstand an almost unlimited amount of 21 cm shelling, and to be able to hold out for three months."

Bob, I agree with you 100 percent. The thought that the "heaviest" guns were designed for use against the Belgian forts is incorrect. They were too slow to be used in a plan as quick moving as the coup de main at Liege. The thought of using super heavy (and super slow) artillery in a coup de main or any other fast moving action to capture the forts blocking the rail lines goes against logic.

True, if memory serves, the six light army corps that attempted the initial Handstreich had, as its heaviest artillery, all of six 15 cm howitzers, and not even a single 21 cm howitzer.

The Germans had a pretty traumatic experience with the French fortifications in 1870-71. This is lost a bit in the afterglow of victory. They were very lucky that most of the French garrisons had little stomach to fight. If they had all resisted as at Belfort the war could well have had another outcome--and that is also the opinion of German writers after the war.

Pal

[joerookery]

An absolutely superb discussion! I was traveling for much of this but this is thrilling. After having read all the discussions and debates I could find I tend to agree with Paul. I think we gave that a pretty fair judgment back in 2009.

The question is not whether Schlieffen drew up plans or not, or if those plans required 96 or only 90 divisions to be carried out. The question Zuber puts on the table and Groß and Mombauer are unable to brush aside is: what is the real meaning of the operational study the retired General Schlieffen wrote in winter 1905/06?

One thing is for certain this thesis has certainly renewed discussion on something that had long been considered dogma. Zuber has done a good job standing up to a storm of opposition. If nothing else he has certainly raised my understanding. Lots of semantics.

In a nut-shell, yes, there was Schlieffen Plan - or to be more precise -- there was a study that Schlieffen handed to his successor in February 1906, which outlined the possibility of a war against France without having Russia at the back door. This 1905/06 study certainly revealed a good deal of militaristic thinking in the Great General Staff, but it did not contain any widely accepted golden scheme. The study was not a holy grail of a secret of victory that Schlieffen handed to Moltke (who just failed to understand).

Now if only we could have the same kind of discussion about the books on the Ardennes and Mons where I have some significant umbrage…

[Terry Duncan]

One thing is for certain this thesis has certainly renewed discussion on something that had long been considered dogma. Zuber has done a good job standing up to a storm of opposition. If nothing else he has certainly raised my understanding. Lots of semantics.

Certainly a lot of semantics, but also a lot of lazy historians who simply accepted what they had been told in the 1920's and 30's without checking for anything else. Even if we were to adopt the extreme position that everything Terence Zuber concludes is incorrect, we are still left with planning that shows that Germany did look at alternatives, and that the Germany army may very well have been a lot more flexible than a few arrows on a map suggest.

Many of the long standing cannards are certainly looking unsteady, the pronblem of what to do about Paris, the lack of troops to impliment the famous memorandum plan - and that it was only for a single front war anyhow, and the deployment of troop to the left wing that indicate it was meant to do more than simply sit and defend or even retreat in the face of a Franch attack.

Terence Zuber has at least opened up the debate and showed there is enough evidence to at least question what many have blindly accepted for years, and to raise the question why has it taken so long to unearth these documents. After all, from the moment Terence Zuber published his ideas others were quickly finding other new documents to suggest he is wrong, so it would appear that for decades people approached what is one of the most crucial aspects of the 20thC with a laxity that is astounding.

[bob lembke]

One thing is for certain this thesis has certainly renewed discussion on something that had long been considered dogma. Zuber has done a good job standing up to a storm of opposition. If nothing else he has certainly raised my understanding. Lots of semantics.

My study of WW I is generally at a more detailed level, and I usually leave the cosmic questions and the "what ifs" (and the related reading) to others. But it seems that in German histeography (sp?) there are some very strong "does and don'ts", and that a lot of the attention to (but, seemingly, a dearth of actual scholarship) the "Schlieffen Plan" is related to the mandatory bow to the concept of German war guilt for WW I. At one of the talks by Professor Zuber that I was fortunate to attend recently, I was struck by his account of the vehemence with which he was accosted at a scholarly meeting in Germany by a German Army historian. (A related "don't" is mention of the millions of Germans who died after the conclusion of hostilities in WW II, which is especially taboo in Germany, but is also carefully observed elsewhere, but let's not go there, we would be wildly OT and "off-rules".) Let's just say that there are lots of taboos in Germany, due to recent tragic history, and that only recently some of these are slipping a bit; interestingly, largely due to violations of the taboos by leftist intellectuals, not the right.

Bob

[Chris Boonzaier]

I think this may be a bogged down arguments of Semantics.

1) Sex Pistols invented Punk

2) Greenday play Punk Music (ok, pseudo Punk).

