Lions led by donkeys?

[Jonathan Saunders]

Am I right in thinking Jon and Chris are starting to agree with each other? NO fireworks at all?

No fireworks ... wrong time of year.

We wasnt necessarily disagreeing to any large extent in the first place. Chris posed a question and in the absence of any other reply I couldnt help but dive in ... the temptation was too much. Just because we largely agree doesnt mean I will forego a chance to voice my point again and again and again

[Gunner Bailey]

I am inclined to think that the horrendous casualties suffered during the war tends to overly influence some of the debate on this subject without considering all of the contributing factors that caused them. I also think there is too great a tendency to regard only the British generals as being 'donkeys' without considering the German generals and the appalling casualties the Germans suffered. Langemark and Verdun spring to mind, as do instances of repeated fruitless counter attacks.

Well said. A point I agree with entirely.

It seems a very British thing to beat ourselves up when we emerge from a terrible situation, victorious. To me, 1918 is a huge vindication of all that went before. Yes, there were some terrible lessons learnt, but they were learnt. The British / Commonwealth forces continually evolved tactics and weapons and innovated all the time. Our casualties were the lowest of all the main nations involved, yet our forces were involved continuously, and by 1918 were the force that defeated the Germans, taking more prisoners than the French, USA, Italy and all other Allies put together. The German and the French generals bought into attrition far more than the British, but let's face it no general can be soft in time of war. Ultimately it was a combined effect of the strong British army, a resolute Naval blockade of Germany and the ability to know when to hit the enemy with the final assault that won the day. Not the work of donkeys.

Great debate and some fine contributions all round.

Gunner Bailey

[Crunchy]

A quick note to say that Robert Dunlop is overseas at the moment and he will contribute when he returns to the UK.

[squirrel]

This is a superb thread with some very well expressed opinions and discussion.

I agree with Gunner Bailey's comments in post 177 and those quoted from Crunchy's in post 171.

I feel some frustration with some of those who are very knowledgable about WW1 and some who know little, when they concentrate on the casulty figures, which are horrendous of course, without looking at the broader picture to see why and how these occured.

No war can be won without casualties and it takes time and experience, unfortunately, to learn how to minimise them.

[Ozzie]

Gunner "" taking more prisoners than the French, USA, Italy and all other Allies put together.""

Is this on a per ratio of division to prisoners captured? And from what info did you come to the conclusion?

Cheers

Kim

[Gunner Bailey]

Gunner "" taking more prisoners than the French, USA, Italy and all other Allies put together.""

Is this on a per ratio of division to prisoners captured? And from what info did you come to the conclusion?

Cheers

Kim

Author - John Toland - Book - 'No Mans Land'. Simple arithmetic, nothing clever as you suggest.

Gunner Bailey

[Ozzie]

Sorry if I came over as suggesting anything, just curious as to how they worked these things out.

And my question still stands. How did they work this out? Division captures X amount of prisoners, battalion captures etc etc????

Cheers

Kim

[Gunner Bailey]

Sorry if I came over as suggesting anything, just curious as to how they worked these things out.

And my question still stands. How did they work this out? Division captures X amount of prisoners, battalion captures etc etc????

Cheers

Kim

Hi Kim

Sorry can't reply in full to this as the book is in France and I won't be going back for about three weeks! But as stated, I think it was simply from the overall total of soldiers captured in 1918.

Gunner Bailey

[Jonathan Saunders]

Having said all that, one general I feel could fit into the category of ‘donkey’ is LTGEN Sir Richard Haking of XI Corps. Not a particularly caring or savoury character from what I have read to date and one who seemed to learn nothing from the disasters he presided over.

There is actually much more in your reply that warrants an answer than I first imagined. I apologise if this is a bit incoherent but we have about five themes running: The Learning Curve; Haig; Gough; Somme; “Donkeys”. ... and this is a very general reply and more my personal ramblings although I think I could elaborate on most points with reference back to some source if pushed. Much of these thoughts are from a retrospective viewpoint as well.

