Lions led by donkeys?

[Crunchy]

There is, however, (at least) one major pitfall in this process of analysis. The enemy NEVER sits passively on the receiving end, especially not the German Army. At best, generals might have improved performance in one particular battle, but the continued application of a 'successful' operational template led to counter-measures that rendered it 'not successful'.

Robert,

Great point and one that we should never forget in a debate such as this. The old issue of a tactical/technological development followed by the counter - development, which is a never ending theme in the history of warfare.

Regards

Chris

[Crunchy]

Jon,

Apologies for not replying earlier to your comprehensive post # 184. The debate had rushed on by the time I had considered the issues you addressed and in truth many of the points related to Haig himself. Several of your views on him appear to be fair and reasonable, however, I don't know enough about him to be able to provide a decent reply.

A few points if I may.

I am not sure that Haig planned his battles on a breakthrough theory per se. From my reading on the Somme, he put in place resources that could exploit a breakthrough IF it occured. This is a reasonable and sound thing for a commander to do.

I am not convinced that Haig continually made the wrong decision when involving himself in battlefield tactics. What I do accept is that Haig didn't draw all of the lessons from a battle that he could have and that he should have appointed a dedicated team to analyse and work on the problems of minor tactics. He should also have ensured that these lessons and new doctrine were distributed widely throughout the BEF, rather than leaving much of it to lower formations to address individually.

I agree with your view that in general we have an uninformed and erroneous view of the French and that in many respects they were ahead of the British in a number of tactical areas.

I agree that Haig made a mistake in appointing Gough over Plumer and Rawlinson for 3rd Ypres.

I am not sure that Stevenson's note on Haig wanting to re-open the Somme offensive in 1917 necessarily refutes Haig's reluctance to fight on the Somme in 1916. I think there is enough evidence that indicates that Haig preferred Flanders to the Somme in the first half of 1916.

Regards

Chris

[Crunchy]

One of the themes in the debate on the incompetence of the generals and their inability to learn quickly is that which infers that no fault for the disasters that befell the British Army can be laid at the feet of the troops at the front - the PBI. Someone has suggested, and for the life of me I cannot find the actual post, that the Officer's and NCO's in the units learnt to adapt and innovate better than the generals.

I came across following quotes are from Sixsmith British Generalship in the Twentieth Century p 125 126 this evening. They are part of the discussion on the poor resistance offered to the German counter attacks at Cambrai and provide an indication of the balance we ought to apply when making our criticisms of the High Command. The first two comments are from Maxse's report and few would deny that Maxse was an innovative, competent and successful commander.

" The three divisons concerned were weak and distributed on wide frontages, but could have held the enemy long enough to enable reserves to counter-attack ... Infantry battalions were so surprised as to be ineffectual. The root cause of the trouble was ignorance of the rudiments of successful defence and inexperience in handling sections and platoons as fire units."

"Whenever the Bosche was opposed by rifle fire he made no serious attempt to fight. Infantry posts that held out were unmolested. If the principles of defence in depth had been properly applied, the Bosche would have made no headway after he surprised the first line of resistence ... There was no wire sufficient to stop him anywhere, and he attacked with about equal numbers to us, or with only a slight prepondereance of numbers."

Sixsmith continues "The British machine gunners had come in for a good deal of adverse criticism for their part in the defence. Maxse said they had even less idea than the infantry of what to do in the defensive battle. As an example he gave the results of his examination of some officers and NCO's he had questioned. They unashamedly admitted continuing to fire on their SOS lines far behind the enemy attackers when they had within their view, at a range of a few hundred yards, 'Bosche coming over the hill in beautiful order, absolutely on parade, their officers with sticks and maps all slowly and quietly coming over the hill.' After all that the British had suffered from machine guns in their attacks against the Germans, this seems too much to bear"

One would have thought that by late 1917 the ability to conduct a successful defence against German counter attacks would have been bread and butter to the PBI and that machine gunners would have had the initiative to fire on targets presenting the greatest threat.

[PhilB]

Someone has suggested, and for the life of me I cannot find the actual post, that the Officer's and NCO's in the units learnt to adapt and innovate better than the generals.

I suspect that this has long been one the quickly acquired skills of the British soldier. Of course, he has rather more incentive than the generals as its his own life he`s adapting and innovating to protect! Phil B

[Jonathan Saunders]

"Whenever the Bosche was opposed by rifle fire he made no serious attempt to fight. Infantry posts that held out were unmolested.

