BEF 1914. Marksmanship, Musketry and the Mad Minute

[Guest]

Some evidence at least that pre-War the Special Reserve and Extra Reserve battalions were lagging the Regulars. The Regimental Annual of the Sherwood Foresters kept detailed accounts of the Annual Musketry Tests and their Figure of Merit (average score) as well as some breakdown of Marksmen, 1st, 2nd and 3rd Class shots.  The table is self-explanation. To save you the calculations the Regular Battalions (on average) scored 28% higher than the Reserve Battalions (on average) in 1914.

 

          

 

Not shown is the Recruits' Musketry results for the Reserve Battalions. They averaged 63.5 over the four years. In 1914 they were scoring 63.8. This suggests that recruits needed time to come up to the standard of the Reserve battalions. It is worth noting that the Special Reserve had very high annual turnover. The Special Reserve formed a large proportion of the BEF's infantry by end 1914.  

 

While musketry on a range might be very different from musketry in action on the Western Front, but its does perhaps indicate that base skills were different across the types of infantry. 

 

MG

 

Edited 28 October , 2016 by Guest
typos

[dansparky]

This makes interesting reading, there are so many factors that confuse the issue of trying to establish the proficiency of the BEF. It would take some time for  reserves to be brought up to standard.  I think the impact of this is greater with this the higher the attrition levels get and of course, maintaining accuracy etc in live action.  Live action proficiency will never be established due to the many variables, arguments over casualty figures and what caused them and basing our conclusions on anecdotes.  I think the information on this thread is so valuable because the only thing we can hope to measure is pre-war proficiency.  It will never replicate that of live action, but it represents the key that best fits the lock that is the question. 

 

Although there is a lot of attention based on the man behind the gun, i am wondering what comparisons have been or may be drawn from the Rifles of both sides?  I think this may have been briefly mentioned but i fear i have missed it.  

[Guest]

One of the significant factors in the Sherwood's data was the introduction of the SMLE. The 1st Bn Sherwood Foresters received their SMLEs later than the 2nd Bn and had less time to adjust to the new weapon.  This point is specifically made with a certain level of annoyance by the author of the Battalion Notes. There is also important commentary that a year later they saw a huge improvement. This might explain the large differential between the regulars and the SR (long Lees?). However this would challenge the assumption that transitioning from the Long to the Short MLE was smooth. For the 1st Bn Sherwood Foresters it was a two year process. This in itself is interesting as it again challenges assumptions that well trained men (and marksmen to boot) could quickly adapt to a new weapon. The evidence is that they couldn't. That surprised me. A lot. 

 

When we look at the detail, and the breakdown of Marksmen, 1st, 2nd and 3rd Class shots, the Special Reserve lag significantly. The data is heavily skewed towards the middle ground. Typically between 300 and 600 men were tested in each battalion. In the 3rd Battalion there was only a single marksman (less than 1% of all who fired Table B).Contrast this with 17.8% for the Regular battalions. It is a huge differential.

 

Over the four years, based on the available data 78% of the Special Reservists were 2nd Class shots compared to just 31% in the regulars. On the surface this might be a problem, however we should not lose sight of the fact that the BEF's musketry doctrine was about raising the average standard and 2nd Class was probably 'good enough'.  

 

The problems start to arise outside of individual musketry skills. There are examples recorded in the diaries of Officers telling their men to cease fire and 'telling-off' the Marksmen or 1st Class shots to pick individual targets or lay down some range-finding shots so that others might adjust their sights. This is the part that truly is a 'thing of perfection' in my view. Minute level adjustments in the heat of battle that have exponential positive impact. Brilliant.  Fire control, fire discipline, target acquisition, ammunition conservation all in a few seconds. It is this type of nitty-gritty-low-level tactical application of the musketry skills that mattered. If the Special Reservists were not producing their own Marksmen and 1st Class shots, (and junior leaders in the shape of Officers and NCOs) it would be difficult to replicate these critical elements of group musketry. In modern parlance these skills are force-multipliers.