Its a good point you make about the cultural process, and coordination and decemination of “lessons learned”. As far as I am aware the writing of new instructions (from circa 1917 onwards) remained very much down to the individual with people like Maxse and I assume Birch, etc., writing new manuals from their viewpoints and reflections – to what extent they canvassed the thoughts of others who could have equally valid opinions I don’t know. In practice, and as the war progressed, preparation for offensives became more organised, there was generally better leadership at Division, Brigade, Battalion level right down to platoon and section. Yet much of the innovation is credited as originating from the colonial armies … particularly Canada, Australia, New Zealand. It has been suggested that this was because the command structure of the colonial armies were not so rigid but it is clear the British themselves were evolving their methods. Perhaps it came down to the cultural identity of the individual, with some senior officers unable to offload their feelings of personal subordination to the next level up, whilst others thrived in their own confidence and abilities to dictate policy and that this was more easily characterised amongst the colonial army officers.

I accept your view of “donkeys” existing in the armies of other countries with Langemarck being the perfect example of folly. I think “we” – being the descendants of the men of the British army of 1914-18 – apply most of our focus on the British generals because of a combination of our familiarity of the circumstances, the enormous loss of life, the repetition of seemingly futile attacks, and the, sometimes still tangible impact this had on our families.

There is little information available in English language books to fully explain the German command position or the enormity of their losses. This is probably in part because of a lack of original sources that were lost in WW2. It’s a different story about German airmen but certainly the German army has no detailed profile in British history books and suffers from a lack of interest for want of a better expression – something that historians like Jack Sheldon and Bob Foley are trying to change. Overall its difficult to become informed of the reasons behind those decisions that were taken and therefore to properly assess who was good and who was bad amongst the German army.

But if the Germans had “donkeys” they also had innovators and their own learning process. We had a thread about this within the last 12 months – basically did the Germans “learn” faster than the British. As I recall the balance of opinion was the Germans did learn faster – deeper dug-outs, elastic defence etc.

The French, I think, are rather ignorantly viewed by the uninformed amongst the British as having performed worse than us irrespective of the facts – it probably comes down to the love/hate relationship we seem to have with the French. There was a somewhat controversial thread a couple of weeks ago that had to be pulled – the question was something like “Did the French Let us down” with the emphasis on the fact the French had let us down. It was such a ridiculous question that I abstained but for me the question mirrored the prevailing opinion amongst the wider general public. Not my opinion I hasten to add. I think there are good reasons to like and respect Foch and Petain. Driant (of Bois de Caures fame) was an interesting character and a hero if ever there was one.

As I was re-reading my notes on the Somme I came across a comment by David Stevenson in which he says Haig wanted to re-open the Somme offensive in the Spring of 1917. I only mention this to reinforce my opinion that Haig was committed to the Somme battlefield as opposed to having it forced upon him.

Haig sought to justify the Somme by connecting it to part of a much larger strategy of attrition. The problem with this, IMHO, is that it does not take into account British losses. The Somme in isolation actually damaged the British as much, if not more, than it did the Germans. When the Somme was closed down the Germans thought they had bettered the British because of the level of losses sustained by the British army. The difference was Britain was able to offset exhaustion of material resource in the short term and human resource in the long term by American intervention – Haig always had American materials and the Naval blockade to fall back on, and that weight of power always made an Allied victory more likely. I think it was Niall Ferguson who made the point that the Allies spent twice as much on their war economy but suffered twice as many casualties - if Ferguson is correct it doesnt paint a very impressive picture of the key players on the Allied side.

Haig never really moved away from the breakthrough theory, and I think this is the catalyst that has harmed his reputation and rightly so IMHO because this unnecessary pursuit of the breakthrough led to inequittable losses. Ignore the Somme and at Arras we sustained the highest ratio of casualty figures for days in action, at Messines Plumer did oversee limited objectives but then weeks later at Third Ypres we return to pursuing another unrealistic breakthrough. Cambrai had a great beginning as a bite and hold operation but it had no middle and no end - it just fell down when we failed to take Bourlon Wood.

As far as I can see Gough had no understanding of the limitations of his command and what was reasonable to expect. He had no concept that the welfare, good training and good leadership of the men under his command was just as important a part of his responsibility as actually fighting battles. Gough’s leadership was very poor and I feel this inability would have been the same whether he fought on the Western Front or Mespot/Palestine or any other front. He learnt nothing from the Somme, Bullecourt or Third Ypres.

In his planning for Third Ypres I believe he totally disregarded the high ground on his right flank as if it wasn’t there. Unless I have misunderstood, Haig tried to tell him to plan for all of the ridge but Gough ignored Haig and Haig didn’t intervene any more strongly than giving Gough a pointer. This is another of those Haig anomalies where the year before Haig was telling the very able Rawlinson how he should fight his battle – but then gives the very limited Gough much more latitude to basically do what he wanted.

