Inventing the Schlieffen Plan

[Glenn239]

There are a bunch of "ifs" involved here, the biggest and least likely being that the British would want to guarantee Belgian neutrality against the French.

In any case, the Germans never thought that the French would respect Belgian neutrality, and Moltke was certain that the Belgians would side with the French, regardless of what the Germans did.

Nobody thought the Germans could "finish first with Russia". The country was too big and the communications net too underdeveloped.

From August to October 1914 the Germans could best-case have advanced to Smolensk and then it begins to snow and where are they?

Terence Zuber

Fair enough. In the west, assuming Belgium's territory remains neutral for the duration of a conflict, do you think it feasible that either France or Germany could reasonably expect to undertake a decisive offensive against the other, or would the large size of their armies and the poor communications along the common border assure a permanent stalemate?

[Wuerzburg]

That's better, Glen239, the fantasies are left where they belong - in the mind of those who allot a greater importance to them than historical reality.

It seems pretty clear that the "casual discussions" you highlight did not lead to the "understanding" between Britain and France vis-a-vis Belgian neutrality that you strongly imply stemmed from said discussions i.e. you say that in 1912 Britain agreed not object if a scenario such as that highlighted in Poincare's letter came to fruition.

If such an "understanding" had been reached then there would have been no need for Britain to send diplomatic telegrams to both France and Germany in very early August 1914; Britain actually asked France its intentions towards Belgian neutrality, and France responded immediately by saying it would respect it unconditionally. Consequently, although Poincare may have asked for British acquiescence towards French pre-emptive violation in 1912 and Grey may have acknowledged such a request, the later telegram from Britain, and France's rapid reply to it ,clearly shows that the true "understanding" between the powers was in fact the very opposite of what you imply - no diplomatic self-assuaging jibber-jabber in the diplomatic telegrams of early Aug 1914.

In other words, the actuality of events completely overtake any conclusions stemming from prior casual discussions. Casual discussions and requests are one thing, reality in this instance is a completely different thing, and blatantly so.

That said, I can understand why Germany would misread such things - by 1914 they had become geo-political incompetents of the highest order.

Kaiser Bill's succession, followed by Bismarck's fall from grace, started the chain of German geo-political disasters that ended with it having ambitions much bigger than its wallet, being almost diplomatically isolated with very few friends, being hemmed-in on land, outgunned at sea, and chained to a corpse. Then Germany had the gall to claim that it had no choice but to invade a neutral country, despite being a guarantor of said neutrality, on the grounds of self-defence.

Wilhelmine, post-Bismarck, Germany came to regard treaties as "mere scraps of paper" to be thrown into history's rubbish bin when they no longer suited German self-interest. German policies in the two decades prior to 1914 were woefully lacking in geo-political nous; the powers-that-be in Germany had an unerring knack of painting themselves into a geo-political corner. Through it own policies, by 1914 Germany felt threatened militarily (by an encirclement all of its own making), felt threatened economically (for all its industrial power, it had financial problems stemming from its massive investment in growth over the previous few decades, and its liquidity was in dire straits - in other words, its ambitions were far bigger than its wallet by 1911), felt threatened politically (its policy of Weltpolitik was failing because of cost and thus causing internal political strife - and, as in all countries, heavy socialist sentiment began to spring from the industrialised cities).

Consequently, in my opinion, when the July crisis arose in 1914, Germany was totally incapable of dealing with it with any geo-political insight/foresight at all, and by late July it had convinced itself that it had no choice but follow its militaristic instincts - and just like many of those who fall prey to their own failings, it didn't take much to convince itself that it was in fact the victim, and had no choice but to attack before being attacked (a sentiment that even to this day still seems to hold sway in some quarters).

Cheers-salesie.

The usual one-sided analysis of the strategic situation in 1914. No consideration given to Franco-Russian planning or actions.

Between 1911 and 1913 the French and Russians agreed to conduct a joint general offensive against Germany on the 15th day of mobilization.

There was never such a stipulation in German planning

The questioon of defending the scantity of the treaties of Belgian neutrality was never an issue in Franco-Russian military planning.

Russia declared general mobilization first, setting the Franco-Russian attack plan in motion.

The first battles were fought at Tannenberg in East Prussia and in German Lorraine.

In both cases the Germans, defending German territory, counterattacked.

The German army was the last of the four great powers to large-scale offensive operations, meeting the French army, which was also advancing, inside Belgium.