 

Euripides: Ten men well led will beat a hundred without a head

 

It would be reasonable to assume that when the SR  men filled the depleted ranks of the BEF, there were still enough Regulars and Army Reservists with the requisite skills to direct these 2nd Class musketeers. Unfortunately this is where the hard stats again bring us to an abrupt halt. Where we have forensic data of the attrition of battalions in 1914, the wastage among the 'originals' is quite overwhelming. When we translate this to scenarios such as Gheluvelt and First Ypres, where the trench system was rudimentary, small scale command and control mattered. A lot. The shattered remnants of platoons and sections using their own initiative when higher level command and control has been destroyed. L/Cpls, and Private soldiers with well honed skills and drills.... and drills... and relentless drills...that became automatic in times of extreme stress. This is the essence of basic infantry training: to embed automatic reflexes in the most extreme conditions. The problem is that these are skills that are difficult to replicate in part-time soldiering or the less intensive training and high turnover of the SR.  

 

Modern sports science might be helpful here as we are beginning to understand the scientific importance of repetitive training and how this impacts muscle memory and automatic response. If Gunner Bailey is still reading, it is worth considering why golfers spend so much time on the ranges. A scratch golfer needs to practice continually. These are finely honed skills that decay over time. I suspect the British Army could tell the sports scientists a thing or two about the compounding effects of incremental returns on small incremental improvements across a number of factors. The Army's obsession with team sports is interesting in this aspect and probably would be a fascinating area of study. Another thread I think. 

 

If a battalion such as the Royal Irish had SR NCOs who were 'entirely ignorant of their duties' one might be forgiven for wondering if this might extend to the command and control aspects of Musketry.  When we then consider that most battalions were hollowed out and replaced with these same men, it raises questions.  Unfortunately this was an age when the leaders were annihilated. Roughly speaking 40% of infantry Officers and NCOs who witnessed these events were killed. 50% were wounded and invalided. Of the 10% who survived unscathed very few (proportionally) left their memoirs; of these very few focused on these low level tactics and training which is why, I think, this is a difficult area to research. 

 

Any mistakes are mine. MG

 

 

Edited 29 October , 2016 by Guest

[seaforth78]

Martin, 

 

I find it very interesting that there was a great deal of difference in terms of adjusting between the Mark I and Mark III as the bolt action concept sans charger is the same but I suppose with a difference of barrel length surely this was something to consider. Out of interest the 1st Batt. Foresters was in Singapore as of 1907, the 2nd Batt. was at Aldershot. By the time they changed roles in 1911 or so I suppose the time lost to the 1st in endeavouring to catch up to standard to 1914 was considerable? 

[dansparky]

On 16/12/2014 at 01:31, QGE said:

More from Hansard on the relative merits of the SMLE v the German Mauser from 1912...

http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/1912/mar/04/the-army-rifle

 

 

Looking at what is said about the existing Rifle (must be MKIII), Advantages of the British Rifle is lighter, Larger magazine all =  higher rates of fire, and bullet past 1,500 more effective, downside defective breech chamber.  German rifle better-performing bullet at shorter  distance and flatter trajectory (argument being more likely to hit target if estimated distance wrongly), also continental rifles have simpler sights.

[Guest]

11 hours ago, seaforth78 said:

Martin, 

 

I find it very interesting that there was a great deal of difference in terms of adjusting between the Mark I and Mark III as the bolt action concept sans charger is the same but I suppose with a difference of barrel length surely this was something to consider. Out of interest the 1st Batt. Foresters was in Singapore as of 1907, the 2nd Batt. was at Aldershot. By the time they changed roles in 1911 or so I suppose the time lost to the 1st in endeavouring to catch up to standard to 1914 was considerable? 

 

I think the introduction of the SMLE at the same time as Battalions were moving Overseas or returning had a disruptive effect. It may simply have been the down-time from regular training. Clearly not every battalion was moving at this time. I think the example is relevant given it clearly shows that the transition from one rifle to another was not smooth in terms of musketry results despite the fact that the mechanisms were very similar. 

