Lions led by donkeys?

[Jonathan Saunders]

No Jon, just that he learnt, but perhaps at the rate we today would find not acceptable.

Arm - by "he" I assume you mean Haig. With respect, the rate Haig learned battlefield lessons from 1915 seem to me, in my admitted ignorance, to be somewhat at a slower pace than his contemporary Rawlinson (as an example).

However was the 14th of July the battle that Rawlinson had envisaged? Or was it a battle learnt from the 1st July. Particularly the artillery plan.

Arm - can you elaborate on what you mean by "particularly the artillery plan"? There was a lesser amount of artillery available for 14 July but only about a 1/4 to 1/3 of the German trench system to be "prepared" by artillery fire (to the best of my recollection). As we know, one part of Haig's direct involvements in the 1st July plan was to extend both the frontage of the offensive and the depth that was expected to be gained.

Regards,

Jonathan S

[Jonathan Saunders]

Robert,

I am afraid I am baffled by your first para. However I am happy to clarify my standing - that is the experiences of offensive action by the BEF in 1915 gave no cause that a breakthrough was likely to be achieved against the Germans in the, then, near future (unless something catastrophic happened to the German army and as a very poor example I mean a contingency such as a socialist led mutiny).

To answer your previous questions.

1) Yes Haig wanted rapid exploitation towards Aubers Ridge as I recall. I do not recall if this was ever viable during the Neuve Chapelle battle.

2) Yes the British did make a break-in to the German lines following the hurricane bombardment. They did not make a significant breakthrough to the best of my knowledge.

3) & 4) regarding the extent that some of the front line battalion commanders and brigadiers felt that immediate exploitation was possible you may be right - I do not know - however I would say that implementation and direction of the plan had been poor and not fully synchronised. I would need to delve through notes and books to give you examples.

I would like to add that the little that was achieved at Neuve Chapelle came at a considerable price in casualties (although such casualty figures would become insignifcant by the late summer of 1916). Also I think it was following Neuve Chapelle that it hit home to Rawlinson the importance of the infantry only pushing on and exploiting ground after the artillery had been brought forward to prepare the way forward.

Regards,

Jonathan S

[Robert Dunlop]

Jonathan, my first paragraph is explained in the following quote. It comes from General Huguet, who was the Chief of the French Military Mission to the British Army, 1914-15. He wrote a book that was translated as 'British at War: A French Indictment'.

"The battle of Neuve Chapelle was in itself only a secondary affair; but it influenced subsequent operations to a degree which must be pointed out...

Up to now every attempt to break through had failed and this, on the contrary, had seemed to be on the point of succeeding.

From that time the feeling was strengthened, with both the French and the English General Staffs, that attacks of this description were capable of bringing about a break-through.

The brilliant success of the opening phase... was attributed solely to excellent preparation, and General Joffre sent to all French Staffs a translation of the orders given by General Haig as an example of how things should be done.

As a set-off, the reverses that followed were put down to mistakes of detail or of manoeuvre (delay in exploiting success, insufficient liaison, shortage of ammunition, etc, etc); all incidents which, it was thought, would be easily remedied in the future.

And thus the conviction grew and strengthened that attacks like Neuve Chapelle would not fail to produce a break-through, the day it was possible to execute them on a grand scale."

Whether Huguet's interpretation of the reactions to the opening phase of the battle are correct or not, it is interesting to note what Joffre did.

Returning to your query about my first paragraph above. What I am seeking to do is to uncover contemporaneous reactions to various battles leading up to the Somme. What lessons were learned at the time? How were these lessons applied? For us to compare the outcomes of the Somme and Neuve Chapelle post hoc does not capture the learning process as it occurred.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Here is an account from Sir Morgan Crofton, an officer with the 2nd Life Guards. His unit was posted near Ypres on March 10. He noted in his diary:

"At 8 o'clock we could hear a terrific bombardment taking place towards La Bassée. We could distinguish the deep thunder of Grandmother amidst the general hubbub. [Lt-General the Earl of] Dundonald [retired, formerly in the 2nd Life Guards, and had commanded 2nd Cavalry Brigade in South Africa] turned up during the morning and said he was staying with [Field-Marshall] French, and had motored out to see us. Incidentally he let out that French had invited him over to see a big battle which was just going to start. He did not enlarge on this information.

At lunch the Colonel said that he didn't think that there was any further need for secrecy. A big attack was taking place at La Bassée to seize a ridge which lay at right angles behind Neuve Chapelle. The attack was to be carried out by the First Army, of which IV and Indian Corps were to attack, and I Corps was to demonstrate and act as support. 200 Guns were massed to prepare the advance."

