BEF 1914. Marksmanship, Musketry and the Mad Minute

[dansparky]

However, there is something I forgot to consider in the last post.  Table B classification practice exercises compared between 1905-1910  are not identical, more emphasis on rapidity etc.  This makes a comparison that little bit trickier, but where they do appear to be the same there is a mark reduction in the distance of the target.  This leads me to believe that the size was actually reduced to compensate for the fact that it was closer to the rifleman.   So, therefore, they were reduced to prevent the classification test from becoming easier now that distances were shorter.  So without mathematically working out to see if there is a relative difference between each target and their respective distance in actual terms, there seems to be little difference other reduction in shooting time (increased rapidity).

[Guest]

Changing tack slightly: something that I stumbled on while checking some deatils on the 4th Bn Greandier Guards. The following account is an extract from the History of the Grenadier Guards 1914-1919 Vol III pages 45-47 and describes the heroics of the 4th Bn and Capt Pryce MC's No. 2 Company in particular on the 11th-13th April 1918 when the Battalion was effectively annihilated: 90% casualties..... It is without doubt one of the most heroic last stands of the war and one where they really did fight to the last round.

 

"There remains the epic story of Captain Pryce. One last message was received from him—that his company was surrounded and his men shooting to front and to rear, standing back to back in the trenches to meet the encircling enemy at all points.

 

Of what happened afterwards, an outline at any rate was gathered from a corporal of the company, who escaped from Vieux Berquin the following night. Reduced now to only thirty men, the gallant little band fought on all that day. Without a pause they fired at their advancing foes, steadily, calmly, with the same rapidity and deadly aim that caused the Germans in the Mons retreat to mistake our “contemptible” riflemen for machine-guns. The enemy was puzzled. They could not for a moment believe that such a stout resistance could be put up by anything but a formidable force, and dared not make the attempt to come to close quarters.

 

By the evening the defenders were practically at the end of their tether. Only eighteen out of the thirty were left, and they had used up every scrap of ammunition. The Germans were in Verte Rue, and the beleaguered band could see the field-grey uniforms advancing towards Bois d’Aval. It was now 8.15. Suddenly Captain Pryce perceived a new move against him. A party of the enemy had made up their minds to test the strength of their obstinate opponents ; they pressed forward, and got to within 80 yards of the stubbornly-held trenches. The position seemed hopeless, but not for a moment did he flinch. Though the last cartridge had been fired, the men still had their bayonets, and he ordered them to charge.

 

Straight at the advancing enemy he rushed at the head of his handful of men. The Germans were completely taken aback. They dared not fire, for fear of hitting their own men, who were now in rear of the Grenadiers’ desperately defended position, and retired. Thereupon Captain Pryce decided to take his men back to the trench again. But by now the enemy had seen. They had realised the almost incredible weakness of the hitherto unknown force, that had so long success¬ fully kept them at bay. And, restored to confidence, they came on once more. Once more Captain Pryce led the tattered remnant of his company—that now numbered only fourteen—to the charge, and when last seen they were still fighting fearlessly and doggedly against overwhelming odds.

 

In all the glorious record of the Grenadiers there has been no story more splendid than this. It was a Homeric combat—two battalions held up (and the advance of a whole enemy division thus delayed) by a few determined men. Of the losses they inflicted on their overwhelmingly superior foe, some idea was gathered by Lieu¬ tenant Burt, who when taken prisoner afterwards was shown by a German officer the heaps of enemy dead in front of the British trenches. If ever a niche were earned in the Temple of Fame it was by these brave men and their brave leader—who, having already won a bar to his Military Cross, was awarded the Victoria Cross for this crowning act of gallantry."

 

It is interesting that Ponsonby (the author) implies that No. 2 Company's rapid fire was the same to that of Mons and that the Germans again mistokk rapid fire for machine gun fire. It is worth some rudimentary analysis.  The history records that  'total casualties amongst Other Ranks were 504 or 90 per cent of the strength of the Battalion". This implies the Battalion started with 560 Other Ranks.  The history also records that the Battalion fired off 70,000 rounds on the first day. The context implies this is a huge figure and one worth noting. If 560 men fired 70,000 rounds it means on average they each fired 125 rounds. Divided by 15 rounds per minute (a very conservative estimate given we know 20 rounds per minute was easily achievable) this means the battalion could only sustain the mad minute for 8 minutes and 20 seconds throughout the whole day before every round had been fired. With only 70,000 rounds, it would seem more prudent that 'conservation of ammunition' would have been the key element of musketry in this case.

