Lions led by donkeys?

[Robert Dunlop]

Here is the map for circa 0800 hrs, approx 30 mins after the start of the British bombardment. The artillery lifted to attack the village and to provide a protective barrage beyond the village. The British forces have captured much of the German front line, except in the north.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Here is the map from circa 0900 hrs. The British have captured the village and stopped just beyond it. German reinforcements are shown on the move via dotted dark blue lines. The remnants of the shattered front line troops have made it back to Bois du Bièz, where they were rallied by the two guns of the forward battery that survived.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Here is the picture at approx 1000 hours, assuming this is when the Jäger surrendered. Further German troop movements are underway, as marked with the blue dotted lines.

Here is an approximation of Rawlinson's view of the battle at the same time:

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

The Rawlinson (IV Corps) view of the battle is an approximation. I will return to this later. 23rd Brigade had a clearer view of what was happening in their sector, with the failure to take all of their objectives due to the German defences. 25th Brigade had a clearer view in their sector too. The reactions of the two battalion commanders, Stephens and Laurie, to the capture of Neuve Chapelle has been described above. Both wanted to exploit the opportunity: Stephens to push his riflemen forward; Laury to turn the German resistance to 23rd Brigade from the flank and rear. The requests were turned down by 25th

Brigade's commander, Lowry Cole.

At this point, I think it might be instructive to look at 8th Division in more detail. It was composed of Regulars. They had limited experience of the Great War, having only arrived in France in November but the various regimental commanders were not naive. It should also be noted that the division included riflemen, who were more like Jaeger. Thus, Stephens and Laury were more likely have been trained to sum up a potential opportunity or threat, and take appropriate action. This is supposition on my part, but I think it is inappropriate to dismiss or ignore their responses. I don't know anything about Brig Gen Lowry Cole, GOC 25 Brigade. The 8th Division history is not forthcoming on his background. He was killed in the Battle of Aubers Ridge. The only relevant action that might have contributed to his very conservative response was the December 1914 attack made by 23 Brigade against the defences outside Neuve Chapelle. A short section of frontline was captured by the British, but then abandoned when the Germans mounted a bombing counterattack from the flank. 25th Brigade contributed to the attack but did not appear to suffer any significant casualties. Seems unlikely that this would have had a significant impact.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Leaving aside, for a moment, the question of whether the British could have advanced once Neuve Chapelle, we see a situation where two British battalion commanders wanted to take the initiative, the 25th Brigade, 8th Division, and IV Corps Commanders did not, and the Army Commander did. As described earlier, Generals Davies and Rawlinson wanted to consolidate the capture of the village of day one, then advance on day two. I don't know about Davies but there are some very clear pointers in Rawlinson's past that provide some insight into his approach.

On October 15, 1914, Rawlinson wrote in his diary that he 'met Sir John [French] at noon at Hazebrouck. He congratulated me on the good work I had done in Belgium [as GOC 7th Division] and unfolded to Allenby, Pulteney and myself his plan of action for the future. My task is to push forward slowly till the IIIrd Corps comes up in line, and then to press on, as the left flank of our line, with the French cavalry and Byng on my left again.'

On October 16, Rawlinson gradually pushed IV Corps forward, conscious that his flanks were exposed. In General Maurice's biography of Rawlinson, he wrote: 'that night orders arrived from Sir John, saying that he intended to carry out a vigorous attack on the enemy, and directing that IV Corps to "move on Menin". Such a movement would carry the IVth Corps in a south-easterly direction, and expose its left and rear to attack from the very direction in which Rawlinson expected the Germans might be in strength. As Sir John's order did not directly specify that he was to attack Menin, Rawlinson moved forward cautiously on the 18th.'

GHQ Staff Officers arrived and gave Rawlinson a hard time, believing that there were no Germans in the vicinity. Menin, however, was captured by the Germans. Rawlinson noted in his diary: 'Orders to hand to attack Menin. Just as 7th Division was proceeding to attack, heavy German columns came down on my flank from the east. Extricated the division with 150 casualties.' I am looking into Rawlinson's pre-Great War experiences to see whether there were any examples of being in a unit that was attacked from the flanks.