 

I wonder when the Special reserve received their SMLEs. Edit: 4th Bn Notes record the first issue of the SMLE for the Reserve Bn was on 7th June 1910. One might think that a long Lee Enfield was more accurate at longer ranges than the SMLE. Technicalities aside, whatever weapon they were using at the time, the SR (and the Militia before 1907) were consistently poorer shots than the regulars. I have the Regimental Annual going back to earlier years so it is possible to compare further back. I focused on the immediate pre-war years simply because it would be more relevant. The fact is that the SR's musketry  was consistently far behind that of the regulars. MG 

Edited 29 October , 2016 by Guest

[David Filsell]

Post 503 is an excellent and valuable addition to the thread. Thank you Martin, it triggered a re-read of the entire thread for me.

 

It seems to me from my own research that up until the end of 1st Ypres, despite massive losses -  despite numbers of reserves in officers and men sent in penny packets l - including the posting in of 'officers' from the Artists rifles - the integrity of Rawlinson's and Haig's divisions (latterly under the overall command of Haig) remained amazingly capable of  offering highly effective infantry fire despite being inadequately officered and nco'd, in both composite battalions or penny packet companies and despite officer or nco losses.  The British very largely held the ground and certainly held the German advance against both good and inadequate German infantry. (Whether the holding of the "blood bought' salient long term or whether a Hindenburg Line type retirement should have taken place is quite another matter.)

 

There  have been in this  threads discussion of the loss of trained officers, staff officers - a shortage of which remained a huge problem until relatively late in the war, -  and a little, not surprisingly, about nco's . Despite Martin's research, which I do not query, although I question some of the views he has expressed, it remains a fact that the reduced ranks of Expeditionary Force at Ypres , regardless of detail about musketry, adequacy of reserves, tactical skill, held the line. Above all else this must be judged a  "magnificent" achievement.

 

Even by mid 1916 at all levels of performances, the army overall  was not fitter for purpose than in 1914 despite the Zuberist claims of Germany superiority in everything but the price of biscuits. The reality is not lack of ability in the ranks but that the he British Army was too small, yet punched above its weight in 1914.

[trajan]

2 hours ago, David Filsell said:

...despite the Zuberist claims of Germany superiority in everything but the price of biscuits. ... 

 

I have not read this work so perhaps I should, not the least because the combined German armies were certainly not superior when it came to supplies of modern infantry weaponry at the start of the GW, in the sense that they found themselves woefully short of rifles and bayonets before mid-August 1914. Indeed, over the next few months some front-line units were forced to replace their Gew 98's with Gew.88's so that the men in the Ersatz and Reserve units could learn how to use these! On the other hand, I have the impression - but don't mind being corrected if necessary - that the Prussian, etc., Reserves were overall accustomed to a more rigorous training regime than was usual among the TF in Britain.

 

Julian

[Guest]

Northumberland Fusiliers on mobilization:

 

“But though in numbers the battalion was complete, its quality was not regarded by the Commanding Officer as entirely satisfactory. It had been anticipated that the first men to arrive from the reserve would be highly trained men who had but recently left the Colours. But this was not the case. At the close of the South African War the terms of service for the infantry of the line had been altered to 3 years with the Colours and 9 with the Reserve. This reduced Colour Service had remained in force for some three years. In 1914 the reserve service of those first enlisted under these terms was approaching its conclusion. The drafts so provided to be composed very largely of these men which had been in civil life for close to on nine years – years moreover that had been marked by the great developments in training which had followed the South African War.

 

An urgent call was dispatched to the greatly harassed Depôt Commander for one hundred picked, fully trained reservists and each commander was instructed to weed out the twenty-five most backward reservists allotted to his company. The hundred men dispatched by the Depot in response to this demand were selected from among those who had received their discharge on the return of the Battalion from India. The arrival of these cheery, confident men to take their place in the ranks they had but recently left, immensely strengthened the Battalion. None the less the Fifth was to go to war with a large proportion of men who for years had had no marching and who were in sad need of military training in general.

 

Never let it be thought that these older men lacked spirit; they were to give ample evidence of that. But had it been possible on mobilzation to arrange for men to rejoin the Colours in the reverse order to that in which they had gone to the Reserve, opportunity would have been secured for giving training and exercise to those most in need of it and the Battalion by the inclusion of men in harder condition and with more recent training would have been better equipped for the first few strenuous weeks of the War”

 

MG

Edited 30 October , 2016 by Guest

[Guest]

2nd Bn Suffolk Regiment. This battalion is interesting for a number of reasons.

