BEF 1914. Marksmanship, Musketry and the Mad Minute

[seaforth78]

On April 19, 2016 at 13:22, QGE said:

A snippet from the 7th Div Routine Orders. One of the few pieces of hard evidence i have seen of Germans complimenting the British on their musketry.

Martin, 

I'm all for first hand sources; were you ever able to discover the original German accounts of these officer's statements? I'm quite curious if they were ever talked about. 

Edited 22 October , 2016 by seaforth78

[dansparky]

I am going through my archive material as we speak , as writing up about musketry.  Will re-explore what i found.  Where did you obtain this source Martin do you have a ref? 

[Guest]

A general observation: If one wanted to construct an argument that British musketry was 'superior' it would be possible to carefully select the supporting anecdotal evidence and discard the counter-evidence. Similarly if one wanted to construct the opposite argument the same could be done. My sense is that the British OH was doing the former and this confirmation bias has infected most subsequent histories. It is simply a view and one that is difficult to 'prove'.

 

There are first hand accounts written by British officers who had a low opinion of the BEF during the retreat. These observers were sometimes disgusted with the behaviour of the BEF, often pointing the finger at 'other' battalions and not necessarily their own. Occasionally they were critical of their own battalions. Shooting high was a common problem. It doesn't matter how many rounds per minute are being fired if they are shooting high. It is important to recognise that British musketry, including the mad minute relied on aimed shots .'Shooting high' was observed at Mons, Le Cateau and throughout the retreat, yet the OH carefully deselects this counter-evidence from eyewitnesses because it doesn't support its pre-conceived bias. 

 

Criticism of the standard of training of the Reservists was quite common, particularly with reinforcement drafts in October. They formed at least 60% of the first cohort (infantry) and significantly higher proportions of subsequent reinforcements (until they ran out of Reservists).The criticism started in early August. Some Commanding Officers actually sent Reservists back to the Reserve Battalions and asked for them to be replaced with men who had left the colours more recently. It is pretty clear that the standard of training and fitness varied considerably within  the battalions. The Black Watch had every trained man in France by mid October, meaning from this point onward any subsequent reinforcements would have been poorly trained. The age and fitness of Reservists also came under sharp criticism as re-enlisted men and hastily trained raw recruits increasingly formed parts of reinforcement drafts from early November. Some of the men who fought First Ypres had never worn a uniform before Aug 1914 and some had Boer war medals. Between these extremes the training and skills of the BEF varied.. There are dozens of accounts in the war diaries extending right through 1914 and 1915 that do not always show the BEF in a positive light.  One also need to recognise that the casualty rates were simply appalling. 90% of the original cohorts and similar proportions of the reinforcements became casualties. It is an undeniable fact that the British Army was losing men faster than it could replace them right through to mid 1915. It is a fair assumption that the best trained men went out first and as time passed the quality of the men generally declined in terms of fitness, experience and training. Five regiments ran out of trained men. Most had less than 100 trained men in the reserves in March 1915. Against these facts it is difficult to see how the British Army could sustain its perceived prowess in musketry. I think it is a myth. 

 

Added to this was the significantly lower levels of training within the TF (20 odd battalions in theatre by end 1914) with long Lee Enfields and incompatible ammunition. The London Jocks experience at Messines and their subsequent destruction provides a glimpse of this.

 

The criticism of the New Army at Loos is something worth considering. A full year after war started, suggesting that the standards of training were still falling short of the unravelling new reality of industrialised warfare. It triggered a complete reorganisation of some Divisions with regulars seeding the New Army formations in order to provide some stiffening. Ditto the New Armies at Gallipoli, wasted away in a matter of weeks. Similarly the standard of training of the TF at Gallipoli was heavily criticised and considered as not being troups d'assault. It is difficult to find any reference to the mad minute or superior musketry on the Western Front in 1915 or Gallipoli. In fact at Gallipoli we often see the opposite; the British having a higher regard for the Turks' marksmanship and musketry skills. 

