Inventing the Schlieffen Plan

[yelob]

Thanks Terry for your answers and all your food for thought as you seem to have read a fair bit on this including Strachan

who if I'm reading him right seems to be in agreement with TZ.

If it's true that (again Strachan) Moltke expected a decisive victory in Lorraine as the cavalry disposition suggests then why was the right wing so strong and why were reservists used from the start?Is it possible that Moltke contemplated the Schlieffen wheel

around Paris as one of numerous options? if not why was 1st army so far west?then you get to the question of flexibility,when does that degenerate into no plan at all? and is it even possible Moltke had no plan at all other then to distribute his forces and 'see what happens'?

It seems the more you dig at this the more questions come up!

Great thread and thanks to all the contributors.

Best/Liam

[SteveMarsdin]

....they wished to force the French away from their fortifications in order to fight a decisive battle certainly looks correct, and from the information we have from Moltke he expected the war to be a long war and not a single short campaign - the comment about the war lasting 7 -30 years, until one nation (alliance) or the other was utterly exhausted certainly would support this. Terry

A very interesting debate but I do find this line a bit self-contradictory - a decisive battle surely points to a planned possibility/hope (however erroneous) of a quick victory. I think the quote of no plan surviving first contact with the enemy is pretty apt and both French and German "plans" seem to encompass similarflexibility: Joffre's XVII with 3rd and 4th Armies pivoting north or south; Moltke's options wth the right wing and centre armies to respond toa French advance through Lorraine etc.

[Paul Hederer]

Terry wrote:

...In your book Inventing the Schlieffen Plan I believe you mentioned that Falkenhayn and Tappen were in favour of a more central attack, do any details of their proposal survive?

Terry,

There is a proposal in the archives in Freiburg for just such an attack (instigated by Ludendorff). I posted this earlier, and for simplicity I'll just post it again:

"The General Staff launched a study in the last peacetime years, in conjunction with the Artillery commission, to determine the feasibility of breaking through the French fortification line. The plan called for capturing four barrier forts, followed by simultaneous attacks on Toul and Verdun. Both the fortress complexes were to be taken in six days. The conclusion drawn was that the needed resources would not be available until 1915/16."

Max Bauer discusses the possibility of breaking through the barrier forts in some of his writings.

There is also a post-war letter from the Reicharchiv researchers to Tappen asking about the plan and the intent. He responded it was just a proposal and did not represent a change to the "non-existent" plan

Paul

[Wuerzburg]

Terry wrote:

...In your book Inventing the Schlieffen Plan I believe you mentioned that Falkenhayn and Tappen were in favour of a more central attack, do any details of their proposal survive?

Terry,

There is a proposal in the archives in Freiburg for just such an attack (instigated by Ludendorff). I posted this earlier, and for simplicity I'll just post it again:

"The General Staff launched a study in the last peacetime years, in conjunction with the Artillery commission, to determine the feasibility of breaking through the French fortification line. The plan called for capturing four barrier forts, followed by simultaneous attacks on Toul and Verdun. Both the fortress complexes were to be taken in six days. The conclusion drawn was that the needed resources would not be available until 1915/16."

Max Bauer discusses the possibility of breaking through the barrier forts in some of his writings.

There is also a post-war letter from the Reicharchiv researchers to Tappen asking about the plan and the intent. He responded it was just a proposal and did not represent a change to the "non-existent" plan

Paul

Paul,

The Bavarians played a rather extensive wargame in 1904/05 to attack the 'Position de Nancy', and as you know, the Germany army maintained plans to attack all of the Sperrforts and the major fortresses. But there is no indication that they ever prepared a strategic attack through the fortress line.

Terence Zuber

[Wuerzburg]

I would guess that he, and all the other writers of the 1920s etc. had access to real living and breating members of the General staff. Which we do not have today.

I would imagine that there were discussions going on by people who were actually there and involved in the planning.

I would think that if Mayr and a host of others in the inter war year years had spoken of things that did not exist... then some crusty old General would have written a book and put him in their place, especially if it meant they were able to put the Socialists and Anti militarists in their place... they did not.

Unfortunatley too many arguments today are based on things we dont find, as opposed to what we do.

