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Remembered Today:

Lions led by donkeys?


Alan Lines

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QUOTE (Phil_B @ Jan 5 2008, 03:22 PM) <{POST_SNAPBACK}>
How would a commander check morale in his own troops and in enemy troops? No use asking Army, Corps, Division commanders etc.

Desertion and sickness rates would be indicators, as would AWOLs and disciplinary problems leading to courts martial. Unusual incidents and losses of equipment would be other indicators. There's also a subjective factor involving the demeanor of the men, whether they're sullen, robot-like, bloody-minded, etc.

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Salesie

You should put Haig's diary entry about McDonogh and his 'tainted sources' in context. In August 1917 the Pope of made a peace initiative, which led some British newspapers to accuse him of being pro-German. I suspect that it was this that influenced Haig, rather than his own engrained antipathy.

Charles M

If the Archbishop of Canterbury had made peace moves and been accused by the British press of being pro-German, and the Director of Military Intelligence was C of E, would his sources have been regarded as tainted? Of course not!

It’s a bit silly, Charles, to suggest that the Pope's peace moves and the reaction of the British press would justify Haig regarding the DMI's assessments as tainted and therefore unreliable simply because Macdonough was Catholic himself (if he'd been C of E would this question have arisen?) . Remember, Macdonough was no ordinary catholic, he was the Director of Military Intelligence and shortly to become Adjutant General.

With respect, Charles, all you do with your attempt to clear Haig of Bigotry is confirm that he was just that. If we accept your concept it means that Haig must have believed that whatever the Pope does tars all Catholics, because deep down they all owe their true loyalty to the Pope not to their country, and even if loyal they're all easily blinded by such things - even the DMI?

Cheers - salesie.

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"yet, it would seem that his sole reason for ignoring it was that it was tainted by Catholicism."

I find this statement hard to take without further corroboration. He obviously regarded Macdonogh as 'defeatist' and we have this single comment in his diary: I'm not sure that any meaningful conclusions may be drawn.

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I find this statement hard to take without further corroboration. He obviously regarded Macdonogh as 'defeatist' and we have this single comment in his diary: I'm not sure that any meaningful conclusions may be drawn.

That's why I said, Ian, "...Surely, given the attrition rates at 3rd Ypres, this warrants further research?"

Cheers - salesie

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But the enemy's ability, or rather their assumed inability, to resist was a major consideration for Haig leading up to the 1st July offensive on the Somme and waves of men going forward in full kit to press on and occupy (not necessarily fight for) the furthest enemy lines and breakout beyond them if the opportunity arose - his plans included for the cavalry to occupy the high ground as far away as Monchy.

Ah, but this is about a concept of operations, not the tactics used to attack the line.

Jonathan, your quote is at odds with several of your comments in the excellent discussion between Robert Dunlop and yourself in the "Attrition, How best done?" thread. As for planning for a breakthrough and the use of the cavalry, any General worth his salt would plan for such a contingency if he thought it might eventuate and have a mobile reserve available to exploit such an opportunity if it arose. You acknowledged both of these points in the above quoted thread. That thread also highlighted that the breakout was one of three possibilities considered by Haig and that he wrote "Alternatively, after gaining our first objective, as described at (a) above, we may find that a further advance eastwards is not advisable" See post #67 of that thread here - http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/i...50&start=50.

Furthermore, it appears that the tactics used for the infantry attack on 1st July varied along the line. What appears to be common is a massive artillery barrage to prepare the way for the infantry and I think we will find that Haig agreed with this. Nonetheless, the tactics for using the artillery to support the infantry advance varied from Corps to Corps and within XV Corps between Divisions. The differences in the infantry assault and artillery support tactics point to a conclusion that Haig's "belief" did not overly influence the tactics employed. It may have influenced Haig's concept of operations but as already mentioned he was not alone on the Western Front in seeking a breakthrough. At the level of campaign planning, which is what Haig was concerned with, this is not an unreasonable objective. But Haig didn't see a breakthrough on the Somme as a foregone conclusion, it was a contingency that he planned for.