 

This of course does not mean that the BEF or MEF were all bad. It simply illustrates that the necessary balance is missing from the British OH, a publication that has a very large influence on popular perceptions of the BEF. When I look at my small library of books on the BEF in 1914 and 1915 very few make any negative comments. They tend to read as eulogies and perpetuate the misinformation in OH. 

 

The central challenge with this debate is that it begins to question popular hero-romantic conceptions of the BEF.  

 

MG

Edited 23 October , 2016 by Guest

[David Filsell]

I think we need to be very careful before accepting the effect of British rifle fire was vastly overpraised. We are not simply talking "marksmanship" as the British Army well knew. It was sustained fire against the mass - invariably II suspect for relatively short periods until the mass was disrupted. 

Not least there are German accounts of its effect and their surprise at its effect.

The initial effect of British rifle could be massive on an attacking force as events at Ypres shows. It was simply the quantity of rounds that were fired - 10 -15 or whatever. The sustained effect was high, the  length of sustainability another. However, four minutes rapid by or so 600 men (say) for 4 minutes equals 36,000 rounds - at ten rounds a minute 2,400 at what say a company? Two? Three? two or three. That's a lot of lead. Shortage of ready ammunition is another fact - although there are few quoted cases off it at Ypres. 

The loss of 'practised' shots after 1914 is a frequent point in accounts

Before the war in an a attempt was made to compare the effect of marksmen taking skilled shots against 'normal' shots in the ranks. 'Browning the mass' proved more effective and influenced training..

As I say I think we need to be careful that what has been called exaggeration for effect is rather more carefully weighed in the balance.

 

DanS - "ah that's a point i think i have heard that somewhere, anywhere i can nab a free glance from?"

Its here - somewhere - I'll try to dig it out from the files.

David

[dansparky]

Agreed and that's why will be continuing to debate this for some time to come.  Ascoli and terraine relied heavily  on the OH as the principal source.  Most papers were still classified and by the the German archives were damaged.   There was, of course, exxeptionsuch as Liddel-Hart but many felt he was over acerbic towards the British Army because of hid own experiences.   Most counter-narratives are very recent  - Zuber, gilbert, Hastings and to a lesser extent Samuels and Gardner in terms of the operational side.

[Guest]

3 hours ago, dansparky said:

Agreed and that's why will be continuing to debate this for some time to come.  Ascoli and terraine relied heavily  on the OH as the principal source.  Most papers were still classified and by the the German archives were damaged.   There was, of course, exxeptionsuch as Liddel-Hart but many felt he was over acerbic towards the British Army because of hid own experiences.   Most counter-narratives are very recent  - Zuber, gilbert, Hastings and to a lesser extent Samuels and Gardner in terms of the operational side.

 

You may wish to add Kate Caffrey (1980) to your list and a host of other modern authors. Bird, Jones, Hutton etc. Caffrey for example tells us the BEF's Old Contemptibles numbered 125,000. That there were 365,622  awards of the 1914 Stars might suggest Caffrey's figure is way short, or she is confusing Old Contemptibles with the first cohorts. It is this type of error that starts the ball rolling. 

 

It would be interesting to trawl the list of publications that focus on 1914-15 and see how many regurgitate the BOH without any considered analysis of its accuracy. I can only think of Zuber, Jack Sheldon and Gardner although I am sure there are more. Despite the recent Revisionist school of thought, the traditional view is a remarkably resistant strain of mythology.  MG

 

 

Edited 23 October , 2016 by Guest

[dansparky]

Adrian Gilbert The challenge of Battle  draws on Zuber quite a bit, Max Hastings is critical of the BEF in catastrophe.  Martin Samuels writes about the two contradictory command system's restrictive control and umpiring.  Gardner builds on Samuels and states that the competence of British Soldiers was undermined by the shortcomings of their officers.  The BEF made decisions based on pre-existing beliefs and that the intellectual predominance Henry Wilson created a vacuum of ideas.  What does Sheldon say and in which book?