 

• It recorded exactly how many Army reservists it required for mobilization and the split by terms of engagement and time away from the colours
• The 1914 Star medal roll has all the Special Reservists annotated with a 3/ prefix to their Army Number making it easy to isolate this group.
• The Battalion lost 600 men in a single day (Le Cateau) - all part of the Main Body which meant that the battalion had to be rebuilt early in the campaign - accelerating the draw-down of the remaining pool of Reservists.
• We know the exact number of available Reservists

 

We can re-construct the Main Body and all the subsequent Reinforcement Drafts from the 1914 Star medal roll. We can also split out the serving men (black) from Army Reservists (blue) from Special Reservists (red). This is shown in the chart below. Dates run left to right on the X axis and Army Numbers are on the Y axis. Recently enlisted men are towards the top of the chart and old and bold are at the bottom. 

 

A few key points:

• Main Body split between serving soldiers and Army reservists. The divide is around Army Number 7500. Men with an earlier (lower) number would be Army Reservists (Blue) in the main with a few long-serving NCOs 
• 1st Reinforcement (ditto)
• Subsequent Reinforcements see a steady increase in the Special Reservist (red). These make up 27% of all disembarkations for the 2nd Bn Suffolk Regt. Note that the SR (red) ran a separate numbering sequence which partially overlaps with the regulars. 
• As time passes, the SR men are increasingly more recent recruits (later Army Numbers).
• Note how the number of Army Reservists (blue) dwindles over time. By the time the 4th, 5th and 6th Reinforcement Drafts arrive, the age of the Army Reservists is becoming older (= lower Army Numbers)
• Small number of serving regulars (black) appear late in the campaign. All late enlistments and probably aged 19. As the campaign wore on the age barrier was relaxed and serving 19 year-old men filtered through. 

 

It should provide an idea of how the composition of a battalion changed and how battalions that experienced large losses in sort periods were forced to rely on Special Reservists to rebuild their depleted ranks. 

 

Also shown is the record of a typical "3 & 9" man 6749 Pte Walter E Clark who had been away from the colours for over 7 years. He formed part of the Main Body when the battalion initially deployed and was part of the advance party on 13th August (see extreme left data). His active service lasted just two weeks: he was one of nearly 550 POWs at Le Cateau.  MG

 

 

 

 

Edited 31 October , 2016 by Guest

[Guest]

One of the other challenges for the Special Reserve was the extraordinarily high annual turnover. In 1913 some 36% of the Special Reserve left and were replaced with new recruits. The prior year was 46%. On average in the five years before the Great War the Special Reserve saw a 40% annual turnover. Effectively the Special Reserve had turned over twice in five years. 25% of infantry Special Reservist had served less than a year's service. 42% had less than 2 years' service. 

 

We can make some accurate approximations of the number of years of service (colour and reserve) of the BEF's Regular Army permanent casualties (KIA, DOW, Discharged, POW) from their Army Numbers. Taking the 2nd Bn Suffolk Regiment as an example, the 554 Prisoners of War taken in 1914 had Army Numbers that averaged around 7118. For the Suffolks that number relates to enlistment in Dec 1905, so, on average these men had around 7 years Colour Service and 2 years with the Army Reserve.  When these men became permanent casualties and were replaced with Special Reservists, it is worth considering the net loss in experience and training. If a third of the Special Reservists who were replacing them had less than a year's training, it would be extremely difficult to sustain pre-war levels of musketry. If the Sherwood Foresters data is any indication, Special Reserve recruits were achieving average scores of 60 on the Musketry tests, nearly half  the score of good Regular Battalions. 

 

An Officer of the 2nd Bn KOYLI (also annihilated at Le Cateau) estimated that Special Reservists represented 90% of the men serving on 1st Jan 1915. He could count the number of original NCOs on two hands. 