 

The war diary also records that the reserve ammunition was dumped in the wrong place and was almost impossible to get to. Capt Pryce's No. 2 Company managed to salvage only 5 boxes. It is a reasonable assumption that the 70,000 rounds on day one was the peak, given it was highlighted in the history. The figure actually originates with the Commanding Officers' detailed report (he was one of only two Officers not killed or wounded) It runs to 2,000 words and states:

 

" The Battalion, during the day, fired some 70,000 rounds of SAA and had fired all its rifle grenades; the casualties inflicted on the Germans were severe; the work done by the Lewis gunners beyond all praise."

 

The account also stresses that the Battalion ran out of ammunition which ultimately led to Pryce's heroic bayonet charges when reduced to less than 20 men. It is interesting that the account highlights the Lewis Guns which presumably had a higher cyclic rate of fire than a rifleman. No mention of these in the published history. Why let facts get in the way of a good story. To my mind it was a physical impossibility that the rate of fire of the riflemen of the 4th Bn could sustain anything close to the rate of fire of a machine gun beyond a few minutes. Less so if the band of brothers was reduced to just 30 men, then 18 and finally 14  - incidentally with no ammunition. Over two days it was impossible due to the limit factor of the number of available rounds. The numbers simply don't add up. 

 

I think this is an interesting example of a history, incidentally pre-dating the Official History by 4 years  - starting to stretch the facts. It at least pushes the earliest published mention of the rifle-fire-mistaken-as-machine-gun-fire myth back to 1920. It also seems to partially absolve Edmonds as the earliest champion of the story. 

[Stoppage Drill]

For Pryce read Danjou.

For Bois d'Aval read Camerone.

[Guest]

47 minutes ago, Stoppage Drill said:

For Pryce read Danjou.

For Bois d'Aval read Camerone.

Funnily I was thinking exactly the same. He must have known that his chances of survival were next to zero. It would be fascinating to read the survivor's account if it still exists. 

 

One might also compare to Charrier of the 2nd Bn Royal Munster Fusilers who personally led a number of bayonet charges when all seemed lost. His company were annihilated having been completely surrounded. No VC though. 

 

[seaforth78]

1 hour ago, QGE said:

 

 

One might also compare to Charrier of the 2nd Bn Royal Munster Fusilers who personally led a number of bayonet charges when all seemed lost. His company were annihilated having been completely surrounded. No VC though. 

 

Charrier's exploits were far more worthy of a VC (if he was ever to be considered for one) than Yate which was really unfortunate. Maxse was sent home because of this incident. 

[Hedley Malloch]

14 hours ago, QGE said:

Funnily I was thinking exactly the same. He must have known that his chances of survival were next to zero. It would be fascinating to read the survivor's account if it still exists. 

 

One might also compare to Charrier of the 2nd Bn Royal Munster Fusilers who personally led a number of bayonet charges when all seemed lost. His company were annihilated having been completely surrounded. No VC though. 

 

In the case of Etreux, all was indeed lost.  No 'seemed' about it.  And he lost a battalion (2/RMF) and not a company.

[dansparky]

Very interesting and it does absolve Edmonds somewhat of cherry picking accounts to form the narrative that was desirable.  It seems Andrew Green's take on Edmonds is closer to mark than Zuber's.  Edmonds likely would have seen this, over embellishments (if that is what they are) came from the original sources on both sides.  The inclusion on rifles mistaken for machine gun's, therefore, is the result of both British and german accounts, (the two seemingly corroborating each other) not simply Edmonds selecting favourable German accounts to create this myth.

 

I am left wondering though how the author came to this conclusion?  was this based on german testimony or because the were hesitant to approach?

[dansparky]

It also makes me think from what is said that the mistaken rifles for mg's came from an earlier source to that of the Grenadier Guards vol III

[dansparky]

On 17/01/2017 at 21:55, Stoppage Drill said:

For Pryce read Danjou.

For Bois d'Aval read Camerone.

 

I am not entirely sure what this means.  Is it in reference to the french foreign legion?

[Stoppage Drill]

42 minutes ago, dansparky said:

I am not entirely sure what this means.  Is it in reference to the french foreign legion?

 

Yes.

Camerone, Mexico, during the Emperor Maximillian adventure. 

Celebrated action.

The wooden prosthetic hand of Capitaine Danjou is paraded on the anniversary.

 

[dansparky]

Some points from the torgau history. (1916)

 

At mons "offered peculiarly favourable targets (mass)  the German losses were very heavy in this part of the field"

 

After this much more caution from advancing infantry is later described.  (inferred stiff resistance and effect of british fire), creeping forward 'gathering on mass for final assault (so extension prior).

 

At Le cateau Fire superiority was ensured before any serious attempt on behalf of the German infantry to get forward (hesitant due to losses inflicted earlier by the British).