 

 

Edited 23 October , 2016 by dansparky

[dansparky]

That would be great David, although it comes later i could quote that :-)

[dansparky]

On 06/12/2014 at 17:35, ss002d6252 said:

A good shot may crack under the pressure of combat and be unable to hit his man however this is clearly too subjective to be quantifiable. The idea of looking at musketry training and abilities pre-war is the only way I can think of to get a base line of ability.

There is an article on the 'new' 1909 German Regs here - http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03071841009436403?journalCode=rusi19#.VIM9jWeMvh4 - if anyone can get access to the journal.

Craig

 

 

Is this the bit you were trying to access or is there more?

Edited 23 October , 2016 by dansparky

[dansparky]

As I re-read the opening pages of this thread I am wondering if anybody has read writing the great war by Andrew Green?   In it, he responds to criticisms of the OH that appear in the Mons Myth.

1. The problem as already mentioned is that subsequent histories relied heavily on the OH as many documents else was available for 50 years.

2. I know no one has explicitly said he had an agenda..  just adding that Green says that he tried to produce as truthful account as he could.  Also, I wonder where Fortescue fits into all this?

3. due to public consumption of the OH he maybe could not be as frank as he wanted.

4 related to 3 - accounts were written to reflect what commands understood at the time and not judge them with hindsight, however, criticisms are there but not explicit.  "The truth would be evident to those that could read between the lines. “

 

---

Green, Andrew, Writing the Great War.p.53.

5. there has been written arguments that Edmonds cherry-picked accounts to match his narrative.  This may well be true but as Zuber tells us... At the time there were very few German sources available.  So his capacity to cherry pick is limited.

 

 

6. where french and  German accounts were available, Edmonds fastidiously compared them with British Sources. 

7. collating documentation on the great retreat had problematic due to several factors, gaps in accounts due to the nature of the retreat, uncompleted diaries, recollections of participants had to supplement this (with the problems this entails).

 

I know this was a while back so apologies i was not aware of the site at the time so just wanted to share this.

 

 

 

[Guest]

Andrew Green's book was based on his PhD and is complusory reading for anyone wanting to understand the integrity of the BOH. The Gallipoli chapters are quite telling as Aspinall Oglander and Edmonds were in fierce disagreement and Edmonds did force some change driven by the need to appease the Australians. ...the point is that Edmonds was quite able and willing to massage the truth if required. This should be no real surprise in an Official History. Despite these known weaknesses, most authors and academics still have a high regard for the BOH and it would be difficult to imagine how someone could attempt to write a (British) Great War operational history without using it as a foundations stone. The challenge is to establish if the truth has been subordinated to preserving reputations. This becomes more complex when Official Historians are relying on other Official Historians' work. 

 

The work on the BOH 1914 relating to the German accounts was I think done by Capt Wynne KOYLI. He was taken POW at Le Cateau and languished in Germany for 4 years. He was by the end a fluent German speaker and joined the Historical Section. His analysis and translation of Ypres 1914 (an official German publication full of hyperbole) makes some heavy criticism of the German account. It is this book that is the source for distorted views about Germans mistaking rapid fire for machine gun fire. 

 

Jack Sheldon and Zuber separately addressed this some years ago. The thread is many years behind them on this aspect. I think Jack may have commented on this thread (or another one?). He makes the point that the translation is not particularly accurate and the interpretation is wrong if memory serves. MG

[dansparky]

I read some parts of the introduction last night, it certainly puts more question marks into one's head.  Zuber simply says it does not appear in german sources and ammo would only last 10-15 mins.  I have just had a thought (oh dear) if I remember rightly  the Germans had noT expected the BEF where they encountered them, neither side was particularly sure what it was up against.   I can't remember at the moment where they thought we were, but they had not realised in front of them was the entire BEF that had landed.  I wonder with this in mind and with an uncertain amount of foes behind hedges they were surprised to encounter this level of fire and thus attributed it to MG fire.  This may be slightly fanciful but it had me wondering.  I think it was used partly as an excuse and to paint a picture of the level of fire encountered.  Not necessarily that they were actually MG'S.