It also seems that the oft quoted view that the infantry marched forward from their own lines at a steady pace in long waves is a myth. If P&W's research in addressing this issue is correct, and what I found surprising, " of the 80 battalions that went over the top in the first attack on 1 July, 53 crept out into no man's land close to the German wire before zero and then rushed the German line, while ten others rushed the line from their own parapet. This leaves just 17 battalions, 12 of which advanced at a steady pace and five for which no evidence exists. There is a further complicating factor here. At least some of the battalions who walked across no man's land at a steady pace did so because they were following a creeping barrage. These were some of the most successful units on the first day". Has anyone done any study or have any other sources that detail the tactics used on 1 July to confirm or dispute P&W's findings?

Cheers

Chris

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Terry and Charles,

I think there is a considerable difference between prejudice and bigotry. I am not advocating that Haig was a religious bigot. I am suggesting that his comment reveals a certain prejudice which was not uncommon at the time and that this may have been one of the factors as to why he so readily rejected Macdonough's intelligence reports.

The flaw in his character I am referring to is his readiness to dismiss intelligence that did not accord with his pre-conceived ideas, not any religious prejudice he may have had. I am sorry this was not clear in my previous post.

Cheers

Chris

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Gentlemen, won't be around much over the next few weeks - work calls. I'll leave you with this thought:

Haig's diary entry is clear and unambiguous, he actually states that he can't see any reason at all, I repeat, any reason at all for the DMI's assessments to be so wrong (when compared with GHQ's) apart from the fact that Macdonogh is a Catholic. He doesn't say that Macdonogh's calculations are flawed, that his whole basis of collecting intelligence evidence is wrong, that his conclusions are illogical, nor does he say we'd better find out why there's such a discrepency in the assessments. No, he says the only reason he can think of is Macdonogh's Catholicism and therefore his sources must be tainted.

In my opinion, even though this obviously offends the revisionist "faithfull", this warrants further research.

Cheers - salesie.

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Jonathan, your quote is at odds with several of your comments in the excellent discussion between Robert Dunlop and yourself in the "Attrition, How best done?" thread.

But Haig didn't see a breakthrough on the Somme as a foregone conclusion, it was a contingency that he planned for.

Chris - I dont see that my comments are at odds at all. Of course Haig had to have the contingency should the breakthrough materialise, and he had to prepare accordingly although he had little reason from past experience IMHO to believe that a breakthrough was possible.

However the concept of a breakthrough overtook his thoughts IMHO. To quote from Haig's diary:

21 June 1916: Rawlinson can employ two divs of cavalry which are now in GHQ Reserve, and which with his own cavalry Div makes a total of three Cavalry Divs under him. He cannot however rely on being reinforced by the Infantry Corps of three divs (under Jacob) which I have in GHQ Reserve. These may be wanted to reinforce the Third Army which is organising an attack south of Arras and which will be pushed in as soon as the Fourth Army attack has produced its effect, that is, has possibly caused Enemy to thin his troops in the part just south of Arras. Also the whole Reserve Corps (Jacob) might have to be sent forward to act under Gough at a later stage. In that case it might be necessary to control Gough direct from GHQ."

27 June 1916: After dinner I sent Kiggell to Querrieu to meet Rawlinson and gough and fix up exactly how the latter was to get control over his command once the battle had started. I favoured giving Gough the two left corps at once, but would like to hear what Rawlinson and Gough had worked out as a result of my talk.

Haig clearly believed the breakthrough was most likely and he is by his own words IMHO, influencing the battle preparation (the thoughts of Rawlinson and Gough) to that end. The question is why? And this I believe is because he grossly misunderstood not only German morale but the German army's ability to resist. Again the question needs to be asked why did Haig believe German fighting morale in the battle sector would be any worse than the morale of the British army?

Furthermore, it appears that the tactics used for the infantry attack on 1st July varied along the line. What appears to be common is a massive artillery barrage to prepare the way for the infantry and I think we will find that Haig agreed with this. Nonetheless, the tactics for using the artillery to support

It also seems that the oft quoted view that the infantry marched forward from their own lines at a steady pace in long waves is a myth.

But why did tactics vary - shouldnt this have been where Haig was insisting on a form of uniformity dependant on terrain and local strength of opposing force. Haig placed far too much emphasis on the artillery barrage - why, what previous experience gave Haig hope that the artillery barrage would destroy German defensives as he expected? Intelligence reports from the more difficult northern sector reported wire uncut - there was poor counter-battery work. Neither should we be carried away by any perceived successes in the south - the British offensive was dependant on taking the ridge from Serre to beyond Pozieres and we know what happened. Yet I think it is clear that Haig believed the high ground would fall on the first day of the offensive and I dont understand why from his previous experience he should come to that conclusion.