If offensive military planning and assuming the military offensive are morally wrong (a point of view I think is military nonsense) -

then Russia and France were blantant aggressors.

Terence Zuber

[Glenn239]

For the Germans, the essential problem is the same on both fronts - an offensive into either France or Russia pulls the units away from the German railheads. This is especially serious in the east. Where does a two-week advance into Russia get you? Nowhere important. But you've just doubled the amount of time it would take you to shift forces back west, and halved your force multiplier.

Terence Zuber

If the German bluff (not necessarily a two week advance into Russia, just enough activity to cause the Russians to activate their 'G' mobilization variant) worked, then it would buy two things; (1) The Russian offensive against Austria-Hungary does not occur in August 1914 and (2) the Russian deployment against Germany is massed deeper in the interior of Russia, meaning that a Russian offensive against Germany is also delayed.

[Glenn239]

That's better, Glen239, the fantasies are left where they belong - in the mind of those who allot a greater importance to them than historical reality.

It seems pretty clear that the "casual discussions" you highlight did not lead to the "understanding" between Britain and France vis-a-vis Belgian neutrality that you strongly imply stemmed from said discussions i.e. you say that in 1912 Britain agreed not object if a scenario such as that highlighted in Poincare's letter came to fruition.

If such an "understanding" had been reached then there would have been no need for Britain to send diplomatic telegrams to both France and Germany in very early August 1914; Britain actually asked France its intentions towards Belgian neutrality, and France responded immediately by saying it would respect it unconditionally. Consequently, although Poincare may have asked for British acquiescence towards French pre-emptive violation in 1912 and Grey may have acknowledged such a request, the later telegram from Britain, and France's rapid reply to it ,clearly shows that the true "understanding" between the powers was in fact the very opposite of what you imply - no diplomatic self-assuaging jibber-jabber in the diplomatic telegrams of early Aug 1914.

Cheers-salesie.

To be clear, when Poincare wrote to London and then Grey replied to Bertie the next day, they were not engaging in some theoretical discussion about German troops at Aachen in a Chitty Chitty Bang Bang movie. Rather, Poicare was using a specific example of why Great Britain must reject Bethmann's conditional neutrality formula of March 1912, and Grey was confirming that he would refuse it on that basis. So far from being 'casual', the matter about a hypothetical French violation of Belgium was deadly serious; it was the specific example Grey gives in the British Documents outlining why he will reject the proposed German treaty. Thus ended the last Anglo-German stab at detente, at a joint policy made independent of the squabbling continentals.

The British question to France and Germany as posed by Grey at the end of July 1914 was non-binding. When the German ambassador on 1 August 1914 responded to Grey's question by asking whether Grey would make British policy binding upon Britain also, Grey refused point blank, indicating to the effect that whatever happened Britain's hands must be free. From BD no. 448,

http://www.gwpda.org/gooch/446-475.htm

He asked me whether, if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgian neutrality, we would engage to remain neutral. I replied that I could not say that; our hands were still free, and we were considering what our attitude should be. All I could say was that our attitude would be determined largely by public opinion here, and that the neutrality of Belgium would appeal very strongly to public opinion here. I did not think that we could give a promise of neutrality on that condition alone.

If Great Britain could not pledge neutrality on the basis of a French invasion of Belgium, (which did not even rule out the possiblity that Britain would ALLY with the violator of the 1839 treaty) then I do not see how Moltke could possibly place any value upon the 1839 treaty when making his plans. Mr. Zuber's argument in Myth of the Schlieffen plan was that Joffre's intention was to come through Belgium and that the 'variant' moblization was the real version. The diplomatic documents do not rule this out. For the purposes of the discussion, that's as far as it is necessary to carry the argument.

[Terry Duncan]

The first battles were fought at Tannenberg in East Prussia and in German Lorraine.

Only if you ignore events in Belgium.

In both cases the Germans, defending German territory, counterattacked.

Belgium was certainly not guilty of attacking Germany, so the first action and battle of the war is at Liege where the Germans attacked.

If offensive military planning and assuming the military offensive are morally wrong (a point of view I think is military nonsense) - then Russia and France were blantant aggressors.

Offensive military planning is not wrong from a moral point of view as many other considerations can come into play that could make such an action important. What is morally wrong is to attack a nation you have sworn to protect simply because it will not violate its neutrality in your favour - the very situation Germany put to Belgium in 1914 - and this sort of action will be long remembered if you then go on to lose the war.