 

I definitely think there may have been some tinkering in the OH, deliberately or unwittingly but it is hard to be sure. 

 

At some point, i will read Andrew Greens bok further, but for now, the later events were not part of my scope so i did not manage to read that far.  Hopefully, I will get to read those sections.  Jack had been mentioned I was largely unfamiliar about what he had written up till then.

 

On another note, i have come across a reason for the suggestion that the  SMLE  be loaded with 5 rounds as opposed to ten was to save wear on the spring and to limit jamming.  I don't know how correct this is?

Edited 24 October , 2016 by dansparky
MISSED SOMETHING

[Gunner Bailey]

Hands up all those who have made comments above who have actually fired an SMLE ?

 

 

 

16 minutes ago, dansparky said:

On another note, i have come across a reason for the suggestion that the  SMLE  be loaded with 5 rounds as opposed to ten was to save wear on the spring and to limit jamming.  I don't know how correct this is?

 

Pretty much WW2 training practice only.

Edited 24 October , 2016 by Gunner Bailey
spacing.

[dansparky]

What is the relevance? I said I came across a reason, ( which was from a source that had fired one). I never said that it was bible, hence I said I do not know how correct it was.  I was exploring reasons as to why SMLE was loaded with 5 rounds one of which int the breach, as opposed to a ten bullet at fire practice.  Unfortunately, I have never fired anything nor am I likely to anytime soon, hopefully, one day :-).  

 

Interestingly this guy states that it is also because at capacity the springs may not lift the rounds effectively. 

 

Edited 24 October , 2016 by dansparky

[Guest]

57 minutes ago, dansparky said:

On another note, i have come across a reason for the suggestion that the  SMLE  be loaded with 5 rounds as opposed to ten was to save wear on the spring and to limit jamming.  I don't know how correct this is?

 

The 'mad minute' part of the annual musketry test stipulated that the magazine would hold only five rounds at the start. I believe the reason was to test the ability to reload/recharge during rapid fire at least twice  i.e. doubling the exercise of reloading compared to starting with 10 rounds in the magazine. 

 

This may have created some mythology that the magazine did not function as efficiently with 10 rounds rather than five. There would seem little point in designing a magazine to hold 10 rounds if it didn't work. Given the rifle was in use for many decades and the design of the magazine hardly changed, might suggest there were no limitations.  

Edited 24 October , 2016 by Guest

[dansparky]

Thanks, MG that makes sense, so like I think you said in an early post had they started with 10 the could have increased rate of fire even more.  Although noted, in peace time under training conditions.

[David Filsell]

"A general observation: If one wanted to construct an argument that British musketry was 'superior' it would be possible to carefully select the supporting anecdotal evidence and discard the counter-evidence. Similarly if one wanted to construct the opposite argument the same could be done. My sense is that the British OH was doing the former and this confirmation bias has infected most subsequent histories. It is simply a view and one that is difficult to 'prove'."

 

How true, although you use anecdotal evidence in one para and officers accounts in another regarding misbehaviour during the retreat - anecdote/written evidence is a fine differrence

Shooting high - ever a problem. Percentage? Undefinable. Even if  my rough calculation of round fired is unacceptable the weight of fire laid down by British infantry was high enough to do great damage. 

 

There's no dispute that the musketry pudding may have, probably was, over egged and clearly over repeated with out attempting to verify it (see below) it but it does seem to have been superior to that of the enemy.

 

I think we are heading into acceptance of a negative when there is clear doubt about fact since the relative effectiveness of British musketry in 1914 is more than mere anecdote. Equally, whilst I accept the inevitable inbuilt  bias often apparent in thinking and writing on almost everything - it must be said  records prove the efforts which Edmonds made in seeking to get things right - letter after letter of comment in the NRA files from participants show the efforts afforded to the task. And as his biography underline he was not a man who was simply prepared to toe the official line on much  at all.