I am of the firm belief that the writers of "then", with access to the protagonists, had living "source material" way better than the few documents found today and the mass that have not been found.

There are plenty of German generals who put a pen to paper between the wars... one would think that one of them would have "exploded the myth of the Schlieffen plan" in a period best seller.

As i have said before, I dont really have a dog in the fight, its not really my area of interest, so i came in willing to be persuaded. So far i am not.

Best

Chris

Chris,

Historians rely on evidence. Pure specualtion is not permitted.

Meyr's information obviously came from previously-published material.

The idea that a Socialist was having nice friendly chats with former general staff officers seems pretty far-fetched. The Socialists were at this time doctrinaire Marxists and their attitude towards the Army was 'not one man, not one penny'. They were in favour of dissolving the army and general staff outright in favour of a Socialist militia. Mayr's conclusion in this article is that the general staff was a bunch of benighted troglodytes who should have been subject to civilian (Socialist) supervision. A conversation between Mayr and the general staff officer would probably have been conducted with fists, if not edged weapons.

Terence Zuber

Terence Zuber

[Wuerzburg]

Thanks Terry for your answers and all your food for thought as you seem to have read a fair bit on this including Strachan

who if I'm reading him right seems to be in agreement with TZ.

If it's true that (again Strachan) Moltke expected a decisive victory in Lorraine as the cavalry disposition suggests then why was the right wing so strong and why were reservists used from the start?Is it possible that Moltke contemplated the Schlieffen wheel

around Paris as one of numerous options? if not why was 1st army so far west?then you get to the question of flexibility,when does that degenerate into no plan at all? and is it even possible Moltke had no plan at all other then to distribute his forces and 'see what happens'?

It seems the more you dig at this the more questions come up!

Great thread and thanks to all the contributors.

Best/Liam

Liam,

Moltke didn't expect a 'decisive victory' anywhere, and said so often. He thought he might win a battle in Lorraine, or in the Ardennes, or in Belgium, but that's another thing altogether.

Schlieffen thought he could win battles of annihilation, but he wasn't at all sure that the other senior German commanders could. In the event, the only battle of annihilation the Germans won in 1914 was Tannenberg, and the Germans were merely replaying Schlieffen's 1894 General Staff Ride East.

Both the French and Germans had to extend their northern wing north because their armies had grown so large that Belgium was the only place they could fight. Indeed, from the German point of view the North European plain was the optimal place to fight a big battle. From the beginning Joffre wanted to attack into Belgium.

Moltke was two armies short of being able to swing around Paris.

It is clear from Plan XVII that Joffre intended to use reservists in the front lines. too. After the war French apologists tried to make out that only the Germans used reservists, and therefore the Germans massively outnumbered the French, which is the only reason they won. Rot. The real problem for the French was that the German reservists fought as well or better than the French active-army types.

War is a two-party exercise, as Clausewitz pointed out. Both Joffre and Moltke modified their plans to take their opponents moves into account. It can't be otherwise.

Terence Zuber

[yelob]

Thanks Terence for the really informative reply,I have learned so much from your answers and look forward to reading your books.This thread has sparked even more my interest in military history,I might have to give up my day job!

Best Wishes/Liam

[Paul Hederer]

Paul,

The Bavarians played a rather extensive wargame in 1904/05 to attack the 'Position de Nancy', and as you know, the Germany army maintained plans to attack all of the Sperrforts and the major fortresses. But there is no indication that they ever prepared a strategic attack through the fortress line.

Terence Zuber

Hello Terry,

Well, I did mention that is was only a proposal.

[Chris Boonzaier]

Chris,

Historians rely on evidence. Pure specualtion is not permitted.

Meyr's information obviously came from previously-published material.

The idea that a Socialist was having nice friendly chats with former general staff officers seems pretty far-fetched. The Socialists were at this time doctrinaire Marxists and their attitude towards the Army was 'not one man, not one penny'. They were in favour of dissolving the army and general staff outright in favour of a Socialist militia. Mayr's conclusion in this article is that the general staff was a bunch of benighted troglodytes who should have been subject to civilian (Socialist) supervision. A conversation between Mayr and the general staff officer would probably have been conducted with fists, if not edged weapons.