Between 1911 and 1913 the French and Russians agreed to conduct a joint general offensive against Germany on the 15th day of mobilization.

Did they have plans to actively invade Beglium irrespective of German intent to uphold the 1839 treaty? If that can be proven, then it would possibly go some way to excusing Germany for acting first. I am aware the German staff concluded France would act in such a way, but that is not the same thing as they could be wrong. Are there specific plans for France to invade Belgium from the outset of a war where Germany did not do so?

[Chris Boonzaier]

At the risk of starting a war on two fronts....

I think everyone with an opinion is "entrenched" on this thread...

It may be time for a virtual race for the sea and continue over to Mons?

http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=142793&st=225

A book I have been meaning to get for some time.

[Terry Duncan]

At the risk of starting a war on two fronts....

I think everyone with an opinion is "entrenched" on this thread...

It may be time for a virtual race for the sea and continue over to Mons?

http://1914-1918.inv...c=142793&st=225

A book I have been meaning to get for some time.

Maybe that is true Chris, but it might not be such a friendly chat! There seems to be somewhat more fundamental disagreement with some aspects in that book than over the Schlieffen Plan - though it is curious the same level of feeling has not be exhibited towards the Ardennes book for some reason!?

[salesie]

The usual one-sided analysis of the strategic situation in 1914. No consideration given to Franco-Russian planning or actions.

Between 1911 and 1913 the French and Russians agreed to conduct a joint general offensive against Germany on the 15th day of mobilization.

There was never such a stipulation in German planning

.

Russia declared general mobilization first, setting the Franco-Russian attack plan in motion.

The first battles were fought at Tannenberg in East Prussia and in German Lorraine.

In both cases the Germans, defending German territory, counterattacked.

The German army was the last of the four great powers to large-scale offensive operations, meeting the French army, which was also advancing, inside Belgium.

If offensive military planning and assuming the military offensive are morally wrong (a point of view I think is military nonsense) -

then Russia and France were blantant aggressors.

Terence Zuber

A one-sided analysis, Terence? I think not! Your assertion that "The question of defending the scantity of the treaties of Belgian neutrality was never an issue in Franco-Russian military planning...Between 1911 and 1913 the French and Russians agreed to conduct a joint general offensive against Germany on the 15th day of mobilization" needs qualifying does it not?

It needs to be qualified by saying, if war with Germany becomes a reality. After all, you've told us many a time that planning for as many eventualities as possible is a normal occupation for Army Staffs; if it's OK for Germany to plan in this way then surely it's OK for France and Russia to do the same? You can't have it both ways; plans are just plans until acted upon, if we were to take planning alone as a sure sign of Franco/Russian aggression then every Army Staff of every country is equally culpable.

And, the opening of hostilities was actually the bombardment of Belgrade by Austria-Hungary, and the first battle of any note was at Liege shortly after the German invasion of Belgium. Both events occurring some two-three weeks before the Russian invasion of East Prussia and France's move in force into German-Lorraine.

Now, a man as knowledgeable as you knows this timeline by heart, so why the blatant smoke-screen? Do you really believe that just by "fiddling" with said timeline you can "prove" that Germany was actually the victim of Franco/Russian aggression? I'm disappointed that you feel the need to stoop to such intellectual dishonesty, and in doing so insult our intelligence.

Cheers-salesie.

[salesie]

To be clear, when Poincare wrote to London and then Grey replied to Bertie the next day, they were not engaging in some theoretical discussion about German troops at Aachen in a Chitty Chitty Bang Bang movie. Rather, Poicare was using a specific example of why Great Britain must reject Bethmann's conditional neutrality formula of March 1912, and Grey was confirming that he would refuse it on that basis. So far from being 'casual', the matter about a hypothetical French violation of Belgium was deadly serious; it was the specific example Grey gives in the British Documents outlining why he will reject the proposed German treaty. Thus ended the last Anglo-German stab at detente, at a joint policy made independent of the squabbling continentals.

The British question to France and Germany as posed by Grey at the end of July 1914 was non-binding. When the German ambassador on 1 August 1914 responded to Grey's question by asking whether Grey would make British policy binding upon Britain also, Grey refused point blank, indicating to the effect that whatever happened Britain's hands must be free. From BD no. 448,

http://www.gwpda.org/gooch/446-475.htm

He asked me whether, if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgian neutrality, we would engage to remain neutral. I replied that I could not say that; our hands were still free, and we were considering what our attitude should be. All I could say was that our attitude would be determined largely by public opinion here, and that the neutrality of Belgium would appeal very strongly to public opinion here. I did not think that we could give a promise of neutrality on that condition alone.

