Lions led by donkeys?

[Jonathan Saunders]

Quite right about the Germans underestimating the British; I was thinking of Mons, Neuves Chapelle, Aubers Ridge, Festubert and Loos. Each underestimated the other in my humble opinion but the Germans were the quicker on the uptake from the lessons learned....

OK now I understand what you mean. I can see your point with regard to 1915, less so in the years that followed, where I think it had transgressed from under-estimating to being out-resourced. Although I think the Germans were very good at learning lessons and adapting new defensive techniques to try and counter the inbalance.

Thanks for your explanation.

Regards,

Jon S

[Robert Dunlop]

Regarding Gommecourt, we shouid point others to the comments of bmac in the Attrition thread (p 6 of the thread) as he probably knows as much about Gommecourt as any other living being.

Jon, I will briefly respond to this point - we have been over the ground of the experts vs me before, nothing has changed in that regard. It was terrific to have Bill's expert opinion on Gommecourt. He pointed out how the Germans had covered the attack and went on to describe how the attack on the Ancre may well have suffered more than would otherwise have been the case. Bill offered several suggestions about how the perceived goal of the attack could have been achieved. My point, however, was that we cannot know how much Gommecourt contributed to the success of the attack in the south, well below the Ancre. Gommecourt can be regarded as a purely local phenomenon, and judged accordingly. I am raising the issue that Gommecourt must be seen in a broader light. You and Bill (and many others) argue that Gommecourt was a terrible waste of lives. I would respectively suggest that the attack may have saved many more lives, mostly French. Perhaps. And therein lies the catch. My more fundamental point is that the obvious tends to be obvious. Cause and effect may propagate more widely than we suspect, or can readily observe. Military planners at this highest level have to consider the entire situation, and not just the individual sectors - the whole being more than the sum of the parts.

We could get into a whole different discussion about whether, even if my suggestion were proven, the lives saved were worth the sacrifice of the men around Gommecourt. If we do, then this will reinforce the broader issue of how on earth military commanders make such trade-offs knowing that they must almost certainly sacrifice men in one sector to ensure success in another. Which brings us back to Chris' point. All I can say is that I am enormously thankful for not having had to be in such a situation.

Robert

[Jonathan Saunders]

All I can say is that I am enormously thankful for not having had to be in such a situation.

Me too!! But obviously the individual - Haig - we are discussing, wanted the responsibility of being in that position.

Lets assume Gommecourt was the best place for a feint and that the preparation suggested to the Germans that this was going to be an intrinsic part of the British offensive. If no infantry attack had been made at 7:30am what do you think would have been the impact on the rest of the Line on 1st July ?

If we have covered this before I will go back to the Attrition thread.

Also I did not mean to sound dismissive of your interpretation of the Rawlinson/Haig objective for first phase. I urge you to put this in front of the academic historians who are familiar with the original sources. Until there is some broader debate I am afraid I am pulled to the accepted version that Haig extended the objective as this appears to be validated by other evidence. I would be extremely happy if you proved this wrong and I had to rethink my views.

Regards,

Jon S

[Robert Dunlop]

You said I have suggested that Haig was slow to learn. I think I need to clarify this, for me as much as you, but I didnt mean he was slow to learn in the way I think you mean it.

Jon, my only interpretation was that Haig, for whatever reason, did not learn from mistakes, so that inadequate methodologies were repeated instead of being replaced with more successful ones.

I think Haig was unaware of where his strengths and weaknesses laid and I think this meant in some aspects he just never learnt the lesson at all because he didnt realise he had a lesson to learn. There is a subtle difference and I hope you follow what I mean.

Haig didn't know what he didn't know. We are all subject to that. Given that this is a universal 'trait', what, in your experience / opinion, marks out individuals who address this problem. More importantly, how have people that you have admired or respected set about minimizing the effects that this problem induces? What strategies do people use to successfully overcome the problem of 'I don't know what I don't know'?

