BEF 1914. Marksmanship, Musketry and the Mad Minute

[stiletto_33853]

1909

[lostinspace]

Seaforth,
 

You're in New York, yes? Most of the chronicles for both Rifle Bde. and King's Royal Rifles are available on the Hathitrust website. I think from around 1902 through 1922, but if I recall correctly one or two of the war issues are missing. You can't download entire books, only individual pages (see the Hathitrust rules for downloading). Hathitrust can only be viewed in North America and from what I've heard proxy servers won't work either. https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/ls?field1=ocr;q1=K.R.R.C. Chronicles;a=srchls;lmt=ft;pn=2 

I'll check and see if Internet Archive might have a year or two that can be downloaded in the UK (later today).

 

Dave

[seaforth78]

Yes indeed I'm right here in NY alright and thanks a lot for the referral to the link. I'm having a look now from post 1907 till 1914. 

 

[dansparky]

Only appears to be brief history and 1904 chronicle on internet archive.  I have searched for regimental histories chronicle 10th batt, will try for others especially rest of 4th division.

[Guest]

Here is a map of the critical action at Nonne Bosschen Wood on 11th Nov 1914. More commonly known as the attack of the Prussian Guard, it is (I think) the single event that the mythology of the rife-fire-mistaken-for-machine-guns is anchored in. It takes some time to tune in. The transparent blocks represent the British Infantry's original line. The black blocks represent the British infantry's final line. Slightly more difficult to discern is the penetration by the Prussian Guard to the North West as far as Westhoek. The furthest point they reached is just SE of Westhoek. The British battery positions can be easily identified, particularly 16th and 17th Bty RFA (XLI Bde RFA) near Westhoek. These are the jolly chaps who were firing "shrapnel: fuze zero" at the Prussians. Shortly afterwards the 2nd Bn OBLI with 5th Field Company RE charged the German line and cleared Nonne Bosschen Wood. it was a rather critical even in the BEF's history.

 

History, largely driven by Stacke has put an inordinate emphasis on the counter-attack by the 2nd Worcesters at Gheluvelt 11 days earlier and barely a mile to the South. The heart-stopping events of Nonne Bosschen were just as important in my view. Critical in all this was Lt Hudson, 1st Bn King's (Liverpool Regt) and its sole surviving Officer doing what British subalterns did best - holding out against all odds. The remnants of his battalion were holding the line running West to East along the southern edge of Polygone Wood, incidentally with his machine guns. The observant will note that this was a perfect position to enfilade the advancing Germans. Somewhere in the fray was the redoubtable Capt Fortune, Black Watch (also a sole survivor of the original Officers) whose trenches were overrun along with the Camerons and Scots Guards. The diaries record Hudson and Fortune meeting at one point.  11th Nov 1914 was not a great day to be a Scottish infantryman as all three battalions broke under unimaginable pressure and ran all the way back to Ypres according to Hudson. Strangely no mention in their histories or the OH and slightly countered by the small annotation on the map of Maj Haig's party, Cameron Highlanders. The action witnessed some important features:; the early use of strong points; reinforced structures that acted as fixed points around which the counter attacks could lever. Built by the sappers. Not original but also heavily used by the Germans in their rather more complex defences of 1915. Also the early use of experimental HE by the RFA. The observant will notice a position annotated as "dismounted parties commanded by Lt Williamson AVC". Who would have thought the AVC as part of the last line of defence. 

 

On core topic: every battalion present had two machine guns and still had them days later with the exception of the Scots Guards. The Prussian Guard was hammered by rifle fire, machine gun fire, HE, sharpnel fuze zero and the bayonet wielded by an array of heroes (a word I use sparingly). I would like to think that someone in the RAVC (or whatever it is called now ) will raise a glass to Lt Williamson and his band of brothers on the 11th November. The RFA left some rather detailed accounts of the day's events as did a number of infantry participants.  Interestingly some alluded to the barrels of their SMLEs becoming too hot to hold despite some defective ammunition that jammed the rifles - something worth exploring. The RFA batteries fired over 600 rounds each - an astonishing figure for the time - mostly shrapnel but some early 18-pdr HE too. 