If Great Britain could not pledge neutrality on the basis of a French invasion of Belgium, (which did not even rule out the possiblity that Britain would ALLY with the violator of the 1839 treaty) then I do not see how Moltke could possibly place any value upon the 1839 treaty when making his plans. Mr. Zuber's argument in Myth of the Schlieffen plan was that Joffre's intention was to come through Belgium and that the 'variant' moblization was the real version. The diplomatic documents do not rule this out. For the purposes of the discussion, that's as far as it is necessary to carry the argument.

Grey is not saying that Britain could not pledge neutrality on the basis of a French invasion of Belgium, he's clearly saying that Britain could not pledge neutrality full stop (exactly as had been the case in 1912). And the reason, in this instance, he gives for this is British public opinion vis-a-vis Belgian neutrality.

However, there is nothing partial nor new in Grey's response to the German ambassador's question; for centuries, Britain's position had always been one of non-neutrality when it came to affairs on continental Europe - it had never had any territorial ambitions of its own on continental Europe since the death of Henry VIII some three and a half centuries earlier, and one thing it would never do is shackle itself with pledges of neutrality to any European state, to do so would limit severely its ability to react to any changes in any threat to what it saw as its own strategic interests.

Germany in 1914 failed to recognise the vital importance of this centuries old British stance, just as you are now.

Cheers-salesie.

[SteveMarsdin]

Maybe that is true Chris, but it might not be such a friendly chat! There seems to be somewhat more fundamental disagreement with some aspects in that book than over the Schlieffen Plan - though it is curious the same level of feeling has not be exhibited towards the Ardennes book for some reason!?

As you bring up the Ardennes book (which is excellent for the German perspective and a useful antidote to Grasset's "romantic" prose, although sometimes too hard on the French, sometimes too easy !) the summary of the Battle of the Frontiers in "The Real German War Plan" book is as good a one page summary as I've seen.

[Wuerzburg]

A one-sided analysis, Terence? I think not! Your assertion that "The question of defending the scantity of the treaties of Belgian neutrality was never an issue in Franco-Russian military planning...Between 1911 and 1913 the French and Russians agreed to conduct a joint general offensive against Germany on the 15th day of mobilization" needs qualifying does it not?

It needs to be qualified by saying, if war with Germany becomes a reality. After all, you've told us many a time that planning for as many eventualities as possible is a normal occupation for Army Staffs; if it's OK for Germany to plan in this way then surely it's OK for France and Russia to do the same? You can't have it both ways; plans are just plans until acted upon, if we were to take planning alone as a sure sign of Franco/Russian aggression then every Army Staff of every country is equally culpable.

And, the opening of hostilities was actually the bombardment of Belgrade by Austria-Hungary, and the first battle of any note was at Liege shortly after the German invasion of Belgium. Both events occurring some two-three weeks before the Russian invasion of East Prussia and France's move in force into German-Lorraine.

Now, a man as knowledgeable as you knows this timeline by heart, so why the blatant smoke-screen? Do you really believe that just by "fiddling" with said timeline you can "prove" that Germany was actually the victim of Franco/Russian aggression? I'm disappointed that you feel the need to stoop to such intellectual dishonesty, and in doing so insult our intelligence.

Cheers-salesie.

Drop the insults. If you have an argument, make it. One would be lead to believe that the insults are made to disguise the lack of an argument.

The Austrians bombarding Belgrad meant practically nothing. The Austrians could not attack for two weeks and the Russians knew it. Serbia was not allied with Russia; an attack on Serbia was not an attack on Russia.

The Austrians were well within their rights. The Serbs were conducting state-sponsored assassination. The head of Serb intelligence organized the entire plot to kill the heir to the Austrian throne. The Russians were supporting murderous thugs (the same chief of Serb intelligence had the entire previous Serb royal family assassinated; the Russians knew this, too).

The Russians began secret mobilization on 26 July and general mobilization on 31 July, which meant that the Russians and French would begin their attack on 14 August.

Mobilization meant war, and the Russians mobilized first.

Arguing that the Serbs and Czarist Russia were pure as the driven snow and the morally offended parties is unbelieveable.