Chris - I really dont know what Sixsmith was thinking when he used this quote. When did Maxse say it? Its simply not true from my experience of studying Cambrai.

I will provide you with a very brief overview of 6 West Kent's between 20 Nov and 30 Nov 1917.

On 20 Nov they passed through their Brigade's first wave to take the more distant objectives of Le Quennet Farm and Lateau Wood. By the time they had moved the 4km or so to their objective the surprise element no longer existed and they faced fierce fighting in taking those objectives.

They were not relieved but spent the next 9 days turning around German trenches and generally trying to create defensive lines. During this period they suffered attritional losses from sustained enemy artillery, which meant they were generally working at night - digging trenches, putting out wire. On 26 Nov they also resisted a German attack. So during those 9 days these men were exhausted with no let-up in work expectation, they were taking casualties and had also been involved in further fighting.

On the 30 Nov they were attacked from their flank when the Germans broke through the Line to the north of them (held - or not - by another unit). Simultaneously the 6th West Kent's were resisting an attack from the south. The CO took the entire Bttn HQ Staff forward to reinforce his Bttn. They held until the weight of enemy numbers forced their fighting withdrawal. The CO was shot through the mouth but was got away after he lost consciousness. The 2 i/c sustained serious GSWs to his shoulder and hand (fingers amputated) and was taken prisoner. The Adj was wounded, taken prisoner but managed to escape.

This isnt "unmolested" and doesnt suggest poor resistance. However it does suggest that something was lacking in the planning (no reserves for example (and short of resources such as wire?) because everything had been channelled to Third Ypres). Do we blame Byng or Haig. I would say both but the weight of responsibility is Haig's for allowing the attack to take place without adequate resources, IMHO.

Regards,

Jon S

[Robert Dunlop]

Joffre's use of Liaison Officers to closely monitor the planning and execution of battles and campaigns.

Jon, I have discovered further compelling, but indirect, evidence that Joffre maintained a tight rein on the planning by his Army commanders. Having read the first two chapters of Laure's book on the French Operations Bureau at GQG, he provides some very telling insights. Laure came into the 3rd Bureau at the same time as Pétain. Laure noted that one of Pétain's main drives was to create a new situation for Army commanders. No longer were they to be subject to the strict control of GQG, but they were to be given greater freedom and responsibility for planning and executing operations. I have not finished translating the material but will post the relevant section when I have time. As I said above, it is not direct evidence but tis interesting nonetheless.

Robert

[Jonathan Saunders]

I have discovered further compelling, but indirect, evidence that Joffre maintained a tight rein on the planning by his Army commanders.

Hi Robert - thanks for the further supporting evidence.

My source was a lecture entitled General Ferdinand Foch and the French contribution to the Battle of the Somme by Dr Elizabeth Greenhalgh of the Australian Defence Academy. The Conference was held at Kent University and jointly organised with the JSCSC, so well sponsored.

I have now dug out the notes I wrote at the time (last summer):

26 June 1916 - Foch was informed by Haig that the British would not pursue Foch's preferred plan to aim at [German] communication hub around Cambrai but would head north to Arras. Foch said if Haig wanted to go for Arras it would have to be on a wide front and not the narrow front Haig intended. Haig refused to cooperate. Joffre subsequently visits Haig and a row ensued - Haig still refused to cooperate. Joffre refused then to discuss further with Haig and left it to Foch to resolve. Joffre busy negotiating Rumanian entry into war.

My recollection of the lecture is that at this time Joffre was immersed in the negotiation to bring Rumania into the war. As I recall, this point (together with his exasperation of dealing with Haig) was emphasised as explanation why Joffre became more distant from the planning of the Somme offensive.

Her CV states she is currently writing a book on Foch in the Great War - we might have to wait its publication before we can understand her interpretation and sources.

Regards,

Jon

[Crunchy]

Jon,

Were the 6th West Kents in the first line of resistance when the German's attacked?

Reading the second quote it appears that Maxse was talking at that point about defence in depth after the first line of resistance was surprised and overcome. His first comment appears to be about the fighting on the first line of resistance - here he is saying that " ... Infantry battalions were so surprised as to be ineffectual. The root cause of the trouble was ignorance of the rudiments of successful defence and inexperience in handling sections and platoons as fire units." He is not saying that they didn't resist, but criticises the way in which the defence was conducted.

