Lions led by donkeys?

[armourersergeant]

Do any of the recent books on the Indian Corps cover this aspect in any detail?

Robert,

I have 'Sepoys in the Trenches' by Corrigan. I have had a quick look at the appropriate chapter and there does not appear to be anything. though there does seem to be many references to Sappers, they seemed to be quite heavy on poineers and the like in the brigades. Davies gets no mention in that chapter and only a passing reference later. It did mention a young officer called Hobart who fiddled with tanks in WW2!

The pages seem quite interesting. if you do not have the book and would like some scans I could sort them for you.

regards

Arm

[Robert Dunlop]

Thanks for checking, Arm. Your mention of sappers fits with an earlier mention in Haig's diary. Willcocks was concerned about the poor quality of some of the troops in the Indian Corps. He 'proposed to form 4 inefficient battalions into a 6th brigade as they are quite unfit for fighting - these he will use to dig and make entrenchments, etc. This I agreed to as a temporary measure.'

It would be lovely to have some extra material on the Indian Corps. Thanks very much.

Robert

[SiegeGunner]

It did mention a young officer called Hobart who fiddled with tanks in WW2!

I'm sure Percy would have found that funny ...

[Robert Dunlop]

Wynn provides the best analysis in English of the German perspective. At least so far as I have come across to date. The German artillery comprised 'six four-gun batteries of the 7th Field Artillery Regiment, of which one was in a forward position hidden near cottages between La Russie and the Bois de Bièz, and the others along a line Bas Pommereau-Ferme du Bièz-Lorgies at the foot of the ridge, at an average of 2,500 yards from the British front line. The fire of these field batteries could be reinforced as soon as the battle opened by the remaining batteries of the 13th and 14th Division artillery, ie the 22nd, 43rd, and 58th Field Artillery Regiments in the neighbouring sectors, and the ten heavy batteries by the remainder of the two (heavy) artillery regiments within reach. A back line of battery positions was in course of construction on the Aubers Ridge on a general line north and south of La Clinqueterie farm about 2,500 yards behind the occupied battery positions.'

Here is a battlemap that illustrates the localities mentioned above:

Robert

NB: this is the same map that I overlaid on the Cambrai battlemap here:

http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/i...st&p=715431

I will do the reverse, ie produce a version of the Neuve Chapelle with map with the Cambrai map laid on it. This will further emphasize the huge changes that occurred in the layout of the German defenses between early 1915 and late 1917.

[Robert Dunlop]

Here is the alternative view of Neuve Chapelle compared with Cambrai. It is difficult to get a precise alignment between the British trenches (red dotted lines). I have rotated the Neuve Chapelle map, then tranposed the area between Trescault and Flesquières. The first thing that strikes you is the significant difference in distance between the front lines - the first line of trenches in the Hindenburg system is marked in larger blue dots, just south of Havrincourt. This is approximately the line of the German artillery at Neuve Chapelle. The second (but not the last) line of the Hindenburg system is next to Flesquières. During the battle of Cambrai, the German artillery was behind this second line.

These two maps illustrate how far both armies progressed: the Germans with respect to the depth of their defensive lines; the British with respect to their ability to break into these defensive positions. On Day 1 of Cambrai, the British advanced well beyond the German second line and reached the third line in many places. At Neuve Chapelle, the advance was stopped after the troops reached the other side of Neuve Chapelle, approximately (but not quite up to) the first line of trenches at Cambrai.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

I am extremely grateful to Arm, who has provided some important additional material from the Indian Corps perspective. This comes from Corrigan's book 'Sepoys in the trenches: the Indian Corps on the Western Front 1914-1915' (ISBN: 1862273545). Corrigan does not mention how the decision was made within the Indian Corps HQ to give 'the task to the Meerut Division...' (For further information about this division, see: http://www.1914-1918.net/Meerut_div.htm). Lt General Anderson was GOC of that division and Haig noted in his diary entry of 27 February:

'Lieutenant General Anderson is still on leave (unwell) so Major General Scott (CRA of Indian Corps) is in command... We rode on to Le Touret, HQ of Brigadier General Blackader's [Garwhal] Brigade. This brigade has been chosen by GOC Division to attack Neuve Chapelle. I therefore went into the operation in some detail and explained the necessity of giving each one a certain definite responsibility and a clearly defined objective. Brigadier General Blackader recently commanded a battalion of the Leicesters: that battalion is now in his brigade and he says all ranks are keen to go on.'

