Lions led by donkeys?

[armourersergeant]

Well I like to think that after Kiggell, there was Lawrence, who it seems to have had a more level headed apporach, was the approach of 1918's battles effected by him or by Haig when he let the others get on with it and played a more admin role and interfered less?

After Gough, who was truely a loss, there was.......Blimey I dont know! Off to dig a bit and see who it was.

regards

Arm

[Jonathan Saunders]

... after Kiggell, there was Lawrence...

Knew that Its between Gough and Kiggell I am struggling with.

[armourersergeant]

Jon,

It was (later Sir) Richard Harte Keating Butler...If you have the Haig diaries from Bourne and Sheffield they have a small bio of him at the end of the book, but it seems he was a 'friend' of Haig who thought highly of him and wanted him as CoS but Robertson vetoed it on, apparently, grounds of too junior. As a corps commander in 1918 he was not a success.

Can send you a scan if you do not have it.

regards

Arm

[Jonathan Saunders]

No I have two copies - one I keep at work incase I need a fix. I did have a quick look but couldnt find who replaced Gough and from your comment I assumed you knew who had acted as Haig's Chief's of Staff off the top of your head!

So it is conceivable that Butler would have highlighted one of Haig's short-comings

[armourersergeant]

Absolutely did not know! I had to run upstairs and look. I assumed you were baiting me

Perhaps one of Haig's short comings was I think to be too loyal to some subordinates! Kiggel and Butler it seems. When Lawrence was 'put' on him he seems to have 'developed' better and the BEF did better, hence my comments, in part, about Commanders and their CoS.

regards

Arm

Ps..just come across a poor copy of England v Australia quater final 2007 and have been savouiring the result.

[Crunchy]

illustrates well I think how dependent commanders were on the staff advisers around them.

Arm raises an important point that is often ignored by the critics of the generals of the Great War in particular. Some seem to believe that all of the fault lies with Haig and his Army Commanders without considering the involvement of others in the planning and execution of operations.

Warfare is an imprecise art with many uncertainties and with opponents who seek to outwit, outclass and outfight each other. The solution is not self-evident, the outcome is not pre-ordained and the “friction of war” is ever present. Exceptional generals such as Marlborough and Napoleon are rare – but even they made mistakes and incurred terrible casualties. With the development of modern warfare, dating from the 17th Century, the breadth and range of issues to be considered increasingly became beyond of the capacity of any one man to handle by himself. With this increased complexity came the growth of staffs to assist the commander in addressing and considering these increased demands.

Good commanders have always sought the advice of their staff and subordinate commanders in planning operations and have relied on them to execute their plans. Some of that advice is good and some of it not so good and often the difference is not evident until after the event. Often the commander receives conflicting advice from ardent advocates of both sides of the issue and he has to decide which to accept. Sometimes the most compelling argument is not always the best option and his decision proves to be incorrect, for which he accepts responsibility. At other times, seemingly good advice is based on erroneous information, either because it was reported incorrectly from the front or because the enemy will seek to deceive an opponent through deceptive information and activities. The role of the CGS at GHQ or a CofS at Army and Corps HQ should not be underestimated and, depending on who filled the appointment, he could be a very influential advisor and player in the planning of operations.

The role of GHQ was to set the broad outline and objectives of the campaign and organize and allocate the resources needed for the operation. In modern parlance Haig and his Army Commanders detailed the objectives and outlined their concept of operations, often after considerable consultation with their staffs. The detailed planning to achieve those objectives and the concept of operations involved commanders and staff all the way down the line in a consultative process. The bulk of the planning and consultation was, and still is, undertaken by the staff. When time permitted the consultation and exchange of ideas was quite extensive. This did not absolve Haig from considering and commenting on the plans of his immediate subordinate commands (ie Army level), which he did, sometimes insisting on a change and at other times deferring to the subordinate commander. The execution of the plan primarily took place at divisional, brigade and battalion level and these were not immune from making mistakes and creating fiasco’s.

The ever increasing size of battlefields also saw the creation of additional levels of command formations into which the Army was organized; and with it the increasing devolution of responsibilities for planning and executing operations to subordinate commanders and their staffs. The formations themselves also increased in the complexity of the arms and services allotted to them.

For the British this development and expansion occurred during the Great War whereas in the German and French Armies it happened during the 19th Century.

