Lions led by donkeys?

[armourersergeant]

I know I shouldn't reply because thats what you want me to do but alas I cant stop myself...

In Memory of

Brigadier General NEIL DOUGLAS FINDLAY C B

Commanding 1st Div., Royal Artillery

who died age 55

on 10 September 1914

Son of the late Thomas Dunlop Findlay, of Easterhill, Lanarkshire; husband of the late Alma Findlay (nee Lloyd). Served in the South African War..

Remembered with honour

VAILLY BRITISH CEMETERY

In Memory of

Major General Sir THOMPSON CAPPER K C M G, C B, D S O

Commanding 7th Division, General Staff

late, East Lancashire Regiment

who died age 51

on 27 September 1915

Husband of Mary Capper, of 67, Portland Court, Marylebone, London.

Remembered with honour

LILLERS COMMUNAL CEMETERY

In Memory of

Lieutenant General Sir FREDERICK STANLEY MAUDE K C B, C M G, D S O

Commander-in-Chief, Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force, 1916., General Staff

Late, Coldstream Guards

who died age 53

on 18 November 1917

Son of Sir Frederick F. Maude, V.C., G.C.B., and of Lady Maude (daughter of Sir Cecil Bishopp, Bart.); husband of Lady Maude, of Hampton Court Palace. Educated at Eton and Sandhurst. Served in Soudan 1885; South Africa, 1899-1901; Military Secretary to Governor General of Canada, 1901-1904; Private Secretary to Secretary of State for War, 1905; D.A.A.Q.M.G., Plymouth, 1906-1908; General Staff, 2nd London Division, 1908-1909; Assistant Director, Territorial Force, War Office, 1909-1912; General Staff, 5th Division, 1912-1914; Brig. Gen. Commanding 14th Infantry Brigade, 1914, Maj. Gen. Commanding 13th Division, 1915; Lt. Gen. Commanding Tigris Corps, 1916.

Remembered with honour

BAGHDAD (NORTH GATE) WAR CEMETERY

[armourersergeant]

The actual figure for staff officers was double and a bit....908 psc in 1914.

Regards

Arm

[Crunchy]

Thanks Arm. Sounds more like it. Still a long way short of the requirement for the expanded BEF IMO.

Cheers

Chris

[Robert Dunlop]

QUOTE (Phil_B @ Apr 29 2008, 09:12 AM) <{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Surely planning would have taken into account the number of guns and shells available and cut its cloth accordingly? Shortages such as these could only be an excuse if they couldn`t have been known or forecast?

Quite right, Phil. So the question to ask is why the cloth was not cut accordingly. To assume that it was because Staff Officers were not aware of the issues is to miss the broader context.

Robert

[Crunchy]

Did nobody in authority forsee the need for expereinced Staff officers and have them removed from Front Line operations?

Jonathan,

Found this in Haig's Diaries (Sheffield and Bourne edition) recently. While the quote does not specify staff officers it does reflect Haig's foresight in keeping a number of trained officers and NCO's out of the BEF for future expansion. It relates to a War Council meeting held on 4th August 1914 at No 10 Downing Street to discuss the military plans for the employment of the BEF. It is the third of four points Haig recounts he made at the meeting

3rd We only had a small number of officers and NCO's. These must be economised. The need for efficient instructors would become at once apparent. I urged that a considerable proportion of officers and NCOs should be withdrawn from the Expeditionary Force. (This latter suggestion was met with much opposition from Sir J French, with the result that only 3 officers per battalion were retained in England from the battalions now ordered to France,)

This would have thrown up some staff qualified officers but not many, and certainly not enough to cope with the massive expansion of the BEF over the next year. My only question would be who were those officers and NCOs to be replaced with in the battalions when they deployed to France? A certain number would have come from promotions within the units but when Haig says a considerable proportion it looks like something in the order of 20 - 25 per cent as 3 officers per battalion would be pretty close to 10 per cent.

Regards

Chris

[Jonathan Saunders]

Hi Chris - thanks for raising this again. Nice to get back to WW1 subjects.

Officer compliment for BEF was reduced to 27 officers - I think from around 30 - per bttn just as the BEF was crossing to France ... literally officers were on the quayside and receiving orders to report to depot. This was an instruction from the War Office.

These officers formed the nucleus of the first Service bttns, with about a half dozen or dozen experienced NCOs. Other experienced officers and NCOs were either raised from depot, Special Reserve, Retired List etc and OTC commissions helped form the officer cadre of the new bttns. Also I think you will find a significant number of WO were commissioned in 1914.