Ergo, Sex Pistols are responsible for Greendays songs... ?

Of course they are not.

25 years of change and other influences make the Pistols and Greenday 2 different bands.... but the influences are obvious.

Greenday are not the pistols, but everytime you hear them you realise that their product is what it is, because the pistols did what they did...

Same with Schlieffen... was the "Schlieffen Plan" exactly worked out by Schlieffen, carried out to the letter?

Of COURSE NOT, no one argues that point...

But of all the influences that made up the German Plan of 1914... maybe his influence was the greatest?

Maybe Schlieffens Influence was 38% and the other 62% was from the input of 31 officers.

Instead of Calling it the "******* plan of 32 officers"... naming it after its largest influence is not such a bad idea?

Did Michael Dell make my Laptop, design the buttons, choose the color and is responsible for all the nuts and bolts stuff? Probably not, but it is still a Dell Laptop.

[Wuerzburg]

Since it seems this is winding down a bit, I would like to make an observation that I introduced (perhaps a bit too indirectly) a few posts back. I think to some degree this debating back and forth about whether there was a Schlieffen plan or not is perhaps a bit of tail chasing--it fails to address more important concept of "The German way of war," at the risk of using a hackneyed expression.

Whether or not there was a "Schlieffen Plan," is to a large degree irrelevant. Strict adherence to such a detailed and complex "plan," in terms of the number of variables involved in it proceeding as "planned," violated every concept of German military thinking since the time of Clausewitz.

There was a "Moltke the Elder Plan" in 1870 as well. There is a paper trail leading up to the war, various Denkschriften reflecting the general concepts and thinking of the Chief of the General Staff (CGS). I'm sure if Prussia and its allies had lost the war there may have been some type of debate that had raged around the "Moltke Plan."

The plan in 1870 was pretty simple--outside of the various details of concentration areas and concepts the directive is "The direction is Paris." Moltke's own dictum of a plan not surviving first contact with the enemy is plain to see here-the "plan" was to advance on Paris, and as events unfolded bring the French Army to battle and destroy it. There was no planned siege of Metz (which came as a surprise) and no detailed plans for the sieges of Strasbourg or Belfort, though it was recognised that taking control of these provinces was an important objective. There was not even any planned siege of Paris--the Germans found themselves spread pretty thin when that developed!

Paul,

You need to read my The Moltke Myth . Moltke composed incredibly detailed ortders whhich he could never execute because they were based on assumption that always proved to be wrong, plus a failure to conduct cavalry reconnaissance.

Your characterization of "The German Way of War as,essentially, "winging it" i8t 180 Degrees off. German practise in the 20th century was based on Auftragstaktik, the foundation of which is thorough training in German doctrine at all levels. The commander not only isues an order but also the reasonoiing behind his decision (Entschluss mit Begrungung) which gives his subordinates thye concept of the operation. In case of unforseen developements - which will always occur - the subordinate commander can exercise his initiative intelligently.

I am fascinated that in the "Schliefn plan" Memorandum Schlieffen says he needed 96 divisions and you say that he really didn't mean it - what Schlieffen really wanted to say is that he was presenting a "concept".

Which brings us to the question - what was that "concept".

And in what document do you find it? You're the doctoral candidate

The thinking of Clausewitz and Moltke was ingrained in the German General Staff. In the pantheon of German military figures if Schlieffen was a god, he is Apollo, and Moltke or Clausewitz is Zeus.

This style of strategic thinking is illustrated by Ludendorff's 1918 offensives. He would launch a series of large attacks up and down the front and see what developed. His offensives have been criticised as lacking direction and unity of purpose. This criticism reflects more a lack of understanding of German military thinking.

It's also reflected, and I think this is less recognised, in Falkenhayn's plan for 1916. Though it never came to fruition, as the first step (Verdun) was allowed to suck in every increasing resources, the concept was very much like that of Ludendorff's in 1918. This is shown by the series of other attacks Falkenhayn was investigating as follow-ons to the Verdun offensive. His plan and concept was even praised by German military writers as displaying clear "Clausewitzian" thinking.

The concept that all three of these plans reflect (1870, 1916, 1918) is that they are open ended and have more the character of guidance to simply putting events in motion to be evaluated as they develop. In the "German way of war," the commander communicates his concept and assigns objectives--the method of achieving the mission is left to the subordinates.

So what happened in 1914? Were the deepest held beliefs of German military thinking and tradition suspended just in 1914? I think not. Wheel west of Paris, wheel east of Paris--ridiculous. Such rigidity goes against every principal of German military thought.

