Lions led by donkeys?

[PhilB]

There`s little danger in raising the divisions - that comes if they have to carry out over-ambitious plans of attack.

[Jonathan Saunders]

According to Terraine, The Smoke and the Fire. p115 by August 1914 there were 447 officers who had passed through the Staff College. A number of these were killed early in the war ...

But thats part of the point of Chris - who in senior military circles believed the war would be over by Christmas? Not Kitchener, not Haig, to name but two.

So what was someone like Major Buckle of the 1/RWK - a trained GSO2 - doing as 2 i/c of his battalion and ultimately killed leading the bttn in Oct 1914? There were other capable officers and senior majors to fulfil battalion roles. From memory, Buckle had held Staff posts since around 1904 and I dont think he had seen much service with the bttn since the Boer War.

Its a rhetorical comment but someone senior was at fault - it had been acknlowledged that the war would be of at least 3 years duration and immediately in August 1914 we have the recruiting drives, but who foresaw the need to effectively utilise experienced officers?

Regards,

Jonathan S

[PhilB]

Can anyone enlighten me as to what steps were taken to increase the supply of staff officers? How soon were there staff officer schools in France or England?

[Crunchy]

Hi Jonathan,

Great to chat with you again.

Even at battalion level there is a need for staff work and in my time the 2IC of a battalion was normally a psc officer. I can't offer an explanation regarding Major Buckie but I think that seeking to apportion blame is not a very productive approach to understanding the war or failure in military operations. With due respect, that takes a very simplistic view of warfare. It may be that Buckie's forte was working at the battalion level, that he wanted to remain in the battalion, that he was required to provide experience or he just slipped through the system. I don't think it is simply a matter that someone at higher levels was to blame for not putting him in a higher staff appointment.

There is a very good book that addresses failure in war. Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Military Failure The Free Press. A Division of Maxwell MacMillan, 1990. Rather than seeking to blame someone for failure, this books looks at a series of military failures by addressing all of the components which, in their opinion, contributed to the failure. For example in Chapter 6 Failure to Adapt, The British at Gallipoli, August 1915 they identify 15 factors that contributed to the failure ranging from the High Command to Unit level. It is probably the best book book I have read regarding an analysis of why certain operations failed and I recommend it for anyone wanting to understand how things go wrong.

I just think the blame game and seeking to find a simple answer to military failures is a pointless activity that says more about the people who partake in it, and particularly their ignorance of the topic, than it does about the people they seek to criticize. By this I am NOT saying that Generals and staff officers are not at fault, on many occasions they can be faulted in some way but there are other contributing factors to a failure as Cohen and Gooch show and to ignore those factors is like putting one's head in the sand. It is a complex business that can rarely be reduced to someone's fault or a simplistic explanation, as some on this forum seek to do.

Alan C Lucas, DECISION MAKING: Risk Management, System Thinking and Situational Awareness, Argos Press, Canberra, 2003 is another useful book that looks at the myriad of factors that contribute to a catastrophic failure.

Warm Regards

Chris

[squirrel]

Chris,

Super post - just ordered The Anatomy of Military Failure - thanks for the mini review.

[Jonathan Saunders]

Even at battalion level there is a need for staff work and in my time the 2IC of a battalion was normally a psc officer. I can't offer an explanation regarding Major Buckie but I think that seeking to apportion blame is not a very productive approach to understanding the war or failure in military operations. With due respect, that takes a very simplistic view of warfare. It may be that Buckie's forte was working at the battalion level, that he wanted to remain in the battalion, that he was required to provide experience or he just slipped through the system. I don't think it is simply a matter that someone at higher levels was to blame for not putting him in a higher staff appointment.

Chris - thats why I made the points that he was Acting CO of the bttn and I have little doubt would have been given the bttn on a permanent basis, plus the fact that to the best of my knowledge it was the first time he had spent any period of time with his bttn since just after the Boer War - his previous 10 years experience as far as I have been able to make out was spent all in Staff appointments or instructing at Staff Colleges.