This does not reflect well on Haig and I think it highlights a characteristic of Haig – he had a penchant for making the wrong decision. He did not, IMHO, have that instinct to instantaneously make the right decision as I regard truly great Commander were able to do, like a Smith-Dorrien or a Mustafa Kemal for example, neither did Haig possess that improtant ingredient of luck on the battlefield. But Haig wasn’t a blunderer. He was responsible for building a very effective army of around 3m+ men in France (any idea on right number?). He was fortunate that he had a never ending supply of munitions and resources but still credit him where it is due, he was a great administrative leader. I think he tried to talent spot, he made disasterous judgements in trusting the likes of Charteris and Gough, but picked the right men with the likes of Birch.

Where Haig went hopelessly wrong IMHO is that he continually made the wrong decisions when involving himself in battlefield tactics. The Somme was never a breakthrough and Haig's method of fighting it was actually out of line with the French limited offensive to the south. Also the French aim was to reach Cambrai, for some unfathomable reason Haig intended to leave the French to it and left wheel at Bapaume and roll up towards Arras. Foch was very damning of Haig’s strategy before the battle, and even more smug after the battle when his predictions had been proved correct. It suggests Foch actually knew more about the capabilities and limitations of the BEF than Haig did in the summer of 1916. Meanwhile the French fought a series of limited objectives and held parts of the German second line by the end of the first week, or thereabouts, and managed getting their cavalry through at one stage. How the Somme was fought was IMHO against most of the lessons of 1915. (To answer your question, the difference between the north and the south of the D929 road on the Somme battlefield is that the northern high ground was a more difficult objective, defended in greater depth and by better quality German troops).

Haig made another significant error when he appointed Gough over Plumer for Third Ypres. It took Haig a month to sack Gough and Plumer had to practically start again resulting in another delay. Add that delay to the delay between Messines and the start of Third Ypres and it was no wonder we were still fighting in the terrible weather of November. It should and could have been avoided. And that is probably where I am with Haig and donkeys. A lot of what happened could have been avoided. I firmly believe we could have achieved the same results in the same time frames but for less loss of life.

As I said these are my observations, and I admit they are with the benefit of retrospect, but I don't think they represent an unfair assessment.

Regards,

Jon S

[Jonathan Saunders]

I feel some frustration with some of those who are very knowledgable about WW1 and some who know little, when they concentrate on the casulty figures, which are horrendous of course, without looking at the broader picture to see why and how these occured.

No war can be won without casualties and it takes time and experience, unfortunately, to learn how to minimise them.

This is interesting because I view this the other way. I get frustrated by people that say "Haig won, so what happened previously doesnt matter. Haig was vindicated".

I think in the first 10 days of the Somme offensives the German casualties totalled 40,000. I believe this is for the full 28 miles of front the Germans were holding and that it is for all casualties not just fatalaties - but I am happy to be corrected if my sources or interpretation are wrong. In contrast the BEF for their 18 miles of front sustained over 100,000 casualties in the first 3 days.

Something else that frustrates me is use of the BEF learning process as an excuse ad infinitum. Using the 1st July as an example, the 10 West Yorks and the Newfoundland Regiment and the other battalions that lost upwards of 50% on that day learnt absolutely nothing. They learnt nothing because the battalions were decimated. All that potential was lost through poor strategy and poor command.

When Haig started from a position where it was much more difficult for him to lose the war, then I don’t see how this can be equitable or how it is vindicated, more so when you consider the number of inconsequential gains against the human loss.

This sounds a much harsher reply than I intend it to be.

Regards,

Jon

[Crunchy]

Kim,

This map from John Terraine To Win A War shows the disposition of the German Army as at 25 September 1918. It shows that the bulk of the German divisions were in the north of France facing the five British Armies and the French northern group of Armies. This may explain the claim that the "British captured more prisoners than the French and Americans put together"

Regards

Chris

[Robert Dunlop]

It is difficult to know where to start in this thread. Alan's original post lamented that, despite the efforts of 'revisionists', the 'lions led by donkeys' concept still features in contemporary press publications. Early responses to this thread prompted Chris Baker to pose a challenge - name British commanders who were 'donkeys' in 1918, and state why. In the absence of a significant number of names (Gough has been mentioned repeatedly, plus one or two others), the discussion has shifted to 1916 and the Somme, and 1917 - Messines contrasted with Third Ypres.