Terence Zuber

Terence Zuber

As you said, Mayr's information came from previously published material.... so you would have to rule out that all the Authors of this material (most not socialists?) had no contact to former General staff members.

Using your above argument.... if the Socialists were jumping around badmouthing Schlieffen and his plan.... why did one of the General Staff members or old generals not put them in their place and show them just how wrong they were.... "Just to prove how stupid Mayr and co. are.... let me just get this off my chest... The plan we used in 1914 ? Well... it was not even Schlieffen's... so there!"

But you will have us believe that for the whole period, Left Wing and Right Wing Germans, both for some strange reason had the same agenda.... fool the world into thinking they had used Schlieffens plan!

What possible reason could have existed to let the world think it was Schlieffens plan if it were not so? It would have to be a conspiracy of Robert Ludlum proportions....

Best

Chris

[Chris Boonzaier]

The real problem for the French was that the German reservists fought as well or better than the French active-army types.

Then why the superiour German hoardes stop advancing ? Where the commanders scared that the victories would go to the soldiers heads?

[Terry Duncan]

But you will have us believe that for the whole period, Left Wing and Right Wing Germans, both for some strange reason had the same agenda.... fool the world into thinking they had used Schlieffens plan!

Chris,

The problem seems to be that they all had very different ideas of what this plan consisted of, the early descriptions differed quite a lot, notably Ludendorff's early writings that Terence Zuber included in his Inventing the Schlieffen Plan book show that what Ludendorff recorded and what Groener wrote were very different things. How could two such senior officers, especially the one responsible for the Liege coup, have such different ideas of what had been planned unless one is not recording the truth?

If of course people insist any German action that involves the right wing moving through Belgium into France is 'the Schlieffen Plan' then the problem is indeed solved, detail becomes unimportant and all is covered by this one catch all phrase. That is not quite what most feel the plan to be though, even if the details do not really seem to fit very well.

Just a side note, but if the plan to outflank the French fortress system with the right wing is the deciding factor in naming any such plan after its originator, should it not be the Waldersee Plan as iirc the original decision to look at such a solution originated during his tenure as CoS in 1890 and not with Schlieffen?

Terry

[SiegeGunner]

If of course people insist any German action that involves the right wing moving through Belgium into France is 'the Schlieffen Plan' then the problem is indeed solved, detail becomes unimportant and all is covered by this one catch all phrase.

I recently went on the Grange subway tour at Vimy, and at one point the chirpy Canadian guide asked the tour group "Does anyone know what the Schlieffen Plan was?". For one moment, I was about to pipe up that it was a long-standing popular myth and misnomer, now comprehensively debunked by Terry Zuber — but in the end I didn't ...

[Paul Hederer]

I recently went on the Grange subway tour at Vimy, and at one point the chirpy Canadian guide asked the tour group "Does anyone know what the Schlieffen Plan was?". For one moment, I was about to pipe up that it was a long-standing popular myth and misnomer, now comprehensively debunked by Terry Zuber — but in the end I didn't ...

:lol:

[awp101]

I'd like to add my "Thanks!" for this discussion/debate. Some of it is above my pay grade but it is fascinating and one of those things I never thought about since for decades "The Schlieffen Plan" was just something we read about and accepted.

I came into the thread skeptical but willing to be convinced. I'm still not 100% convinced Schlieffen's fingerprints aren't on the 1914 offensive somewhere and to some extent but it seems pretty clear there were a lot of fingers in the pie and plenty of blame/credit to go around.

I recently went on the Grange subway tour at Vimy, and at one point the chirpy Canadian guide asked the tour group "Does anyone know what the Schlieffen Plan was?". For one moment, I was about to pipe up that it was a long-standing popular myth and misnomer, now comprehensively debunked by Terry Zuber — but in the end I didn't ...

If I had been there, I would have offered $20 for you to do it!

[SteveMarsdin]

Just an "aside":

Since this thread started Terence Zuber's published two further books on German war-planning.....there is always more to learn !!!

[Guest]

He's a busy man click

" The Real German War Plan 1904-1914 (History Press, in preparation) "

I have yet to read any, but look forward to reading them all eventually.