 

Past Services of the Special Reserve  - Oct 1913 (last official returns before the Great War)

Edited 31 October , 2016 by Guest

[Guest]

A debate in Parliament on the Special Reserve just two years before the Great War; The speaker is an Officer who served in the 3rd (Special Reseve) Bn Hampshire Regiment. The full debate is here: click

 

Viscount Wolmer. "It has been said, not only upon the other side of the House but upon this side, that in many respects the present Special Reserve is a considerable improvement upon the old Militia. I must say that I have not been able to see it. As far as my experience goes, the present Special Reserve, in regard to its annual training, is nothing but a farce, and a very expensive farce at that. I want to give a matter-of-fact account of what happens to any individual in the Special Reserve Battalion going out to training under the present system. Take my own regiment, the 3rd Battalion the Hampshire Regiment. That battalion is composed of eight companies, and it looks very well on paper. The establishment is 580 men, thirty officers, two machine gun detachments, scouts, etc. There is a battalion alleged to be ready to take the field in time of war, and said to be a very considerable improvement on the old Militia. What are the facts? How many men did this battalion parade on the last day of training this last year? There were only 270 men in camp out of an establishment of 580 men, and when it came to parade you had to deduct from that the detachments with two machine guns, the scouts, and the cooks. In the old days in the Militia we had the police and the sanitary squad. Now, owing to the paucity of numbers, the police have had to be amalgamated with the sanitary squad, and therefore they have to be deducted. The result is at the end of the training not more than 200 men go on parade, divided into eight companies. I want the Committee to realise the practical difficulties of drilling battalions constituted on those numbers.

 

The whole of the system on which the organisation is based is on the assumption that the battalion is at least about 600 men strong. When you have only got one-third of that strength the whole principle on which the organisation is built absolutely collapses. Our companies were twenty-five men strong. The strength of a company in the Regulars is supposed to be 120. Now every company has to be divided into four sections, and those sections are six men each instead of being thirty, as they ought to be. I ask the Secretary for War what is the use of telling a solitary man to form fours? You cannot do it. In the training of the last two or three years I have seen matters worse than that, because one company has paraded eleven men with three officers to drill them. Those eleven men are expected to form two half-companies, four sections, and two squads to every section, and we are supposed to go out on parade ground and do company training. The whole thing is a disheartening farce. The officers come on parade and we are simply a skeleton army. We are forced to form up in an organisation devised for numbers three times as great as we can muster, and it is impossible for us to conduct company or battalion training on the numbers we have got under the present system. I am aware that when this question was raised before Lord Haldane said, "That was all very well, but the present Special Reserve was only a nucleus, and was only the core around which you could form an efficient battalion when war actually broke out." I wish to point out to the right hon. Gentleman that that is not the case, because the present system prevents the Special Reserve from being even an efficient nucleus. How can your men be properly trained, and how can your officers be properly trained if every time they go out on parade you have to put three or four companies together in order to do company drill at all, put men under officers who do not belong to their company, leave three or four officers standing idle if there is a surplus of officers, or put your officers to command men they do not know, if there is not a sufficient number of officers? The whole system on which your organisation is built up breaks down, and when you go to war you have a mass of 200 or 300 men who have not been trained together, and who have not been allowed to work in the company unit, as it was intended when the organisation of the Army on its present basis was originally mapped out. You have not got the start to make an efficient nucleus in your Special Reserve; they are simply a conglomeration of so many men and so many officers, the number of men being absolutely insufficient in order to do company or battalion drill. The whole organisation has to be discarded, and therefore you do not get an organisation at all; you simply get a conglomeration of individuals. Therefore, I submit your present Special Reserve is inefficient and useless, even as a nucleus in time of war.

 

There is another criticism I want to make. Not only are you not getting more than a third of the men you want, but the men you are getting are not of the right sort. Go and look at any Special Reserve battalion out training, and you will see that three-fourths of the men are not men at all; they are simply boys, who are ultimately going into the Army, boys who are just trying to see what a military career is like. The result is that not only is the Special Reserve not a force of men at all, but you are not building up a reserve of men. The men who go into the Special Reserve go into the Army; they do not go back into civil life available for call in case of war. They simply go into the Army and the great function originally ascribed to the Special Reserve of building up among our civilians a reserve of men who have had some military training is not served when you get the sort of men you get at the present time, simply boys whose object is to go into the Army later on. In the days of the old Militia we did have a sprinkling of ancient tramps to season our battalion. I do not think in the history of the force we have ever had a sufficient number of men in the prime of life. We have never had a proper number of men in regular employment. No man can go away from his employment a month in every year without running the danger of being discharged. Of course, the ancient men have been struck out under the present system, and the result has not been to increase the efficiency of the Special Reserve. It has simply been to delete a certain number of individuals from the number of Special Reservists. The result is that the Special Reserve to-day is not only wholly insufficient and inadequate in numbers, but it is composed of the merest raw boys who are absolutely unfit to take the field against any conscript army, and who do not form any reserve among our civilians, but who for the most part pass into the Army afterwards"