Sir John French was angry, and his attitude towards Rawlinson deteriorated still further: '...I went into GHQ to find that Sir John was very angry with me for a telegram which I had sent him, which I finished up with the words, "when the 8th Division arrives, it will be easier to hold a front of eight miles". Archie Murray gave me a long talking to, and said that my wire had given Sir John a sleepless night...'. Good reason, I would suggest, for Rawlinson to adopt a rather odd approach to planning Neuve Chapelle, almost as if he did not want to take responsibility for the attack and take the risk of landing in further trouble.

You might say, quite justifiably, that an experienced general should have taken such a tantrum from Sir John in his stride. But Spears offers another interesting insight into Rawlinson's personality in the book 'Prelude to Victory':

'"Rawly", as the army called General Rawlinson, had his moments of ill humour when difficulties occurred, but soon the kindly smile would beam forth again and all would be well. Rawly had a way of floating over and away from his troubles.

The one trouble, in regard to his relations with the French, was that, although he could be quite firm at a distance, when he was with them, vive la politesse, and his affability would lead him into giving undertakings to which it was difficult to adhere. This tendency required watching all the more carefully at the moment because the French, naturally enough, soon forgot how weak Fourth Army was, owing to its extreme extension, and began to look for support from the British right in Franchet d'Esperey's attack. General Rawlinson's bouts of optimism were apt to play ducks and drakes with the rigid economy of effort imposed on his Army by the niggardly means at its disposal. One day he came to see General d'Esperey and to my horror spoke as if he had unlimited artillery with which to support the French attack. He sailed in, a stick under one arm, waving the other, in a splendid humour due no doubt to the fact that he was going on a few days leave... His promises were contrary to everything that had been agreed...'

Spears talks of 'affability' and 'bouts of optimism'. The context, however, speaks of someone who found it difficult to maintain fixed views when with colleagues or other senior figures, but rather sought to impress/please such people, irrespective of the consequences. It is a very interesting psychological insight. Who knows, perhaps this trait played a role in the 'odd' approach to planning Neuve Chapelle, coming so soon after the serious brush with Sir John French and Sir Archibald Murray (Haig alludes to this spat in his diary in the leadup to Neuve Chapelle)?

Robert

[Edward_N_Kelly]

I don't know anything about Brig Gen Lowry Cole, GOC 25 Brigade. The 8th Division history is not forthcoming on his background. He was killed in the Battle of Aubers Ridge.

Robert

I think this must have been Arthur Willoughby George Lowry Cole (Lowry Cole was his surname). CWGC shows his as being a Royal Welch Fusilier (if this has any bearing). Was 54 years old and "...Served in the Burmah, West African, and South African campaigns. Commandant, Northern Nigeria, 1899-1901....."

Edward

[Robert Dunlop]

Thanks very much, Edward. I presume he was the grandson of General Sir Galbraith Lowry Cole, who was described by one source as 'a professional but somewhat conservative soldier' yet his decision to attack the French, against Wellington's orders, in the Battle of Albuera (1811) is still hailed as the key to that victory.

I will be travelling over the next week. It will be difficult to continue this thread - haven't found a way of taking all of the necessary source material .

Robert

[armourersergeant]

'Bloody Red Tabs' has some bio info on Lowry Cole and If I recall a picture of him. I provided someone with some info A year or so ago, but I can not recall if they were doing research on him or just wanted a casual look at him.

If anyone wants I could look out the info in the book, when I get a chance.

regards

Arm

[Robert Dunlop]

Arm, that would be great, if you get a chance. Past experience of a commander is not the only factor that contributes to decision-making, but it can be important.

Robert

[Edward_N_Kelly]

Thanks very much, Edward. I presume he was the grandson of General Sir Galbraith Lowry Cole, who was described by one source as 'a professional but somewhat conservative soldier' yet his decision to attack the French, against Wellington's orders, in the Battle of Albuera (1811) is still hailed as the key to that victory.