No doubt he was eager to proceed to France with his bttn in a combative roll but that was not utilising him to the best of his experience and ability. When war was declared he was only with the bttn on a temporary basis as he was under orders to proceed to Scutari to take up yet another Staff appointment.

By the time of his death we are well into K3 and the WO is requesting old NCOs to join up and train recruits - so it was obvious at an early stage that with an increasing army, there would be a requirement for experienced psc officers.

How many similar psc officers were there that "slipped through the system" - well by your own admission a number of these were dead by quite early in the war - so on that basis there was no system for them to slip through.

Did nobody in authority forsee the need for expereinced Staff officers and have them removed from Front Line operations? Buckle (his name was Buckle) was involved in hand-to-hand combat a few hours before he was killed. Therefore I think it a little disingenuious to say that there wasnt many trained staff officers for the ever increasing size of the army when such experience had been thrown away to no good end on the 1914 and 1915 battlefields.

You may think that is an attempt to apportion blame but I think it is a reasonable point to make.

Your warm regards are returned.

Jonathan S

[salesie]

I just think the blame game and seeking to find a simple answer to military failures is a pointless activity that says more about the people who partake in it, and particularly their ignorance of the topic, than it does about the people they seek to criticize.

I think this sentence just about sums it up, Chris - in my opinion, focusing on Western front military operations/organisation alone for answers to victory/defeat is a blind alley.

Why blame the BEF's staff amidst rapid expansion for high casualties? The Germans had a well established staff in place amidst an existing and large standing army and what in fact did it get them? It got them exactly the same result as the BEF, high casualties and stalemate! The number, and quality, of staff officers would seem to be a non-answer.

Why blame the lack of war materials for failure in the field and high casualties? As the British Empire gradually geared up for total-war and eventually out-materialed the Central Powers the more casualties it suffered (and inflicted). Indeed, Germany out-materialed the allies up to 1916 but the end result was still stalemate and high casualties. So it would seem that material advantage alone is not the answer (or excuse).

Why praise the Generals/staff for their "learning curve"? The fact is no matter what any side tried militarily, whether innovative or downright stupid, the end-result was always stalemate and high casualties until the German nation imploded, until it was on the brink of socio-economic and political collapse. Making it possible for the victors, and some later historians, to crow about their "learning curve" when in fact they were virtually impotent (militarily) until the "other factors" of total-war took their eventual and inevitable toll.

Blame/praise the generals as much as you like, but in my opinion victory/defeat came about not through generalship (nor the lack of it) but by Britain's underlying but greater economic power, by its relatively stable and accountable political system, by its social unity forged through centuries not just decades, and by its powerful fleet - all of which made Britain, and its people and empire, more capable of waging total-war than Germany (but at a dreadful cost to itself).

Cheers-salesie

[charlesmessenger]

QUOTE (Phil_B @ Apr 29 2008, 11:35 AM) <{POST_SNAPBACK}>

Can anyone enlighten me as to what steps were taken to increase the supply of staff officers? How soon were there staff officer schools in France or England?

Phil

The mistake was closing down the Staff College at the outbreak of war, a reflection of the general belief that the war would be short. New staff officers were literally trained on the job as 'staff learners' and not until 1917 were proper staff schools established. At the risk of banging my own drum read the relevant chapter of my book Call to Arms.

Charles M

[armourersergeant]

Before becoming overly critical of the staff officers involved, there were very few trained staff officers to go around.

For me it was not a criticism of the staff, the problem is that a staff officer has to be taught/created and can not be pulled out of the bag. It is not the officers fault he has no staff experience. In some respects its now ones fault. However I think that Jon's question has a point. Given that Kitchener had visions of a large war it may have been wise to pull out those, still left after 1914, who had some experience and put them in the job. Though that at officer also by having gone to staff college would have been a cut above the average and thus may well have been the sort of officer who was required to help fight the war on the ground. Pull them all out whose left to lead?