Jon, you have re-raised a number of issues with respect to Haig, his command style, and his culpability with respect to the Somme and Third Ypres campaigns in particular. With regard to the latter, it is not just that Haig bore ultimate responsibility for the heavy casualties in these campaigns (which had to be the case given that he was C-in-C), you have suggested that Haig was slow to learn, and maintained an approach that caused more casualties than was necessary. You have pointed to the 'bite and hold' approach advocated by Rawlinson as a less costly alternative.

I don't want to restate the details of alternative views on these issues. I am conscious, however, that some members may be new to this debate and may not have read about these alternative perspectives. For any members who are interested, I would respectfully suggest reading the threads that have appeared before. For example, Haig did not change the 'bite and hold' objectives advocated by Rawlinson - the infantry commanders had precise orders with clearly defined limited objectives that, in the areas covered by Rawlinson in his original plan, coincided with Rawlinson's stated objectives. Haig did not extend the depth of those objectives, but he did extend the width of the 'bite'. In all sectors of the attack, the infantry commanders provided very clear, written orders to their subordinates to hold the precisely defined limits of the their attacks. Haig also ensured that plans were in place in case the German defenses collapsed. See these posts, and following, for more details, including the quotes from the original sources:

http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/i...st&p=481612

http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/i...st&p=482524

With respect to Gommecourt, see the following posts and those that followed in the same threads:

http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/i...st&p=494328

http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/i...st&p=574306

With respect to counter-battery fire, see these posts and those immediately following:

http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/i...st&p=573237

http://1914-1918.invisionzone.com/forums/i...st&p=573476

Chris (aka Crunchy) made two important points, which I would wholeheartedly endorse. Firstly, many authors criticize World War 1 commanders in the absence of any indepth understanding of the enormous challenges and complexities of planning and executing a battle in the age of million-plus men armies. Second, it is very easy to criticise in retrospect, when the post-event outcomes are to hand. As to the complexities of Staff work and the challenges facing High Command, I feel we are only just scratching the surface, with respect to WW1. There are members of the Forum who have served as Staff Officers in various armies, and their contributions are invaluable. I have never served in the military, so the other sources involve accounts from Staff Officers in the war. I am steadily building up a library of these sources, including the most recently acquired 'Au 3eme Bureau du troisieme GQG', written by a French Staff Officer, Laure, who served in the Operations Bureau of Petain's headquarters.

The second issue is even more interesting. When analysing the outcomes of various battles, it seems, at first glance, that the information is to hand - number of casualties for the Somme day one, gains made (or not made), number of shells fired, etc, etc. I would respectfully submit that we are still missing big chunks of the picture, particularly with regard to the command and control issues. This despite the significant leaps forward in what has been published in recent times. Thus, not only do most of us not understand what it is like to command/plan a major military campaign, we still do not have complete information about what the WW1 Staff Officers and commanders were working with. Forum Members are free to express whatever opinions they wish to about the competence or otherwise of WW1 generals, bearing in mind that those individuals are not here in person to defend their position but their relatives might be Forum members.

Just as one example, adverse comments have been made in this thread about Charteris, in the context of other comments about Haig not acting appropriately on the intelligence reports he received. What evidence is there for these conclusions? I am very familiar with the disparaging comments made about Charteris in many secondary sources. I am very uncomfortable about the basis for these reports. Please note, this should be interpreted to mean that I am a supporter of Charteris. I do not have an opinion one way or the other - there simply is not the detail available. What reports were made? What discussions took place around these reports? What, if any, effect did they have on the decision-making process? If there were deficiencies, were these recognised and could they have been prevented? So many unknowns.

Which brings me to the final paragraph of this post. The scale of death and suffering inflicted on British and Dominion servicemen during WW1 was unprecedented in the past history of these entities. The circumstances were ugly and brutal. Haig had overall command, and therefore accountability, for the greater part of the time spent by British and Dominion forces on the Western Front. The scale of the death and suffering increased during that time, in line with the projected increase in the involvement of the British Army before he took up the post of C-in-C. The brutality and ugliness increased. Many people point to Haig and say he was to blame. But what if war was to blame? What if it did not matter who the C-in-C was? What would have happened if the scale of operations had been reduced, smaller campaigns conducted, bite and hold operations were the order of day (assuming they were not)? I have consistently argued that the enemy would have adapted, the number and proportion of casualties would have been unchanged, and probably the duration of the war would have been no different. I share Annette's view on this point. The implications of this view are quite different. If it is assumed that Haig was to blame, then material is written and interpreted in such a way as to highlight examples that support his 'incompetence'. If we assume that war was to blame (and please do not interpret this to mean that I think Haig did not make mistakes), then the whole focus of research is fundamentally different.