I will be travelling over the next week. It will be difficult to continue this thread - haven't found a way of taking all of the necessary source material .

Robert

Yes he was a grandson of that gentleman - and was part of the Earl of Enniskillen's family (a junior branch). It appears as though the family was at least until the late nineteenth century a very prominent part of the Ulster life and in particular the preservation of Protestant pre-eminence in Ireland. I wonder how his sentiments lay about the time of the Curragh Incident/Mutiny and the Third Home Rule Bill for Ireland....

Edward

[Robert Dunlop]

Thanks, Edward.

Robert

[armourersergeant]

I have believed for a long time that the studying 'his' younger years is crucial to understanding the man and what he becomes, after all we are all products of our past experiences.

Bullett points of his career from 'Bloody Red Tabs'

Born Nov 1860

Aug 1880 2nd Lt 23rd Foot.. RWF

1881 lt

Burma 1885-87

West Africa 1897-98

North Nigeria 1900 Kaduna Exp, where he was wounded.

South Africa 1901-02 17th mounted Mixed column commanded and was also awarded the DSO (which means I will have other info on this chap from the DSO Bible)

1906 Sokoto Expedition as commander

1907 made a CB

In 1914 he was returned from retirement and promoted to Brig-Gen and put in chaerge of Admin Northern command. (I did not realise he was technically a dugout)

Then commander 25th Brigade

West Africa and Nigeria is a little unusual to what I have come across!

regards

Arm

[squirrel]

He is buried in Le Trou Aid Post Cemetery.

[green_acorn]

G'day all,

An interesting thread, but ...... it does seem to be somewhat adrift in a sea of hyperbole, whilst at the same time denigrating some "accepted wisdom" and facts of the time. The old ABC and KISS principles would seem to help, Accuracy, Brevity and Clarity followed by Keep-It-Simple-S#$%^d. Ultimateley what is the point of the thread? "Lions led by donkeys" Is it to continue to dengirate a handful of senior commanders, is it to understand the complexity of this "new" style of warfare or is it to honour and respect the Lions who served at all ranks?

The weeding out process of senior officers, happened quickly in 1915 and 1916, and was not limited to the General Officers, it went right down the ranks to the LCPL and CPL and more appropriate jobs were found for all whether it be MAJGEN James McKay, a former Minister of Defence in Australia and Commandant of pre-war Australian Intelligence Corps, posted to a supporting role supervising the raising and training 6 Aust Inf Div in the UK.

Crunchy has also made the critical link between Wellington and others, those who could pick their place of battle and observe and react quickly to what they saw. With the introduction of better cannon and rifle dispersal started to occur and the commanders lost overal vision of the battlefield, runners and couriers (communicaitons) become critical for operational messages from units. Runners and scouts and agents become important to find out where the enemy is? what condition he is in? where he appears to be heading and why? who is in the enemy army? has he gained allies or lost allies? How many are their? How long will it take to get here? What is there objective? What support direct and indirect do they have?

All of the imponderables that any commander has to deal with and without the instantenous communication and control systems of the PC spreadsheet of today. Remember we all deal with similar questions everyday in our life, the difference being we take our operational appreciation from what we read, hear or see at our workplace, we take our information about competitors, customers and circmstances and process it ourselves into intelligence. And if we have the luxury, we task our sales and logistics staff to ensure they match the competitor, send an observer to look at competitor pricing and best practice, keep the customers satisfied and bring forward enough stock "just in time" to minimise wastage and costs. A gross oversimplificaiton, but one relevant to put it into the context of many of us today. Good CEO are rewarded, bad one crash fairly quickly, because the faults are visible far more early, consistently and authoritavely (spreadsheets kill careers) than they were pre reliable telephone, radio, teletype, fax,tv of 1914-1918.

If you then look at the distances, vast number of troops and other considerations in the planning and conduct of war, those generals and their staff who had survived through to the end of the war, were also lions, by ensuring wheerever possible the troops were husbanded and not left for too long in the line, learnt and improved continually at the various schools and courses Army's, Corps and Div's ran when they were out of the line.