Mike

[bill24chev]

I have been following this thread since it began and now have the following thoughts on the debate.

In 1914 the German General Staff had the problem of allied enemies to both east and west. It would be perhaps be an advantage to quickly defeat one enemy quickly to avoid a long two front war.

The vastness of Russia and an almost bottomless pit of manpower meant that an early victory against them was an unrealistic ambition. Napoleon’s disastrous advance a century before would still loom in the minds of military planners.

To the West, the Franco-German border was not only quite short but would be congested with the size of the armies that could oppose each other and heavily fortified with no open flanks to manoeuvre. If the war in the west was fought exclusively here in all probability the stalemate of trench warfare would have existed from day one.

In the decade or so before August 1914 a plan to use Belgium as an open flank to Get round the French border defences Seems to have gained sway in the German General Staff The aim being to inflict a similar quick military defeat on France as in !870. The problem with this plan is that it may, and did, bring the UK into a war against Germany. From a military point of view this was not expected to be a problem because as the Kaiser later said Britain had a contemptibly small army. But it would Bring the Royal Navy against the smaller German Navy

In 1905 von Schlieffen, the recently retired Chief of Staff, produced a memo outlining a possible plan but pointing out that a right hook by the German army through Belgium would need considerably more divisions than the army actually possessed. This may have been either to show an attack of this sort was impractical or for political lobbying to increase the size of the army . If it was political lobbying ,it was a dangerous game because increasing the size of the army would have reduced spending on the navy.

When war did come, Moltke Set off in the west with the right hook through Belgium with about thirty Divisions less than Schlieffen suggested was needed for success. Despite this shortage the German army came very close to success, Only less than top class generalship on the right wing and at GHQ, the armies out running their logistics and shrewd generalship by Joffre, the French CinC. defeated the German army.

Although the Schiefflen plan may not have existed in the form suggested by historians in the period from 1919 the German army must have had some plan and calling it the Schliefen plan is I believe a good label as any. By plan I mean the general idea of a Right hook through Belgium.

[Wuerzburg]

As you said, Mayr's information came from previously published material.... so you would have to rule out that all the Authors of this material (most not socialists?) had no contact to former General staff members.

Using your above argument.... if the Socialists were jumping around badmouthing Schlieffen and his plan.... why did one of the General Staff members or old generals not put them in their place and show them just how wrong they were.... "Just to prove how stupid Mayr and co. are.... let me just get this off my chest... The plan we used in 1914 ? Well... it was not even Schlieffen's... so there!"

But you will have us believe that for the whole period, Left Wing and Right Wing Germans, both for some strange reason had the same agenda.... fool the world into thinking they had used Schlieffens plan!

What possible reason could have existed to let the world think it was Schlieffens plan if it were not so? It would have to be a conspiracy of Robert Ludlum proportions....

Best

Chris

The Army insisted that they lost the Marne campaign only because Moltke (and Buelow, and Hentsch) failed to understand the brilliant Schlieffen plan. So it wasn't the General staff's fault, or the fault of Kuhl, the dimwitted chief of staff of the 1st Army.

The Schlieffen plan was an excuse.

No giant conspiraxcy needed. The retired officers controlled the Reichsarchiv. Simplicity itself.

There were lots of people who accepted that the German war plan was the Schlieffen plan, but said it was the wrong plan - Hans Delbrueck for one, Karl Mayr for another. The army's reply was that these people didn't know what they were talking about.

I translated much of this argument in German War Planning 1891-1914. You should read it - it's only about 40 pages.

Terence Zuber

[Wuerzburg]

He's a busy man click

" The Real German War Plan 1904-1914 (History Press, in preparation) "

I have yet to read any, but look forward to reading them all eventually.

Mike

T^he Real German War Plan is out - I'm computer illiterate and my website needs updating.

Terence Zuber

[Wuerzburg]

I have been following this thread since it began and now have the following thoughts on the debate.

In 1914 the German General Staff had the problem of allied enemies to both east and west. It would be perhaps be an advantage to quickly defeat one enemy quickly to avoid a long two front war.

The vastness of Russia and an almost bottomless pit of manpower meant that an early victory against them was an unrealistic ambition. Napoleon's disastrous advance a century before would still loom in the minds of military planners.