 

I have no idea why the 2nd Bn OBLI did not go down in history in the same way as the 2nd Bn Worcesters. . Critically it involved two sets of conflicting orders, leaving the CO of the OBLI to make a rather critical decision. I will post their account later as it might help us understand what the Germans were facing. Importantly the German accounts survive. More of this later. What is clear is that this was a fairly mobile operation  flanked on both sides by entrenched British battalions in perfect positions to enfilade the Prussians. 

 

For anyone wanting to look at the map in finer detail it is page 210 of the 16th Bty RFA war diary (WO 95/1326) which also contains some interesting first hand accounts. Any mistakes are mine. 

 

MG

[TwoEssGee]

I think it's worth pointing out just how weak in terms of manpower that 1st (Guards) Brigade were by this point on the 11th, due to their heavy losses in the previous days and weeks. On the eve of the attack of the Prussian Guards the Brigade had around 800 men to hold 1000 yards of front line The Cameron Highlanders had the most, then The Black Watch. The 1st Bn Scots Guards had one officer (Capt. Reggie Stracey) with no more than 165 men. At roll call on the 12th, they had one officer and 69 men and only a very few stragglers turned up later in the day.

[Derek Black]

CWGC records 212 men of the 1st Btn Scots Guards died between 11th and 12th of November 1914 in Belgium.
The 1st Black Watch was a quarter of that at 51.

The 1st Camerons was 137.

 

Even without the numbers of PoW and wounded those are huge losses.

[TwoEssGee]

There had been no roll called in 1SG for several days Derek. A lot of those listed as killed on 11 November had actually been killed between 31 October (the date of the last roll call) and 12 November. There were so few men left that no one could be sure of exact details.

[Guest]

8 hours ago, TwoEssGee said:

I think it's worth pointing out just how weak in terms of manpower that 1st (Guards) Brigade were by this point on the 11th, due to their heavy losses in the previous days and weeks. On the eve of the attack of the Prussian Guards the Brigade had around 800 men to hold 1000 yards of front line The Cameron Highlanders had the most, then The Black Watch. The 1st Bn Scots Guards had one officer (Capt. Reggie Stracey) with no more than 165 men. At roll call on the 12th, they had one officer and 69 men and only a very few stragglers turned up later in the day.

 

It is also worth pointing out that the 1st Bn Scots Guards received two small drafts by way of the 4th and 5th Reinforcements of 50 and 60 Other Ranks led by Sgt Howson and Lt B W Smith on the 6th and 7th Nov 1914; this makes the small number of surviving men even more remarkable. This Battalion had effectively been annihilated. During its time at Ypres the battalion diary recorded:

 

15th Nov 1914. Snow and rain.  The whole place a sea of mud.  Total casualties in the YPRES district:

Killed:          Officers 9, Other Ranks 105
Wounded:   Officers 7, Other Ranks 151 
Missing:      Officers 5, Other Ranks 430

 

[Total:           Officers 21, other ranks 686]

[David Filsell]

The drafts comprised reservists I assume.

Edited 3 November , 2016 by David Filsell

[Guest]

43 minutes ago, David Filsell said:

The drafts comprised reservists I assume.

 Short version: Quite probably

 

Long version:  Quite probably, particularly with any Guards battalion. Foot Guards peace establishment in 1914 was about 400 short of War Establishment. The Foot Guards also enlisted men for "3 and 9" throughout 1902-1914. This is a major structural difference from the Line Infantry who were enlisting "7 and 5" from 1905 which produced rather different levels of serving men and reservists. On the positive side, the Foot Guards were largely up to Peace Establishment, so there were conflicting dynamics. 

 

Some of the drafts may well have included recovered wounded. Very few diarists recorded the split between new arrivals and those who were returning having recovered from wounds or sickness. Many diarists failed to record every draft. 