Corrigan recorded that 'Lieutenant General Sir Charles Anderson DSO, commanding the Meerut Division, issued his Operation Order no 21 on 9 March, the day before the attack was to begin'. Clearly, however, planning for the attack was going on at a lower level prior to this. Anderson's operation order summarised the First Army plan and noted that the Garwhal Brigade would lead the attack, followed by the Dehra Dun Brigade responsible to exploiting the first phase. Specifically, the Garwhal Brigade was to assault the German trenches to the south of Neuve Chapelle, push on to the village and link up with 8th Division, then 'push on to the best available line' to the east of the road between Neuve Chapelle and Port Arthur. The subsequent objectives were the eastern edge of Bois du Bièz and then Aubers Ridge. The Operation Order paid special attention to the right flank. Anderson noted that bombers from the Garwhal Brigade should enage the German right flank, supported by the elements of Bareilly Brigade who were in the front line facing south. It was vital that German forces were prevented from infiltrating behind the assault forces of Garwhal Brigade.

Once the Garwhal Brigade had stepped off, the Dehra Dun Brigade was to move up and take their place in the old front line, ready for the their role in the next phase of the operation. The (dismounted) divisional cavalry regiment was to form the reserve.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Brigadier General Blackader (GOC Garwhal Brigade) set out clearly the tasks for each of the units in his brigade. The locations for each battalion were precisely defined, and the HQ location was recorded. It was 8,000 yards from the front line - 'on the face of it, rather far away to be able to exercise any real influence on the battle'. Each of the assaulting battalions was to take two machine guns forward. The remaining ten MGs and the trench mortars were to concentrate on the German right flank, again reflecting the significance of this flank (not because it was more special than any other flank in this or other battles, but because it was a flank). The Brigade orders set out how much ammunition and supplies each soldier would carry, as well as the number of grenades that would be taken forward.

Brigadier General Blackader (GOC Garwhal Brigade) set out clearly the tasks for each of the units in his brigade. The locations for each battalion were precisely defined, and the HQ location was recorded. It was 8,000 yards from the front line - 'on the face of it, rather far away to be able to exercise any real influence on the battle'. Each of the assaulting battalions was to take two machine guns forward. The remaining ten MGs and the trench mortars were to concentrate on the German right flank, again reflecting the significance of this flank (not because it was more special than any other flank in this or other battles, but because it was a flank). The Brigade orders set out how much ammunition and supplies each soldier would carry, as well as the number of grenades that would be taken forward.

Further down the command chain, the battalion commanders issued their orders. Lt Colonel Drake-Brockman (GOC 2/39th Garwhalis), for example, instructed his company commanders and other officers verbally at 2000 hours on the evening before the attack. His Staff then confirmed the verbal orders in writing later that night. Drake-Brockman increased the personal allocation of SAA, and provided other details of the advances to be made by each company. The precise details were therefore provided at the eleventh hour. Other preparations, however, had been carried out, indicating that the planning process itself was not last minute. It had been noted, for example, that the road leading to the Indian Corps front was slightly raised and work was carried out on the neighbouring ditch to enable troops to move forward under greater cover. Ladders were provided for use by assault troops, and the Bareilly Brigade made preparations to engage the Germans right flank.

Throughout the preparatory phase, Corrigan notes that the RFC had been very active in keeping German aerial observers away from the scene.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Here is what Hubert Gough wrote about Neuve Chapelle in his book 'The Fifth Army':

'During the early months of 1915 preparations were being made for the first serious attempt to break through the enemy's trench line. The plans for this operation were conceived by Haig, and the organisation of the attack was being carried out by my brother John up to the moment of his death. The battle was to begin by the capture of Neuve Chapelle as a distinct operation. Then the front of the attack was to be widened and an attack on a five-mile front was to be made with the object of capturing Aubers Ridge, which dominated the country about there. This was the first attack which was organised by methods which were to become the model on which future assaults were to be based - a close concentration of artillery and an attack following immediately behind the bombardment.

For the first time an artillery time-table was issued, giving to each battery a definite purpose and target for each of the various phases of the bombardment. Also for the first time Objective Maps (with the later well-known 'Red' Line, 'Blue' Line, etc) were prepared, and for the first time a barrage was ordered.