To the West, the Franco-German border was not only quite short but would be congested with the size of the armies that could oppose each other and heavily fortified with no open flanks to manoeuvre. If the war in the west was fought exclusively here in all probability the stalemate of trench warfare would have existed from day one.

In the decade or so before August 1914 a plan to use Belgium as an open flank to Get round the French border defences Seems to have gained sway in the German General Staff The aim being to inflict a similar quick military defeat on France as in !870. The problem with this plan is that it may, and did, bring the UK into a war against Germany. From a military point of view this was not expected to be a problem because as the Kaiser later said Britain had a contemptibly small army. But it would Bring the Royal Navy against the smaller German Navy

In 1905 von Schlieffen, the recently retired Chief of Staff, produced a memo outlining a possible plan but pointing out that a right hook by the German army through Belgium would need considerably more divisions than the army actually possessed. This may have been either to show an attack of this sort was impractical or for political lobbying to increase the size of the army . If it was political lobbying ,it was a dangerous game because increasing the size of the army would have reduced spending on the navy.

When war did come, Moltke Set off in the west with the right hook through Belgium with about thirty Divisions less than Schlieffen suggested was needed for success. Despite this shortage the German army came very close to success, Only less than top class generalship on the right wing and at GHQ, the armies out running their logistics and shrewd generalship by Joffre, the French CinC. defeated the German army.

Although the Schiefflen plan may not have existed in the form suggested by historians in the period from 1919 the German army must have had some plan and calling it the Schliefen plan is I believe a good label as any. By plan I mean the general idea of a Right hook through Belgium.

I'd say a lot of people would agree with you.

But the two things - the plan and the force structure to carry it out - go together.

Schlieffn said that unless the Germans had 96+ divisions, the attack into France wouldn't work. Moltke tried it anyway, and lo and behold - it didn't work!

I think you overestimate how close the Germans came to success. On 5 September, even before Joffre launched the Marne counterattack, the Germans admitted that the attack had accomplished nothing and had run out of gas.

Terence zuber

[Terry Duncan]

Thanks Terry for your answers and all your food for thought as you seem to have read a fair bit on this including Strachan

who if I'm reading him right seems to be in agreement with TZ.

If it's true that (again Strachan) Moltke expected a decisive victory in Lorraine as the cavalry disposition suggests then why was the right wing so strong and why were reservists used from the start?Is it possible that Moltke contemplated the Schlieffen wheel

around Paris as one of numerous options? if not why was 1st army so far west?then you get to the question of flexibility,when does that degenerate into no plan at all? and is it even possible Moltke had no plan at all other then to distribute his forces and 'see what happens'?

It seems the more you dig at this the more questions come up!

Great thread and thanks to all the contributors.

Best/Liam

Liam,

Thanks, and sorry I didn’t reply earlier. When you say that the more you dig, the more questions come up, is exactly where my problems with the Schlieffen Plan started.

Even if you disregard all the work Terence Zuber has done - and I wouldn’t say that was sensible at all - there are serious flaws with the plan as presented in popular history books. Even the GGS were not good enough to have planned for a war where enemy actions such as deployment of if they took and entirely defensive posture didn’t matter, where the advances in technology cannot impact on the plan, and that everything is laid out so perfectly all that needed to be done was to open the envelope containing the plan and put it into action. If that really were true, the German government could have happily laid off almost all this huge body of staff officers and employed on clerk to open an envelope if a war looked likely.

There is also the question raised by the fact Moltke was CoS for eight years, and the idea he contributed nothing to planning in that time is really stretching things, if only because the German army increased in size during that time and therefore these new units would need to be included - unless you believe Schlieffen was so incompetent he had not noticed he did not have 96 divisions to command even in a one front war!? The war plans from 1904-1905 would have had to be for operations conducted by the army at that time, otherwise if a war did happen the CoS would look rather stupid having to tell the Kaiser he didn’t have an army big enough for the only plan he had, and was now somewhat making it up as he went along. Moltke would have had to have plans for the army he actually had, so prior to the army increases in 1912 even the actual war plan implemented in 1914 would have been impossible due to a shortage of troops. We also have the strange deployment of the cavalry in 1914. If the left wing is simply a blocking force, the cavalry is essential on the right and a luxury on the left. Who planned to put them there? If Moltke had already deviated from this great plan by this one act, why wasn’t anyone complaining from the outset that the great plan was being imperilled?