Thus in August 1914 the BEF comprised a GHQ controlling two Corps, each controlling two divisions, plus the cavalry. In December 1914 the Army level of formation was introduced between GHQ and Corps to cope with the increased size of the BEF and the battlefields it was covering, when 1st and 2nd Army were created. By this stage the BEF comprised seven Corps (including the Cavalry Corps, the Indian Corps and the Indian Cavalry Corps). Of these formations only GHQ and I and II Corps had existed at the outbreak of war. This considerable expansion would continue throughout 1915.

The creation of new Corps and Army HQ resulted in the considerable expansion of staffs drawn from a very small pool of trained staff officers. Thus the standard of staff work and advice was fairly elementary in the beginning and would only improve with experience.

Initially an administrative function, the creation of Army HQ eventually involved further devolution of the responsibility for planning and execution from GHQ in order to cope with the sheer scale of operations. GHQ also expanded considerably to cope with increased workloads and new responsibilities such as policy and training.

Thus to lay the blame solely at Haig and his Army Commanders’ doors is to ignore the very considerable input and advice from a multitude of staff officers, subordinate commanders and their staffs - and their subordinate commanders and staffs, many of whom were relatively inexperienced compared to their continental counterparts. It also ignores the reality that fiasco's could also be created at brigade and battalion level.

Cheers

Chris

[Jonathan Saunders]

Thus to lay the blame solely at Haig and his Army Commanders’ doors is to ignore the very considerable input and advice from a multitude of staff officers, subordinate commanders and their staffs - and their subordinate commanders and staffs, many of whom were relatively inexperienced compared to their continental counterparts. It also ignores the reality that fiasco's could also be created at brigade and battalion level.

But the responsibility remains with the C-in-C and certainly in late 1915 if not before, this was a position Haig coveted and manipulated to attain - it was not a position thrust upon him. However I fear we are transgressing.

[Crunchy]

Jonathan,

I am not sure of the point you are making in the above post.

My comment was about laying the blame solely at Haig and his Army Commanders' doors. You are right in saying the CinC had overall responsibility but direct responsibilities have boundaries. It is easy to make all embracing statements about responsibility but can we hold him responsible for every failure that occurred on the Western Front given the devolution of planning and execution of operations? Do we ignore the performance of the enemy and the mistakes of subordinates at lower levels in the analysis? Where does Haig's direct responsibility for a particular failure begin and end and to what extent can he be held solely responsible?

Nor am I sure what the issue about Haig's intrigues to obtain the post of CinC has to do in the debate. The fact that he sought the post is, IMO, a credit to the man, although I heartily disagree with the way in which he went about it. It was not a responsibility to be taken lightly, but IMO his intriguing for the appointment has nothing to do with the issue at hand.

I am not a supporter of Haig but I believe any criticisms have to be based on an honest appraisal of all the issues pertaining to a particular failure rather than pre-conceived prejudice and it seems to me that a good deal of the criticism of the man is based on the latter rather than the former.

Cheers

Chris

[Jonathan Saunders]

My comment relating to Haig coveting the position of C-in-C is to underline the fact that he wanted that position and contrived to attain it. With that position comes responsibility. Haig chose, and actively conspired, to take on that responsibility. By all means criticise with good reason the Staff (or other levels of subordinates) below Haig as may be appropriate, but Haig wanted to have that authority to make, shape, influence the crucial decisions being taken on the W.F. and, therefore, it is right, IMHO, that he remains accountable for them at the macro-level.

I assume senior Staff positions would have been Haig's appointments?

Regards,

Jonathan S

[PhilB]

I assume senior Staff positions would have been Haig's appointments?

Regards,

Jonathan S

I'm not sure they were, J. From Tim Travers:-

"Lloyd George and the War Cabinet decided that one way of gaining control, or at least improving efficiency at GHQ, was to change the staff, and a host of new appointments were made in late 1917 and early 1918 - Lawrence as the new Chief of Staff; Dawnay as Maj Gen Organization; Maxse as Inspector Gen Training; Cox as Chief of Intelligence replacing Charteris; Hartley to take charge of gas warfare; Wace to organize the disregarded area of labour; Crookshank to control Transport; Heath as new Chief Engineer; Dill, Fuller and Nethersole to do liaison and make the staff at GHQ more efficient, and so on."

[Crunchy]

Haig wanted to have that authority to make, shape, influence the crucial decisions being taken on the W.F. and, therefore, it is right, IMHO, that he remains accountable for them at the macro-level.