Also that staff officer would still in many respects have to learn the war he was fighting. If the Commanders had a learning curve then obviously so did the staff officer. It was not just all about the logistics etc side of things. One of the biggest problems faced, IMO, was the handling of large bodies of troops. Lt-Gen. Snow writes in his papers that all the war games did not replace what they did not get, the ability to train with large bodies of troops enough.

Getting officers off to staff class was just one part of the job, IMO.

regards

Arm

[Crunchy]

in my opinion, focusing on Western front military operations/organisation alone for answers to victory/defeat is a blind alley.

I fully support the thrust of your argument Salesie. A great many factors contributed to the Allied victory and not all of them military.

Fundamental to winning the war was the Allied (largely British) strategy to shift the pattern of war so as to achieve some control over Germany's ability to wage war - the establishment of Allied control of the seas and the imposition of the maritime blockade on Germany. While it was not the only factor that contributed to the victory, the importance of this to the Allied victory is often overlooked. According to J .C. Wylie Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control it was one of only two attempts by the Allies to shift the pattern of the war away from the initial pattern set by the Germans.

Cheers

Chris

[Crunchy]

Jonathan and Arm,

While it is reasonable in hindsight to advocate such a move, I am not sure it was a practical option nor was it as simple as pulling all of the staff trained officers out of units at the commencement of the war.

Of the 447 who had passed through the Staff College, a good number of them would have been CO's of units and in more senior command appointments such as Haig, Rawlinson and other senior commanders, as well as officers filling essential staff appointments from Brigade level up. While your point is about Buckie being a Battalion 2IC and thus was wasted given his experience, the 2IC does most of the logistical and administrative staff planning in the battalion and thus provides an important function in the unit on operations. He is also required to take command on the CO becoming a casualty. To simply withdraw all psc qualified officers from battalions would have led to major disruptions in the units concerned at the time of mobilization. I am sure you wouldn't advocate removing all psc qualified Battalion commanders. The staff college course does not only focus on staff work; it also addresses higher tactical level studies and prepares officers for higher command appointments.

A good many of those who were "staff trained" were in command appointments or in staff appointments of the formations that were sent to France in 1914. It would not be unusual for the following to be psc: both the Battalion CO and the Bn 2IC; the Brigade Comd and the Brigade Major, the Commander and senior staff officers on the Divisional and Corps HQ and GHQ.

Pre war the staff college course was two years IIRC. One of the reasons it may have been closed was to release officers for war service - Charles can you please advise?. While it is easy for us to look back and see the substantial increase in the importance of staff work as the nature of the war changed, it wasn't evident in 1914 when a war of movement was envisaged.

Irrespective of this, 447 staff trained officers were not enough by a long shot to fill all of the staff positions required in the BEF by 1916. Nor do I believe that withdrawing Buckie and the other psc qualified Battalion 2IC in the original BEF would have made much difference.

Regards

Chris

[armourersergeant]

I am not sure it was a practical option nor was it as simple as pulling all of the staff trained officers out of units at the commencement of the war.

Pre war the staff college course was two years IIRC. One of the reasons it may have been closed was to release officers for war service - Charles can you please advise?.

Irrespective of this, 447 staff trained officers were not enough by a long shot to fill all of the staff positions required in the BEF by 1916.

Chris,

I agree in the main for the reasons you mention in your post. I intimated as much in my post.

Indeed the Staff college course was two years. It was also suspended, or at least Gough was released early, having IIRC not technically passed the course so he could go to South Africa, so there was precedence to close.

I also believe their was actually more than the stated 447 staff officers in the army. I seem to recall Dr John Bourne saying he was having to 'eat his own words' as it had become apparent that there were more than the accepted figure. I will see if I can get hold of the exact figure, not that it would have vastly helped the 'problem' in my opinion. As I have written above, the logistical admin side of the staff work was but one aspect to the job.

regards

Arm

[charlesmessenger]

Pre war the staff college course was two years IIRC. One of the reasons it may have been closed was to release officers for war service - Charles can you please advise?. While it is easy for us to look back and see the substantial increase in the importance of staff work as the nature of the war changed, it wasn't evident in 1914 when a war of movement was envisaged.