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Jon, I would love to pick up on the points that you have raised but I want to get to these issues in the course of developing this thread. One aspect is directly pertinent to Neuve Chapelle: "The question is why [did Haig believe a breakthrough was possible on day one of the Somme]?". In the opening hours of the Battle of Neuve Chapelle, the British forces broke clean through the German front line trenches and captured the village, then stopped - despite Haig's orders to the contrary. Experienced front line officers recognised the significance of the break-in and wanted to press on. They were stopped by an intermediate level of command, and the opportunity for exploitation was lost.

Robert

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Robert,

Neuve Chapelle was a much smaller offensive supported by a heavier weight of artillery per yardage. Neither was this battle launched against one of the strongest parts of the German line - in fact if I recall correctly, this was considered a lightly held part of the German line. I believe my question regarding breakthrough is still valid.

Regards,

Jonathan

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Crunchy

Thanks for you comments. However, whether it is prejudice or bigotry, where is the hard evidence to support this? All we have is a few selected comments which just happen to suit the anti-Haig lobby. This just reinforces the point I have been making; that supposition, presumption and narrow view cloud the mind on this subject, which really requires a well researched debate, rather than an argument based on opinion.

Nothing to do with the above , I would like to return to one of my earlier posts. "Lions led by Donkey's" refers to the whole the General Staff. Rather than just Haig - bashing, perhaps we could take a look at his GHQ staff and make informed comment about them, unless of course we really believe that Haig made all his decisions in isolation, in which case there was no need for a Staff. Perhaps someone could name the staff of his Operations Branch in 1918, the year we won the war. After all, these officers were about as close to Haig as you could get and must also have been donkeys if popular prejudice is to be believed.

TR

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Salesie,

To what end?

Cheers

Chris

To the same end I suppose you conduct your own research, Chris. When the germ of an idea inplants itself in your mind do you not wish to find out if your suspicions are wholly justified or not?

Cheers - salesie.

PS. When I have the time I'll probably start with this book: G. Sheffield and J. Bourne, eds, Douglas Haig: War Diaries and Letters 1914-1918 (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2005). A review of this book by Dan Todman caught my eye; "...This volume will not, however, end debates about Haig’s character, nor convince those who continue to condemn him. They will find here evidence of Haig’s misreading of the confusion of war, of his self-belief obscuring any reasoned analysis of the reasons for failure, and of his appalling prejudices against Catholics in general and Italians, Frenchmen and Irishmen in particular..."

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Terry,

Thank you for your reply.

While I am ambivalent about Haig, I certainly don't support Haig bashing and I think many of my previous posts indicate that. I have never thought he was a bad General and on balance I thought he did as well as most Generals could have done under very difficult circumstances. But he was not without his flaws and he did make mistakes - a very human trait. My ambivalence towards him is largely concerned with his character and his continuation of some battles beyond the point of diminishing returns.

I am seeking to gain a better understanding of him and his Generals and through this Forum, particularly the primary and participants' sources that Robert Dunlop has provided, and wider reading I am coming to the conclusion that he was better than I originally thought. I would hope that this discussion eventually sees most members of the Forum come to a balanced view of Haig and his Generals. Many of them did a much better professional job than some historians have done in portraying them. In fact, some of those historians have done both the Generals and their readers a great disservice and have shown either, a readiness to be selective in their use of sources and interpretation; an ignorance of the subject they purport to portray or a readiness to distort matters to achieve their own ends.

I agree that there is a good deal of "supposition, presumption and narrow view [that] clouds the mind on this subject" and IMO there is both a very selective use of sources and people reading more into a quote attributed to Haig than is really there. I would hope we are all coming to this discussion with an open mind and a willingness to consider the well founded cases and constructive opinion from both sides.