Belgium was never allied to France. An attack on Belgium was not an attack on France, it merely gave the Belgians the right to ask for French assistance. The French didn't actually send any. The French government never said that their political or military actions were determined by the German attack on Belgium, and for good reason: no Frenchman in his right mind was going to die for Belgium.

Neither Belgrade nor Liege changes the fact that the initial great battles (the Russians and French both attacked with about 20 divisions) were fought on German territory. The French and Russians were attacking, the Germans were defending.

Terence Zuber

[Wuerzburg]

The first battles were fought at Tannenberg in East Prussia and in German Lorraine.

Only if you ignore events in Belgium.

In both cases the Germans, defending German territory, counterattacked.

Belgium was certainly not guilty of attacking Germany, so the first action and battle of the war is at Liege where the Germans attacked.

If offensive military planning and assuming the military offensive are morally wrong (a point of view I think is military nonsense) - then Russia and France were blantant aggressors.

Offensive military planning is not wrong from a moral point of view as many other considerations can come into play that could make such an action important. What is morally wrong is to attack a nation you have sworn to protect simply because it will not violate its neutrality in your favour - the very situation Germany put to Belgium in 1914 - and this sort of action will be long remembered if you then go on to lose the war.

Between 1911 and 1913 the French and Russians agreed to conduct a joint general offensive against Germany on the 15th day of mobilization.

Did they have plans to actively invade Beglium irrespective of German intent to uphold the 1839 treaty? If that can be proven, then it would possibly go some way to excusing Germany for acting first. I am aware the German staff concluded France would act in such a way, but that is not the same thing as they could be wrong. Are there specific plans for France to invade Belgium from the outset of a war where Germany did not do so?

Terry,

If morality is the most important issue, then the Serb assassination of the heir to the Austrian throne is the proximate cause of the war and a far more serious crime. Absent that, nothing else happens. The Russians and, by extension the French and British, were supporting international criminals with armed force.

Terence zuber

[Chris Boonzaier]

Maybe that is true Chris, but it might not be such a friendly chat! There seems to be somewhat more fundamental disagreement with some aspects in that book than over the Schlieffen Plan - though it is curious the same level of feeling has not be exhibited towards the Ardennes book for some reason!?

I think there is a simple answer to that...

The Schlieffen question is a strategic argument at a level that is above what most of us are interested in. Personally I am more interested in things from Divisional level and down. If the Schlieffen question had been answered/settled, I would have said.. "Ah...ok. Good job folks!" and moved on.

The Mons question obviously evokes great interest here on the forum because of the British connection and obviously there is polemic.

The Ardennes book is over into French territory, so few people on the forum feel the need to mobilise. For me this may be /May have been the most interesting of the topics but in one of the reviews on Amazon there was a quote that really made me wonder ... so i am still deciding if I should buy or not.

Either way, Terence has been a good sport discussing the Schlieffen question... maybe he would like to tackle Mons... I imagine it would be like leaving a game of football to join a game of Rugby.

Best

Chris

[Wuerzburg]

Maybe that is true Chris, but it might not be such a friendly chat! There seems to be somewhat more fundamental disagreement with some aspects in that book than over the Schlieffen Plan - though it is curious the same level of feeling has not be exhibited towards the Ardennes book for some reason!?

I'd be happy to talk about Ardennes or Mons.

I looked at this thread and didn't see much I could have commented about.

Terence Zuber

[Wuerzburg]

Fair enough. In the west, assuming Belgium's territory remains neutral for the duration of a conflict, do you think it feasible that either France or Germany could reasonably expect to undertake a decisive offensive against the other, or would the large size of their armies and the poor communications along the common border assure a permanent stalemate?

A war just using the common Franco-German border is a non-starter. Immediate stalemate.

Terence Zuber

[yelob]

Terence,

I am a bit surprised that you say that the Austrians were within their rights to bomb Belgrade and that Serbia sponsored the

assassination of the heir to the Austrian throne.My understanding has always been that there were never any links proved

to the Serbian government even by the Austrians themselves in their own investigations.

I'm aware of Apis and the links to the Serbian army etc but that hardly implies full Serbian government knowledge,not to mention

that killing the Austrian heir would hardly be a good thing for the Serbian government.

Best/Liam

[Terry Duncan]

If morality is the most important issue, then the Serb assassination of the heir to the Austrian throne is the proximate cause of the war and a far more serious crime.

The rights or wrongs of what Austria and Serbia were doing really does not excuse other immoral events being committed the other side of Europe by Germany. The simple fact is that Germany acted badly towards Belgium, and had intended to do so despite her treaty agreement for some time in the event of any war.