 

The easiest way to resolve this is to cross check against the medal rolls. The challenge is that the disembarking troops would typically go to the base where other troops were (some recovered wounded ect). The subsequent drafts received by the battalions therefore do not always exactly match the disembarkation data. If we take the data for all disembarkations and try and resolve against all know drafts received we usually get a decent picture. I can only think of two or three battalions in the whole of the BEF whose diaries retain the recorded the names and Army numbers of the drafts received in 1914 (Kings Liverpool, Northumberland Fus and one other that elludes me at present- so something in the order of 3% of all battalions. Occasionally drafts were diverted to other battalions.

 

The other challenge with the 1914 Star rolls is that they do not capture every man on the regimental roll. If a man had subsequently been transferred to another regiment by the time the rolls were collated he will not be on his original regimental roll. I have recently completed the 2nd Bn Suffolk Regt roll and the 1914 Star only captures 850 men with the 'correct' disembarkation date of 15th Aug 1914. We know the battalion disembarked with over 1,000 ORs, so 150 are floating elsewhere on the rolls of the Labour Corps, ASC, Garrison Battalions etc (they were almost all medically downgraded but continued to serve). 

 

As a rough estimate I would say there is an 90% chance that the men in any large draft were Reservists rather than recovering wounded returning. The number of recovering wounded that returned to the front line is not properly understood. Medstats figures are often misinterpreted as they simply state that 59% 'returned to duty'. This does not necessarily mean into the front line. Where we have reliable data the per cent of hospitalised wounded and sick returning to front-line duty within the period of the 1914 Star is extremely low; less than 10%. There is another thread that covers this minute detail. 

 

MG

Edited 3 November , 2016 by Guest

[Guest]

I have just purchased five Rifle Brigade Chronicles which contain the Musketry data for the four Regular Battalions in fine detail. Stilletto has very kindly filled the gaps, so we should have a complete picture of four battalion's worth of data from 1905-1913 - some 45 datapoints. From what I have seen so far the usual trends play out: a steady increase in musketry scores ending in a high standard. The average score of the regular battalion in 1912 and 1913 was a Figure of Merit of 120. The highest Battalion score being 122. This is in the same order of magnitude as the SHerwood Forester's data.  

 

The proportion of Marksmen and 1st Class shots is exceptionally high, averaging at 30%. The Rifle Brigade might be an out-lier in the British Army data, but it will at least provide a benchmark for what could be achieved.

 

Interestingly, and perhaps of greater importance is the percent of shots on target during the field firing. It averaged around 30% and is some indication of the differential between static target shooting and fire and manoeuvre. 

 

I will post the tables when I have collated all the info. 

 

MG

 

Thanks to Stilletto for his kindness. 

Edited 3 November , 2016 by Guest
typo

[Muerrisch]

Martin, the RB data will be pounced on, thank you in advance.

 

There is always a "but" ...............

 

But I seem to recall that we never satisfied ourselves [or I never satisfied me] of the definition of a Figure of Merit. If we did, I can neither remember nor find it.

 

One other thing. You were considering the possibility of a draft at an IBD in France being directed to another regiment. Of course this happened distressingly frquently later in the war, but I know of no instances during the 1914 star period. Do you? Does anyone? It would fly in the face of how the infantry regimental system saw itself.

 

My oft quoted example of unkind posting was a bugler of 15th N & D Bantams ending up in a kilted regiment. This would be no earlier than 1916. Neither party was at all happy, but he had the last laugh by rising to CSM.

[ss002d6252]

7 minutes ago, Muerrisch said:

One other thing. You were considering the possibility of a draft at an IBD in France being directed to another regiment. Of course this happened distressingly frquently later in the war, but I know of no instances during the 1914 star period. Do you? Does anyone? It would fly in the face of how the infantry regimental system saw itself.

 

My oft quoted example of unkind posting was a bugler of 15th N & D Bantams ending up in a kilted regiment. This would be no earlier than 1916. Neither party was at all happy, but he had the last laugh by rising to CSM.