Without entering into a detailed account of this attack, it is sufficient here to say that the first phase was highly successful, the village of Neuve Chapelle being captured and organised for defence; but later on (as was found to be common experience throughout the War), the energy of the attack spent itself and its strength being exhausted, while the defense, owing to reserves coming up, gradually obtained the mastery.

The role of the cavalry was to be in position in close support of Sir Douglas Haig, ready to go through and exploit success if it had been sufficiently decisive. The Cavalry Corps was under the command of General Allenby; my own division was placed close behind Estaires, and was at first retained under the orders of Sir John French and GHQ - though Haig was allowed to call on one of my brigades should he wish to use it. I was in close touch with Haig, who was temporarily in Estaires so as to be near Rawlinson during the battle. Rawlinson was conducting the battle, and after the news of the first successes had come in, Haig asked for a brigade to be pushed forward and I at once sent for Chetwode's.

I went down to see Haig, and told him that he could count on every man and every gun under my command if required, even though we were in GHQ Reserve; it seemed to me almost a crime to imperil the success of any battle by anything short of full and loyal co-operation with those already engaged, whatever the orders might have been.'

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Gough's attitude to decision-making was shared by at least one other cavalry officer at that time. Brig General Archibald Home, a senior Staff Officer, wrote in his diary dated 18 March 1915:

'In Cavalry work the carrying out of orders intelligently means making decisions on the spot without being able to refer to higher formations for orders. In the case of cavalry ordered forward this applies specially.'

Home was writing about Neuve Chapelle, though he was not in the vicinity when the attack took place.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

The German forces had some forewarning of the attack. Fifteen Indians had deserted to the 16th Regiment on 3 March, 1915. They mentioned preparations for an attack that would take place within a few days (in den nächsten Tagen). Wynne pointed out that 'tactically, however, surprise was obtained'. Corrigan noted 'the [british] artillery bombardment was to begin at 0730 hours, but at 0700, just as it began to get light, a German aeroplane appeared. The pilot, showing great courage and daring, flew very low - around 200 feet - over Port Arthur and was able to signal the presence of unusual amounts of men and equipment to his colleagues on the ground. This information drew the inevitable artillery and machine-gun fire on the 2nd Leicesters and 1/39th Garwhalis, both of which suffered casualties.' The German 58th Field Artillery history, however, recorded:

'On the morning of the 10th the battery commanders were going their usual rounds expecting a day of peaceful routine. The meadows were covered with a shroud of dense white mist. Suddenly a great burst of artillery fire came from the direction of Neuve Chapelle. It was the first real drum-fire (Trommelfeuer) yet heard.'

At least for some German forces, the attack came as a complete surprise.

Robert

[Terry_Reeves]

Re: General Davies's pre-1913 experience:

Sudan campaign 1885; Jebu expedition 1892; S. African War 1899-1901. Military Commander, Johannesburg Police, 1900-01.

TR

[Robert Dunlop]

Fantastic, Terry. Thanks very much.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

I have exhausted most of my sources on the planning phase of Neuve Chapelle. Next I would like to focus on the first day of the battle. Specifically, I will deal with some aspects of the initial attack, both from a British/Indian forces and a German perspective. The latter will be more limited. Full details of the attack are available in other sources, so the purpose will be to concentrate on those areas where lessons needed to be or were learned. It should highlight the command and control problems that prevailed during a battle in the Great War.

Robert

[Jonathan Saunders]

Robert - still following the thread.

[squirrel]

Robert - still studying this most educational thread. Looking forward to seeing your info on the first day of the battle.

[armourersergeant]

Robert,

You really should stop writing here and start putting it in a book!

Arm

[Robert Dunlop]

I'm working on it, Arm. Thanks Jon and Squirrel for the encouragement.

The British bombardment started at 7.30 am. The hurricane barrage tore into the German trenches and barbed wire. Approximately 30 minutes later, the barrage lifted and the infantry assault began. Some guns fired on the village, whilst others laid a protective barrage beyond it. Bridger noted that some of the fire was directed by at least one aircraft equipped with wireless (this was not new, having been used on the Aisne). German batteries and machine gun nests were targeted as well. The battalions in the centre burst through the German defences and then had to pause until the softening up of Neuve Chapelle was completed. The village was then captured after a brief period of house-to-house fighting and at around 0900 hours the British moved on to their first objective in the open ground just beyond the village. German soldiers were seen fleeing up the ridge. Wynne noted that 'the diary of the German advanced battery at La Russie says that its guns did not fire at first, as they were not sure whether the troops coming out of the village, about 1,000 yards away, were friend or foe. They seemed to be wearing German helmets and were waving white flags, and it was not till the smoke of the bombardment had cleared away that the situation was appreciated and the battery opened fire.' Several German guns were hit and put out of action.