The Russians and, by extension the French and British, were supporting international criminals with armed force.

At best the Serbian state involvement in the Sarajevo assassination was unknown to Austria at the time, the Austrian report had specifically noted that the Serbian government was not at all likely to be behind it. Russia may well have been acting badly, but then so were Austria and Germany in forcing a war in the Balkans when a peaceful resolution would have been better. After all, did the deathsof two people demand a war that would kill thousands certainly, and ended up killing over ten million?

The Austrians bombarding Belgrad meant practically nothing.

It certainly did to the people of Belgrade, and presumably to the Austrians too, otherwise why do it.

The Austrians could not attack for two weeks and the Russians knew it. Serbia was not allied with Russia; an attack on Serbia was not an attack on Russia.

So maybe Jagow and the Foreign office should not have been pressing Austria to to hurry up and go to war before somebody managed to force a peaceful solution to the crisis! As Albertini recorded;

But while Berchtold was at Ischl the Ballplatz received Szogyeny’s telegram, which had left Berlin at 2.12 p.m. on the 25th reaching Vienna at 8 p.m. and which said:

Here it is universally taken for granted that an eventual negative reply by Serbia will be followed by a declaration of war from us and military operations. Any delay in commencing military operations is regarded here as a great danger because of the interference of other Powers. They urgently advise us to go ahead and confront the world with a fait accompli.

I agree that Austria could not act until 12th August, therefor Berlin urging Austria to declare war and thus cut off any chance of talks to settle things is heavy handed to say the least. There had been time to try and seek a peaceful settlement if anyone had really desired it, trying to blame one side or the other exclusively for the war really doesnt work.

[Chris Boonzaier]

I'd be happy to talk about Ardennes or Mons.

I looked at this thread and didn't see much I could have commented about.

Terence Zuber

Ummm..... were we looking at the same thread !?!

[Wuerzburg]

Ummm..... were we looking at the same thread !?!

The one I saw had a bunch of posts from 2010, particularly from a "JoeRookery" (?) who expected me to write a detailed monograph on German tactical, operational and strategic doctrine of the three combat arms going back to 1877 or something. I think he's a former War College guy (instructor?), which would explain a lot. Plus a Belgian I'd apparently pissed off with insufficient attention to his army. Sound familiar?

Terence zuber

[Chris Boonzaier]

Hi,

both of those may be in there somewhere, but the real challange is about 10 pages of guys discussing the Mons and Ardennes books.

Thee are very many points made, I am sure I am not alone in being interested in your answers to some of the points.

Agreed that the last 4 pages or so have much bitch slapping between members, but the first 5 or so are packed with views, reviews and thoughts on your work.

best

Chris

I will be picking up the ardennes book soon, am sure there are some things I will agree with, and know there are a few statements that I wont... as such, I would be interested in seeing your views on the points raised.

[Wuerzburg]

If morality is the most important issue, then the Serb assassination of the heir to the Austrian throne is the proximate cause of the war and a far more serious crime.

The rights or wrongs of what Austria and Serbia were doing really does not excuse other immoral events being committed the other side of Europe by Germany. The simple fact is that Germany acted badly towards Belgium, and had intended to do so despite her treaty agreement for some time in the event of any war.

The Russians and, by extension the French and British, were supporting international criminals with armed force.

At best the Serbian state involvement in the Sarajevo assassination was unknown to Austria at the time, the Austrian report had specifically noted that the Serbian government was not at all likely to be behind it. Russia may well have been acting badly, but then so were Austria and Germany in forcing a war in the Balkans when a peaceful resolution would have been better. After all, did the deathsof two people demand a war that would kill thousands certainly, and ended up killing over ten million?

The Austrians bombarding Belgrad meant practically nothing.

It certainly did to the people of Belgrade, and presumably to the Austrians too, otherwise why do it.

The Austrians could not attack for two weeks and the Russians knew it. Serbia was not allied with Russia; an attack on Serbia was not an attack on Russia.

So maybe Jagow and the Foreign office should not have been pressing Austria to to hurry up and go to war before somebody managed to force a peaceful solution to the crisis! As Albertini recorded;

But while Berchtold was at Ischl the Ballplatz received Szogyeny's telegram, which had left Berlin at 2.12 p.m. on the 25th reaching Vienna at 8 p.m. and which said:

Here it is universally taken for granted that an eventual negative reply by Serbia will be followed by a declaration of war from us and military operations. Any delay in commencing military operations is regarded here as a great danger because of the interference of other Powers. They urgently advise us to go ahead and confront the world with a fait accompli.