 

Heavy artillery bombardments and Mg Sweeping that the British had little answer for.   "fire superiority was possible without the attacker exposing himself to any degree.

[Guest]

1 hour ago, dansparky said:

Some points from the torgau history. (1916)

 

At mons "offered peculiarly favourable targets (mass)  the German losses were very heavy in this part of the field"

 

After this much more caution from advancing infantry is later described.  (inferred stiff resistance and effect of british fire), creeping forward 'gathering on mass for final assault (so extension prior).

 

At Le cateau Fire superiority was ensured before any serious attempt on behalf of the German infantry to get forward (hesitant due to losses inflicted earlier by the British).

 

Heavy artillery bombardments and Mg Sweeping that the British had little answer for.   "fire superiority was possible without the attacker exposing himself to any degree.

 

At Le Cateau the critical differences were that the British Infantry had not much to shoot at for the first half of the action and their Artillery on the Right Flank was totally exposed being positioned between the infantry's rudimentary 'trenches' on a forward slope. The German artillery fired from deep, concealed positions and could not be located by the British counter-battery efforts. Added to this the Germans used aeroplanes to mark the British positions. German FOOs had clear sight and annihilated 5th Divisions' artillery (50% losses in artillery on this flank in just a few hours). It was exceptional on a number of levels. I am not convinced it is a representative battle as some of the tactics used by the British were unusual for this kind of warfare. The battle had some similarities with Waterloo (an early artillery duel) and Colenso (exposed artillery being destroyed) Wellington at least used a reverse slope for part of his battle. Le Cateau did at least finally answer a point of (British) doctrinal debate: Artillery and forward slopes. 

 

As far as the mad minute goes, there are a few examples of British rapid fire having some effect (2/KOYLI firing at the Germans coming over Suffolk Hill) although again there is the ever present risk that British accounts confused going to ground with inflicting fatal casualties. Jack Sheldon's analysis of German casualties suggests the effects of the mad minute were limited. I would suggest limited ammunition might have been a factor. Sustaining the mad minute for any period of time simply drains resources. Few authors who regurgitate the mad minute mythology give this aspect much consideration. An infantryman's typical scales of ammunition in 1914 were 200 rounds, meaning he could sustain 13 minutes of rapid fire before needing resupply. 

 

Le Cateau only has significance for the British. The Germans and the French hardly mention it. Had Von Kluck not made a mistake in guessing which direction Smith-Dorrien was scooting, things might have turned out rather worse. While the British can rightly claim it stopped the Germans for a while, the chaos that ensued in the following days meant that II Corps were probably unable to coordinate its battalions in the same way. The diary evidence from the Battalions is quite clear on this. The British losses in the subsequent days  - including the fragmentation of a few battalions is something that is largely glossed over by British historians who prefer to focus on the 'Stopping Blow' dealt by the BEF.

 

Incidentally the guns lost at Le Cateau were not replaced until after the crossing of the Aisne.

 

MG

[dansparky]

Thanks, MG,

Yes tis true and the Torgau history refers to many casualties and even pockets of our own troops mown down, which you usually here the other way round.  The certainly had difficulties in replying, this is mentioned numerous time.  Could not locate and also so much cover afforded to approach troops.

 

There is also mention of K.O.Y.L.I  rapid being completely ineffective.  As the Germans Rose from the dead ground in such overwhelming numbers at such close range, on a position that had already been softened up.  Definitely, by now any effect the mad minute had was becoming less so.  Fire superiority and more successful manoeuvres to enable the crossing the fire-swept zone by the Germans (as mentioned by Zuber) seem to be more evident by this time.  Underestimation of the British, confidence in the bulldozing effect of the German army and possible naivety of conscripts may have led to isolated reports of troops being mown down earlier on at mons.  This was then possibly over quoted in the sum of events at mons.

 

DS

[David Filsell]

"Sustaining the mad minute for any period of time simply drains resources."

And, of course its employment demanded good targets.

[Guest]

7 minutes ago, David Filsell said:

"Sustaining the mad minute for any period of time simply drains resources."

And, of course its employment demanded good targets.

 

Indeed. I cant imagine many Germans wanting to loiter, making themselves falling plates. 

 

Does anyone have any examples where the mad minute was fired for more than a minute? 

[dansparky]

Indeed, and mentioned earlier in the thread was withheld until enemy close.  For effect and due to resources.  Looking at Le Cateau the environment made it difficult to bring fire to bear in reply, approaches shielded infantry movements.  The withering fire from Artillery and Mg's would have reduced this capacity even further.  So if they were able to approach cautiously and gained fire superiority without exposing their own positions.  This caution and the length of time devoted to fire superiority prior to advance makes me think that the British had acquitted themselves well prior to le cateau.  Although, in all probability the British performance is over-egged to cover the fact they had to fall back.