I agree with Dr. Zuber that there was no "Schlieffen Plan." There was a German deployment plan based on the concept of an initial end run through Belgium to avoid the French fortification lines. It's important not to confuse the complexity of the mobilisation plans, which of course had to be detailed to the nth degree (they were in 1870 was well), with a continued "clock-like" running of a pre-set plan.

The German General Staff didn't think in such terms of rigidity in 1870, and neither did it in 1916 or 1918. What I honestly believe is being interpreted as rigidity to the "plan" is reflecting the weak leadership of Moltke the Younger in 1914.

To debate the year of the last Schlieffen Denkschrift or the exact number of divisions it detailed is moot. It was a concept, an appraisal, a thought paper, but it was no "plan." Did it drive German actions in 1914--absolutely. But to call it a plan is to misunderstand the "German way of war."

Paul

Paul,

You need to read my The Moltke Myth: Prussian War Planning 1857-1871 . Moltke composed incredibly detailed plans which he could never execute because they were based on assumption that always proved to be wrong, plus a failure to conduct cavalry reconnaissance. Hence the last- minute desperate improvisations.

Your characterization of "The German Way of War" as, essentially, "winging it" is 180 degrees off. German military practise in the 20th century was based on Auftragstaktik, the foundation of which is thorough training in German doctrine at all levels. The commander not only issues an order but also the reasoning behind his decision (Entschluss mit Begrungung) which gives his subordinates thye concept of the operation. In case of unforseen developements - which will always occur - the subordinate commander can exercise his initiative intelligently. This is the antitiesis of "winging it".

I am fascinated that in the "Schlieffen plan" Memorandum Schlieffen says he needed 96 divisions and you say that he really didn't mean it - what Schlieffen really wanted to say is that he was merely presenting a "concept".

Which brings us to the question - what was that "concept"?. Do we cherry-pick the parts of the Memorandum we like and leave out the bits that we find annoying?

I note again that you have not answered my question presented in my first posting concerning the actual contents of the Schlieffen plan memorandum.

It is becoming clear that the attractiveness of the "Schlieffen plan" myth is that it validates unsupported opinions - the "Schlieffen plan" is whatever you want it to be.

It is not a historical fact but more like a cult.

I may not be back for a while. I was gone the last three days to see my granddaughter compete in a triathlon. We will put her on the plane in four hours and then pick up our daughter and the other two grandchildren tonight and go off until Friday. Maybe I'll find some time before then.

Terence Zuber

[Wuerzburg]

I think this may be a bogged down arguments of Semantics.

1) Sex Pistols invented Punk

2) Greenday play Punk Music (ok, pseudo Punk).

Ergo, Sex Pistols are responsible for Greendays songs... ?

Of course they are not.

25 years of change and other influences make the Pistols and Greenday 2 different bands.... but the influences are obvious.

Greenday are not the pistols, but everytime you hear them you realise that their product is what it is, because the pistols did what they did...

Same with Schlieffen... was the "Schlieffen Plan" exactly worked out by Schlieffen, carried out to the letter?

Of COURSE NOT, no one argues that point...

But of all the influences that made up the German Plan of 1914... maybe his influence was the greatest?

Maybe Schlieffens Influence was 38% and the other 62% was from the input of 31 officers.

Instead of Calling it the "******* plan of 32 officers"... naming it after its largest influence is not such a bad idea?

Did Michael Dell make my Laptop, design the buttons, choose the color and is responsible for all the nuts and bolts stuff? Probably not, but it is still a Dell Laptop.

[George Armstrong Custer]

An eye-catching analogy, Terence. But it doesn't work, as you're comparing an entire genre - punk music - with a particular piece of work - the plan Germany went to war on in August 1914. Your analogy would have had more credibility if you were arguing that a particular song first written by the Sex Pistols was reworked down the years by different bands doing their interpretations of it, before becoming a cover of that evolved song by Greenday. Your argument as it stands, however, is referencing the evolution of an entire musical genre of punk-influenced music from the Sex Pistols down to Greenday. To make your analogy credible you would have to be comparing this generic musical evolution to the wider evolution of European military planning in the period running up to the Great War, rather than the evolution of one particular plan first outlined by Schlieffen which you are attempting to liken it to.

George

[Edit, Paul has kindly pointed out that Terence's post which I was responding to was merely quoting Chris' - which I have to say I missed. Oh well - the point I'm making still stands. Perhaps the habit of some of quoting entire posts and inserting - or not - responses within them in the same text colour is not a good one for clarity, as well as bandwidth!]

[Paul Hederer]

Hello Terry,

I actually never used the term "winging it," and that's not what I meant. I agree with your characterisation of the German way of planning and execution. I did say very detailed planning, but extreme flexibility in execution, and that seems to be what you're driving at as well.