I read it as Martin meaning that the drafts who arrived in France were often changed at the IBD by virtue of men being taken out of the draft and others, recovered sick & injured, being substituted before the draft was sent on to the battalion (rather than drafts being sent to different battalions).

 

Craig

[Guest]

39 minutes ago, Muerrisch said:

Martin, the RB data will be pounced on, thank you in advance. Tomorrow I hope.

 

There is always a "but" ...............Indeed

 

But I seem to recall that we never satisfied ourselves [or I never satisfied me] of the definition of a Figure of Merit. If we did, I can neither remember nor find it. Personally I feel is does not matter. As long as the methodology is consistent we are comparing like with like. I think Figure of Merit is either a simple average or weighted average, and nothing more complex.

 

One other thing. You were considering the possibility of a draft at an IBD in France being directed to another regiment. Of course this happened distressingly frquently later in the war, but I know of no instances during the 1914 star period. Do you? Does anyone? It would fly in the face of how the infantry regimental system saw itself. Edit. It was about drafts battlions, not regiment, i.e. in v drafts out via IDB (see Craig's comment below)

 

Separately Yes. Two examples in 1914. One Scottish Regiment's draft diverted to another (Seaforths to Camerons if memory serves  - but I will revert). Not permanent but they plugged a gap. The other was the draft for the 2nd Bn Black Watch being diverted to the 1st Bn after Ypres. Not a different regiment but at least illustrates that fact that men were sent to where they were needed. Also in Sep 1914 massive drafts of Kitchener recruits divered from Northern surpluses of the KOYLI, Y&L etc to the southern Irish K1 battalions. Over 2,000. 

 

My oft quoted example of unkind posting was a bugler of 15th N & D Bantams ending up in a kilted regiment. This would be no earlier than 1916. Neither party was at all happy, but he had the last laugh by rising to CSM.

 

In blue. MG

Edited 3 November , 2016 by Guest

[Guest]

18 minutes ago, ss002d6252 said:

I read it as Martin meaning that the drafts who arrived in France were often changed at the IBD by virtue of men being taken out of the draft and others, recovered sick & injured, being substituted before the draft was sent on to the battalion (rather than drafts being sent to different battalions).

 

Craig

 Yes. This is correct. ...something that Grumpy pointed out to me some years back. The IBD was essentially a shock absorber the took drafts in and sent drafts out. Those coming in (in name and number) did not always match those going out. 

 

I know Grumpy knows this. My error for not being clear. MG

[Muerrisch]

Thank you both.

 

Drafts "intended for the nth battalion of the Blankshires" [and under a nth battalion officer], did indeed end up, en masse, in the Mth battalion of the Blankshires.

 

I discovered this when doing early work on RWF [of course]. The informal log/diary of  the 3rd [Reserve] battalion at the Depot  stated to which battalion a draft was going ..... they were seen off by the Depot Commander with "May God go with you. I will go with you as far as the station". 

There is a spectacular example of redirection of a draft of "2nd RWF men" from the IBD in response to the 1st RWFs disastrous losses at First Ypres.

[Guest]

First Ypres changed the BEF's mindset. It is a fault line in British attitudes. The almost complete destruction of many battalions put such extraordinary pressure on the reinforcement chain; drafts in excess of 300 were required by many and still battalions were at half War Establishment. There are accounts of Battalions not being able to form C and D Companies until early 1915. 

 

3rd Dec 1914 the 2nd Bn Welsh Regt received a draft of 500 men in a single day.  The Regiment's reserve battalion ran out of trained men in March 1915. MG

[dansparky]

Mg Fantastic work.  Also Rifle brigade chronicles 1901, 1904, 1905 are available on the internet archieve. 

[Guest]

Rifle Brigade -  Annual Musketry Test Scores (Battalion Figure of Merit) 1905-1913. The Rifle Brigade Chronicle recorded the Annual Musketry results in exceptionally fine detail. The results are laid out in tabular form below showing left to right. 