Robert

PS: the question is not directed at Jon. Inputs from others would be very welcome.

[PhilB]

What strategies do people use to successfully overcome the problem of 'I don't know what I don't know'?

Robert

In the case of a C in C, the onus is upon him to select staff to make him aware of what he doesn`t know but should know? It shouldn`t take long before he realizes he`s not being told what he should be told. Phil B

[Robert Dunlop]

If no infantry attack had been made at 7:30am what do you think would have been the impact on the rest of the Line on 1st July ?

Jon, we haven't covered this before. The honest answer is that I don't know. Why I raise the point, however, is that in my detailed reading of other battles, it is clear that events in one sector can have a profound effect on events in a distant (ie not immediately neighbouring) sector. I will turn the question round, if I may - prior to my raising the possibility, had you thought that Gommecourt might have played a positive role in the success of the French attack?

Also I did not mean to sound dismissive of your interpretation of the Rawlinson/Haig objective for first phase

I did not interpret your comment as dismissive. I understand precisely why you raise the issue, in the true sense of academic debate (which isn't always as 'scientific' as it might be, as you know - and I am not referring to our debates by the way). I would be entirely comfortable, indeed would welcome the chance, but there are only so many hours in the day, especially after wasting two of them taxiing on JFK Airport runways last night

The honest answer is that I don't know.

Just to be clear, I know I don't know

Robert

[Jonathan Saunders]

I will turn the question round, if I may - prior to my raising the possibility, had you thought that Gommecourt might have played a positive role in the success of the French attack?

Hi Robert,

No I hadnt because I dont think it did. I presume you are saying this could have been an indirect consequence of the feint at Gommecourt.

Locating the feint at Gommecourt, thus encouraging the Germans to reinforce that position, could only compromise the neighbouring offensive - as happened at Serre, and unneccesarily sacrifice invaluable human resource, as happened with 46 and 56 Div.

But lets say your right and it did assist the French in the south. Then I dont see how Haig could justify having purposely attacked one of the strongest points of the Line that only created a positive advantage to an attacking force at one of the weakest points of the Line, more so when your objectives at that weak point were limited, as they were with the French. So, IMHO, Haig still got this very wrong.

All the best,

Jon

[armourersergeant]

Haig didn't know what he didn't know. We are all subject to that. Given that this is a universal 'trait', what, in your experience / opinion, marks out individuals who address this problem. More importantly, how have people that you have admired or respected set about minimizing the effects that this problem induces? What strategies do people use to successfully overcome the problem of 'I don't know what I don't know'?

I guess you use what you know, or if you are really inventive, you adapt what you have and learn from what you have recently witnessed. Think about the problem and be bold.

However given that mens lives and a battle is at stake, you may choose to stick with what you percieve to be the best practice and leave bold until the next time. Safety first.

I think we can say that Haig was no Marlborough, Genhgis or Philip II. He was a safe pair of hands?

Been away for a few days and as usual when Robert and Jon get going it moves on somewhat. Will try to catch up.

regards

Arm

[Robert Dunlop]

Thanks, Arm. Nothing like heaping a few more expectations on the discussion .

Jon, you touched on the issue of attacking the strongest part of the line. While not directly relevant to your current point, others may wish to read some posts on the general issue of attacking the strongest vs the weakest part of the line here:

http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/i...st&p=472847 through to post 59

With respect to the Somme, I can't say whether there was an explicit intent on Haig's part to facilitate the French efforts to the south. The intent need not have been explicit. It was a well-understood principle, as I discussed in this post:

http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/i...st&p=579003

You noted that:

...[the] objectives at that weak point [where the French attacked] were limited

This point is true, if you consider the objectives to be defined solely in terms of the depth of the break-in or the possibility of a break-out. I have noted before that the French High Command did think in terms of a break-through, and had begun moving cavalry up in preparation, as illustrated in the following post and its immediate neighbour:

http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/i...st&p=587797

After the unexpectedly easy success of the their attack on July 1, the French realised that they had missed a trick. Although the cavalry were being prepared, they were not ready on the day, in contrast to the British cavalry (thanks to Haig's foresight). I did not quote this material in the earlier discussion, but following July 1 the French cavalry were frequently put on alert and stood in readiness to break-out during subquent French operations. In the 'Historique de 2e Corps du Cavalerie du 1er Octobre 1914 au 1er Janvier 1919' (History of the French 2nd Cavalry Corps from October 1914 to January 1919), Général Bouillaire recorded:

"The battle of the Somme began on July 1, and the results obtained raised the possibility, at some point in the near future, of opening up the enemy's front line. Given this possibility, the commander wanted to have his cavalry ready. The whole prospect lifted the morale of the troops; the relieving of Verdun, capturing hundreds of guns, thousands of prisoners, a methodical advance which seemed irresistible, although slow, all appeared to indicate almost certain success, and the regiments prepared with a confident keeness, in spite of some less optimistic forecasts.

The stay in the [cavalry] camp was not expected to be a long one. According to the various possibilities caused by the as the battle evolved, cavalry divisions were quickly placed at the disposal of the various army corps involved, sometimes close to the front, sometimes further back; every division wanted to have their share of the opportunity."

Even this point about the cavalry is not sufficient to explain the objectives of the attack. At this highest level, the initial expectations for the Somme offensive had to modified in light of the German pressure at Verdun. Capitaine Gazin noted in his book 'La Cavalerie Française dans la Guerre Mondiale (1914-1918)' that:

"Initially envisaged as an attempt at a decisive breakthrough of the front, the battle of the Somme had to be reconsidered by the French command, after the attack of Verdun, as a relieving operation, intended to increase the attrition of enemy manpower thereafter."

More detailed information in support of Gazin's summary has previously been posted here:

http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/i...st&p=587155 and following.

I quoted from Gazin because he went on to mention how the results of July 1 translated into the more active role given to the French cavalry in waiting:

"[in the operation planned for] September 3 [1916]... the 1st Cavalry Corps was to exploit successes of the Sixth Army, while the 2nd Cavalry Corps was to operate on the left in the English sector to the north of Péronne towards Cambrai and Saint-Quentin, attacking the enemy communications in collaboration with the British cavalry."

Robert

[AndyHollinger]

At least you're only gone for a few days ... I leave for a month, Summer semester starts in two weeks, and I am greated by a LLD string.

[Jonathan Saunders]

Hi Robert,

I looked at the links you provded and understand the point you are making about Gommecourt and I can see how this might be resonable in other circumstances. However by enticing the Germans to reinforce Gommecourt Haig was compromising his attack from Serre to Beaumont Hamel. As we know from bmac's study, the guns brought to the Gommecourt salient as a result of the British activity at Gommecourt were used on 1 July to devastate the 31 Div and 4 Div assaults on Serre and the Redan Ridge respectively.

Viewing the battle from a 1st July perspective then if you split the battlefield by the D929, and this is said with the greatest respect to those who were involved south of the road, the south of the road was of secondary importance. The high ground to the north of D929 was the key from which the future of the offensive could be pivoted. Things turned out differently as we know but for 1st July those northern ridges had to be seen as the key. Thats one of the reasons why Gommecourt was such an obvious mistake, IMHO.

After the unexpectedly easy success of the their attack on July 1, the French realised that they had missed a trick. Although the cavalry were being prepared, they were not ready on the day, in contrast to the British cavalry (thanks to Haig's foresight).

I am not sure the French missed a trick at all (or convinced of Haig's foresight). Foch had no intention to breakthrough on the Somme. He knew he was not strong enough to breakthrough thanks to Verdun and he realised the British did not have enough of the right type of guns and munitions to break through. To quote from a William Philpott lecture "He [Foch] had no expectation of success as his resources were diminshed due to Verdun". Foch knew his infantry and cavalry had to be managed carefully and he only wanted them to attack those areas where the French guns had dominated, hence the limited objectives.