Robert

[Robert Dunlop]

Chris, what a fantastic map! It illustrates the fundamental strategic problem facing the highest levels of command. Leaving aside the density of units in the front lines, the concentrations of reserves stands out very clearly. Fascinating. Thanks

Robert

[squirrel]

Jon,

There is a lot oto digest in these two posts 184 & 185. Some of your points I can agree with but to understand the way that senior commanders like Haigh behaved I believe that you have to look back pre war to their own training and experience and the expectations of the British Army itself. That we had only recently formed a General Staff and lacked sufficient numbers of talented commanders at all levels is undeniable.

All of the training and the manuals it was based on emphasised the attack in set piece battles. Trench warfare as such was hardly mentioned and I find this surprising after the experiences of the Boer War.

Once the war started, they then had to recruit and train an army and what we refer to today as logisitc support and develop weapons and tactics to deal with the stalemate on the Western Front. They then had to work out the best way of using these resources effectively while still fighting a war.

I do not for one moment deny that the casualties were apalling in some of the battles and that before 1918, based on the experience of the 1914/1915 battles, they did resort to a certain extent to the "let's use a bigger club" method of attack. But they also developed what some refer to as an "all arms weapons system" which came to fruition in 1918.

The Somme 1916 and Passchendaele 1917 had very heavy casualty rates but so also did Neuve Chapelle, Aubers Ridge, Festubert and Loos in 1915 and they did try to learn from each of these. Essentially they were trying to do two things at one time and achieving success in both at the same time was not possible.

Also there is a need to bear in mind that the resources to equip, train and fight with were not forthcoming as quickly as was found to be needed.

Did they do the best with what resources they had? Probably not.

Could anyone else have done it better? Probably, but who were they and where were they to be found ?

Hindsight is a wonderful thing, but the casualty figures should be looked at in the light of immensity of the task that had to be undertaken and who and what was available at the time to undertake it. Consideration should also be given to the quality of the opposing forces.

[PhilB]

Chris, what a fantastic map! It illustrates the fundamental strategic problem facing the highest levels of command.

Robert

Particularly when you consider that, at the time, each commander basically only sees his own side of the map and guesses at the other! Phil B

[Ozzie]

What was being taught to the officers, or officers in training, to prepare them. Had they learnt anything to pass on to the new upcoming officers?

This is from a LH officer's notes he made while in England at a training school, Nov 15 to Jan 16'

Hang on will try again

[Ozzie]

Believe me the writing is really this small. In some places you need a magnifying glass to read the notes and that is on the actual page.

[Ozzie]

Ta Chris for the map.

Cheers

Kim

[Jonathan Saunders]

Hindsight is a wonderful thing, but the casualty figures should be looked at in the light of immensity of the task that had to be undertaken and who and what was available at the time to undertake it. Consideration should also be given to the quality of the opposing forces.

These are all good points that you make in your post but this last paragraph interests me. To what extent do you think the high casualties sustained in 1916 and 1917 should be related to Haig’s reoccurring mistaken belief that the Germany army on the Western Front was on the verge of collapse?

Regards,

Jon S

[squirrel]

Jon S,

essentially, sources from Divisional level upwards, and which in any way refer to the state of the German Army and it's combat potential, seem to be overly optimistic regarding their apparent lack of ability to fight and withstand an attack. Nearly always underestimated. Brigade and battalion reports in most instances seem to be on the mark and realistic.

From the German side it appears that they were sometimes bewildered by the way attacks were made against them and the way they continued to be carried out apparently regardless of cost. Somewhat the same as the British were in 1914 at 1st Ypres.

Apart from information brought in at Brigade and Battalion level from the front line there was a lot of good information available but also a lot that was not. It was the way that this was interpreted and passed upwards that was the problem.