Jonathan,

Yes I agree he is responsible at the macro- level. However, even if he had not sought the appointment but had been thrust into it would not have altered the situation. The mere fact that he held the appointment, irrespective of whether he actively sought it or not, means he is responsible at the macro- level. Thus IMO whether he intrigued for it or not is irrelevant to an assessment of his ability as a CinC. My point is that some people try and hold him responsible for everything that occurred including situations that either were beyond his control or where the responsibility for a certain outcome lay elsewhere.

By all means criticise with good reason the Staff (or other levels of subordinates) below Haig as may be appropriate,

Criticism of the staff or subordinate levels of command was not the intent of my post. I was simply trying place the debate in some sort of context to highlight that the planning and execution of operations involved a great many people, many of whom had a direct input into them. They were also complex operations for which no simple solution or pre-ordained outcome was evident. Once the battle started Haig had little ability to influence it and the actual execution was undertaken by subordinate commanders all the way down the line. No plan is infallible nor can every circumstance that eventuates be foreseen.

Cheers

Chris

[Robert Dunlop]

QUOTE (Phil_B @ Jan 4 2008, 05:15 PM) <{POST_SNAPBACK}>

I'm not sure they were...

Another classic example was the appointment of Smith-Dorrien to replace Grierson, when French wanted Plumer.

Robert

[Chris_Baker]

I assume senior Staff positions would have been Haig's appointments?

No. Recommended by, influenced by, but not appointed by. That was the duty of the Adjutant-General and ultimately the Army Council.

[Jonathan Saunders]

No. Recommended by, influenced by, but not appointed by. That was the duty of the Adjutant-General and ultimately the Army Council.

Thanks - so I assume something between 80% and 90% of the senior Staff positions Haig would have been able to have his man in situ.

[salesie]

I'm new to this thread, and, given its length, I have only quickly scanned the previous posts. So if anyone else has mentioned/criticised Brigadier-General Sir John Charteris, Haig's chief of Intelligence, please forgive my intrusion.

General Sir James Marshall-Cornwall served on Haig's Intelligence staff as a GS02 in 1916 & 17, and apparently, according to his unpublished memoirs held at the Intelligence Corps museum, he did not care too much for Charteris and the influence he had on Haig i.e. "I soon discovered that the views held by Charteris, and reported by him to Sir Douglas Haig, regarding Germany's manpower reserves, morale and economic resources, differed widely from the estimates made by the Director of Military Intelligence at War Office, Major-General George Macdonough [sic], and submitted by him to the CIGS, Sir William Robertson. Macdonough [sic], assisted by Colonel Edgar Cox, the head of MI3, combined the best Intelligence brains at the disposal of the country. Charteris, however, with breezy optimism, disregarded the sounder and more cautious forecasts, which emanated from the War Office and were submitted to the War Cabinet. Consequently the GHQ Intelligence Summaries seemed designed to bolster up our own morale rather than to present a true picture of the enemy's strength and fighting qualities."

Marshall-Cornwall's view would seem to be that Charteris' main objective was to maintain Haig's morale i.e. 'He felt that his principal duty was to sustain the morale of his chief by painting the situation in the rosiest colours and ignoring unpleasant factors. This motive inevitably led to a combination of suppressio veri and suggestio falsi.' According to Marshall-Cornwall, 'Charteris deliberately misled Haig but 'honestly thought that by suppressing all pessimistic evidence about enemy potential, morale and physical, he was strengthening his chiefs determination to win the war'.

If true, and I've not yet seen any reason to doubt Marshall-Cornwall's judgement, would this "false, overly optimistic intelligence", given Haig's "one continuous battle" beliefs, not have "seduced" Haig into believing the end of the "wearing down phase" was much closer than it actually was?

But, given Haig's confidence in himself and his own judgement, was Haig in fact "seduced" by Charteris during 1916/17 up until his replacement in December 1917 (and Charteris' successor would say after he was replaced)? If true though, whose "fault" would it have been; would the "blame" lie with Charteris for operating what, on the face of it, would appear to be a sucking up exercise - or with Haig for relying so much on Charteris' own calculations about the morale and resources of the German army and people when so much at odds with those of Macdonough? Or, would both be equally culpable?

To put it bluntly, was this a case of a lion taken for a ride by a donkey? Or a pair of donkeys ee-awing in tune with each other?

Cheers - salesie.