Things did not go well on the north flank. The wire was not destroyed and the garrison survived. Two machine guns of 11th Jäger Battalion wrought havoc on the soldiers of the Middlesex and Scottish Rifles Regiments. Eventually, a further barrage was ordered and at 1130 hours one officer and 63 men of the 11th Jäger Battalion surrendered, according to Wynne's recounting of the battalion's history. The British 8th Division's history provides a slightly different story, whereby the division received the request for the new bombardment at 0940 hours, with the Jäger surrendering at 1000 hours. The British 7th Division history recorded that the German garrison 'were [also] being pressed from the flank by bombers'. These minor differences are neither here nor there, given that the 8th Division's history confirms that the rolling up of the German front line to the Moated Grange took until 1300 hours.

On the southern flank, the usual description is similar to that given by Wynne: 'On the extreme right a mistake in direction had led to confusion about Port Arthur, and here also no progress had been made.' Corrigan gives a much more detailed account:

'On the left and centre of the Garwhal Brigade all had gone well so far. Not so on the right. The right assaulting battalion, attacking from Port Arthur, was the 1/39th Garwhalis, the sister battalion of the attackers on the left, and its officers and men were well aware of the risk posed by the German line which outflanked the attack start line and could enfilade it from the south. This threat had been well understood by all involved in the planning of the operation from Haig downwards, but despite the bomb guns [early trench mortars] and the massed machine-guns of the Bareilly Brigade, the 1/39th Garwhalis, whose axis of advance was towards the north-east, came under heavy fire from German strong points to the east of Port Arthur. Unable to ignore the fire being directed against them, which was starting to inflict casualties very early on, the Garwhalis had no option but to swing to their right to deal with the hostile fire. This created a gap between themselves and the 2nd Leicesters and brought them up against German wire which had escaped the bombardment uncut. Eventually the German stronghold was captured in the late afternoon by an attack by the 3rd Londons, the reserve battalion of the brigade, and what was left of the 1/39th Garwhalis, supported by a flank attack by the 4th Seaforths from the Dehra Dun Brigade.'

From Corrigan's account, it is clear that the British right flank ran into almost exactly the same problem as the left flank, not surprisingly.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Higher up the chain of command, Rawlinson learned at 0825 hrs 'that the two leading battalions of 25 Brigade had taken the German front line. (It was captured at 8.15). Then at 9.50 he was informed that one of these battalions (the Rifle Brigade) had entered Neuve Chapelle and was holding the main street. The Rifle Brigade had captured this line at 8.50. At 8.59 Brigade HQ had been informed' (Prior and Wilson).

It became clear that 23 Brigade had run into serious problems. At 0835 hrs, Rawlinson received a report that the brigade was under 'considerable hostile fire'. At 0930, a liaison officer was dispatched from IV Corps to 23 Brigade HQ. Then the aforementioned request to 8th Division for artillery support on the intact German garrison was reported to IV Corps HQ at 1000 hours. Furthermore, Prior and Wilson note that Rawlinson did not receive any news about the progress of the Indian Corps troops.

Just after this time, Lt-Col Stephens sent a message to 25 Brigade HQ ' saying that there seemed to be v[ery] few of the enemy in front of us and asking if a further advance was to be made'. Bridger records that 'his request to spearhead at advance was, however, refused [by Brig Gen Cole, GOC 25 Brigade] in line with a policy of a broad front approach. Instead Royal Engineers were sent to help fortify the positions already gained.

The Battalion continued to dig all day but lost a good many men from the fire from two field guns and a Maxim... in Bois du Bièz'

To the left of Stephen's battalion, Lt-Col Laurie (Royal Irish Rifles), 'realising that the 23 Brigade was in trouble, asked if he should swing round to the left to help them. He wanted to skirt behind the virtually undamaged line that was firing on the Middlesex and Scottish rifles. Permission for this manoeuvre was refused.'

The 8th Division history mentions that 'realizing the difficulties of 23rd Brigade's task, the Divisional Commander had authorized General Pinney [GOC 23 Brigade] to call upon the 24th Brigade for support if necessary. Accordingly, at General Pinney's request, the 1/Worcestershire of the latter brigade had been sent forward...'