I agree that Austria could not act until 12th August, therefor Berlin urging Austria to declare war and thus cut off any chance of talks to settle things is heavy handed to say the least. There had been time to try and seek a peaceful settlement if anyone had really desired it, trying to blame one side or the other exclusively for the war really doesnt work.

The Russians and, by extension the French and British, were supporting international criminals with armed force.

Everybody knew who Apis was. The Serbs refused to allow the Austrians to conduct an investigation precisely because they knew what the Austrians would find.

The French and Russians were real good at "plausible deniability" (as in, there are no minutes of the French-Russian discussions at the highest levels in St. Petersburg 20-23 August - fancy that). But there is every indication that the Russian military attache to Serbia knew exactly what Apis was up to. And didn't stop it.

The assassination is the original sin. It is inconsistent to be morally outraged about Belgium and blase about the fact that the Serbs perpitrated a calculated act of terrorism - calculated to start a great war. A calculation which Russia, France and Britain supported.

Anyway, the French and British weren't squeamish about occupying neutral Greece.

The British method of avoiding interational law was merely to have nothing to do with it - the blockade of Germany was illegal, but the British never signed the law, so starve all those women and children. In fact, keep starving them for a year after the Germans quit.

I knew a woman who was born in 1913 in Germany. Because of the blockade, she got rickets as a child. She was in constant pain. She lived to be 90. Starve all those women and children. Well, its better than incinerating them in their bomb shelters. I'm no bleeding-heart liberal: I'm an airborne infantry officer, as nasty as they get. I only mention this because you have such high regard for the moral importance of the 1839 Belgian neutrality treaty.

The Austrians bombarding Belgrad meant practically nothing.

Belgrade was 'bombarded' by a river monitor and, as I rememer, some field artillery. Negligible damage. Nothing like a real act of wanton destruction like, say, Dresden. But in any case, bombarding Belgrad was militarily insignificant and not the cause of the Great War. And inflicted nothing like the horrors the Serbian people were going to suffer in the war the Serbian government started.

The Austrians could not attack for two weeks and the Russians knew it.

The point being here that the Russians had two weeks at the minimum to conduct negotiations - and the Kaiser was screaming "Stop in Belgrade" at the top of his lungs. But the Russians mobilized anyway. No reason to wonder why - they wanted to get the war started.

Jagow wanted the Austrians to punish the Serbs in a localized war. This was the whole point of German policy - I'm surprised I have to mention it.

Terence Zuber

[Terry Duncan]

Everybody knew who Apis was.

And in 1914 nobody had anything to suggest he was involved until the war was well under way.

The French and Russians were real good at "plausible deniability" (as in, there are no minutes of the French-Russian discussions at the highest levels in St. Petersburg 20-23 August - fancy that).

Rather like Berchtold's diary being entirely empty for the week following the assassination then really.

But there is every indication that the Russian military attache to Serbia knew exactly what Apis was up to. And didn't stop it.

Apis said Artamanov didnt know what the money he gave Apis was used for, so that part is at best dubious. There has never been anything to suggest Russia knew of the plan let alone agreed with it.

It is inconsistent to be morally outraged about Belgium and blase about the fact that the Serbs perpitrated a calculated act of terrorism - calculated to start a great war.

Saying the assassination did not need a war to resolve it and pointing out Germany acted badly towards Belgium are hardly the similar. Pointing out that Germany should not have attacked Belgium is not moral outrage, it is pointing out the massive stigma it caused for Germany.

The British method of avoiding interational law was merely to have nothing to do with it - the blockade of Germany was illegal, but the British never signed the law, so starve all those women and children.

It cannot be illegal if the law was not ratified. The German U-boat blockade of Britain was designed to do exactly the same thing, it is absurd to try and suggest only one side transgressed.

I only mention this because you have such high regard for the moral importance of the 1839 Belgian neutrality treaty.

Presumably treaties are supposed to have some purpose, and are not simply a scrap of paper to be disregarded as soon as it suits? Saying Germany was wrong is not showing high regard for the treaty, it is pointing out that Germany disregarded a treaty she had agreed to.

Belgrade was 'bombarded' by a river monitor and, as I rememer, some field artillery. Negligible damage.