[truthergw]

With regard to Haig and Charteris. Is it possible that we have two long serving soldiers of similar social standing, education and general outlook, seeing the same facts and interpreting them in the same way? Neither of them seeing a need to move out of his ground and view events from a new stand point.

[salesie]

With regard to Haig and Charteris. Is it possible that we have two long serving soldiers of similar social standing, education and general outlook, seeing the same facts and interpreting them in the same way? Neither of them seeing a need to move out of his ground and view events from a new stand point.

That's one valid interpretation, Tom. Both men certainly hailed from the same "club" - they were personal friends, and Haig himself appointed Charteris as his head of Intelligence, indeed he'd been on Haig's personal staff since 1908, and both had belonged to the same Masonic lodge in India. So your interpretation would seem to have some basis in fact. However, could this "theory" be expanded?

Haig would not see the bare facts forming intelligence reports, but he would see both Charteris' and Macdonough's sometimes wildly differing interpretions of those facts - Marshall-Cornwall (and he's not alone in this view) clearly states that Charteris' assessments were wildly optimistic and that he virtually ignored anything negative; that his reports were misleading. I know that Haig, when defending Charteris to Lord Derby, said that he made allowances for Charteris' overly optimistic nature - but that doesn't explain why he believed in June 1917 that phase 4 of his one continuous battle doctrine was close enough to justify a belief in victory that year i.e. "The German army too, shows unmistakable signs of deterioration in many ways and the cumulative effect of further defeats may at any time yield greater results in the field than we can rely on gaining...the fundamental objective is the defeat of the German Army and this can not be achieved in a single battle and we must make preparations for very hard fighting lasting perhaps for weeks and we must arrange to deliver a series of organised attacks on a large scale and on broad frontages." This optimistic opinion of the state of the German army was at odds with Macdonough's reports. In my opinion, Haig favoured Charteris' assessment because it agreed with his own opinion - in other words Charteris knew what Haig wanted to hear and duly obliged, and Haig appointed him because he knew that Charteris would be only be too happy to tell him what he wanted to hear.

And there may be an additional reason why Haig preferred Charteris' assessments over Macdonough's - and it could be due to religious prejudice. Both Haig and Charteris were staunch Scot's Presbyterian. Haig wrote in his diary October 1917, "...it is stated in a note by the DMI War Office that the morale of the troops in the field gives no cause for anxiety to the German High Command. I cannot think why the War Office Intelligence Department gives such a wrong picture of the situation except that General Macdonough is a Roman Catholic and is (perhaps unconsciously) influenced by information from tainted (i.e. catholic) sources." Charteris wrote to his wife, November 1917, "My chief opponents are Roman Catholic people, who are really half-hearted about the whole war and have never forgiven DH for being Presbyterian.

A case of great minds thinking alike, Tom, or fools seldom differing?

Cheers - salesie.

[truthergw]

In the eye of the beholder, Salesie. Charteris completely discounted the idea that Haig was unduly influenced by his staff. According to him, Haig listened then made up his own mind. I'm not sure what to make of that, frankly. It is worth while remembering that Haig was a very good staff officer himself. He would have been able to shadow any of his staff and do at least as good a job. I think he made up his mind and that was it. He did change his mind but not often and not easily. He did not welcome critical analysis of his orders. He famously ordered a junior officer out of the room for arguing with him. There was still an Army ethos long after WW2 which said, " Here is the job, now get on with it as best you can with the resources at your disposal. We will talk about it later".

[salesie]

In the eye of the beholder, Salesie. Charteris completely discounted the idea that Haig was unduly influenced by his staff. According to him, Haig listened then made up his own mind. I'm not sure what to make of that, frankly. It is worth while remembering that Haig was a very good staff officer himself. He would have been able to shadow any of his staff and do at least as good a job. I think he made up his mind and that was it. He did change his mind but not often and not easily. He did not welcome critical analysis of his orders. He famously ordered a junior officer out of the room for arguing with him. There was still an Army ethos long after WW2 which said, " Here is the job, now get on with it as best you can with the resources at your disposal. We will talk about it later".

I agree that Haig appointed staff, when allowed, on the basis they would agree with him - tell him what he wanted to hear. But I would pose this question:

How many men died because Macdonough, a virtual genius when it came to the accuracy of his intelligence reports, was catholic?

Cheers - salesie.