An interesting example of reinforcing failure rather than success.

Given that the right and left flanks remained under severe pressure, the remaining assault troops were crammed into a small area around the village. Consolidation continued but when the time came to resume the assault, it was no longer possible as the German defenders had reacted quickly. More on this anon.

Robert

[squirrel]

Excellent and thanks for posting it.

[AndyHollinger]

Ditto on the book or pamphlet idea ...

[Robert Dunlop]

I am working on a book but not around these topics, at least not directly. Currently, I am researching the evolution of cavalry thinking in the British, French, German and Belgian Armies before WW1. This work also extends to detailed analysis, based on sources from these four countries, of the use of the cavalry on the Western Front until the end of First Ypres.

With respect to this thread, I am painfully aware of the many gaps in my knowledge. Nevertheless, there is a need to publish something on the 'learning' process. It will have to be Open Source 'publishing' for the moment . Having written other books in the past (not in this field), I am not keen to race into a second project. Thank you for the prompts though.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Wynne recorded that 'four of the German companies (three of the 16th Regiment and one of the 11th Jäger Battalion) had been overrun in the first rush, and only a few escaped back.

Meanwhile, before the bombardment had been completed, the support company (12th) of the 13th Regiment at Piétre (East) has occupied the two machine guns in the strong-point at Piétre (West), and at the same time, on the southern flank, a support company (7th) of the 16th Regiment from the Ferme du Bièz garrisoned the strong-point at Les Brulots [see Corrigan's account above for information about the effect of this strong-point]. If the British assaulting battalions had pressed on at once through Neuve Chapelle a gap of over 2,000 yards lay open in front of them, between the two strong-points at Piétre (West) and Les Brulots, with only two guns of an advanced field battery 91st of the 7th F.A. Regiment at La Russie, and a few stragglers from the front breastwork to defend it. The intervening ground was, however, to a great extent covered by these two strong-points, which could have made it very costly to the dense British attack-formations [in] an advance on the Bois du Bièz.'

I will break the narrative here briefly. If Corrigan's account is correct, then he has illustrated how a strong-point could be engaged. While Wynne's point is correct in general terms, it might have been very difficult for the Les Brulots strong-point to have simultaneously engaged the advance from Neuve Chapelle.

Resuming Wynne's account:

'By 9 am, when the British assault-battalions were emerging from the ruins of Neuve Chapelle village, the support company (12/13) at Piétre (West) had also occupied for defence a disused trench that lay between the strong-point and the front breastwork on the Piétre-Chapigny road. From this it would have been able to further enfilade and block effectively any further British advance eastwards or northwards from Neuve Chapelle. So, too, on the southern flank another support company (6th) of the 16th Regiment had been sent forward from Halpegarbe to La Tourelle, where it, together with the 7th Company at Ferme du Bièz and Les Brulots, could block by fire any further British advance eastwards or southwards. Already a bottleneck had been formed into which any further British progress could be confined, with a gap still open at its eastern end. The history of the 11th Jäger Battalion tells how this gap was gradually filled.'

Another pause. I will add these movements and timings to the Neuve Chapelle map. It will take a few hours but I think it will add to our understanding.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Wynne again:

'From messages received by runners (all telephone cables had been broken) with half an hour of the end of the bombardment, the Jäger Battalion commander at Halpegarbe gathered that the British assault had broken through the front of his two Jäger companies and of the 16th Regiment... but that the left of the 13th Regiment held firm at the Moated Grange, though the extend of the break-through to the south, in the 16th Regiment sector was unknown. His first intention, on this information, shows his appreciation of the appreciation of fire-power. The cyclist company and the remainder of this machine-gun company, that is, about a hundred riflemen and four machine-guns, were to advance to the Bois du Bièz; and there this most insultingly small force was to hold the British offensive in front, while his two remaining Jäger companies were to move around to Piétre (West) to assist in blocking the northern flank of the break-in and take in enfilade any further advance. Here again, the first care of a German commander was to block the flanks and only to fill up the centre as reinforcements became available. The brigade commander, however, feared that the break-through might have extended to south of the Bois du Bièz, and he therefore ordered the whole Jäger detachment to meet the attack frontally.