Foch was very happy with what the French achieved on 1st July. When he did get his cavalry through a week later, the breakthrough had a natural barrier of the Somme river. It is not clear to me how this impacted Foch's planning for 1st July but I assume in the sector the French were attacking that the Somme river would always be a hindrance.

Regards,

Jon S

[Robert Dunlop]

Jon, the perspective you present on Gommecourt is still a local one. Let's say that Gommecourt did not go ahead, or at least with insufficient evidence of an attack such that the Germans decided there was no threat. Then some of the guns defending Gommecourt, and all of the guns transferred to defend it, might have been transferred further south. Not only that, but the transfer of German troops might not have happened from south of the river in front of the French. Indeed, it might have been possible to reinforce the French sector from the north if the threat to Serre seemed easy to defend.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

I am not sure the French missed a trick at all (or convinced of Haig's foresight). Foch had no intention to breakthrough on the Somme.

Why did the French cavalry find themselves riding hither and thither as each new operation was planned, in contrast with July 1? Why were two French cavalry corps geared up to ride deep into German lines with the British on 3 September? Bear in mind that Foch was not the ulimate master of the French plan, as I pointed out in the previous posts.

Robert

[Jonathan Saunders]

Jon, the perspective you present on Gommecourt is still a local one. Let's say that Gommecourt did not go ahead, or at least with insufficient evidence of an attack such that the Germans decided there was no threat. Then some of the guns defending Gommecourt, and all of the guns transferred to defend it, might have been transferred further south. Not only that, but the transfer of German troops might not have happened from south of the river in front of the French. Indeed, it might have been possible to reinforce the French sector from the north if the threat to Serre seemed easy to defend.

Let me answer a different but more appropriate question. "What if the feint had been to the north ie. making a showing that a full scale offensive was to be launched from Arras, as Allenby and Snow had originally planned for?"

Von Falkenhayn was convinced the main attack would come somewhere around Arras or to the north of it. Even after 1st July had been launched he still believed another, more powerful offensive, would be launched to the north. If some showing or build-up had been observed by the Germans for an attack from Arras, then von Falkenhayn would not have reinforced Gommecourt. The additional guns would not have been there to fire on 31 and 4 Divs.

Then if the Hawthorn Ridge crater had not been blown early, resulting in all the VIII Corps guns lifting from the German first line to the German second line, thus warning and allowing the German defenders to be in position for the infantry assault. If the saps going out into NML at Serre had been used. Even allowing for the lack of effective C.B. work in this sector, possibly if these things had happened as seems logical, then just perhaps, disaster and failure in the VIII Corps sector may have been avoided.

Regards,

Jon S

[Jonathan Saunders]

Why did the French cavalry find themselves riding hither and thither as each new operation was planned, in contrast with July 1? Why were two French cavalry corps geared up to ride deep into German lines with the British on 3 September? Bear in mind that Foch was not the ulimate master of the French plan, as I pointed out in the previous posts.

Robert

Robert I dont know. My knowledge of the French army on the Somme is in the planning and execution up to 1 July 1916. After that I can only tell you very little. When you say Foch wasnt the ultimate master of the French plan are you referring to Joffre? I must have missed something. Joffre was fairly disinterested in the Somme, or at least up to 1 July.

Regards,

Jon S

[truthergw]

I had always believed that the Somme was a joint plan between Joffre as senior partner and Haig as support. This was the reason given for stripping the Verdun forts of their heavy artillery to the point where the French Government had to intervene. The original plan was for some 40 French divisions on the Somme. It was Joffre's baby and he was reluctant to let it go until forced.

[Jonathan Saunders]

It was Joffre's baby and he was reluctant to let it go until forced.