I also think that this goes back to the attitude of the senior officers at the time. Those who were not positive were "not with us" so to speak. Haigh was at the top of the pyramid where the air of optimism was the greatest based on what he had been told and advised. He was an optimist himself most of the time. A positive mental attitude as it is called these days was and still is considered to be very important in winning a war. Moral as it was referred to then and was enshrined in the training manuals.

Quite rightly, but it can be taken too far resulting in an unrealistic view of the enemy's potential and consequently underestimating it. Cognitive dissonance played a part as well once a plan was made.

None of this was peculiar to the British Army alone though. It is equally true of the French and Germans when they mounted attacks.

At 1st Ypres Haigh was surprised that the Germans, despite their losses, had not continued their attacks as there would have been little to stop them. He always remembered this and thought that "one more push" would achieve a result.

Far more should have been learned from this and of these defensive capabilities in the 1915 battles. Relatively small numbers of German troops held what they could until a counter attack with reserves was made and, unless a strategic withdrawal materialised, this was continued until 1918. This policy was also costly in lives and casualties to the defender. On the Somme, from what figures I have seen, at the end of the battle the British had suffered about twice as many casualties as the Germans.

Inevitably, the side that had the most resources and the resolve to use them and keep on using them achieved a victory. The Naval blockade certainly played a major part in the defeat of the German army on the Western Front.

The German army's capability was consistently underestimated by the British but then so was the British Army by the Germans until the latter stages of the war.

[Jonathan Saunders]

Squirrel,

Great reply.

One further question. 1914 aside, in what circumstances did the Germans under estimate the British? I might be having a blank but I cant think of any German offensive against the British part of the Line after April 1915 until March 1918.

Regards

Jon S

[Jonathan Saunders]

It is difficult to know where to start in this thread.

Hi Robert - trust your well. I understand your dilemma - the thread sort of died, was brought back to life and has evolved into more of a conversation of general observations and interpretations with several themes running. Very confusing.

Thanks for the links to the old threads. I should really try and find the time to read them again - it would be interesting to see how my thoughts have developed although I think the fundamental basics of my observations remain the same.

Regarding Gommecourt, we shouid point others to the comments of bmac in the Attrition thread (p 6 of the thread) as he probably knows as much about Gommecourt as any other living being.

Your comments regarding the non-interference of Haig in setting objectives for Rawlinson on 1st July are plausible but with respect remain your interpretation. As far as I recall, and I mean this with the greatest respect, they do not reflect the findings of the academic historians, who I trust, have poured over a broad base of original documents and eye-witness accounts. Nor are they supported by the entries in Rawlinson's diary as quoted in Prior & Wilson although I accept P&W may be quoting out of context. My memory has been left with a feeling that there are other softer issues that indicate Haig was pushing out the boundaries.

You said I have suggested that Haig was slow to learn. I think I need to clarify this, for me as much as you, but I didnt mean he was slow to learn in the way I think you mean it. I think Haig was unaware of where his strengths and weaknesses laid and I think this meant in some aspects he just never learnt the lesson at all because he didnt realise he had a lesson to learn. There is a subtle difference and I hope you follow what I mean.

Agree with you what you say about complexities of command and also the benefit of being able to criticise retrospectively. All I can say about the second point is I have tried to look at July 1916 for example, by analysing 1915 and with due consideration of the resources available. As you already know, I regard the most important lesson as the role of the artillery - both ours and the enemy's. My feelings on counter-battery work for the opening of the Somme offensive havent really changed.

I was somewhat confused by your comments concerning individuals not being here to defend themselves. I may have misunderstood you but it came across, to me anyway, as if we shouldnt criticise their competence or speak ill of the dead. First of all, if they were still here to defend themselves, then judging by some of the autobiographical material they wrote after the war, I would want to verify their comments from independent sources anyway. Regarding whether we should criticise them, they sought public honour and reward and no doubt in many cases, chased their place in history - on that basis why shouldnt we criticise them if we feel it appropriate? For the sake of history we have a duty to investigate them and discuss our findings.

Charteris: when I was looking into the sacking of Jellicoe a few months back it was characterised by the PM being called a Liar in the House of Parliament by one or two former Cabinet members, as I recall. All the Sea Lords said that they wanted to resign in protest but didnt feel able too because Britain was up to her neck in war. You got the feeling that a great injustice had been done. Charteris is sacked and only Haig had a good word to say about him - most of those that knew and had contact with Charteris at the time believed Haig should have sacked him much earlier. The contrast between the reactions to the two sackings is very clear. My evidence is just about every book I have that comments on Charteris' removal and I am sure you are familiar with most of them.