Then we have the input of Terence Zuber to this discussion, and the support in publishing his first book of Hew Strachan. Strachan is clearly a most respected scholar, so it is only reasonable to conclude that he was involved because he thought that Terence had a good case and had done his research well enough to deserve a decent hearing. With regards to the works of Terence Zuber - I have read them all, and many of the counter arguments - he has unearthed documents that show at least that German planning was not as rigid as was told for decades, and that Molkte did have planning input. He has also shown that simple acceptance of the famous map as a correct interpretation of the plan, showing arrows sweeping across Belgium and France towards and around Paris is now seriously open for debate - it is still on the Wikipedia page to illustrate The Schlieffen Plan - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Schlieffen_Plan.jpg

Even if we do not accept Terence's work as correct, he has shown there is enough doubt about the detail of how this subject was previously presented, and that too many historians have followed previous generations without really investigating the archives at all. We can argue about what was intended by Germany, but we cannot dispute that previously we were always told that there were no surviving archive documents as they had all been destroyed and yet now people are arguing about a very considerable body of documents that had been overlooked. I like to keep an open mind to all possibilities, and think there is likely to be a long time to go before this matter is settled.

Terry

[Wuerzburg]

I have been following this thread since it began and now have the following thoughts on the debate.

In 1914 the German General Staff had the problem of allied enemies to both east and west. It would be perhaps be an advantage to quickly defeat one enemy quickly to avoid a long two front war.

The vastness of Russia and an almost bottomless pit of manpower meant that an early victory against them was an unrealistic ambition. Napoleon's disastrous advance a century before would still loom in the minds of military planners.

To the West, the Franco-German border was not only quite short but would be congested with the size of the armies that could oppose each other and heavily fortified with no open flanks to manoeuvre. If the war in the west was fought exclusively here in all probability the stalemate of trench warfare would have existed from day one.

In the decade or so before August 1914 a plan to use Belgium as an open flank to Get round the French border defences Seems to have gained sway in the German General Staff The aim being to inflict a similar quick military defeat on France as in !870. The problem with this plan is that it may, and did, bring the UK into a war against Germany. From a military point of view this was not expected to be a problem because as the Kaiser later said Britain had a contemptibly small army. But it would Bring the Royal Navy against the smaller German Navy

In 1905 von Schlieffen, the recently retired Chief of Staff, produced a memo outlining a possible plan but pointing out that a right hook by the German army through Belgium would need considerably more divisions than the army actually possessed. This may have been either to show an attack of this sort was impractical or for political lobbying to increase the size of the army . If it was political lobbying ,it was a dangerous game because increasing the size of the army would have reduced spending on the navy.

When war did come, Moltke Set off in the west with the right hook through Belgium with about thirty Divisions less than Schlieffen suggested was needed for success. Despite this shortage the German army came very close to success, Only less than top class generalship on the right wing and at GHQ, the armies out running their logistics and shrewd generalship by Joffre, the French CinC. defeated the German army.

Although the Schiefflen plan may not have existed in the form suggested by historians in the period from 1919 the German army must have had some plan and calling it the Schliefen plan is I believe a good label as any. By plan I mean the general idea of a Right hook through Belgium.

If I could add-

Schlieffen had nothing to do with Moltke's actions after 24 August, that is, with Moltke's decision to pursue towards Paris/central France.

The example Moltke was following was his uncle, the elder Moltke;

1) After Koeniggraetz, the elder Moltke advanced on Vienna.

2) After Sedan, the elder Moltke advanced on Paris.

3) in the elder Moltke's post-1870/71 war plans against France, he always intended to advance in the direction of Paris (see Inventing the Schlieffen Plan, chapter 2)

This was the Moltke plan, uncle and nephew, elder and younger. Leave Schlieffen out of it.

Terence Zuber

[Terry Duncan]

If it was political lobbying ,it was a dangerous game because increasing the size of the army would have reduced spending on the navy.