 

There can be no doubt - despite the fact that not every burst of fire was 15 rounds rapid - and that some rounds were high - that British rifle fire proved highly effective. That is not simply anecdote it is strongly evidenced by British and German accounts personal and official and my point about German reportage of it has been made and apparently ignored.

 

Equally "who said what" in their works on 1914 is actually often quite irrelevant in the light of modern research. As has been pointed out JT was not working from war diaries but from published accounts as was the work of many who followed.  There's no way that the weight of 'anecdotal' evidence - and it is weighty - as it is for BEF misbehaviour -  can or should be simply brushed aside without firm evidence rather than personal belief frequently being displayed on this thread. The fact is that the effectiveness of British musketry at Mons, on the retreat and at Ypres is indisputable.

 

I'm not, and never have been,  pushing the "important thing apart" angle, merely expressing the view that I think the target is being moved and, at the moment, some of shooting on this thread seems a little high, and in search of  negatives.

 

Edited 25 October , 2016 by David Filsell

[seaforth78]

On October 22, 2016 at 19:22, seaforth78 said:

Martin, 

I'm all for first hand sources; were you ever able to discover the original German accounts of these officer's statements? I'm quite curious if they were ever talked about. 

 

Martin, I know you got quite caught up with answering others but I didn't want you forget my question which had excited my  curiousity for a while. I don't know if you are conversant with German but have you ever had a lookin on the German side? 

[Guest]

4 minutes ago, seaforth78 said:

 

Martin, I know you got quite caught up with answering others but I didn't want you forget my question which had excited my  curiousity for a while. I don't know if you are conversant with German but have you ever had a lookin on the German side? 

 

Apologies.

No. I haven't even tried to pursue this. I am sure it is interesting  but the paper trail is rather too thin to follow..... and yes I can read German but there are not enough hours in the day.. MG

[David Filsell]

Amused by the uniform of the shooter - Brodie and mint 1914 style ammunition pouches!

[seaforth78]

37 minutes ago, QGE said:

 

Apologies.

No. I haven't even tried to pursue this. I am sure it is interesting  but the paper trail is rather too thin to follow..... and yes I can read German but there are not enough hours in the day.. MG

No worries. I and others marvel how many hours you manage to add to the 24 hour clock given your output. ✨

[Guest]

3 minutes ago, seaforth78 said:

No worries. I and others marvel how many hours you manage to add to the 24 hour clock given your output. ✨

 

I see you have acquired another sword recently. ..ditto. 

[seaforth78]

3 hours ago, QGE said:

 

I see you have acquired another sword recently. ..ditto. 

Yes and thanks to your help on Darley-Waddilove you were able to bring that sword to life. ?

Edited 26 October , 2016 by seaforth78

[Guest]

5 minutes ago, seaforth78 said:

Yes and thanks to your help on Darley-Waddilove you were to bring that sword to life. ?

 

Darley-Waddilove-ly.

[Gunner Bailey]

On 24/10/2016 at 20:21, dansparky said:

What is the relevance?

 

 

 

 

 

I asked that because unless you have shot an SMLE you are like a non driver commenting on driving without experience.

 

I shot rifle and pistol in the 80-90s and have also done some range days in the last few years. I have also shot WW1 era rifles.

 

My father a WW2 infantryman also supplied lots of stories of the SMLE an No 4 and they always had 10 loaded and one up the spout.

 

I have spoken to lots of National Servicemen who trained with No 4's and many of them are still convinced to this day the No 4 only took 5 rounds. It's bizarre.

 

I tried a mad minute with a 1918 SMLE a while ago and got 22 rounds on the target at 300 metres. I would expect the Regular of 1914 to beat that in terms of accuracy and numbers. It was a lack of loading at speed that slowed me down. I was in a pit so it was trench like conditions with chargers next to the rifle.

 

John