 

 

 

[dansparky]

Edmonds Memoirs liddell hart archive

1.territorial force obsolete equipment, below strength, needed 6 months training before fit.  most first 6 months spent getting rid of bad officers.

2.not many officers suitable age and fitness.  lack of expansion munition factories.

3.Britain entered the war insufficient numbers and resources.

[David Filsell]

Trajan,

i think Zuber well worth reading, although at times he appears like some on thread to draw the long bow, he makes you, despite the sometimes awkward writing, think 'different'.

[dansparky]

agree with that, I am not sure i agree with the massive superiority he argues the Germans enjoyed.  His argument contends numbers equal, it was only the difficulties of pursuit and mistakes by HC that denied them.   I think something of the truth lies between Zuber and the British OH, as I read it I felt his argument had a clear agenda and as such was doing what he accuses BOH of doing.  That said it is a good book and is a great place to start for a counter-narrative.

[dansparky]

10th Brigade on Mobilisation.

4th August an extra '100' rounds from Hythe.

5th August RESERVISTS begin by rifle practice & all men do a days section practice and  2 days comp training.  1 days batt training.  PROGRESSIVE MARCHES go on whole time & night work.  I have directed that discipline shall be of strictest, march discipline, emergency formations, drill, fire direction practices etc.

7th Reservists firing at 500 yrds, moderate accuracy, many men do not know present rifle.  Instructions FOR mobilisation:  the reserve will be rather rusty as regards Training, it is important to work them with men of their comps so may whole shake down together and give COHESION and strength to units which enthusiasm alone cannot do, All reserves fire on range and march 8 miles a day, by third day of training packs must be added, 5th day 12 miles comp route march 3/4 hour night work, etc etc.

7th continued ....every man save rounds, remember every bullet worth its weight in gold.  kill and disable as much enemy as possible.  Remember MOVEMENT id the SOUL OF ATTACK, passivity the reverse. 

 

 

 

[dansparky]

Statistical analysis of musketry results from Boer War to World war are problematic for reason we have highlighted.  These variables make it difficult to evaluate degrees of an increase or decrease in musketry proficiency over the whole period.  However, post 333 ( 1st Bn East Surrey Regt results in 1912-1914), post 225 (Eleventh Hussars 1910-1913), clearly, indicate an increase in proficiency in the immediate years before ww1. How are these results obtained?  What is the reference information?  (hopefully, i can dig into units within 4th division)   There represent interesting pieces of the puzzle, as does post 501 which indicates a quite marked level of proficiency between the regulars and the reservists.

 

Actual statistical data is proving very interesting, paints a more detailed picture than that of anecdotes alone or changes in doctrine e.t.c.  This thread is becoming more and more interesting.

 

Fantasitc work

[timsanders]

On 30/10/2016 at 17:54, QGE said:

But had it been possible on mobilzation to arrange for men to rejoin the Colours in the reverse order to that in which they had gone to the Reserve, opportunity would have been secured for giving training and exercise to those most in need of it and the Battalion by the inclusion of men in harder condition and with more recent training would have been better equipped for the first few strenuous weeks of the War”

 

A powerful point Martin. My GGF was on reserve from 1907 after serving for only 3 years, yet there he was sailing for France on 13th August with the first draft. How he got through the following few months I will never know.

[Guest]

2 hours ago, timsanders said:

 

A powerful point Martin. My GGF was on reserve from 1907 after serving for only 3 years, yet there he was sailing for France on 13th August with the first draft. How he got through the following few months I will never know.