 

 

Table 1: Battalion Figure of Merit. Please note that the scoring system prior to 1909 was double that of the revised musketry test introduced that year. The different systems are colour-coded on Table 1. Some battalions were still using the old test in 1909. When calculating the Regimental averages I have simply halved the scores from this period and averaged them (Adj Ave). Also note that the data is missing for the 2nd Bn in 1910, 1912 and 1913 - the Chronicle shows no returns. 

Table 2. Breakdown of the absolute number by Classification: Marksmen, 1st Class, 2nd Class and 3rd Class shots, and total numbers scored. Please note in 1910, 1912 and 1913 when the 2nd Bn scores were not recorded, there is a dip in the absolute numbers, so we are not comparing like with like from year to year.

Table 3. Per cent breakdown of the overall number of Marksmen, 1st Class, 2nd Class and 3rd Class. This allows us to  compare across years. 

 

If we focus on the average score each year (circled in red) we can see a steady improvement. It is also worth noting the large variations between years in the proportion of Marksmen, 1st Class shots etc. The fault lines are 1905 and 1909. In each of these years the Annual Musketry Test changed. In addition the introduction of the SMLE in the earlier years was not uniform. It is very clear from the data that the battalions took time to adjust to the new rifle and the new test.

 

The average number of men tested each year was 2,700. The omission of the 2nd Battalion data in later years is unfortunate, however the data still has consistency and integrity. Not shown is the Battalion breakdown by Classification and % splits, which I will post later. The Battalion data shows large differentials between overseas and home based battalions which warrants some analysis. I suspect it simply reflects the Overseas battalions carrying lots of young soldiers on their first overseas tours. It will be possible to get the 1911 Census data and compare the ages of the men in each battalion to make a comparison. This should enable us to approximate the services of the individuals and see if there is any correlation between young solders and lower scores. 

One very striking aspect of the nitty-gritty data in the Chronicles (there are dozens of pages in each) reveals the high number of NCOs as Battalion and Company Best Shots. When we look at the Riflemen who were Best Shots they are invariably men with long service. This might indicate that marksmanship was something that took time to learn; the potential implications being that young men with little training (such as the Special reserve in 1914) might not be particularly good marksmen or musketeers. Speculation that needs some stress-testing.  My early conclusions:

 

1. We have tangible evidence that Musketry and Marksmanship improved steadily from 1905-1913.

2. The introduction of the SMLE and new Tests disrupted the smooth progress. Invariably it took 2 years to fully adjust.

3. There is a strong positive correlation between length of service and standards of musketry and marksmanship

4. Riflemen found it most difficult to adjust to the 1909 Test. Note the collapse in the % of Marksmen in 1910 (Table 3). This may simply reflect the fact that the Test was more difficult. 

5. Battalion Figure of Merit scores varied little in 1913 suggesting uniform and widespread improvement in musketry. 

6. The data is statistically meaningful and has integrity. Sample size is the aggregated scores of 2,700 Riflemen tested each year (on average) across nine years. 24,293 Riflemen's individual musketry tests underpin the stats. 

 

Many thanks to Stilletto for providing some of the missing data. Indebted to you. Any mistakes are mine. MG

Edited 4 November , 2016 by Guest

[dansparky]

This data is fantastic, it shows that musketry proficiency increased steadily after the Boer war.  We have all read about rapidly, records, larger amounts of ammo made available compared to the continent (more practice), fire and movement tactics and so on.  But rather than just mere anecdotes and the like, this data clearly demonstrates that standards improved. Fluctuations and effect of reservists etc aside, this does seem to illustrate the increasing effectiveness of Brtish Marksmanship. 

Fantastic work Martin :-), how did you come by the Rifle Brigade Chronicles?  I searched, no luck :-(

[Guest]

1 hour ago, dansparky said:

This data is fantastic, it shows that musketry proficiency increased steadily after the Boer war.  We have all read about rapidly, records, larger amounts of ammo made available compared to the continent (more practice), fire and movement tactics and so on.  But rather than just mere anecdotes and the like, this data clearly demonstrates that standards improved. Fluctuations and effect of reservists etc aside, this does seem to illustrate the increasing effectiveness of Brtish Marksmanship. 