It may well have been in December 1915 and January and most of February 1916, but thereafter Joffre was more concerned with other issues, namely Verdun in the first instance. He also became exasperated in dealing with Haig and decided to leave that to Foch, who was better in dealing with France's military partners. Finally Joffre became involved in negotiating Rumania's entry in to the war.

Regards,

Jon S

[Robert Dunlop]

http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/i...st&p=587134 through to post 135 gives Doughty's account of the planning for the Somme. Foch was reluctant to even fight on the Somme at all, and had to be compelled to do so.

http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/i...st&p=589929 through to post 151 describes Joffre's use of Liaison Officers to closely monitor the planning and execution of battles and campaigns.

http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/i...st&p=578947 through to post 182 provides a detailed analysis of feints, comparing and contrasting the Gommecourt with the Arras option. Jon, I will pass on your question, interesting though it would be to answer further. I simply wanted to make the point that we cannot dismiss Gommecourt from the broader context of the entire battle on the Somme. To this extent, and as I presented in the series of posts identified at the beginning of this paragraph, I regard Gommecourt as being quite different from Fromelles for example. In case my view is not clear, Fromelles was an example of how NOT to execute a feint. In the case of Gommecourt, it is very difficult to disentangle what happened to the south from what happened as a result of emphasizing the attack north of the Ancre.

Robert

[Jonathan Saunders]

Hi Robert - thanks for the links. Interesting to read over some of them again.

I agree Foch was reluctant about the Somme - he had many reservations, mainly as he saw the artillery as paramount and he knew his resources were limited due to Verdun and he had less faith than Haig in what the British artillery would achieve.

Joffre may have kept himself informed but I think as the Somme drew closer he became more directly involved in the Rumanian entry into the war and this made increased demands on his time. Also I believe Joffre lost patience with Haig and my notes suggest it was at this point he effectively withdrew from being an active participant. I dont know when this was but would imagine it was either the famous meeting when Haig discussed an August start date and Joffre blew his top, or whether it was when Haig said he would roll up towards Arras from Bapaume rather than proceed towards Cambrai.

At the moment we have to agree to disagree on Gommecourt - but I'll keep working on you! I understand your point but I think any positives Gommecourt could have provided were offset by the negatives it could be predicted would happen.

Regards,

Jon S

[Crunchy]

It is difficult to know where to start in this thread. Alan's original post lamented that, despite the efforts of 'revisionists', the 'lions led by donkeys' concept still features in contemporary press publications.

Robert,

An excellent summary of this never ending debate in your post # 187. IMO you have encapsulated the principle issues surrounding the debate, including the tendency to go over old ground.

If I can bring the current discussion back to the topic of the thread by addressing an important issue Robert has identified and then differing approaches the “Lions Led by Donkeys” debate itself

Robert has raised an issue, which I think is at the nub of the Great War and is often overlooked or ignored by those who place the blame for the horrendous casualties solely on Haig and his generals.

That is, the nature of the war that was being fought. The Great War was shaped by the revolution in weaponry and the size of armies that had occurred over the previous fifty years. The revolution in weaponry had vastly increased the range, rapidity of fire and lethality of artillery and small arms, while the massive increase in armies had multiplied the scale of this lethality on the battlefield beyond anything previously seen. On the Western Front, the massive size of the armies shaped the nature of the battlefield itself by denying open flanks and the ability to manoeuvre to a position of advantage. In effect the Western Front became a frontal assault on a massive fortification with a density of men and guns across the front unheard of before. Assaults on heavily defended fortifications have always incurred heavy casualties because there is no simple answer to overcoming the defenders with light casualties to the attacking force unless one starves them out.

Add to this the density of weapons with a vastly increased lethality and rate of fire per yard of frontage on a scale not seen before, a defence conducted by one of the strongest and best trained armies in the World at that time and a recognition that the defence was considerable stronger than the attack. Surely the nature of this war, the lethality of the weapons and the enemy the British were fighting on the Western Front had a significant impact on the casualties incurred. To suggest that the British generals, and Haig in particular, should have found a solution to overcome this problem quickly and in a way that significantly reduced the casualties to the British forces is rather optimistic and ignores the very nature of the conflict.