In August 1914 Kitchener also publicly requested retired NCOs to re-enlist and act as Instructors to the new Service bttns. This appeal had great success.

In the case of the 1st bn Royal West Kent's, three officers left the bttn just as it was about to leave for France, and a reshift of responsibility occured to accomodate Major Buckle psc as 2 i/c (who had been destined for a Staff Appointment in Scutari just prior to outbreak of war).

I believe this diary entry refers to the reduction by the War Office of the officer compliment for each bttn in Aug 1914, and also the provision of experienced NCOs as instructors. If it included any psc officers it would be, to my mind, more by good fortune than design.

Regards,

Jonathan S

[truthergw]

I believe Haig's point was that a new battalion, created from scratch would need a strong cadre of experienced officers and NCOs. It would be easier for an established regular battalion to cope with a shortage by promoting and training replacements than for a new battalion to try to train them from recruits. The shortage of trained officers would be felt more by the New Army than the regulars. A lose, lose situation, unfortunately. Both the BEF and the New Army needed experienced officers, both would suffer from a shortage. Haig seems to have thought that the BEF could best handle the shortage and I think Loos and the Somme go some way toward supporting that view. I believe that the shortage of Staff officers was a result of the shortage of all officers.

[Jonathan Saunders]

I believe Haig's point was that a new battalion, created from scratch would need a strong cadre of experienced officers and NCOs.

Well it was the view of the War Office and Haig was correct to support it as his diary entry indicates.

Regards,

Jonathan S

[George Armstrong Custer]

Chris, your suggestion that Haig's diary entry putting the case for retaining a proportion of experienced officer's and NCO's from the BEF in 1914 for the purpose of more rapidly professionalising the required New Armies would include officers with Staff experience is a sound one. It's been suggested, however, that if this was the case it was more 'by good fortune than design.' No basis for such a supposition is offered. Certainly Haig's diary entry is concise and does not detail the specific functions of any of the officers and nco's he suggests ought to be retained, suggesting to me that (quite sensibly) he intended that they be drawn from across the entire board of military functions - including staff officers. That, I admit, is an inference of my own - however, I base it upon its consistency with what we know of the value Haig attached to the function of the Staff in creating an efficient army.

Haig's record as a proponent of the value of sufficient Staff Officers is beyond dispute. He was, of course, himself a graduate of the Staff College. More importantly, once Haig had capably assisted Haldane in laying the legislative basis for the Territorial Army he was, towards the end of 1907, appointed to the position of Director of Staff. Having worked successfully with Haig in creating the TA, Haldane now wanted his experience to hand in creating the Imperial General Staff.

Within weeks of his appointment as Director of Staff, on 2 February 1908, Haig visited the Staff College where he met with Haldane to discuss what steps were necessary to increase the number of students. Haig's diary for the day notes that in addition to the above proposal for expansion of student numbers, "I explained my scheme for creating a number of War Schools. Mr. Haldane was much pleased and says that he will arrange to find money for both."¹ On the 7 February 1908, Haig's diary notes that he "put forward the names of 14 general Staff Officers for appointment as 2nd grade G.S. Officers to Territorial Force."² Right from the outset, then, Haig makes it clear that the assignment of experienced Staff officers from the regulars to the expanding Territorial force was something he regarded as essential. To underline this, in a letter to Haldane dated 18 March 1908 discussing the measures necessary to improve the professionalism of the Territorial artillery units, Haig's requirement #2 is that "A Divisional Artillery Commander and Staff is provided to direct the training throughout the year."³ Haig concludes the letter by emphasising the need to maintain close links between the Staff Officers placed with the Territorial units with the regular General Staff: "Lastly the General Staff Officer in each Division of the Territorial Army brings the General Staff at Army Headquarters into close touch with the Territorial Force, so that the results of what is being done will be closely watched and proposals for improvement in organisation and training will be carefully thought out, and put forward as necessity demands."⁴ On the 19th March 1908, Haldane read out this letter from Haig to the House of Commons. That the British Army and its Staff were inadequate without huge expansion to the demands of the kind of large scale continental war starting in August 1914 is without doubt - as is the fact that the sound basis upon which that expansion was built would have been fatally inadequate without the efforts of Haldane and Haig in the first decade of the century. Given the above, it is simply unsustainable to argue that Haig's call in August 1914 for a proportion of BEF officers and nco's to be retained to help professionalise the rapidly expanded armies then required would only have included Staff Officers by good fortune rather than design.