 

He and his fellow Reservists who survived were also very lucky. They were fortunate to have been led by the finest group of young British Officers to have ever worn uniform. They were wholly ill-prepared for what they were about to receive. They fought with a dogged determination that was well beyond any reasonable expectation. In my view the critical factor in the BEF's achievements in 1914 was cultural.

 

Mons and Le Cateau were blessed with a disproportionate weight in the historiography; First Ypres is where it mattered and was the critical point of the War for the British in my view. The British were vaaastly outnumbered at First Ypres yet their refusal to die like dogs in a ditch and their self-belief was the critical factor. I have never understood why the Mons Star was not called the Ypres Star. It would be more fitting and have touched the hearts of the 4th, 6th and 7th Divs as well as the TF who gave as much, and more than the first cohort.  The achievements at First Ypres are on a completely different level to the failings at Mons. 

 

Edited 1 November , 2016 by Guest

[trajan]

On 10/31/2016 at 20:13, David Filsell said:

... i think Zuber well worth reading

 

23 hours ago, dansparky said:

agree with that...

 

Thanks both - I didn't want to sideline or bump this thread in any way, as it does make for fascinating reading, but I was and I am interested in the different approaches taken by GB and by 'Germany' to the matter of practical training of reserves of all kinds. 

[dansparky]

Continuing from post 517, even if the accuracy of the reservists was lower than that of the regulars it is difficult to determine the significance of this.  As has been discussed the former may have had more battle experience, more importantly at in the retreat the objective was to delay.  Some have argued that aside from accuracy the "Principal value was to delay and disrupt the advance of the army rather than kill or wound individuals".  Forcing redeployments and delay were still incredibly important part of the defence. In all probability rates of fire were higher amongst the regulars, but by how much a factor his hard to be sure.  Had they delayed rapidity until close proximity it would have probably been pretty effective even if some were more inaccurate than others.  So as such lower levels of proficiency may have been masked. 

 

I do, however, think some major issues have been addressed here in this thread if you read the many books on this subject you get the feeling amount of reserves required is offset by experience (Boer war etc) to the individual and the moral factor on the whole.  It is also accompanied by quotes substantiates that the reservists could fire with rapidity.  The only real negativity is in terms of fitness, either accuracy was never that important or more likely very few if any publications have ever scrutinised disparity or Marksmanship across the British Army.

 

 

[Guest]

24 minutes ago, johnboy said:

What was the maximum distance of the target in the musketry tests?

 

 

If you read the thread the whole Musketry test is laid out. It changed over time. 1,000 yards maximum. Here it is again. MG

 

Edited 1 November , 2016 by Guest

[Guest]

2 hours ago, dansparky said:

Continuing from post 517, even if the accuracy of the reservists was lower than that of the regulars it is difficult to determine the significance of this.  As has been discussed the former may have had more battle experience, more importantly at in the retreat the objective was to delay.  Some have argued that aside from accuracy the "Principal value was to delay and disrupt the advance of the army rather than kill or wound individuals".  Forcing redeployments and delay were still incredibly important part of the defence. In all probability rates of fire were higher amongst the regulars, but by how much a factor his hard to be sure.  Had they delayed rapidity until close proximity it would have probably been pretty effective even if some were more inaccurate than others.  So as such lower levels of proficiency may have been masked. 

 

I do, however, think some major issues have been addressed here in this thread if you read the many books on this subject you get the feeling amount of reserves required is offset by experience (Boer war etc) to the individual and the moral factor on the whole.  It is also accompanied by quotes substantiates that the reservists could fire with rapidity.  The only real negativity is in terms of fitness, either accuracy was never that important or more likely very few if any publications have ever scrutinised disparity or Marksmanship across the British Army.

 

 

 

Dan, not in any way meant as a criticism or indeed as a response to this specific post, but many of your observations /questions have been already been addressed in this very long thread. Can I ask that you spend some time to read it in full, which will prevent us from going around in circles and repeating ourselves, lest those who have followed the thread throughout get bored and disappear. It is not meant as a criticism of many of your very valuable observations.