Getting back to the point you raised about hard evidence to support Haig's prejudice or bigotry. Certainly one comment doesn't make him a bigot and I agree we need hard evidence to support such a view. Nonetheless, I do think that for a man in his position to make such comments indicates a level of prejudice, which I have said "was not uncommon at the time and that this may have been one of the factors as to why he so readily rejected Macdonough's intelligence reports. ". The thrust of my comment was concerned with human traits that lead people to accept or reject intelligence reports in an attempt to understand why Haig rejected Macdonough's reports. It wasn't simply a matter of religious prejudice. Having personally been involved in or watching others consider intelligence reports these factors do exist and have to be guarded against when considering conflicting assessments.

Cheers

Chris

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Of course Haig had to have the contingency should the breakthrough materialise, and he had to prepare accordingly although he had little reason from past experience IMHO to believe that a breakthrough was possible.

However the concept of a breakthrough overtook his thoughts IMHO. To quote from Haig's diary:

Jonathan,

What do you mean by the phrase "the concept of a breakthrough overtook his thoughts ". I am assuming you mean it unduly influenced his planning and that he was obsessed with it. You may be correct in these assumptions, however, I think we need to consider all of Haig's correspondence, diary entries and orders at the time in order to make a reasonably valid judgement as to the extent to which this dominated his thoughts.

There appears to be no doubt that Haig considered the possibility of a breakthrough and, as agreed, any General worth his salt should plan for such a contingency and allocate resources in case the opportunity arises.

We all read different things into what people write and say and we have to be careful that we don't read too much into a particular comment. I am conscious that documentary evidence may not reflect what actually occurred or was said in a meeting. People are prone to hear what they want to hear and record the emphasis of the issues they place on a particular discussion. Also diary's are summaries of events and are rarely in context with the broader issues and surroundings; consequently I prefer to use them carefully and in conjunction with other sources.

Looking at Haig's diary entry of 21 June it seems to me that he is reflecting on the resources available for the later stages of the campaign and the ensuing command and control arrangements, which, as CinC, he should be thinking about prior to the start of the campaign. But I don't read this particular entry as evidence that the concept of a breakthrough is "overtaking his thoughts". It may be in the context of a possible breakthrough but then he may be thinking of another scenario. Look at this part of the entry immediately following your emphasis about the three divisions under Jacob. These may be wanted to reinforce the Third Army which is organising an attack south of Arras and which will be pushed in as soon as the Fourth Army attack has produced its effect, that is, has possibly caused Enemy to thin his troops in the part just south of Arras. [My emphasis] I don't know the context of these thoughts but I wouldn't assume from them alone that the concept of a breakthrough has "overtaken his thoughts".

To me the diary entry of 27th June doesn't reflect influencing the battle preparations in the sense that you are suggesting or that a breakthrough was most likely. One of the possibilities he has considered, and indeed his operational objective, is a breakthrough and he has planned for it. A passage of lines and exploiting an opportunity with reserves at the operational level is a difficult and complicated operation and if not coordinated properly the opportunity can be lost easily. It is important that the command and control arrangements and the way in which it is to be effected are agreed before the battle commences rather than waiting until the opportunity arises. I see this as prudent coordination and finalising an important detail should the opportunity arise. It cannot be left until the opportunity arises or the opportunity may be lost and, in Haig's view, such opportunities had been lost before.

Was a breakthrough possible? In hindsight it wasn't but let us consider some of the issues that may have influenced Haig in thinking a breakthrough was possible.

By 1916 his experience had shown that the front line could be broken and while there were opportunities to exploit the break in, a failure to actually do so for various reasons had diminished the gains made and any greater success to be attained.

The Germans and French were engaged at Verdun suffering horrendous losses, so much so that it significantly reduced the French ability to participate in the proposed Somme offensive. These losses also led to their call for the British to launch it as soon as possible in order to take German pressure off them. Thus Haig saw a French Army severely weakened by the Verdun fighting. He therefore had reasonable grounds to assume that the Germans were similarly weakened and thus had less resources to counter an offensive on the scale that was being planned.

The detailed planning and the massive artillery preparatory bombardment indicates that Haig and his Generals recognised the visible strength of the German defences but didn't realise the extent and depth of the underground shelters. The preparatory bombardment IIRC was the largest and longest to that date of the war. The Generals had reasonable grounds to expect that such a massive battering of the German line would do considerable damage to it and its defenders, which in turn, would make the infantry's job of breaking into the German defences easier. This is what they were seeking to do. The effect was diminished for a number of reasons: partly because a proportion of the shells were faulty, which was unknown at the time; issues associated with the transformation of artillery techniques to the considerably more difficult indirect fire mode and the depth and extent of the dugouts.