If you agree with Crunchy's comments about learning curves, and I most definetely do: you need to appreciate, we are talking about the days before PC, Fax and Phone as we know it. Some lessons may not come back to GHQ for months, as the one or two soldiers who devised it may have had to stay in the trench for a few days, then they go out for their ten days rest and forget about it. Before going into training and making a suggestion or improvement, at the end of the day they show it to the Pl Comd and other sections, the next morning the company commander and CSM and so it goes on. Someone sits down and writes some notes and does some drawings, and it is sent up to brigade and demonstrated there, then onto Div. At this point in the war the Div probably wasn't running a school, whilst defending a sector, so it has to go through Corps to Army who can then implement it into the Infantry training school schedule and improve on it. At each pont the Learning Curve is getting higher and with time broader, becoming "Organisational Learning" and finally making it into the compendium of knowledge, know by its German word "Doctrine" . And then train the remainder of the Army in this new skill. So from the time those two soldiers thought of something, may take a few months for it to be implmented and accepted in battle on the Western Front.

And finally as Crunchy also mentioned a cardboard wargame or computer simulation cannot bring in all the imponderables and I would add should not in anyway be compared or equated to the US inspitred concept of "wargaming" during their Military Decision Making Process, where the Operations test a few plans, againstthe Enemy Courses of Action determined by Intelligence and input from each of the other principle staffs to determine the outcomes and select the Op Plan and codify the most dangerous course of action from the enemy.

Chris Henderson

G'day all,

An interesting thread, but ...... it does seem to be somewhat adrift in a sea of hyperbole, whilst at the same time denigrating some "accepted wisdom" and facts of the time. The old ABC and KISS principles would seem to help, Accuracy, Brevity and Clarity followed by Keep-It-Simple-S#$%^d. Ultimateley what is the point of the thread? "Lions led by donkeys" Is it to continue to dengirate a handful of senior commanders, is it to understand the complexity of this "new" style of warfare or is it to honour and respect the Lions who served at all ranks?

The weeding out process of senior officers, happened quickly in 1915 and 1916, and was not limited to the General Officers, it went right down the ranks to the LCPL and CPL and more appropriate jobs were found for all whether it be MAJGEN James McKay, a former Minister of Defence in Australia and Commandant of pre-war Australian Intelligence Corps, posted to a supporting role supervising the raising and training 6 Aust Inf Div in the UK.

Crunchy has also made the critical link between Wellington and others, those who could pick their place of battle and observe and react quickly to what they saw. With the introduction of better cannon and rifle dispersal started to occur and the commanders lost overal vision of the battlefield, runners and couriers (communicaitons) become critical for operational messages from units. Runners and scouts and agents become important to find out where the enemy is? what condition he is in? where he appears to be heading and why? who is in the enemy army? has he gained allies or lost allies? How many are their? How long will it take to get here? What is there objective? What support direct and indirect do they have?

All of the imponderables that any commander has to deal with and without the instantenous communication and control systems of the PC spreadsheet of today. Remember we all deal with similar questions everyday in our life, the difference being we take our operational appreciation from what we read, hear or see at our workplace, we take our information about competitors, customers and circmstances and process it ourselves into intelligence. And if we have the luxury, we task our sales and logistics staff to ensure they match the competitor, send an observer to look at competitor pricing and best practice, keep the customers satisfied and bring forward enough stock "just in time" to minimise wastage and costs. A gross oversimplificaiton, but one relevant to put it into the context of many of us today. Good CEO are rewarded, bad one crash fairly quickly, because the faults are visible far more early, consistently and authoritavely (spreadsheets kill careers) than they were pre reliable telephone, radio, teletype, fax,tv of 1914-1918.

If you then look at the distances, vast number of troops and other considerations in the planning and conduct of war, those generals and their staff who had survived through to the end of the war, were also lions, by ensuring wheerever possible the troops were husbanded and not left for too long in the line, learnt and improved continually at the various schools and courses Army's, Corps and Div's ran when they were out of the line.