Part of the problem may have been insufficient reserves. My point is that on occasions the units on the ground themselves made serious mistakes and we can hardly blame Haig and Byng for the machine gunners actions. All I am arguing for is a balanced criticism based on an understanding of all the factors that contributed to a disaster.

Unfortunately we don't have Maxse's full notes but I posted the quotes because Maxse, IMO, is a credible commentator and a man who analysed issues and drew the appropriate lessons from them. He was an excellent trainer of divisions and performed well on the Somme.

Note also that Sixsmith is not necessarily a supporter of Haig. What is evident is that his criticisms of Haig and others, are balanced.

Regards

Chris

[Jonathan Saunders]

Reading the second quote it appears that Maxse was talking at that point about defence in depth after the first line of resistance was surprised and overcome. His first comment appears to be about the fighting on the first line of resistance - here he is saying that " ... Infantry battalions were so surprised as to be ineffectual. The root cause of the trouble was ignorance of the rudiments of successful defence and inexperience in handling sections and platoons as fire units." He is not saying that they didn't resist, but criticises the way in which the defence was conducted.

Hi Chris,

Just so I am clear who is Sixsmith (and Maxse?) pointing the finger of blame at here?

I cant recall how well known and practised defence in depth was within the British army at this stage. Presumably any problem to defence in depth was availability of reserves ie. actually have resource to defend - I assume if reserves had been available then the 6 West Kent's would have been a perfect example of a bttn in serious need of relief. For example, having taken a leading role in the offensive and then spent the following 9 days in front line duty, C Coy of 6 West Kent's were holding a front of 400 yds with 4 officers and 42 men. I will try and find out what was happening to their rear in regard to defence in depth – I seem to recall from memory that the Guards division were behind them although they were themselves recovering from being involved in earlier heavy fighting.

Regards,

Jon S

[Robert Dunlop]

Jon, no doubt you will be examining Dr Greenhalgh's book with a more criticial eye. If Dr Greenhalgh is suggesting that Joffre was too busy with the Romanian situation to keep an eye on Foch, then I would respectfully submit that either Dr Greenhalgh does not understand how high command, and French GQG in particular, operated (as per Chris' point above) or she has access to material that has not been published before that shows that Joffre lapsed. This would be very unusual, given that Joffre managed to maintain an overview of the entire Battle of the Frontiers via his Liaison Officers for example. It would also have been entirely out of character. This does not mean that such evidence could not exist, but it is not enough to infer indirectly that because Romania was important to Joffre then Foch was not. Even if Joffre was not engaged at all, his Chief of Staff definitely was, as I quoted before.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

The concept of a 'learning curve' is frequently applied to explain the differences between the British Army of 1914 versus November 1918. The concept is often directed at the generals, particularly at Haig, to describe the process whereby the generals became more proficient, culminating in the Last 100 Days. Separately, the concept is also applied to the 'army', ie all those who were not generals. More often, however, the implication is that the performance of the British Army is always more directly linked to the position of the generals along the curve at any point in time.

The whole learning process is enormously complex in large organisations. I want to start by rewinding to the Battle of Neuve Chapelle, then look briefly at the other battles fought by the British in 1915. What was understood by the generals, Haig in particular, at the time of Neuve Chapelle? What was carried forward by the generals, Haig in particular, after Neuve Chapelle? These observations will be set against the concept that the Germans learned more quickly than the British from these battles.

The planning and execution of the Battle of Neuve Chapelle illustrates that Haig knew the central importance of artillery. This is not surprising, given the experiences of the BEF on the Aisne and First Ypres for example. Both of these battles illustrated the significance of indirect fire and the use of howitzers firing high explosive. On 28 February 1915, Haig noted in his diary 'we don't want to run any risk of failure, so I decided to ask for 2 more batteries of 6 inch howitzers (siege) making 28 in all'. This appreciation came from an analysis of the effects of German heavy howitzers in the earlier months of the war, as well as a review of the first use of 'Mother', the British 9.2" howitzer that 'fired 91 rounds in the two days [prior to the successful advance of] our line from Cuinchy', recorded in Haig's diary of 11 February.

Furthermore, Haig appreciated the importance of a surprise bombardment. On 10 February, he recorded 'I saw General Mercer (CRA) regarding the action of the artillery against Neuve Chapelle. He proposed bombarding it by compartments, and to take 4 days over it. In my opinion such action would lose much of the effect of the heavy shells. Much better to compress this fire into a terrific outburst for 3 hours... This will take advantage of the element of surprise!' (a theme to which Haig would return before the Battle of the Somme, as noted previously).