Chris

Absolutely correct. Under the mobilisation plans the directing staff and Senior Division moved to staff posts, mainly with the Expeditionary Force, while the Junior Division in the main were made Railway Transport Officers to oversee the xpeditionary Force's deployment to France.

Charles M

[Muerrisch]

It is not the officers fault he has no staff experience.

regards

Arm

Not strictly true: for many officers 'married to the regiment' it was not the done thing to 'waste' two years on psc. This mind set was, however, changing by 1914, probably earlier.

[PhilB]

This is the 1896 Staff College course. (Haig, Allenby & Edmonds present). There are 54 men there, though a few may be instructors. Assuming one intake per year (?), that means some 50x18 graduates by 1914 = 900, most of whom would be active or recently retired. Is that a reasonable guesstimate?

[Jonathan Saunders]

While it is reasonable in hindsight to advocate such a move, I am not sure it was a practical option nor was it as simple as pulling all of the staff trained officers out of units at the commencement of the war ...

Chris – his name was BUCKLE not Buckie. A minor point but if we are going to use him as an example I would like us to use his correct name.

Yes I had considered that most of the senior appointments and a proportion of Bttn COs would have been psc qualified. Most of the Bttn COs that survived to 1915 were probably Brigadier-Generals by then.

Yet taking 1/RWK – there was a wealth of experience already in the bttn. The senior Major had a wealth of combat experience, had served as Adjutant, commanded the Depot, etc. The Senior Captain had been a Captain for over 10 years – again had combat experience, served as Adjutant etc. To the best of my knowledge neither of these men were psc qualified but they did have to be “demoted” to accommodate Buckle – including Buckle was not avoiding a disruption but causing one. Back at the depot there were at least two other Majors I can readily think of who were considered experienced enough to be given bttns in F&F in the early months of the war – I think neither was psc qualified. There were also experienced Captains who were soon Majors and then commanding bttns by 1915/6. If this was the situation in the 1/RWK then how many other units did this mirror? My point is that the competent and trained Staff officers were a premium yet there were plenty of experienced and able officers to fulfil bttn roles.

Nor do I think this is simply a case of hindsight. As I indicated previously, recruiting offices were overwhelmed, old NCOs were being asked to return as instructors, retired and reserve officers were being dug out for senior positions within new battalions, bttn COs were being made up to Brigadier-Generals. The only thing that appears to have been overlooked was obtaining qualified Staff Officers for these new Brigades, Divisions and Corps. Nor do I think it was envisaged in 1914 that this would be a short war of continuous movement – certainly not by Kitchener, Smith-Dorrien or Haig to name but three.

Accepting the number of psc qualified officers was 447 then you are right to say that this simply wasn’t enough to fill Staff positions for the army of 1916 but my point of view is that this made those qualified psc available for Staff appointments in 1914 critical for the expansion of the army that had already been foreseen. To my mind it was already evident within the first two months of the war that having Buckle kill Germans in hand-to-hand combat was a complete mismanagement of his skills.

Regards,

Jonathan

[George Armstrong Custer]

I just think the blame game and seeking to find a simple answer to military failures is a pointless activity that says more about the people who partake in it, and particularly their ignorance of the topic, than it does about the people they seek to criticize.

That hits the nub of much of what passes for informed discussion of military history, Chris. Unfortunately the blame game, played with the benefit of armchair hindsight, is the raison d' etre of many who post here.

I also fully agree with your assessment of the value of Cohen and Gooch as a corrective tool to the inclination (most prevalent amongst British commentators) to simplify the apportioning of blame by scapegoating individuals when assessing Great War operations.

ciao,

George

[Crunchy]

Chris – his name was BUCKLE not Buckie. A minor point but if we are going to use him as an example I would like us to use his correct name

Apologies Jonathan - my poor eyesight.