These issues, together with the intelligence assessments he was receiving, may have influenced Haig's optimism that a breakthrough might be possible. I don't regard the two passages you have quoted from his diary as irrefutable evidence that he believed it would most likely occur. Certainly, from what I have seen of the evidence presented his concept of operations envisaged breaking through at some time in the campaign and he was more optimistic than some of his subordinates. The evidence presented in "GHQ Letter O.A.D. 12 to General Sir H Rawlinson, 16th June 1916 Stating the Objectives [for the attack on July 1, 1916]" [post #67 here http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/i...50&start=50] indicates to me that he also recognised it might not happen. This is also evident in his diary entry of 27 June quoted in the same post above: "In my opinion it is better to prepare to advance beyond the Enemy's last line of trenches, because we are then in a position to take advantage of any breakdown in the Enemy's defence. Whereas if there is a stubborn resistance put up, the matter settles itself!"

When the matter settled itself after the first day, it seems that he persisted in the battle to achieve the objective of taking pressure off the French at Verdun and to further wear down the German Army. To have closed the battle down after 1 July was not a viable option open to him, both politically and strategically.

As mentioned earlier you may be correct but I have haven't seen the evidence to sustain the case yet.

But why did tactics vary -

I don't know. My initial reaction was similar to yours but on reflection I can envisage a number of reasons why they were not standardized at that time. I need to think about this more before suggesting some possibilities. We may get to understand why through Robert Dunlop's approach in considering these battles. It is a worthwhile approach and I would like to see to the discussion continue to develop from Neuve Chappelle, through Aubers, Festubert and Loos to the Somme. I think it would be more fruitful than discussing issues in isolation and out of context if we are to gain any meaningful conclusion about Haig and his Generals.

cheers

Chris

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By 1916 his experience had shown that the front line could be broken and while there were opportunities to exploit the break in, a failure to actually do so for various reasons had diminished the gains made and any greater success to be attained.

To have closed the battle down after 1 July was not a viable option open to him, both politically and strategically.

Chris - my quotes are just two in what I regard as a long line of similar quotes indicating Haig expected a breakthrough however I am running short of time and may only have brief moments to log on to the Forum again in the next 48 hours, so want to take you up on the two comments made above.

1) Experience proved a break-in could be achieved but not a breakthrough. This is why Rawlinson favoured the bite and hold concept.

2) I agree it would have been politically impossible to close the battle down after 1st July but the first day was such a disaster IMHO because of Haig's influence over the operations. Despite the complete failure in the all important northern sector of the battlefield, Haig continued the offensive in the same vein in the days that immediately followed.

Regards,

Jonathan S

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Despite the complete failure in the all important northern sector of the battlefield, Haig continued the offensive in the same vein in the days that immediately followed.

Jon,

Within days, Haig allowed Rawlinson to submit and re-submit a plan, differing from the concept of 1st of July. He consulted his advisers, who said it had merit and after some 'badgering' from Rawlinson allowed the attacks of 14th July to go ahead, with some success. A turn around within 14 days, allowing subordinates to ask more than once to try the attack, even allowing others to influence his decision.

Did the complete battles of the Somme continue in the same vein or did they adapt as it went? You notice I do not ask if it continued too long, but if as it did, did it change and learn as it went.

regards

Arm

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Within days, Haig allowed Rawlinson to submit and re-submit a plan, differing from the concept of 1st of July.

Arm - Nothing fundamental changed for the 3rd July offensives. It is well known that 1st July returned 60,000 casualties - this figure was increased by an additional 40,000 following the 3rd July push. These 3rd July casualties were caused by the same German machine guns and the same German artillery and British troops were caught up on the same unbroken wire.

As you know Rawlinson, with some foresight and very good reasons, had submitted a bite and hold plan to begin with.

Regards,

Jonathan S

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Within days, Haig allowed Rawlinson to submit and re-submit a plan, differing from the concept of 1st of July.