What is less well appreciated is that Haig understood the significance of aerial observation in support of the artillery. It is likely that the effects of the German aerial observation process did not pass Haig by, but he certainly knew of the use of aerial observation in directing British artillery efforts on the Aisne. In addition, Haig pressed for the use of artillery to be located in the front lines, firing directly at wire and parapets. Tests were conducted, which Haig attended, to demonstrate the power of artillery used in this way. Some mountain guns were brought forward for Neuve Chapelle and contributed to the clearing of the wire.

Next I want to look at other aspects the planning process, including intelligence reviews, before examining the execution of the battle. Work beckons however.

Robert

[Jonathan Saunders]

If Dr Greenhalgh is suggesting that Joffre was too busy with the Romanian situation to keep an eye on Foch, then I would respectfully submit that either Dr Greenhalgh does not understand how high command, and French GQG in particular, operated (as per Chris' point above) or she has access to material that has not been published before that shows that Joffre lapsed.

Robert - I cant speak on behalf of Dr Greenhalgh and i dont think I have suggested that Joffre was not keeping himself fully appraised of the Somme battles and planning. What I said was Joffre became less directly involved - in fact that would suggest he was using his liaison officers to a greater extent as you point out.

Joffre's fury with Haig is well known. I have the impression that Joffre did not think greatly of the British army. Also from the British viewpoint Joffre was regarded as over-reacting in certain situations. Possibly I have used the wrong expression. Possibly Joffre backed off from direct confrontation with Haig as he was astute enough to understand that Foch dealt with the British better. As I said we will have to wait for the publication of her book before we can fully understand her interpretation and sources. What I have given you is my interpretation of a lecture Dr Greenhalgh gave.

Following the late June meeting between Joffre and Haig do you know when they next had a direct meeting or exchange of letters, or more importantly Joffre with Foch?

Regards,

Jon

[Crunchy]

Just so I am clear who is Sixsmith (and Maxse?) pointing the finger of blame at here?

Hi Jon,

Neither Sixsmith nor Maxse are pointing the finger of blame at anyone in particular; nor am I. I do not think blaming people is a useful approach as many factors can contribute to a particular outcome, especially where battles are concerned.

Sixsmith is addressing the lessons learned from the German counter attack. He starts with Smuts' assessment that "no-one down to and including corps commanders was to blame, but that some brigade and divisional commanders were at fault and that the training of junior officers and NCO's required immediate attention." Sixsmith then disagrees with the initial part of that assessment and addresses issues relating to Byng (Army Commander) and Pulteney (III Corps commander) and the failure of either of them to take sufficient precautions against a German counter attack. he believes the boundary between III and VII Corps was badly choesen, VII Corps was weak in artillery and that both the artillery and infantry in III Corps were badly sited. On the other hand IV Corps (Snow) and 29th Division in III Corps fought staunchly in well organised positions.

He then goes on to discuss the issue of training of officers and NCO's stating " there is no doubt that the strictures on the state of training of the junior officers and NCOs were right". Maxse's comments are included in this part of the assessment as examples. Maxse was on the court of enquiry that sought to discover the lessons learned from the German counter attack phase of the battle.

Neither are pointing a finger of blame, they are simply highlighting some of the problems that occured at lower levels. You may well be right about the lack of sufficient reserves but it would seem, from what Maxse and Sixsmith are saying, that the poor sighting of defensive positions and the knowledge of junior officers and NCOs in defensive fighting also contributed to the success of the German counter attack. That is NOT to say they were to blame. Obviously other factors also contributed.

My reason for including the quotes was that, while there is a tendency to assume that all of the mistakes are made by the High Command, in reality factors or mistakes at different levels of an organisation often contribute to the outcome. That the machine gunners continued to fire on their SOS targets behind the German attackers rather than engaging those they saw to their front, IMO, is a folly that should not have occured.

I hope this clarifies the matter.

Regards

Chris

[armourersergeant]

It is rather strange that we seem to shy away from criticising potential mistakes and lack of knowledge of junior officer and other ranks when looking at battle analysis. Almost as if we are soiling the very name of those that gave their lives. The fact we can and do criticise General officers, some of who also died seems not to matter. It stands to reason that some lower grade officers and men would make mistakes, though I would have thought that more often than not some of these would be through being in the mix, hard at it and making decisions at a moments notice. Yet also there must have been times where their training and ability to learn would have played a part in mistakes. This does not take anything away from the sacrifices they made.