It is a fallacy to suppose that battles can be won painlessly. However brilliant the plan, in the end the troops must advance to destroy the enemy. Where the enemy is prepared to fight, as the Germans always were, this means bloody battle and heavy casualties.

In the final offensive between 8 Aug -11 Nov, where the British drove the Germans back with great success, the British daily rate of casualties was higher than the daily rate incurred on the Somme and at 3rd Ypres. (Terraine The Smoke and The Fire Table C, p 46) The Somme daily rate was 2950, 3rd Ypres was 2121 and the Final Offensive was 3645. Thus even at a time when the protagonists on both sides of this debate agree the generals were successful and had “learned the lessons” the casualty rate was still high.

Where are the lines drawn in this debate? I think it is important at this stage of the debate to attempt to identify the main features of the principal positions being argued. It seems to me that there are three approaches being taken, particularly with regard to the Western Front:

a) A position that simply regards the generals as donkeys, in terms that they were stupid and should have known better. This opinion gives no recognition to the nature of the battlefield, the strength of the enemy or indeed some of the facts. It is an approach that lays the blame for the horrendous casualties squarely on the stupidity of the generals. It cannot be taken seriously.

An approach that acknowledges the generals were not fools but believes they made serious mistakes that either should have been foreseen or that if they were not foreseen, the difficulties should have been overcome more quickly than they were. While this position recognises some of the difficulties and complexities facing the generals it lays the primary blame on them for failing to learn the lessons and identifying the tactics necessary for success more quickly. It is a position that tends to focus on the horrendous casualties of 1916 and 1917 for little territorial gain and places much of the blame for this on Haig. Of course there are differing degrees of emphasis amongst those who support this approach.

c) An approach that more readily accepts the impact of the nature of the war, the quality of the German Army and the complexities and difficulties the generals confronted in waging the war. This position agrees the generals made mistakes and that some of them were quite unsuitable but in the main, many of them were competent, learned from the lessons of earlier operations and eventually won the war. It argues that Haig and his generals had a difficult task, places emphasis on the learning curve and seeks to demonstrate that there are other significant factors to be considered when assessing the performance of the commanders and the causes of the horrendous casualties. Those who support this approach have differing views on Haig's ability.

I hope I have identified the approaches correctly, although I am sure I will be corrected if I haven’t.

The truth probably lies between positions b and c and it would be interesting to see where the opinion of forum members rests in this debate.

Much of the remainder of the debate on the thread takes specific issues to reinforce one position or the other.

Regards

Chris

[PhilB]

The truth probably lies between positions b and c and it would be interesting to see where the opinion of forum members rests in this debate.

Chris

In so far as there is a "truth", I`d go along with that. Since we have no yardstick to measure the commanders against, judgements will continue to be somewhat subjective. For those of us whose knowledge is not as deep as others, perhaps a little more subjective . I`m grateful for these summaries. Phil B

[Crunchy]

A select bibliography of books currently available that cover much of what this debate is about. Some of the reviews are quite interesting.

http://www.amazon.co.uk/Learning-Curve%3F?...7568566-2663111

regards

Chris

[Robert Dunlop]

A very helpful summary, Chris. In taking a step back for a moment, it could be useful to examine examples of 'stupidity' on the part of other generals. Rennenkampf and Samsonov, who were the Russian generals commanding the Russian First and Second Armies respectively in 1914, stand out. They allowed their armies to be isolated and systematically destroyed by the Germans. Hundreds of thousands of Russian combatants were taken out of the war, either killed, wounded or captured within a matter of days. Had this happened on the Western Front in the Battle of the Frontiers, well who knows what might have happened...