I think if there had been another C-in-C and Rawlinesque bite and hold operations, it would have resulted in little difference to the duration of the war. I do however, think it would have made a difference to several thousand families across the globe. I realise thatt isnt important from this distance to everybody and i accept that, but it does remain important to me.

All the best,

Jon S

[Alan Lines]

I personally think this is complete tosh, but let's begin a proper discussion here. I don't want emotion, hearsay or fiction, just facts and evidence. Beginning with the men who commanded British Armies during the war on the Western Front from August 1918 onward. Please explain which are donkeys and why. Don't drift off into what they did before August 1918 or after November 1918.

As a reminder,

Henry Horne

Herbert Plumer

Julian Byng

Henry Rawlinson

William Birdwood

We can expand this to others and other periods later on.

So do we just ignore the previous 48 months or so? Even donkey's can learn a few tricks in that time.

[squirrel]

Jon S,

your post no 196.

Quite right about the Germans underestimating the British; I was thinking of Mons, Neuves Chapelle, Aubers Ridge, Festubert and Loos. Each underestimated the other in my humble opinion but the Germans were the quicker on the uptake from the lessons learned.

While the Germans certainly learnt very quickly after Neuves Chapelle and strengthened their defences accordingly, Aubers Ridge nearly caught them on the hop but we had neither sufficient men or artillery and Festubert taught us a costly lesson.

Loos was a different case, but they did not expect the attack to be on such a scale nor for it to last for so long. Concentrating the attack on a smaller front may have achieved a different result.

On the Somme, it was the continued tenacity of the British attacks that surprised the Germans and while not being a particularly succesful battle from the British point of view, it did the German morale no good at all. Arras and 3rd Ypres had a similar effect.

Cambrai caught them by surprise by it's timing with 3rd Ypres but for a number of reasons, as has been discussed elsewhere on the forum recently, was not as successful as it might have been.

August to November 1918 was not perhaps an example of the Germans underestimating the British. More a case of them running out of options after their own attacks in March and April.

Perhaps one might say that the retreat to the Hindenberg Line was an example of the Germans accepting that they had underestimated what could be achieved by the British.

Certainly the growth, size and application of the British Army attacks from 1915 onwards was something that the Germans had not anticipated in 1914 by underestimating not only the British Army but the nation and Empire and the resources they would call on as well.

[Chris Martin]

Something else that frustrates me is use of the BEF learning process as an excuse ad infinitum. Using the 1st July as an example, the 10 West Yorks and the Newfoundland Regiment and the other battalions that lost upwards of 50% on that day learnt absolutely nothing. They learnt nothing because the battalions were decimated. All that potential was lost through poor strategy and poor command.

On the contrary, I believe much was learned on 1 July 1916. That Regiments were decimated by the days fighting (not to sound cruel) means little. Ultimatly it is not for specefic regiments to learn how to plan and fight battles. They are a small part of a vast system, through brigade, division, and army. They follow orders of battle, not plan them. The Newfoundland Regiment had little control over the events of the day, they could have been a regiment with decades experience and, short of disobeying direct orders, would have been stopped and damaged on the day. That they recived an 82% casualty rate has much to do with the C.O's inexperience and interpretation of brigades orders, when told to get moving right away. The Essex, who were to advance with them, stayed in the trench system and were slowed by clogged trenches, while Hadow decided to send his men above ground from the reserve trench thus exposing them to fire for a longer period. A mistake that was not made again, to my knowloge, in the NFLD Regiment. They learned from the day.

But back to my origional point. The Somme was some what of an anomaly. I can't remember the General's name, but as I understand one British general felt the new army traning and diciplin was not up to par and ordered that the men walk in formation to preserve order on the field. This accounts for many of the casualties (in very basic terms) and was not a policy that was kept in the later stages of the war. Further more General Ivar Maxie went against convention by digging saps into the battle field to provide a jumping off point further out from the front line giving his men less gound to cover, as a result his men faired somewhat better on the day. This practice was used in later engagements of the war.

While regiments learned to operate on their level in a way specefic to them, it was at the army level that much was learned and filtered through the verious orginizations. Mistakes were made, and continued to be made, and some inexscusable, but as a whole the officers of the BEF were instrumental to sucess of the army.