With all that said, the inquiry after Cambrai is to my way of thinking a calous whitwash, and all should be ashamed. Whilst some of the men and junior officers may have been lacking in abilty, as discussed above, it is quiet obvious to me that Byng should take the main blame for the failure, certianly after the German counter attacks. He was warned by Snow (VII) that they were coming. His chief of staff, Loius Vaughan I believe, noted the intel from this corps and promised that things would be done to re-inforce VII corps front and reserves, yet then apparently did little to follow up. I can not believe he did not inform his commander of the news, Vaughan seems to have a good staff reputation, and did nothing about it. So one wonders who decided not to react to this information, or choose to not believe it.

Co-ordination of this expected counter attack by the Germans was poor at best. The co-ordination should have come from Army command, IMO, and does not seem to have done so, atleast to my limited knowledge of the battle.

Whilst some Corps commanders went home after the battle, seemingly as a cost of these failures (Snow was a sick man and had requested to be relieved), they did so quietly and with reputations apperently in tact. Byng, who seems to have not wanted to criticise anyone, he kept his own council, aledgedly, or did he feel a 'fifth ammendment' was in his best intrests!, moved on and was involved in March 1918 and the retreats, where Gough paid the price for the withdrawls.

Not perhaps relevant to this on going discussion but...

Arm

[Crunchy]

Arm,

Your comments are very relevant. Sixsmith would agree with you re Byng and, by inference, that the inquiry too readily exonerated the Army and Corps commanders.

Regards

Chris

[Jonathan Saunders]

Neither are pointing a finger of blame, they are simply highlighting some of the problems that occured at lower levels.

Chris thanks for clarifying. The context wasnt clear to me when I read your original use of the quotes.

Cheers!

Jon

[Robert Dunlop]

It is rather strange that we seem to shy away from criticising potential mistakes and lack of knowledge of junior officer and other ranks when looking at battle analysis. Almost as if we are soiling the very name of those that gave their lives. The fact we can and do criticise General officers, some of who also died seems not to matter.

Arm, this was the very point I was trying to make previously. Well put.

Robert

[Jonathan Saunders]

It is rather strange that we seem to shy away from criticising potential mistakes and lack of knowledge of junior officer and other ranks when looking at battle analysis.

Arm - this is very fair. Obviously General officers had greater responsibility and shaped battles and there are greater volumes of sources from which to evaluate and form an opinion. But if criticism is valid then it should be discussed and understood.

Regards,

Jon

[Jonathan Saunders]

Following the late June meeting between Joffre and Haig do you know when they next had a direct meeting or exchange of letters, or more importantly Joffre with Foch?

Robert - first thing I did when I got in from work was look through Haig diaries. Haig and Joffre had another meeting 3 July in which another arguement ensued regarding Haig's decision to attack south of he D929 rather than the high ground at Thiepval. The next contact appears to be 6 August when Haig and Joffre seem to have endulged in some mutual back-slapping. As yet I have only read on into August but Haig is definitely making references to Joffre making decisions.

Regards,

Jon

[Robert Dunlop]

Co-ordination of this expected counter attack by the Germans was poor at best. The co-ordination should have come from Army command, IMO, and does not seem to have done so, atleast to my limited knowledge of the battle.

Arm, FWIIW I think the defensive measures on the right flank should not have required oversight from Army command. They should not have to be involved in issues of detail at this level. The defenses on the left flank operated perfectly. The glaring issue, from a tactical perspective, on the right flank was the presence of the ravine right on the junction of the two corps. This provided a natural protected route of attack for the Germans. At the very least, the two corps commanders should have noted this and made the appropriate arrangements for lower level commands, both artillery and infantry, to sort it out. The situation is analagous to the junction between French and British Armies, for example on the Somme. Liaison staff from the lower levels would work out details of cross-artillery fire, timing of reliefs, etc. Junctions between major units were really dangerous points - Staff Officers at lower levels should have known this and taken extra care.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Thanks, Jon. Joffre was really angry with the British effort as a whole. Haig continually tried to prevent the British Army being committed too early. Meanwhile, the French were bleeding heavily, having haemorrhaged badly in 1915. Furthermore, Joffre was under increasing personal pressure. He will have sensed this, even if it had not been made explicit. I have Joffre's memoirs, but not those covering this period. Time to go to Abebooks again.

Robert

[armourersergeant]

Robert,

Would you say then that the success for the German attacks was more to do with the dispositions and co-ordination of the British forces than to the lack of sufficent troops?