The Battle of Tannenburg illustrates very clearly, IMHO, what happens with incompetent generals. When we look at the British Army, then the debate about 'stupid' generals, at least on the Western Front, is not in the same league. Not from a technical competence perspective. So we come to the b and c options mentioned above. Here, the issue rests primarily on the terrible suffering inflicted on so many men who survived, and the families of the men who died, as well as those who survived. From a military perspective the generals were accountable, with the C-in-C having overall accountability on the Western Front. No-one can disagree with this point, although there is the murky issue of politicians' responsibility for going to war and keeping the country in the war - this should be left out of the equation IMHO. The question is to what extent were the generals culpable for their decisions, whether knowingly made or not, to commit men to battles in which high numbers of casualties were sustained. This isn't an issue about one battle. As bad as the casualties were on July 1 1916, a 50% reduction in casualties on day one of the Somme would have barely registered on the toll of dead and wounded at war's end. As Jon put it:

I think if there had been another C-in-C and Rawlinesque bite and hold operations, it would have resulted in little difference to the duration of the war. I do however, think it would have made a difference to several thousand families across the globe. I realise that isnt important from this distance to everybody and i accept that, but it does remain important to me.

This issue is important to me. I don't want to look back on the Great War and lay blame, but that is just a personal thing. The issue is, however, extremely important in the context of today. In essence, Jon, what you are proposing is the routine application of a method for achieving success in battle - by 'success', you mean that the same outcome is achieved but with fewer casualties. I agree with the intent of your proposal. I have studied many battles in great detail precisely because I wanted to understand what factors were involved in producing the outcomes. The other motivation for this is to reproduce the battles as accurately as possible in simulations - replay 'what if' scenarios if you will. There is, however, (at least) one major pitfall in this process of analysis. The enemy NEVER sits passively on the receiving end, especially not the German Army. At best, generals might have improved performance in one particular battle, but the continued application of a 'successful' operational template led to counter-measures that rendered it 'not successful'. I can see several ways that the German generals could have inflicted serious casualties on 'Rawlinesque bite and hold operations', while minimizing their own casualties, once they had appreciated that there was a pattern to the attacks. This is why I am not in favour of the concept of a learning curve, or any other shape, to describe the evolution of the British Army from 1914 to 1918. But more on this anon.

The most important aspect of this issue, to me at least, is to understand whether there is such a thing as a 'clean' war. If war is the problem then no matter who the generals are, the outcome in terms of human suffering and waste will be more or less the same over the long haul. If generals are the problem, then getting the 'right' general will seemingly make all the difference. The immediate modern day analogy is the First and Second Gulf Wars. Oh how the plaudits were lauded on the generals who so 'cleanly' (surgically?) took out the Iraqi invaders of Kuwait. But the recipients did not stand still. The Insurgency represents a natural redefinition of how to combat a modern army. No doubt Hezbollah, along with many others, are reappraising their next tactics in light of the IDF response to the rocket attacks.

To date, I have not posted on the question of whether the Germans learned more quickly. This is a very complex issue but it has risen to the surface again. Furthermore, I would like to devote some time to the British 'learning curve' issue as well - the two things are related.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

QUOTE (Phil_B @ Jun 22 2007, 02:29 PM) <{POST_SNAPBACK}>

In the case of a C in C, the onus is upon him to select staff to make him aware of what he doesn`t know but should know?

Phil, just a quick follow-up on this important point that you raised. In general terms, this is a key issue. Does your reply also refer, albeit indirectly, to the oft-proclaimed tendency of Haig to put 'Yes' men in place?

Robert

[PhilB]

I was making a general point, Robert. However, I feel there are two kinds of things he didn`t know he didn`t know. Those he should have been informed about and those he couldn`t have been informed about (German plans, troop movements etc). His staff would be culpable for the former but not the latter - those would come under the "fog of war" banner.

Did H appoint yesmen? Popular idea is that he did. I `d appreciate other opinions. If he did, he was making a rod for his own back? Phil B