In a letter to the Secretary of the War Office dated 4th April 1919 Haig referred to his proposals of 4 August 1914, reiterating his view of that time that, as the war would probably last for several years, a percentage of its regular officers and nco's should be retained in Britain to train new troops.⁵ 1919 also saw the publication of Haig's wartime Despatches, which reveal that his views on the importance of a professional Staff and the need for its expansion to meet requirements had remained consistent from his days as Director of Staff when he had called for expansion in numbers and the introducion of War Schools at the Staff College in 1908. In his Final Despatch of 21 March 1919, after noting that the war had been the first time in British history when commanders had had to be provided for such immense forces, Haig moves on specifically to the Staff:

Similarly as regards the Staff, the magnitude of our operations introduced a situation for which no precedent existed. The Staff Colleges had only produced a reserve of Staff Officers adequate to the needs of our Army on a peace footing, and for the mobilisation of the Expedtionary Force of six divisions. Consequently, on the expansion of the Army during the war many officers had to be recruited for Staff appointments - from good regular officers chiefly, but also from officers of our new Armies - and trained for the new duties required of them. Though numbers of excellent Staff officers were provided in this way, it was found as a general rule that the relative efficiency in Staff duties of men who had passed through the Staff Colleges, as compared with men who had not had that advantage, was unquestionably greater.

Good Staff work is an essential to success in all wars, and particularly in a struggle of such magnitude as that through which we have just passed. No small part of the difficulty of achieving it lies in the possibility that officers on the Staff of higher formations may get out of touch with the fighting forces, and so lose sense of proportion and become unpractical. Every endeavour was made to avoid this by maintaining a constant interchange of such officers with others from the front, so that all might keep abreast with the latest ideas and experience both in the fighting line and elsewhere. In pursuance of this principle, in addition to 18 officers from Army or Corps Staffs and other officers from the Intelligence Corps or General List, there were brought in during the period of my command some 50 officers direct from active duty with divisions or smaller units to hold for longer or shorter periods appointments in the General Staff Branch at G.H.Q.⁶

Given his own experience of the Staff College over nearly two years from January 1896, and his words and actions from 1908 as Director of Staff, and in 1919 as C-in-C of a victorious BEF, it is inconceivable that Haig would not have implicitly included the vital role of experienced Staff Officers in his suggestion of 4th August 1914 that a proportion of the BEF's officers and nco's be retained to professionalise as rapidly as possible the new armies then required.

Best,

George

¹The Preparatory Prologue: Douglas Haig Diaries & Letters 1861-1914 edited by Douglas Scott.

²Ibid.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Sir Douglas Haig's Reputation by David French, in The Historical Journal, Vol 28, No 4, Dec 1985

⁶Sir Douglas Haig's Despatches, December 1915-April 1919 edited by J. H. Boraston.

[Jonathan Saunders]

Jonathan,

Found this in Haig's Diaries (Sheffield and Bourne edition) recently. While the quote does not specify staff officers it does reflect Haig's foresight in keeping a number of trained officers and NCO's out of the BEF for future expansion...

Chris,

Just trying to get to the bottom of the reduction in officer strength per bttn in Aug 1914 but I havent found anything that confirms who was responsible for the decision.

It appears Kitchener met with the PM and other principle Ministers on 4th, 5th and 6th Aug and discussed how the war was to be conducted. I believe French and Haig were also present at the meetings on 5th and 6th Aug.

As we know, Kitchener believed the war would be of a minimum 3 years duration and from memory I think he reported this belief in the meeting of 4 Aug. Also in the first day of war or very shortly after, Kitchener stated that a new army would have to be formed by a volunteer force (he opposed conscription and was concerned that Territorials were signed up for home service and a limited duration only).

I would assume Kitchener had been giving this some thought for several weeks (if not longer) in the event war would break out and, tehrefore, I assume he was the driving force behind the War Office instruction. I am sure Kitchener was not alone amongst the senior Generals in coming to this conclusion.

I dont have a copy of Grey's memoirs but they may help on what was said by whom and when.

Regards,

Jonathan S

[Jonathan Saunders]

Chris,

Some further investigation using the Queen's Own Royal West Kent's.