Two days after the opening of the battle, Crofton recorded:

"On Wednesday evening [this was the Friday] the village of Neuve Chapelle was in our hands. We captured about 800 prisoners, and all the 3rd Battalion of their 16th Regiment was either killed or wounded. On Wednesday night the enemy were reinforced by the 6th Bavarian Division. The rapidity with which they were hurried down, and the way in which miscellaneous units were thrown into the fight, are evidence of the complete surprise of our attack last Wednesday."

On Thursday 18th March, just over a week from the opening of the battle, Crofton recorded the final 'lesson' that he had 'learned' from the battle. What is so interesting, and so important to bear in mind, is that he played no direct role at all in the battle, being many miles away at the time:

"The offensive of March 10-14 was very nearly sensational. The first attack was due to come off about 8 am and the objective was timed to have been reached about 1 pm. The second attack was timed for 3 pm, but although the first objective was gained at 10.30, nobody thought of altering the time of the second attack. By 3 o'clock the Germans had collected enough reinforcements to stop any further progress. At one time there was nothing in front of the Indian Corps as far as Lille. Better staff management would have enabled us to acquire that town. The authorities seem satisfied. But to us the casualty lists seem very heavy for the results attained."

Robert

[Crunchy]

Congratulations Jonathan, Arm and Robert. Good quality discussion. I would like to support Robert’s approach of focussing on Neuve Chapelle at the moment for the reasons he and I have given above.

If we follow the process of the war through these battles to the Somme, and perhaps beyond, we will be in a better position to evaluate one way or the other our various positions on the Generals and the way in which the war was fought. I agree with Robert that “to compare the outcomes of the Somme and Neuve Chapelle post hoc [or indeed any battle in isolation] does not capture the learning process as it occurred”. Nor will our judgments be in context. Thus many of them on both sides of the argument will be flawed and be about as useful as an ashtray on a motorcycle. I know that I have had to revise some of mine since joining the Forum.

The value of this discussion is that we have opposing views; it will be really valuable if both sides have a willingness to consider the opposing points made and where there is sound evidence or logic to do so, be prepared to change our minds on a particular point. I doubt very much that we will come to complete agreement; nor will we truly understand what really happened - but that is not the objective. IMHO, the objective is for us to make our own minds up based on a rigorous consideration of what transpired in terms of the evidence available to us and in the context of the time and situation it was written.

I have to go out now but I would like to make some comments that, I hope, puts Neuve Chappelle into some context along the learning process.

Cheers

Chris

[armourersergeant]

Arm - can you elaborate on what you mean by "particularly the artillery plan"? There was a lesser amount of artillery available for 14 July but only about a 1/4 to 1/3 of the German trench system to be "prepared" by artillery fire (to the best of my recollection).

4th Army had a concentration of fire that amounted to 660 pounds of shell per yard of trench, equating to five times greater than that used on the first day of the battle of the Somme. Rawlinson was able to use two thirds of the total artillery used attacking 6,000 yds of line and 12,000 yds of overall trench as against 22,000 yds of front and a total trench length of 300,000 yds on 1st July.

Also the use of Hurricane and creeping barrages, and greater counter battery work. Coupled with kicking off at dawn and from no mans land. Whilst some of these concepts are not new they do, IMO, show a movement away from 1st july. For Haigs feelings on this battle and the days before it, you could consult the diary entries, where it is clear he is at first not in favour of the attack as laid before him. He does imply that Rawlinson changed/adapted the plan and then upon advisment he accepted it. Not sure how or if it changed fundemently, or if this is Haig justifying to himself his change of mind! (Jon, brain **** the entry clearly shows what Haig did not like etc)

It is Haigs 'ability' to consider other options and be convinced of anothers ideas that originally made me use this battle as an example not of its great planning, though this was a vast improvement, IMO, but more to show Haig 'learning' etc.

I would like to support Robert’s approach of focussing on Neuve Chapelle at the moment for the reasons he and I have given above.

If we follow the process of the war through these battles to the Somme, and perhaps beyond, we will be in a better position to evaluate one way or the other our various positions on the Generals and the way in which the war was fought.

Jon,

As Robert and Chris have indicated a preference to follow it logically in order I feel to continue about Bazentin would be better left until you guys get there or, in case you think I am retreating, off topic.

regards

Arm

[Crunchy]

I feel to continue about Bazentin would be better left until you guys get there

Arm,

I would hope that you, and a good many other members, will participate in the discussion from Neuve Chapelle on. In reading the available evidence that is presented each of us will draw different conclusions from it. Each of those conclusions are worthy of consideration.

Cheers

Chris

[armourersergeant]

If and when I can, I shall join in Chris. Though in regard to many battles I still have a lot to learn and hope to do so.