I agree. The puropse of the bombardment was to stop all attempts at a peaceful settlement though. Negligable damage at first, almost 20 million dead as a result.

And inflicted nothing like the horrors the Serbian people were going to suffer in the war the Serbian government started.

I would love to see you or anyone else post actual proof that the assassination was a government policy and not the act of an officer acting outside his instructions from the government. After all, that would probably creat very big headlines as it has never been proven yet. I seem to recall that the declaration of war was Austrian and not Serbian.

The point being here that the Russians had two weeks at the minimum to conduct negotiations - and the Kaiser was screaming "Stop in Belgrade" at the top of his lungs.

Berchtold ignored the Kaiser, or rather Bethmann though and insisted the war continue, the very act that caused Russia to mobilize. If Austria had not gone to war, Russia would not have mobilized, it was all a giant knock on effect.

Jagow wanted the Austrians to punish the Serbs in a localized war. This was the whole point of German policy - I'm surprised I have to mention it.

I am surprised that anyone who has studied the situation in 1914 could ever conclude that the localized war was at all possible, even Franz'Joseph got the outcome perfectly correct when he saw the final draft of the Note 'Russia will never accept this! There will be a really big war!' it simply was not possible due to the international tensions. Such a policy was delusional, and rather predictably a localized war did 'set fire to the map of Europe' as Sazonov pointed out the Austrian actions would do.

[Paul Hederer]

The one I saw had a bunch of posts from 2010, particularly from a "JoeRookery" (?) who expected me to write a detailed monograph on German tactical, operational and strategic doctrine of the three combat arms going back to 1877 or something. I think he's a former War College guy (instructor?), which would explain a lot. Plus a Belgian I'd apparently pissed off with insufficient attention to his army. Sound familiar?

Terence zuber

Terry,

I asked you to the forum, so it pains me to say it, but you could be a bit more cautious with your pot shots at other members. I know you have written a great many books, but that doesn't give you free and particular license to be unkind. Joe, for example is a well established member here who happens to also be a great guy and has written a very useful book on Germany and the German Army.

Paul

[salesie]

Drop the insults. If you have an argument, make it. One would be lead to believe that the insults are made to disguise the lack of an argument.

The Austrians bombarding Belgrad meant practically nothing. The Austrians could not attack for two weeks and the Russians knew it. Serbia was not allied with Russia; an attack on Serbia was not an attack on Russia.

The Austrians were well within their rights. The Serbs were conducting state-sponsored assassination. The head of Serb intelligence organized the entire plot to kill the heir to the Austrian throne. The Russians were supporting murderous thugs (the same chief of Serb intelligence had the entire previous Serb royal family assassinated; the Russians knew this, too).

The Russians began secret mobilization on 26 July and general mobilization on 31 July, which meant that the Russians and French would begin their attack on 14 August.

Mobilization meant war, and the Russians mobilized first.

Arguing that the Serbs and Czarist Russia were pure as the driven snow and the morally offended parties is unbelieveable.

Belgium was never allied to France. An attack on Belgium was not an attack on France, it merely gave the Belgians the right to ask for French assistance. The French didn't actually send any. The French government never said that their political or military actions were determined by the German attack on Belgium, and for good reason: no Frenchman in his right mind was going to die for Belgium.

Neither Belgrade nor Liege changes the fact that the initial great battles (the Russians and French both attacked with about 20 divisions) were fought on German territory. The French and Russians were attacking, the Germans were defending.

Terence Zuber

Just as I suspected, Terence, when the camouflage is stripped away you're nothing more than yet another lame-excuse maker for Wilhelmine Germany's militarism, and its geo-political failures and aggression.

I'll let some of Bismarck's last words, before his death in 1898, be my parting shot; how they must have rung loudly in Kaiser Bill's ears as he fled from his own people into Holland:

“Jena, twenty years after the death of Frederick the Great; the crash will come twenty years after my departure if things go on like this”.

Cheers-salesie.

[cdr]

oh dear, some people seem to be a bit grumpy

re Belgian neutrality in 1870. Germany under Bismarck issued a statement that German troops would enter Belgium if French troops entered Belgium and were not opposed by the Belgian army. So first the French would invade.

from where comes the statement that Moltke was certain that Belgium would ally with France. If so why did he (the ultimatum to Belgium was worded by Moltke) only ask for free passage through Belgium and offer to pay for all expenses by the German army. This is supported by the ever popular German regimental histories who claim that they were issued with extra coins to pay.

Carl