By end of December 1914 there were 2 Lt-Cols and 8 Majors (still alive!) that held pre-war regular commissions in August 1914. I do not know how many of these were psc but certainly 3 of them were serving in Staff roles and one was commanding a Brigade. All but one of these officers was serving in a war theatre. As already stated, Buckle (who was kia in Oct 1914) was "transferred" in to the 1st Bttn despite being psc. Beyond that its difficult to ascertain the number of psc that were being held back.

With regard to retired NCOs, by end of Feb 1915, exactly 150 had voluntarily re-enlisted since 4th Aug 1914. These were all serving either at the depot or in training (mainly as instructors?) with one of the service bttns.

Regards,

Jonathan S

[Muerrisch]

ACI 41 of 7 Aug 1914 .... each regular battalion at home will send at once to its regimental depot the following for new units to be raised: captain x 1, subalterns x 2, sgts x 2, sgts and cpls to total 13 .....

and

ACI 62 of 10 Aug ..... any officers of line battalions surplus to 26 for battalion, 1 for first reinforcement and 3 for details at peace station should be sent to depot forthwith.

True to form, 2nd RWF took not a blind bit of notice and paraded [including first reinforcement and early drafts] 29 officers.

HOWEVER!

There appears to be no emphasis on holding back officers suitable for staff ..... almost the contrary, in that the shortages in the BEF were not of Majors or Captains stripped out of their battalions, but of subalterns, such that many platoons were commanded from the outset by their sergeants. A glance at Westlake 1914 will demonstrate this fact very clearly.

The other point is that there is no stipulation in the ACIs regarding the status of the officers to be left behind: regular or special reserve. Had there been any real thought to staff needs, the special reservists would, in all logic, have been sent with the BEF and the regulars, of whatever rank, held back.

I think we can forget the staff angle.

[Jonathan Saunders]

Had there been any real thought to staff needs, the special reservists would, in all logic, have been sent with the BEF and the regulars, of whatever rank, held back.

I am pleased to say this is exactly what happened with the 1st Bn Queen's Own (Royal West Kent Regiment).

Apologies - my figure of 27 officers included the Medical Officer.

[George Armstrong Custer]

ACI 41 of 7 Aug 1914 .... each regular battalion at home will send at once to its regimental depot the following for new units to be raised: captain x 1, subalterns x 2, [........]

HOWEVER!

There appears to be no emphasis on holding back officers suitable for staff ..... [.......]

But surely none of this should come as a surprise - nor who those primarily responsible for it were? Haig's memorandum of the 5th August 1914 War Council at Downing Street states:

I urged that a considerable proportion of officers and NCO's should be withdrawn from the Expeditionary Force. (This latter suggestion met with much opposition from Sir John French, with the result that only 3 officers per battalion were retained in England from the Battalions now ordered to France.)

With such small numbers - against Haig's explicit advice - being held back, it's not surprising that an even smaller proportion of these were psc. I have already set out why it is inconceivable that the 'considerable proportion of officers...' which Haig advocated being retained for facilitating the expansion of the army would not, in his mind, exclude experienced Staff Officers. Unfortunately, as General Officer Commanding at Aldershot in August 1914, Haig's view did not prevail over that of Sir John French.

ciao,

GAC

[PhilB]

many platoons were commanded from the outset by their sergeants.

To what extent is it considered that a platoon suffers by being commanded by a sergeant rather than a 2/Lt? Or is the loss felt more in the paucity of junior officers in training for higher posts?

[Pete1052]

QUOTE (Phil_B @ Apr 29 2008, 06:35 AM) <{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Can anyone enlighten me as to what steps were taken to increase the supply of staff officers?

Now I know what inspired Phil's staff officer thread.

[toofatfortakeoff]

No change to the views I held 20 yrs ago; Haig was a rather nasty piece of work who set up intrigues qnd gunned down his enemies and rivals mercilessly-there were a lot of old buffers in the rear too much dead wood I mean Lord bloody Roberts-ok he didnt get a chzncz to play his cards----the better generals came through in from Canada and Australia and one of them was a tobacconist-Ive heard enough from old soldiers and read enough lit to know that the generals were more despised for their lack of quality than their temperament-I wont argue zith them as that would be doing them a great mis-service

Haig sacked Stuart Wortley of 46 divn for saving the lives of his men on the Somme by sensibly calling off the attack when it was seen to be a shambles all because SW had criticised him over Loos; further; Haig got him on a charge of drunkenness Again in 1918 if Haig had been able to keep the divisions thaty LG wisely sent to Italy (he most likely saved the lives of the Italian divisions too) by the time he had sprung a March assault on the Germans there would have been no men left in what was already a thin khaki line and they would have walked into the rapidly assembling German forces that everyone had been more or less ignoring in the Intel reports; the Germans would have changed their plans and a bit few scraps of British divisions would have been left to man the front after the inevitable slaughter

Newly trqnslated French communiques are also saying that the French reported by July certainly that they had CONTAINED Verdun so zhere does thtat leave the Somme and most of the ideas about it.