 

I will delete this when acknowledged to avoid disruption to the flow of the interesting debate. Thanks. MG

 

 

[Muerrisch]

3 hours ago, dansparky said:

Continuing from post 517, even if the accuracy of the reservists was lower than that of the regulars it is difficult to determine the significance of this.  As has been discussed the former may have had more battle experience, more importantly at in the retreat the objective was to delay.  Some have argued that aside from accuracy the "Principal value was to delay and disrupt the advance of the army rather than kill or wound individuals".  Forcing redeployments and delay were still incredibly important part of the defence. In all probability rates of fire were higher amongst the regulars, but by how much a factor his hard to be sure.  Had they delayed rapidity until close proximity it would have probably been pretty effective even if some were more inaccurate than others.  So as such lower levels of proficiency may have been masked. 

 

I do, however, think some major issues have been addressed here in this thread if you read the many books on this subject you get the feeling amount of reserves required is offset by experience (Boer war etc) to the individual and the moral factor on the whole.  It is also accompanied by quotes substantiates that the reservists could fire with rapidity.  The only real negativity is in terms of fitness, either accuracy was never that important or more likely very few if any publications have ever scrutinised disparity or Marksmanship across the British Army.

 

 

 

Boer War? Few Boer War veterans were in the ranks in August 1914, and those few  tended to occupy CSM/CQMS/ SNCO and battalion staff jobs. Remember that the Boer War ended in 1902, so that only a soldier committed to more than 12 years, or an elderly reservist who had opted for Section D retention, could claim to be such veterans. In any case the intense combat years of the previous conflict were, in the main, in the early years. Some of these veterans would have been held back ab initio [or held back after sickness or wounding] to train the New Armies. There was not much experience at shooting or being shot at in 1914 except for middle ranking officers.

 

Anyone minded to do the hard yards could, indeed, use Regimental Numbers vis a vis the 1914 Star Rolls a regiment at a time. I cannot think of a short cut and I am not volunteering!

 

MG said it at more length upstream:

 

"

2. A very small proportion of Reservists in 1914 had Boer War service. This is another long standing part of the BEF's mythology. The terms of engagement were 12 years typically split 3 and 9 (1902-1904 enlistment) and later 5 and 7 (post 1904). Either way a Reservist would only be on the hook if he had enlisted after Aug 1902 (Calc: Aug 1914 less 12 years). The Boer War had ended more than 12 years prior to the Great War, so the numbers were small. The exceptions were from two areas:

a. Reservists who had signed for Section D (4 year extension to Reserve liability). These were only 5% of the Reservists and were typically the oldest and the least desirable. Many were diverted to train the New Armies, staff the depots or take on admin roles.

b. Regulars who had extended beyond 12 years were small as a per cent of total.

There is a post on this thread that gives the exact proportion of men who could possibly have served in the Boer War. From memory it is around 12% max. Put another way 88% couldn't have served in the Boer War. Of the 12% one has to make an educated guess as to the proportion who were weeded out and replaced with younger men - something the War Diaries show in rich detail - and the proportion diverted to training roles. My guess, (and it is an informed guess having researched this in detail) would be less than 1 in 20 BEF infantrymen had Boer War experience. Most would be in admin/QM/RQMS/CQMS/Storemen roles so the number in the firing line would be even less in my view. One might also consider what proportion of the British ARmy fought in the Boer War. Britain still had a vast empire to police that absorbed over half the Army. One might reasonably halve or quarter the assumptions above".

Edited 1 November , 2016 by Muerrisch
addendum and corrigendum

[Guest]

1 minute ago, Muerrisch said:

 

Anyone minded to do the hard yards could, indeed, use Regimental Numbers vis a vis the 1914 Star Rolls a regiment at a time. I cannot think of a short cut and I am not volunteering!

 

The problem is that few are willing to do the hard yards. Very few; including published authors and academics who often talk complete and utter nonsense on this aspect. Only today I read a book by an author who proudly claims to have an MA in British World War Studies from the University of Birmingham who claims that every reservist in 1914 served "3 and 9". In the same introduction he makes three other factual and rather massive mistakes. It slightly devalues the badge of honour.  When one climbs into the ivory tower one might expect some arrows. 

 

MG

 

P.S. can you change your profile back to Grumpy please? It is confusing for continuity.