Accepting the number of psc qualified officers was 447 then you are right to say that this simply wasn’t enough to fill Staff positions for the army of 1916 but my point of view is that this made those qualified psc available for Staff appointments in 1914 critical for the expansion of the army that had already been foreseen. To my mind it was already evident within the first two months of the war that having Buckle kill Germans in hand-to-hand combat was a complete mismanagement of his skills.

That is a fair point and indeed they would have been of great value. I am not sure, however, if withdrawing Buckle and others like him from units on either on mobilization in August 1914 or two months later would have made any significant difference in the broader scheme of things nor would it have altered the real issue concerning a lack of qualified staff officers later in the war.

Regards

Chris

[Crunchy]

I also believe their was actually more than the stated 447 staff officers in the army. I seem to recall Dr John Bourne saying he was having to 'eat his own words' as it had become apparent that there were more than the accepted figure. I will see if I can get hold of the exact figure, not that it would have vastly helped the 'problem' in my opinion.

I think you might be right Arm. I was surprised at the number Terraine cites. I would be interested in the actual number available if you can track it down.

Regards

Chris

[Crunchy]

just ordered The Anatomy of Military Failure - thanks for the mini review.

Squirrel,

Thanks for your comment. I hope you enjoy the book as much as I did. I still refer to it from time to time. After introductory chapters discussing "Why Misfortune?," "Understanding Disaster" and "Analyzing Failure" the book considers five failures from 1915 to 1973.

Regards

Chris

[Crunchy]

Under the mobilisation plans the directing staff and Senior Division moved to staff posts, mainly with the Expeditionary Force, while the Junior Division in the main were made Railway Transport Officers to oversee the xpeditionary Force's deployment to France.

Charles,

Thank you for that. I was unaware of the roles for the Senior and Junior Division officers, although it makes sense. Even today, given the commitments of our Army, we are finding the odd officer being withdrawn from staff college courses for operational duty or a particular course being given an urgent operational problem to consider and come up with possible solutions.

Regards

Chris

[Crunchy]

I also fully agree with your assessment of the value of Cohen and Gooch as a corrective tool to the inclination (most prevalent amongst British commentators) to simplify the apportioning of blame by scapegoating individuals when assessing Great War operations.

Yes it is a great book George. I can think of several military historians who could benefit from reading it.

Regards

Chris

[Jonathan Saunders]

That is a fair point and indeed they would have been of great value. I am not sure, however, if withdrawing Buckle and others like him from units on either on mobilization in August 1914 or two months later would have made any significant difference in the broader scheme of things nor would it have altered the real issue concerning a lack of qualified staff officers later in the war.

It is also a fair point that you make but I think it could only have been an improvement in the local theatre.

Just for clarity - they pushed Buckle "in" on mobilization - to all intense purposes he was already "withdrawn". I dont expect this was an isolated case.

I will look out for the book you mention.

Always interested in your views and a book recomendation!

Regards,

Jonathan S

[armourersergeant]

I think you might be right Arm. I was surprised at the number Terraine cites. I would be interested in the actual number available if you can track it down.

I have sent an email off to John Bourne and will post back when he gets back to me.

regards

Arm

[armourersergeant]

QUOTE (Phil_B @ Apr 30 2008, 10:02 AM) <{POST_SNAPBACK}>

This is the 1896 Staff College course. (Haig, Allenby & Edmonds present). There are 54 men there, though a few may be instructors. Assuming one intake per year (?), that means some 50x18 graduates by 1914 = 900, most of whom would be active or recently retired. Is that a reasonable guesstimate?

Phil,

Not just Haig, Allenby, Edmonds......but Forestier-Walker, Capper, Haking, Dyer (of Amritsar fame), McDonough, Furse, Findley (1st General killed in WW1), Maude. and I know where they are too

Been reading Greens book have we?

regards

Arm