Accordingly, the cyclist company and two machine guns were ordered to the south-eastern corner of the Bois du Bièz, from where they were to command the roads leading back from the front of the 16th Regiment. The two Jäger companies and the other two machine guns were to meet the attack at the northern end of the Bois du Bièz, protect the advanced battery there at all costs, and work forward if possible, and work forward if possible to the road triangle north of Neuve Chapelle village. These two companies advanced widely extended, under heavy shell fire, down the slope of the Aubers Ridge to challenge Britain's battering-ram of fourty-eight battalions; but, in fact, they had no idea that such a mighty British phalanx lay waiting below.'

Pause. Wynne is exaggerating the British numeric superiority for literary effect. While the total number of battalions was consistent, the British were not able to get that number of battalions into the battle area. Corrigan notes:

'It was now that the Dehra Dun Brigade should have been following up closely, ready to storm through and take the Bois du Bièz, 800 yards in front of the Garwhal Brigade's new position. Unfortunately the very success of initial attack had out-run the plan and there was now a long delay... it was not until 1100 hours on the 10th when the Dehra Dun Brigade arrived at Port Arthur [having advanced from the] A1 Redoubt, about 800 yards south-west of Port Arthur.'

Corrigan does not give an explanation for this seemingly tardy follow-up. I have run several simulations of Neuve Chapelle in 1/300 scale - it is one of the very few WW1 battles that can be simulated in this scale on a 4x6' table. The overwhelming impression is the huge log-jam that quickly occurs if the flanks are constricted by the historical resistance, especially by 11th Jäger near Moated Grange.

Wynne's more general point, leaving aside the absolute numbers, still holds.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Back to the German narrative:

'The two [Jäger] companies passed through the northern end of the Bois du Bièz and reached the road that borders its western edge. There they halted in full view of the leading British battalions 700 yards ahead across the flat water-meadows, the two machine guns taking up position in the strong-point in the Bois du Bièz, covering the bridge over the Layes brook.

From 9.30 am onwards this small force, with only a few stragglers from the morning attack, was the only opposition on a frontage of 2,000 yards which faced and awaited the British onslaught; but the flanks of the offensive were blocked, and the strong-points at Piétre (West) and Les Brulots covered the front. The morning hours passed and the British assault remained stationary in front of Neuve Chapelle village, but about midday further German reinforcements began to arrive. On the northern flank another support company (9th) of the 13th Regiment from L'Aventure strengthened the line of the 12th Company at Piétre (West), while, of the two reserve companies at Herlies, the 3rd [Company] still further strengthened this flank at Mauquissart and the 6th moved to the wood near Haut Pommereau in close support, behind the right centre. On the southern flank two of the reserve companies (1st and 2nd) of the 16th Regiment marched up from Illies by way of Halpergarbe-Ferme du Bièz-Les Brulots and reinforced the 10th Company in the front line facing Port Arthur, while the other two reserve companies moved to Halpergarbe. At about midday, these two were ordered to reinforce the two Jäger companies and, at 2 pm, came up on their right at the northern end of the Bois du Bièz. Encouraged by this support all four companies advanced about 200 yards across the open to the line of the Layes brook. And still the British remained along the line they had reached in the morning.

Later in the afternoon the German companies in Corps and Divisional reserve, began to arrive on the battlefield. When the British attack was resumed between 5.30 pm and 6 pm it was therefore faced by exactly double the strength it had to contend with in the morning assault.

The Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria, commanding the Sixth Army, in his diary entry on the following day writes that it was a mistake to continue to reinforce a line which actually lay in front of a line of strong-points. He would have preferred a weakly held front line based on the strong points, with the local reserves kept back under cover till an adequate force for the counter-attack had been assembled; even, he adds, if the British had broken through this line they would only have offered more favourable conditions for the counter-attack. In these words the Crown Prince Rupprecht unwittingly predicted, or had a glimpse of, what was to be a main feature of the mobile defence-in-depth of 1917.

Be that as it may, the defence had so far worked according to General Falkenhayn's plan; the rallying line pivoted on the strong-points (Stützpunkte) was now in a position to block any further advance either to front or flanks. For the Germans the crisis was past; the problem now was to recapture the front breastwork.'

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

The following map shows the initial dispositions of most German forces around Neuve Chapelle. I have included the two sections of the forward battery of field artillery. These have a white inner to the dark blue hexagon. The support companies have a light purple inner. It is not worth showing the equivalent size British units. The whole British zone would be a sea of red!

Next I will add the movements and times thereof.

Robert