[truthergw]

Put baldly like that, I have no way of knowing. There is not likely to be documentary evidence of religious bigotry. Although all the people who were close to Haig during the war comment on his deep faith, I have never heard him accused of bigotry so I can only assume that it was well hidden if it existed. The Rev. Duncan who acted virtually as Haig's chaplain for much of the war, does not come across as a hard line Presbyterian. Haig's view on the condition of the German Army after the defeat at Arras would have been held by many German Officers as well as British Intelligence. If two views of the situation were offered, Haig's optimistic nature would incline him to the one which promised the better results. We need to be realistic here. When tasking an army or a corps, no commander is going to tell them that it is doomed to failure or that it is going to drag on in a seemingly endless blood bath. If he believed that, he would not engage in the action. His job is to encourage not discourage his forces.

[Terry_Reeves]

I have to say that I'm taken aback by the suggestion that Haig discriminated on the grounds of religion. That really takes the biscuit as far as Haig bashing goes. Is there some evidence to support this?

TR

[salesie]

Put baldly like that, I have no way of knowing. There is not likely to be documentary evidence of religious bigotry. Although all the people who were close to Haig during the war comment on his deep faith, I have never heard him accused of bigotry so I can only assume that it was well hidden if it existed. The Rev. Duncan who acted virtually as Haig's chaplain for much of the war, does not come across as a hard line Presbyterian. Haig's view on the condition of the German Army after the defeat at Arras would have been held by many German Officers as well as British Intelligence. If two views of the situation were offered, Haig's optimistic nature would incline him to the one which promised the better results. We need to be realistic here. When tasking an army or a corps, no commander is going to tell them that it is doomed to failure or that it is going to drag on in a seemingly endless blood bath. If he believed that, he would not engage in the action. His job is to encourage not discourage his forces.

I'm sorry, Tom, but you seem to have missed the documentary references I provided, I repeat: October 15th 1917, Haig wrote in his diary, "...it is stated in a note by the DMI War Office that the morale of the troops in the field gives no cause for anxiety to the German High Command. I cannot think why the War Office Intelligence Department gives such a wrong picture of the situation except that General Macdonough is a Roman Catholic and is (perhaps unconsciously) influenced by information from tainted (i.e. catholic) sources." The DMI being Macdonough, does this not show that Haig regarded Catholics as "tainted"?

Charteris wrote to his wife, November 1917, "My chief opponents are Roman Catholic people, who are really half-hearted about the whole war and have never forgiven DH for being Presbyterian." Does this not show that Charteris believed that Catholics were his main detractors?

Also, there are other documents, a letter written by Haig to his sister and IBID, 4th August 1918, 3155/66, where Haig expressed feelings against both Roman Catholics and Jews.

Of course, no commander will set his forces on a course of action and tell them they're going to fail - that's not the point, that has do with man management not strategic planning.

The point is, Haig based his strategic planning on his own deep-rooted pre-war theory of one long continuous battle. He set about and/or continued with certain actions based on his belief that stage 3 of his theory, the wearing down phase, was almost at an end and phase 4 would be entered and therefore the war won in 1917.

This belief was based on his own pre-war estimate of the war's duration, and on Charteris' over-optimistic intelligence assessments that were almost certainly designed by Charteris to bolster Haig's own beliefs. Haig ignored good and reliable evidence from Macdonough's reports that an end to phase 3 was far from close, ignored on the basis that Macdonough and his sources were "tainted" by being Catholic, and, of course, they didn't concur with his own theory, unlike Charteris' - and even Haig's own own regimental officers, those at the sharp end with the Germans, were inclined to resent the over-optimism of GHQ about falling German morale etc. and doubted the wisdom (at this stage and with these numbers) of set-piece battles as against the trench raid business (witnessed by a letter sent to the Bishop of Pretoria and written November 7th 1917 by Geoffrey Dawson, Editor of the Times, after a visit to the front).

I don't regard Haig as being a fool, and, on balance, he was probably the best available at the time - but I do have the opinion that many a man's life was lost unnecessarily because sometimes his judgement calls were based on his inability to consider anything other than his own ideas as being valid and, perhaps worst of all, he was in the final analysis a bigot, and he allowed his bigotry to boost his own ego and ignore sound alternative intelligence and therefore allowed it to affect his judgement.

Cheers - salesie.

[PhilB]

I have noticed that, in general, strong religious belief and bigotry are closely related.

[truthergw]

I have a notion that that suggestion would be strongly opposed by churchmen everywhere.

[PhilB]

Naturally!