Arm - this quote is from Griffiths: Battle Tactics of the Western Front: The British Army's Art of Attack 1916-18 p 74/5:

No one who reads the monumental staff work and planning for 1st July on the Somme can doubt the preparation had been very thorough indeed. When it led to failure, however, the high command did not sit back quietly to analyse the technical reasons, in order to make another careful assualt later; but instead it called for an immediately renewed effort, in the hope of snatching victory from the jaws of defeat. Impatient generals cast aside their admirable earlier acceptance of such things as logistic build up, rest and breakfast for the assualt troops, reconnaisance, rehearsal, detailed coordination, and briefing of all participants ... and similarly kept on demanding instant results. As we have seen in Wyn Griffith's attack on Mametz Wood on 11 July, such "decision making on the hoof" was almost always disasterous. Yet it was a bad habit that persisted well into 1917, leading repeatedly to attacks that were called at too short notice and on too narrow frontages, before esssential preparations could possibly have been made.

Regards,

Jonathan S

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Neuve Chapelle was a much smaller offensive supported by a heavier weight of artillery per yardage...
Jonathan, I am interested that you are excluding Neuve Chapelle from consideration. You are perfectly at liberty to do so, but why would Haig ignore the lessons of previous battles?

Leaving aside any similarities or otherwise with the first day of the Somme, do you agree that:

  1. Haig had ordered rapid exploitation.
  2. the British made a significant break-in to the German lines following on the hurricane bombardment.
  3. some of the front line battalion commanders felt that immediate exploitation was possible, based on their appraisal of the tactical situation.
  4. immediate exploitation was overruled by an intermediate (brigade) commander.

Robert

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Jon,

If you mean the next few days literally, as in 3rd of July then I would agree. Yes I know few usually menas three, however I took you to mean longer than that. However my point is that Haig with two weeks was able to consider a completely different concept of attack. Advised by lower ranked officers, Brig Gen Tudor for one, though it was funnelled through Congreve and Horne. I guess you could argue that he may have thought after the first few days that he had nothing to lose. Though I like to think he consulted and listened to advisers around him and made a decision.

I fear you may be out numbered on this current discussion, though I am sure that will be neither a problem or new to you! ;)

regards

Arm

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Jonathan, I am interested that you are excluding Neuve Chapelle from consideration. You are perfectly at liberty to do so, but why would Haig ignore the lessons of previous battles?

Robert - I never said exclude the experience of Neuve Chapelle but would suggest the lesson had to be taken in the correct context.

Would you disagree that it was a much smaller offensive?

Would you disagree that there was a much heavier weight of artillery per yardage?

Would you disagree that this was a relatively lightly held part of the line, certainly in the context of what the BEF faced on the Somme?

My question remains, what happened in all the 1915 battles that suggested a breakthrough was possible on the heavily defended Somme with the material available to the BEF?

Regards,

Jonathan S

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However my point is that Haig with two weeks was able to consider a completely different concept of attack.

Arm - are you suggesting that 100,000 casualties was acceptable in the first three days of the offensive because Haig eventually fought the precise type of offensive that Rawlinson had originally planned for (from Rawlinson's reflection from the 1915 battles)? Dont forget there were further offensives in the same vein as 1st July and 3rd July launched around 7/8th July that also sustained heavy casualty returns.

Regards,

Jonathan S

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No Jon, just that he learnt, but perhaps at the rate we today would find not acceptable.

However was the 14th of July the battle that Rawlinson had envisaged? Or was it a battle learnt from the 1st July. Particularly the artillery plan.

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Jonathan, I am interested to learn what you mean by context. It sounds like you mean that the lesson of day one of Neuve Chapelle could only be learned long after the event, when that battle could be compared with the Somme? This is what you appear to be doing, which does not accord with the context in which the battle was fought.

Leaving this aside, I would totally agree with all the points you made with respect to Neuve Chapelle versus the Somme.

At the time, however, it was the first time a British Army (as opposed to a GHQ with separate corps) had fought a major action; it was the largest concentration of artillery up until then; and the German line had not been reinforced because the preparations for the battle had been kept secret.

Bearing in mind all the caveats that you have set out, I would like to repeat my questions if I may. To be quite clear, agreement with the questions does not constitute any form of acknowledgement, positive or otherwise, of Haig's handling of the battle of the Somme. Of course I don't have any problem if you disagree with this assessment of day one of Neuve Chapelle, leaving aside any comparison with the Somme i.e. as if day one was the last battle ever fought by the BEF in the First World War.

Robert

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