[truthergw]

No change to the views I held 20 yrs ago; Haig was a rather nasty piece of work who set up intrigues qnd gunned down his enemies and rivals mercilessly-there were a lot of old buffers in the rear too much dead wood I mean Lord bloody Roberts-ok he didnt get a chzncz to play his cards----the better generals came through in from Canada and Australia and one of them was a tobacconist-Ive heard enough from old soldiers and read enough lit to know that the generals were more despised for their lack of quality than their temperament-I wont argue zith them as that would be doing them a great mis-service

Haig sacked Stuart Wortley of 46 divn for saving the lives of his men on the Somme by sensibly calling off the attack when it was seen to be a shambles all because SW had criticised him over Loos; further; Haig got him on a charge of drunkenness Again in 1918 if Haig had been able to keep the divisions thaty LG wisely sent to Italy (he most likely saved the lives of the Italian divisions too) by the time he had sprung a March assault on the Germans there would have been no men left in what was already a thin khaki line and they would have walked into the rapidly assembling German forces that everyone had been more or less ignoring in the Intel reports; the Germans would have changed their plans and a bit few scraps of British divisions would have been left to man the front after the inevitable slaughter

Newly trqnslated French communiques are also saying that the French reported by July certainly that they had CONTAINED Verdun so zhere does thtat leave the Somme and most of the ideas about it.

Some very interesting opinions there and some new information. Can you give me a reference for the French communiques? I'd love to look at the sources.

[toofatfortakeoff]

The chap to get in touch with is a Laurence LLwellyn Brown I kid ye not He works at Thiepval memorial and he knows the Somme He was a revelation to meet in person-he has been going to the Somme throughout his life so he has an idea or two about it. He seems to know every inch of the place-he has got access to these comms I dont know whether he plans a book or not but he has been given access to French docs given his great command of French. He isnt going to work at Thiepval much longer as his main job is a translator so what he will do with his translations is anyones guess

[armourersergeant]

Some very interesting opinions there and some new information. Can you give me a reference for the French communiques? I'd love to look at the sources.

I was more interested to see that Haig sent Stuart-Wortley home, when I thought it was at the 'insistence' of Snow (cool with Haig and vice-versa) and that during/before the trial he was sent home by Allenby (not loved by Haig and Vice-Versa).Though in fairness, Haig may well have had to sanction the degumming.

Also with my fair hat on Haig may not have been keen on S-W who was writing to the King! As was Haig, who may have thought this was his domain and not for anyone else.

regards

Arm

[toofatfortakeoff]

True enough what seems odd to me is that Haig was quoted as sayingthat Loos was being fought on most unfavourable ground so he should have been in agreement with SW on that point but squabbles go all the wayy back to staff college. Lok at what happened to Samsonov

[truthergw]

I take it your source is a chap who works at Thiepval? I will be on the Somme in a couple of weeks and plan a visit to Thiepval. Perhaps he will let me see his sources. I read a little bit of French. I don't recall Samsonov and Haig being at Staff College together. Have I got that wrong?

[Jonathan Saunders]

I was more interested to see that Haig sent Stuart-Wortley home, when I thought it was at the 'insistence' of Snow

You must read A Lack of Offensive Spirit?

[Jonathan Saunders]

I dont know whether he plans a book or not but he has been given access to French docs given his great command of French.

Lets hope he does plan a book as if the information is as you have hinted, then it deserves to be in the public domain. Afterall we never stop learning and adjusting our understanding and assessments as new material becomes available.

Regards,

Jonathan S

[armourersergeant]

You must read A Lack of Offensive Spirit?

Not had the pleasure yet I am afraid. Though I would be interested to see how Haig would have been able to send S-W home without the recommendation of a Corps and Army commander under which that Divisional commander was subordinate.

I am willing to accept, however, that Haig was not happy to see others 'talking' to the King who may contradict his version of events.

regards

Arm