I am looking at this purely from a VII corps perspective and Snow's contribution, thats where my research comes from. I understand that Snow knew exactly where the Germans would hit and did what he could to re-inforce that area, referenced not just from Snows dairy but also cross ref to Haigs dairy. I also understood that Vaughan (COS Third Army) noted Snow's comments and told him something would be done. This does not then seem to have transpired.

Your comments on this would help with furthering my research in this area.

regards

Arm

[Robert Dunlop]

Arm, all my reading to date supports your conclusion. The primary problem was a lack of co-ordination, particularly in launching a pre-emptive bombardment when the build-up of German forces was detected on the night before the attack. There is no doubting, however, that some units should have (and could have) been relieved. I do not know where the failure lay in this regard. Did it lie with the lower level commanders, who did not recognise and/or seek replacements? The lack of attention to the critical tactical issue might suggest that other issues were overlooked as well.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Back to Neuve Chapelle. Sticking with the artillery planning, Haig noted in his diary that the planning was quite carried out quite carefully:

'General Mercer came to see me about 6 pm. He had been to see some practical Battery Commanders of recent experience. He now considered a bombardment of half an hour sufficient. I told him that in my opinion it was a question of calculation. For instance there were certain houses to be demolished. How many shells would it require in each case? How long would it take to fire these? Then there was the bombardment of trenches! The number of shells required must be worked out, time required for firing, etc. When all this has been totalled up we might then give a decision.

3 March 1915 - General Mercer came to see me about 6 pm. He has gone thoroughly into the artillery question with Colonels Franks and Uniacke and the CRAs concerned. The conclusions they arrived at is that 35 minutes in all of a bombardment should suffice. I am to have a detailed statement of the roles assigned to the several guns and batteries by tomorrow morning. There is a considerable difference between the 2 1/2 hours bombardment first recommended by IV Corps and the present proposal!'

Farndale noted in his book 'History of the Royal Regiment of Artillery: Western Front 1914-18' that:

'General Haig, whose First Army was to carry out the operation, gave his Corps Commanders four tasks for their artillery. The tasks were: first, to destroy the enemy fire and front trenches; second, to protect the flanks; third, to form a curtain of fire behind the enemy's front trenches to prevent him reinforcing them; and fourth, to neutralise enemy guns and machine guns.'

The latter point reinforces that Haig understood the significance of enemy artillery and machine guns. With respect to the latter, it should be noted that the enemy strongpoints behind the front line came in for special attention, though not all were detected by the new innovation of aerial photography.

Thirty-six guns (4.7" and 6") were assigned to attack German artillery. This represented approximately 10% of the artillery. Aerial observation was recognised as important to the artillery effort, with Haig writing on 16 February 1915:

'I also saw Major Trenchard today... I told him the plan and asked for his proposals as to disposal of airoplanes [sic] for reconnaissance and also for artillery observation. Some new lamps are required to supplement the wireless in case the latter is damaged by the heavy explosions of the shells and big guns.'

The artillery was secretly concentrated behind the lines. Observation towers were constructed.

The artillery barrage opened up at 0730 hours on March 10th, 1915.

Robert

[Crunchy]

Arm, FWIIW I think the defensive measures on the right flank should not have required oversight from Army command. They should not have to be involved in issues of detail at this level.

Robert,

I agree with you.

The location of the boundary between III and VII Corps would have been set at Army level, in discussion with both Corps Commanders. It was probably chosen because it was easily recognisable on the ground, albeit not a particularly good choice given it provided a covered approach between them. Normally the boundary feature is designated as inclusive of one of the corps, which means that corps has responsibility for it.

In reality the boundary would be between two battalions on the ground and the responsibility for the detailed coordination between them lies at that level, overseen by the brigade commanders and for coordination of artillery, the divisional commanders. We are talking here about the sighting of machine guns and positions at platoon and company level such that the defences on either side of the boundary are integrated with interlocking fire and coordinated artillery support. The brigade commanders must ensure that the depth battalions are positioned such that they can support the forward battalions and coordinate across the inter - brigade boundary.

One cannot expect an Army commander to work out the detailed coordination on the ground at that level. He would expect his subordinates at the appropriate levels to do this. It certainly wasn't Haig's responsibility - that is taking micro-management too far.

Byng would have been better to have placed the boundary a set distance to one side or other of the ravine, such that it was clearly the responsibility of one particular unit.

Regards

Chris