As for the term concept, I think that is the most accurate word, yes--a general notion, a plan (oh no!) or intention; a conception--seems very appropriate. To characterise the Denkschriften of the various Chiefs of the General Staff as concepts of operations is very apt.

No, I don't really think debating the number of divisions in the Denkschrift is the critical issue. It's not a matter of cherry-picking no, I think it might be better to focus on our understanding of what happened. You asked where can we find Schlieffen's concept--you already have, it's his memorandum, but it is not encapsulated in a bean counting of divisions.

I agree with what you wrote about the myth aspect with Schlieffen, either the man or his "plan." I believe the same could be said about Falkenhayn or Ludendorff, which is why it is so valuable when people write books that stir debate. But isn't is just part of the need we seem to feel to associate some persona with enemy actions? Hutier tactics, Bruchmueller, Verdun, Falkenhayn's battle, Ludendorff offensives, Mackensen's battering ram, the Schlieffen plan, Guderian's panzers, etc, etc.

I do want to echo what a few people have mentioned here. We may not all agree on every point, but that's not really an issue--but I think we can all agree that in writing your books you have definitely re-stoked the fire, and forced the academics to rethink their positions.

There is no doubt that Schlieffen was the major influence, and that makes sense--he was the CGS for a long period before the war, followed by Moltke II, who seems to have been less strong.

But maybe a better question is what were the major influences on German war planning instead of who was the biggest influence?

Paul

[truthergw]

Big edit..................................................

But maybe a better question is what were the major influences on German war planning instead of who was the biggest influence?

Paul

That would certainly be an interesting discussion, Paul but perhaps it would be more suited to a different sub forum.

[Paul Hederer]

That would certainly be an interesting discussion, Paul but perhaps it would be more suited to a different sub forum.

Tom,

I reckon it would, But perhaps it's better to let the Schlieffen fatigue wear off a bit first

Paul

[truthergw]

I await the opening post with great anticipation,

[Wuerzburg]

Hello Terry,

I actually never used the term "winging it," and that's not what I meant. I agree with your characterisation of the German way of planning and execution. I did say very detailed planning, but extreme flexibility in execution, and that seems to be what you're driving at as well.

As for the term concept, I think that is the most accurate word, yes--a general notion, a plan (oh no!) or intention; a conception--seems very appropriate. To characterise the Denkschriften of the various Chiefs of the General Staff as concepts of operations is very apt.

No, I don't really think debating the number of divisions in the Denkschrift is the critical issue. It's not a matter of cherry-picking no, I think it might be better to focus on our understanding of what happened. You asked where can we find Schlieffen's concept--you already have, it's his memorandum, but it is not encapsulated in a bean counting of divisions.

I agree with what you wrote about the myth aspect with Schlieffen, either the man or his "plan." I believe the same could be said about Falkenhayn or Ludendorff, which is why it is so valuable when people write books that stir debate. But isn't is just part of the need we seem to feel to associate some persona with enemy actions? Hutier tactics, Bruchmueller, Verdun, Falkenhayn's battle, Ludendorff offensives, Mackensen's battering ram, the Schlieffen plan, Guderian's panzers, etc, etc.

I do want to echo what a few people have mentioned here. We may not all agree on every point, but that's not really an issue--but I think we can all agree that in writing your books you have definitely re-stoked the fire, and forced the academics to rethink their positions.

There is no doubt that Schlieffen was the major influence, and that makes sense--he was the CGS for a long period before the war, followed by Moltke II, who seems to have been less strong.

But maybe a better question is what were the major influences on German war planning instead of who was the biggest influence?

Paul

I'd like to wrap up this discussion from my point of view.

It appears that all that the advocates of the "Schlieffen plan" know is that something called the "Schlieffen plan" was the German war plan. What the "Schlieffen plan" consisted of is foggy, a matter of opinion and "common knowledge". The crudest details of the plan, such as the number of divisions employed, and the fact that it was for a one-front war against France alone, are unimportant. What counts is the "concept", but what that concept consists of is vague.

As far as I can tell, none of the advocates of the "Schlieffen plan" have actually read the Memorandum. Even if you accept the fiction that Schlieffen wrote the plan in December of 1905, none of the advocates of the "Schlieffen plan" are curious to know what Schlieffen's planning before that time looked like, and none of the advocates of the "Schlieffen plan" are aware of the content of any of Schlieffen's war games or General Staff rides: it's not that they are unimportant - for advocates of the "Schlieffen plan" they don't actually exist.

So the "Schlieffen plan" is document-free, content-free. It is faith-based.

I can't argue rationally with that. For advocates of the "Schlieffen plan", either you Believe in the Holy Schlieffen Plan or you don't.

Terence Zuber