Bill

This would surely have been a good thing for Germany, especially given the tensions over the fleet were one of the main resons Britain was so closely associated with France and Russia in this period. Without it, Britain and Germany may have been able to come to some agreement prior to 1914. The fleet was hardly essential for Germany, she would stand or fall with her army.

Terry

[yelob]

Thanks Terry,interesting info as always.It's funny I started Strachan's book as my summer project but now I really want to put it on hold and read Zuber,one of the joys of history I suppose.

Someone said it earlier and maybe it's worth repeating but it would seem an awful lot hinges on this question of what plan Germany used in 1914,particularly if it had a defensive or offensive bias.Surely that would have a big impact on future events such as reparations and war guilt and the even more tragic events of the inter war years in Germany.Is it possible for instance that Germany was reacting to Russian aggression (and then Franco Russian aggression).

I know a lot of that has to do with the origins of the war and not the subject of this thread but the fact is Russia mobilised first

and Germany didn't expect the Serbian crisis to be other than local,at least that's my understanding.So is it possible that Moltke (as well as everyone else) was surprised by the speed of events and could do not much more than deploy as best he could and see what happens.

It is fascinating to think that a lot of opinions could be debunked by solid answers this question.

One thing I am a little confused about is when the 1906 memorandum was published or made known and how much of it was

known before the war and immediately after it.Strachan says it was published but doesn't say when and I can't understand how Moltke could be blamed for not following the 1906 memorandum after the war if the document wasn't known about before the blame game started.

I think Chris also makes a good point as to how many ways is there to skin that cat especially as TZ has pointed out that going into Belgium was almost a given considering the size of the armies involved.

Best/Liam

[Wuerzburg]

Thanks Terry,interesting info as always.It's funny I started Strachan's book as my summer project but now I really want to put it on hold and read Zuber,one of the joys of history I suppose.

Someone said it earlier and maybe it's worth repeating but it would seem an awful lot hinges on this question of what plan Germany used in 1914,particularly if it had a defensive or offensive bias.Surely that would have a big impact on future events such as reparations and war guilt and the even more tragic events of the inter war years in Germany.Is it possible for instance that Germany was reacting to Russian aggression (and then Franco Russian aggression).

I know a lot of that has to do with the origins of the war and not the subject of this thread but the fact is Russia mobilised first

and Germany didn't expect the Serbian crisis to be other than local,at least that's my understanding.So is it possible that Moltke (as well as everyone else) was surprised by the speed of events and could do not much more than deploy as best he could and see what happens.

It is fascinating to think that a lot of opinions could be debunked by solid answers this question.

One thing I am a little confused about is when the 1906 memorandum was published or made known and how much of it was

known before the war and immediately after it.Strachan says it was published but doesn't say when and I can't understand how Moltke could be blamed for not following the 1906 memorandum after the war if the document wasn't known about before the blame game started.

I think Chris also makes a good point as to how many ways is there to skin that cat especially as TZ has pointed out that going into Belgium was almost a given considering the size of the armies involved.

Best/Liam

Liam,

I can't imagine that Strachan says that the 1906 Memorandum was published at any time before Ritter did in 1956. I'd check that passage closely.

The only proof that Moltke read it was in 1911. He wasn't impressed.

The 'blame game' started in 1914 - all the German generals knew they'd screwed up. Everybody got a share: 7th Army for attacking in Alsace, 6th Army for attacking too soon in Lorraine, ditto 5th Army in the Ardennes, 3rd Army for a whole series of mistakes, 2nd Army for attacking too soon, 1st Army for failing to annihilate the British - twice. This was clear in Stegemann's book published in 1917 (Stegemann was a Swiss).

The first proof that Groener decided to use the 'Schlieffen plan' excuse is in 1919.

One of the plus points of the 'Schlieffen plan' excuse for the generals was that all these other screw-ups faded into the background. If Moltke (and Buelow, and Hentsch) had just understood the 'Schlieffen plan' then everything would have been fine. And Moltke and Hentsch were dead, and Buelow had a stroke and would soon be dead too.

The 'Schlieffen School' made very selected and tendentious references to it 1920-1929, but were a long way from 'publishing' it.

Terence Zuber