Arm

[Jonathan Saunders]

Congratulations Jonathan, Arm and Robert. Good quality discussion. I would like to support Robert’s approach of focussing on Neuve Chapelle at the moment for the reasons he and I have given above.

Robert, Arm,

I know you would be disappointed if I did not have counter comments to your various replies. Do you want me to continue to respond (we appear to be around June/July 1916) or should I wait until Robert's narrative (currently March 1915) catches up?

Regards,

Jonathan S

[armourersergeant]

Jon,

I am happy to continue. However as Robert and Chris have stated an interest to deal chronologically, with some merit I have to say, it may be best not to confuse the narrative until the date allows.

I can then have a good read up in preperation!

regards

Arm

[Jonathan Saunders]

Its "preparation"

[PhilB]

I, too, will read in prep*ration. Just one point - am I right in thinking that the ratio of attackers to defenders was much more favourable at NC compared to July 1st?

PS I always have trouble with seperate and separate.

[armourersergeant]

My teacher said the more I read the more my spelling would improve! I have shelves and floors full, obviously not a dictionary, yet...alas. And do not even go there on the grammar.

regards

Arm

[Robert Dunlop]

My committment is to the chronological sequence. I simply cannot revisit the Somme material and look at 1915 as well. Mainly because 1915 has not been a focus of my attention for some while. I have no problem with the Somme debate continuing, or not.

Jonathan, as always it is really great to have clearly-articulated alternative views! And, more importantly, additional material from the various sources!!

Robert

[Crunchy]

One point that I think needs to be kept in the back of our minds when considering Neuve Chappelle and other battles of the Great War is the issue of communications and their impact on the execution of a battle.

John Terraine in The Smoke and the Fire (p 179) quotes an interesting comment made by LTCOL C. F. Jerram in 1966 “ … the fact that it was the only war ever fought without voice control; which came back in World War II with the Walkie Talkie and without which the modern soldier is as completely lost as we were. Nobody recognises that once troops were committed to the attack, all control was over. …“

Terraine goes on to discuss Elles proclaiming his intention to lead the Tank Corps into battle at Cambrai. “He soon discovered that his only command capacity inside “Hilda” was to kick the driver’s right shoulder if he wanted to turn right, or kick his left shoulder if he wanted to turn left. After quite a short time General Elles realized that, if he wanted to influence the battle at all, he had better leave “Hilda”; so he got out and walked back to his headquarters, and started being a general again, at the end of several telephone lines.”

But the telephone was a very limited communication facility once the attack was underway. It required linesmen to run the cables forward into the battle zone and once a line was laid it was frequently cut by artillery fire.

The effect of this at Neuve Chappelle has been discussed by Niall Barr in “Command in the Transition From Mobile to Static Warfare, August 1914 to March 1915” Chapter 2 of Command and Control on the Western Front: The British Army’s Experience 1914-18 . Of the artillery he writes ‘ … after the capture of Neuve Chappelle, the system of communications and the co-ordination began to break down. Information became

intermittent owing to the constant breakages of the telephone wire between forward observing officers and their batteries by hostiles Artillery fire and the numerous casualties among the forward observing officers themselves. These are incidents of a big battle which cannot be provided against. [end of quote]. While such problems could not be prevented in 1915, the breakdown in communications had very serious implications for the rest of the battle. Without effective communications, the higher commanders had to wait for news and this delayed the initial exploitation of the initial success.”

It was a problem that affected the infantry as well and it was a problem to be experienced throughout the war – the effective control and direction of the battle once the attack had commenced. Additionally, the further forward the infantry pushed the more difficult to it was to provide co-ordinated, timely and accurate artillery support to them.

[Crunchy]

Interesting comment from Sir Basil Liddell-Hart in his History of the First World War given that he is a critic of the conduct of the war.

"In design, however, the attack entrusted to Haig's First Army, was both original and well thought out. ... Complete surprise was attained, and most of the first positions captured, but when, in the second phase, the frontage was extended, the artillery support proved inadequate. Further, owing to scanty information and to the two Corps commanders waiting upon each other, a long pause occurred which gave the Germans five clear hours to organise fresh resistance. ... An underlying factor was that the narrowness of the attack sector made the breach more easy for the defenders to close, although this defect was unavoidable owing to the general shortage of ammunition, especially heavy guns and the high explosive shell for them."

Interesting also in that from Robert's earlier posts it seems that Haig, as an Army level commander, had a considerable input into the design of the battle itself.

[Robert Dunlop]

Thanks, Chris. Sanders Marble pointed out that the lifting barrages on day one of Neuve Chapelle were an innovation at the time. The furthest lift was intended to prevent reinforcements getting down the ridge and into position. From the history of the Jaeger battalion that was involved in mounting the immediate counterattack, the men were able to get to the edge of the wood without any significant casualties. What a contrast to the sort of protective barrages that protected I ANZAC in their advance down the reverse slope of the Gheluvelt-Passechendaele Ridge. It is this type of quantitative comparison that negates the 'numbers of artillery per yard of front' comparisons between battles.