Fantastic work Martin :-), how did you come by the Rifle Brigade Chronicles?  I searched, no luck :-(

 

Dan

 

I will now be Devil's Advocate: The data may simply show the ability to pass a musketry test and nothing more. The assumption that this equates to improving musketry skills might be challenged. The Riflemen may simply have been better at passing the Test having over time learned some tricks or learned about the Test's characteristics. One might argue that the 'Test' is simply a proxy for musketry skills. ...if that makes sense. It is a correlation and correlations are not proofs of causality. Not when I studied maths at least. 

 

So I am thinking of ways to either prove or disprove that improving musketry scores actually mean improving musketry skills. One example of something that is troubling me: Some of the test results show per cent of hits in the Field firing tests. It is jaw dropping. Before you read any further, guess what it might be... I will post the number for the worst battalion in 1913 at the very end of the post. There is lots more research to do.. None of this is conclusive and of course then there is the rather large gap between the ranges and facing the Prussian Guard with rather large amounts of 'incoming'. 

 

Rifle Brigade Chronicles: Abe Books. One dealer who I called and we did a deal. Five volumes. Arrived this morning by express post. Looking to fill the gaps. The gaps i the data were filled by Stilleto as already mentioned. 

 

 

MG

13.2%

 

[dansparky]

Martin,

You are completely right about that, that thought crossed my mind, but i figured you can make the similar arguments with regard to combat or transition from training to combat.  But at least this gives us statistical information by which we can build conclusions.  Something we are unable to do reliably for combat effectiveness.  I also figured that a soldier may become more efficient generally by repetition and more effective the more he becomes accustomed to his task.

 

Is that 13.2%?  

 

You must have got a good deal on them, i saw a collection approaching £1,000, admittedly this contained more volumes, but that was out of my spending ability.

[Guest]

11 minutes ago, dansparky said:

Martin,

You are completely right about that, that thought crossed my mind, but i figured you can make the similar arguments with regard to combat or transition from training to combat.  But at least this gives us statistical information by which we can build conclusions.  Something we are unable to do reliably for combat effectiveness.  I also figured that a soldier may become more efficient generally by repetition and more effective the more he becomes accustomed to his task.

 

Is that 13.2%?  

 

You must have got a good deal on them, i saw a collection approaching £1,000, admittedly this contained more volumes, but that was out of my spending ability.

 

I ran lots of ranges in my day and put many hundreds through CQBR in rather exotic parts of the world all at the taxpayers expense. Thankfully no-one thought it necessary to shoot back. My limited experience leads me to believe that good shots on the range and in particular good shots in snap shooting translated well into CQBR. It is simply a qualitative conclusion rather than quantitative as I don't have access to the data. It is something that is axiomatic in my view. It would be interesting to speak to the School of Infantry and the Small Arms School Corps (or whatever the Skill at Ease Springs is now called) to get some modern professional views on the transition from static to mobile shooting and its application in the many small wars that the British Army has been fighting recently. It almost feels neo-Victorian. Fourth Afghan War appears to have lasted longer than the Great War. I doubt that T Atkins (1914) is that much different to T Atkins (2016) with his hand to eye coordination. 

 

Yes 13.2%. An astonishingly low figure from a battalion with 31% Marksmen and 52% 1st Class shots. I have no idea what the implications are for Marksmanship v Musketry but it is a figure that absolutely demands investigation in my view.  MG

[ss002d6252]

 

Quote

Yes 13.2%. An astonishingly low figure from a battalion with 31% Marksmen and 52% 1st Class shots. I have no idea what the implications are for Marksmanship v Musketry but it is a figure that absolutely demands investigation in my view.  MG

Is there such a drop off in the other battalions ?

 

If this drop off is typical of a battalion firing at moving targets then instinct would say it would drop off steeply again once you were a ) shooting at another human and b ) on the receiving end what ever is being flung your way.

 

Craig

Edited 4 November , 2016 by ss002d6252