If you agree with Crunchy's comments about learning curves, and I most definetely do: you need to appreciate, we are talking about the days before PC, Fax and Phone as we know it. Some lessons may not come back to GHQ for months, as the one or two soldiers who devised it may have had to stay in the trench for a few days, then they go out for their ten days rest and forget about it. Before going into training and making a suggestion or improvement, at the end of the day they show it to the Pl Comd and other sections, the next morning the company commander and CSM and so it goes on. Someone sits down and writes some notes and does some drawings, and it is sent up to brigade and demonstrated there, then onto Div. At this point in the war the Div probably wasn't running a school, whilst defending a sector, so it has to go through Corps to Army who can then implement it into the Infantry training school schedule and improve on it. At each pont the Learning Curve is getting higher and with time broader, becoming "Organisational Learning" and finally making it into the compendium of knowledge, know by its German word "Doctrine" . And then train the remainder of the Army in this new skill. So from the time those two soldiers thought of something, may take a few months for it to be implmented and accepted in battle on the Western Front.

And finally as Crunchy also mentioned a cardboard wargame or computer simulation cannot bring in all the imponderables and I would add should not in anyway be compared or equated to the US inspired concept of "wargaming" during their Military Decision Making Process, where the Operations test a few plans, againstthe Enemy Courses of Action determined by Intelligence and input from each of the other principle staffs to determine the outcomes and select the Op Plan and codify the most dangerous course of action from the enemy.

Chris Henderson

[Robert Dunlop]

Chris, I am sorry that the current direction of this thread is not clear. The reason for analysing Neuve Chapelle was provided here:

http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/i...st&p=712137

It is the beginning of a detailed analysis of the 'learning curve', and I plan to continue adding information about other battles in 1915, moving on through the rest of the war. Some German perspectives will be maintained throughout.

You raise the issue of organisational learning within armies. This aspect will be addressed to some degree, given the limitations of the primary sources that I have access to, and the degree to which other contributors are interested to post additional material.

On the issue of simulations, this is something I have done quite frequently. There have been posts on this in past threads that highlight the limitations, particularly the lack of Fog of War. There is no question, in my mind, that simulations add a further insight into battles - the effects of terrain, why a particular direction of attack might have been chosen, why a defense might have succeeded, etc. Like any other source of information, it is vital that the output of simulations is regarded with suspicion. At the very least, the various pros and cons of simulations must be understood as a context for any 'conclusions'. I can only speak for my own experience, but with regard to Neuve Chapelle, simulations have emphasized the tremendous congestion of British troops in the Neuve Chapelle area for example. I find the visual ques very helpful, more so than just looking at maps.

Simulations of Neuve Chapelle have also identified some other 'what if' issues. It is possible to get the British troops to push on, as Haig ordered. When the flanking strongpoints are both engaged, such as occurred with the Garwhalis and the German strongpoint on the British right flank, simulations suggest that significant numbers of British troops might have captured Bois du Biez. The German strongpoint on the right flank would have become dangerously exposed to enfilade fire, but probably not encirclement unless the Ferme du Biez could have been neutralised. The German gun line would have been very exposed but any further British advance up the Aubers Ridge would have been opposed by the German use of the myriad of farmsteads on the forward slope. FWIIW, it is these defensive features that would have played a greater role, rather than the flanking strongpoints, in limiting any British advance on Aubers / Illies, IMHO. The basis assumption of these simulations is that success in the first 2 hours of the battle would have been reinforced, not failure.

I would ask for your patience as this thread unfolds. The real analysis has not begun yet, and it will take time to uncover the details, given that I prefer to quote from as many sources as possible. Thanks for the 'hurry up' though.

Robert

[dycer]

To return to the original Post I know we will never be able to bottom this statement but I do find the following entries from the 1/8th Royal Scots War Diary revealing about the attitude of one Senior Officer to the men under his command.

Festubert 1915

19th May-Lieut Col. A. Broook V.D. died of wounds in Hospital at Bethune.