[squirrel]

FWIW this is from Till The Trumpet Sounds Again The Scots Guards 1914-1919 In Their Own Words volume 2 Vast Tragedy by Randall Nicol  Helion ISBN 978-1-911096-07-8

 

A contrast to the 15 rounds a minute of 1914..

 

page 201 chapter 22 The Third Battle of Ypres - 2nd battalion

September 1917 

 

On the 16th "A hot airless day, perhaps the hottest of the year" they marched off stopping for two hours for the midday meal and a rest before moving off again in mid afternoon, ahead of two days live firing on the Zudansques ranges. "The battalion musketry was very successful, being the best in the Brigade. In the rapid firing the average number of rounds per minute was only a fraction under 12 and one company averaging over 13 rounds". They then collected their kit...

 

 

 

[dansparky]

Whilst trying to find a reference for How many artillery pieces and how many Machine Guns the Germans possessed at Mons I came across this.

 

the astonishingly rapid accurate fire of our infantry, which made the germans state that we possessed twenty-eight machine guns per battalion rather than two. 

 

P.21  The history of the great war C.R.M.F Cruttwell.

 

This is not referenced so I have no idea where he obtained this claim?  So i guess it can be dismissed but it is interesting all the same.

Edited 22 February , 2017 by dansparky

[593jones]

To go off at a bit of a tangent, I wonder how things would have gone if the Great War had broken out a couple of years later, and in the meantime the British Army had adopted the .276 P14 rifle as a replacement for the SMLE.  Most of the musketry training would have been much the same, but the 'Mad Minute' would have been quite different.  There would have been a slower rate of fire and more frequent reloading owing to smaller magazine capacity.  I wonder if this would have had any appreciable impact in a Mons/Le Cateau type of action.

Edited 22 February , 2017 by 593jones

[Guest]

Some cavalry stats with the SMLE:

 

1908. 14th Hussars:

Marksmen...............................354........59%

First Class shots.....................212........35%

Second Class shots..................35.........6%

Third Class shots.......................0..........0%

Total........................................601

 

1910 "The Musketry statistics of the 14th Hussars are a long way ahead in excellence of any other unit in the 9th Division (India). The Regimental average shows and increase of ten points on last year and is so abnormally high as to be specially remarkable. This is doubtless due to the fact that the Musketry training of the Regiment in all it branches is sound, systematic and consistent, that the Regeiment is equipped with the most modern appliances for instruction and to the zeal and interest exhibited by all ranks." GOC 9th Div Official report

 

13th Hussars....................................1906...........................1909.......

Marksmen.................................78........17%..................271........49%

First Class shots.....................170........37%..................250........45%

Second Class shots................209........45%....................27..........6%

Third Class shots........................4..........1%......................0..........0%

Total.......................................461........100%.................548......100%

 

in 1903 Pte Bertie Seed 3rd Hussars "took first place in all India at 600 yards"

 

1909 A Cavalry Sgt was awarded the Gold Jewel - best marksman in all India. 

 

 

 

[dansparky]

Interesting reading from a piece dated January 1920  from Major General Lord Albert Edward Wilfred Gleichen to Smith-Dorrien.  In ref to Mons and accuracy of the Cheshire's, Germans thinking they had 10-12 machine guns rather than two.  Accuracy supposedly so great they seemed to think the British were trained to shoot their adversaries in the 'balls'.

[Ron Clifton]

8 hours ago, dansparky said:

Accuracy supposedly so great they seemed to think the British were trained to shoot their adversaries in the 'balls'.

They were probably trained to aim for their brains!

 

Ron

[Muerrisch]

Interesting thought. If one believed that the scrotum was indeed the target, perhaps wars would be less likely.

[Derek Black]

10 hours ago, dansparky said:

Interesting reading from a piece dated January 1920  from Major General Lord Albert Edward Wilfred Gleichen to Smith-Dorrien.  In ref to Mons and accuracy of the Cheshire's, Germans thinking they had 10-12 machine guns rather than two.  Accuracy supposedly so great they seemed to think the British were trained to shoot their adversaries in the 'balls'.

Are the "love spuds" about the height for machine gun fire to rake an advance with?

[dansparky]

I thought this might induce a few chuckles.    Again, though it is interesting as it predates the official history.   There are a few references to this and many appear in this thread, whilst there is enough references is take the machine guns at Mons seriously I think it is a touch overplayed.  Maybe the experiences of some but representative of the whole line that's another matter.  Although this may source may be of a second-hand nature (who knows) it is interesting as it comes from a prominent figure.