Robert

[petrick]

What intrest me the most is how many staff would actually go see for themselves how their tactics worked? Would they go as far as going in to the frontline themselves and change their tactics after their failures? Overal about 24 million soldiers died in ww1 how many were staff? I know that things were done "by the book" and it would be difficult to change the stiff command structure and all of that, but it still baffles me, the sheer numbers of dead and wounded, the sheer number of failed attacks and offensives.

Yes there were commanders who were great tacticians but still i am a lions led by donkeys man because most staff weren't so great at all.

patrick

[armourersergeant]

Patrick,

When you use the word staff I think you hit on a very good point. The use and quality of staff officers is in my opinion the crucial point. A commander/General was only as good as the staff around him. They advised him, made reports he would judge decisions on. A commander could no longer run a war or battle from eye sight, he had to rely on having the right men in the right place. It took, IMO, a good three years for the BEF to get good qual;ified staff officers in good positions from Divisional to Army and GHQ. We must also not fall in to the trap of assuming that all staff officers were privalidged and never went to, or had been, in the front line. Many GSO1's had very likely spent time in the trenches. Many divisional commanders and certainly Brigade commanders had spent time going over the top.

I am not a 'Lions led by Donkey' man myself.

As for numbers, if I recall the Soviets lost 25 Million 'people' in WW2. Whilst this figure obviously includes civilian dead, it does put in to perspective the losses in WW1, when you consider that WW2 was a 'better' fought war. Is that 24 Million the real figure?

regards

Arm

[Robert Dunlop]

All good points but bear in mind that no Staff Officer, no matter how well trained, could make up for a lack of artillery and inadequate numbers of shells, for example. These were but two practical problems that plagued the British Army until at least the Somme.

Robert

[armourersergeant]

A relevant point Robert, however I still feel that the over riding factor was Staff officers. Yes of course lack of the materials to do the job would be a major obsticle, yet you can have excessive amounts of the stuff and not use it right, IMO. I guess the the flip side is of course you can have all the brains and no materials with which to do it with.

However did the army of 1915 have the knowledge capable of using the materials if they had them in enough quantity? that is a genuine question by the way. One I am off to ponder seeing as I am not sure of the answer.

regards

Arm

Still very unsure that 24 million troops died in WW1. Any comments. The link below gives different stats. tried to search on the mothersite for them but could not find Chris's, though I am sure I have seen them there!

http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/FWWcasualties.htm

regards

Arm

[PhilB]

All good points but bear in mind that no Staff Officer, no matter how well trained, could make up for a lack of artillery and inadequate numbers of shells, for example.

Robert

Surely planning would have taken into account the number of guns and shells available and cut its cloth accordingly? Shortages such as these could only be an excuse if they couldn`t have been known or forecast?

[Crunchy]

Before becoming overly critical of the staff officers involved, there were very few trained staff officers to go around.

According to Terraine, The Smoke and the Fire. p115 by August 1914 there were 447 officers who had passed through the Staff College. A number of these were killed early in the war and the enormous expansion of the British Army simply compounded the problem. In effect many officers were thrust into the ever increasing number of staff positions with little or no staff training in a military environment that was changing each year; particularly in regard to the use and employment of artillery. Thus many of them, including many who had come into the Army from civilian life were learning on the job.

Place ourselves in these men's shoes and I wonder how well we, and the particularly the critics, would have performed under these conditions. Very easy to sit back and criticise when we haven't done it ourselves.

Nonetheless, to simply place most of the blame on the staff officers is to display a real ignorance of the many complexities and factors that to contribute the outcome of a military operation. There are many issues that contribute and even the soundest planning can be frustrated by what Clausewitz called the "friction of war"

Regards

Chris

[PhilB]

Of course it`s a complex business. All the more reason to tailor your plans accordingly. If you are deficient in staff officers, then the plan needs to recognize that and be limited accordingly? Making plans that require guns, ammunition and staff resources which aren`t there is trying to make bricks without straw.

[Crunchy]

QUOTE (Phil_B @ Apr 29 2008, 06:48 PM) <{POST_SNAPBACK}>

If you are deficient in staff officers, then the plan needs to recognize that and be limited accordingly? Making plans that require guns, ammunition and staff resources which aren`t there is trying to make bricks without straw.

Phil,

I presume, therefore, that you would advocate that because there were insufficient staff officers, the BEF shouldn't have raised as many formations (Divisions, Corps and Armies) requiring staff officers as it did? Because that is effectively what you are saying.

regards

Chris