20th May-All the Officers,a firing party and representatives East Lothian detachment of the Battalion attended the funeral of Lieut Col A. Brook V.D. in the town Cemetery at Bethune.

22nd May-The Battalion was addressed by Brig. General Lawford,C.B.,Commanding 22nd Infantry Brigade and Major General Gough C.B.,Commanding 7th Division,both of whom deplored the loss of Lieut.Col Brook and congratulated the Battalion on the part they had played in the recent action.

In July/August 1916 the Battalion served in the High Wood Sector on the Somme as Pioneer Battalion to the 51st(Highland)Division.

14th August 1916-Major General Sydney Lawford C.B. Comdg. 41st Division-who formerly commanded the 22nd Inf.Bde. was at Steenwerck Station to meet the Battalion and expressed the pleasure it gave him to see all ranks looking so well.The Battalion were deeply sensible of the honour done them by Major General Lawford's visit.

George

[Robert Dunlop]

Just a brief note to say that I will be resuming work on this thread over the coming year. Until recently the thread on the planning and execution of Third Ypres, up until the Battle of Menin Road, has been occupying my attention.

Robert

[Jonathan Saunders]

Robert - Will look forward to your further contributions.

Regards,

Jon S

[Robert Dunlop]

On 28 February 1915, Haig noted in his diary 'we don't want to run any risk of failure, so I decided to ask for 2 more batteries of 6 inch howitzers (siege) making 28 in all'.

Although this is out of sequence (i.e. late ), it is interesting to note that the following quote from Haig's diary did not appear in Sheffield and Bourne's edited version. The quote was made in the same paragraph as the above comment:

'None of the artillery commanders seem able to agree as to the amounts of ammunition or time required to destroy a given length of hostile position as now constructed. So I decide to go in to G.H.Q. tomorrow to see C.G.S. on the subject.'

It reinforces how little was known about attacking fixed entrenchments in the lead-up to Neuve Chapelle.

Robert

[armourersergeant]

Robert,

The sentence "'None of the artillery commanders seem able to agree as to the amounts of ammunition or time required to destroy a given length of hostile position as now constructed. So I decide to go in to G.H.Q. tomorrow to see C.G.S. on the subject.'" illustrates well I think how dependent commanders were on the staff advisers around them. Its easy to see Haig and other commanders making descisions based solely on thier own experiences etc, yet often they took those decisions based on specialist advice.

One day I will do a study on Commanders and how they performed with different CoS during the war. I think it will show interesting results!

Looking foward to this topic opening back up.

regards

Arm

[Robert Dunlop]

I agree, Arm. There is another important aspect that is not covered routinely. The informal conversations that took place outside planning meetings. I have picked up on several of these through the personal journals of commanders. One very important example of an informal network was the Old Etonians. Their dinners and other meetings seem to have brought together high-ranking generals with other officers from all branches of the services.

Robert

[Jonathan Saunders]

Its easy to see Haig and other commanders making descisions based solely on thier own experiences etc, yet often they took those decisions based on specialist advice.

Arm - this is very true but it should also be remembered that Haig made some very important decisions against the advice given. It will be interesting to see how Robert develops his thesis.

Regards,

Jonathan

[Jonathan Saunders]

One very important example of an informal network was the Old Etonians. Their dinners and other meetings seem to have brought together high-ranking generals with other officers from all branches of the services.

Robert - this is an interesting statement. I am not sure how frequent the Old Etonian dinners were but as I understand it they brought together senior ranking Generals with lowly subalterns but sobriety was not part of the Agenda. Freddy1918 may be able to throw some light on these from her substantial knowledge of Old Etonians in the Great War.

Regards,

Jon S

[armourersergeant]

Jon,

Very true, sometimes making decisions against the advise of those advisers. Which is why it would be interesting to study the influence of a CoS.

[Jonathan Saunders]

Arm - just remind me, who was/were Haig's Chief of Staff(s) between Gough and Kiggell.

Thanks,

Jonathan