Lions led by donkeys?

[Jonathan Saunders]

1..I too thought it was seniority ...

Arm,

2... which makes Snow's comments somewhat hypocritical and to a certain degree invalid.

4... surely Haig had a responsibility to ensure the reports from Snow and Allenby were factually correct. From experience Haig would have known that first impressions immediately following an offensive could be far off the actual truth. Being on the boat home by 6 July was very quick, more so when considering that the Somme offensive was still very much underway.

5... Not sure if it was only recommendation but it was definitely the only dismissal. Hunter-Weston was, of course, another candidate but Haig made no efforts to send H-W home in the same way.

[armourersergeant]

Arm,

2... which makes Snow's comments somewhat hypocritical and to a certain degree invalid.

4... surely Haig had a responsibility to ensure the reports from Snow and Allenby were factually correct. From experience Haig would have known that first impressions immediately following an offensive could be far off the actual truth. Being on the boat home by 6 July was very quick, more so when considering that the Somme offensive was still very much underway.

5... Not sure if it was only recommendation but it was definitely the only dismissal. Hunter-Weston was, of course, another candidate but Haig made no efforts to send H-W home in the same way.

2..Only if he felt he was unable to do the job and all the evidence in the diary points to about mid 17 before he starts to think this was the case. We are in many respects talking about an attitude not an ability. To put ginger in to the troops and get in amongst them. Snow believed this and did it, there are examples that he got out amongst the troops. Undoubtedly he may not have been able to do a divisional job but he was a step further back.

4..As GAC has mentioned this may just have backed up what he already thought about the man. He had previously had reports from other quarters, from a man he trusted (Haking, rightly or wrongly). However as I said in a later post, for 46th the Somme was over in the immediate future.

5..Hunter-Weston was I believe well connected politically. Haig did I believe side line his Corps and he served out the war, excelling in areas of limited worth, entertaining dignatries and the like. I seem to recall that Haig was less severe with his Corps commanders than he was with Divisional commanders, though Edmonds does say that Haig realised that at Divisional level and below it was a young mans war and did what he could to get younger men in to position.

regards

Arm

[Jonathan Saunders]

2..Only if he felt ...

2... well yes, when he was in F&F ... which was less than S-W.

4... read A Lack of Offensive Spirit and we can discuss again.

5... I dont think that answers the underlying question as to why only S-W was sent home in disgrace following the disaster on 1st July...

[George Armstrong Custer]

4..As GAC has mentioned this may just have backed up what he already thought about the man. He had previously had reports from other quarters, from a man he trusted (Haking, rightly or wrongly). However as I said in a later post, for 46th the Somme was over in the immediate future.

Yes, the documented sequence of events makes this self-evident, I think. I'm just wondering what happened to the contention that Haig had a vendetta against S-W, the prime reason for which was his discovery that S-W was corresponding with the King? The rebuttals of these ideas have been conveniently ignored as increasingly speculative red herrings are introduced in an attempted distraction from the fact that it has been convincingly demonstrated that S-W's dismissal was deserved, that it was not before time, and that it was not driven by Haig but by the recommendations of S-W's immediate superiors and the opinions of an informed Staff over a period of some eight months. The attempt to nail Haig for conspiring against S-W for his own purposes having failed, we are now being asked to believe that Haig is still the villain of the piece because - again with no supporting evidence - it's speculatively suggested that before firing S-W he failed to properly investigate allegations against him in July 1916 which supported similar allegations which had been made by other commanders since October 1915. Snow and Allenby's reports were clearly the straw that broke the camels back as far as Haig coming to a decision on S-W's fate was concerned. It wasn't Haig's job as a commander in the field in the face of the enemy to run about investigating reports from commanders at Snow's level. The assumption was - and had to be in an army at war - that men like Haking, Allenby and Snow (supplemented by information through the GSO grapevine), knew whereof they talked regarding the competence of their own juniors.

ciao,'

GAC

[truthergw]

Once the two superiors had let Haig know of their loss of confidence, he was more or less obliged to remove the officer they complained of. Haig could not very well force them to carry on with a junior who had been directly criticised. That would have been against the whole style of command in the army. I have not yet read Bill's book although I intend to soon. It seems to me though that the whole argument is being based on a passage or passages from the book. If there is substance to the idea then other accounts will surely bear it out?