BEF 1914. Marksmanship, Musketry and the Mad Minute

[PPF]

Well preahps the best way-would be a ratio to ratio comparision:

Take a regiment of each {4 Allied 2 Axis} which is roughly similiar and compare their marksmanship scores 1914 and in 1916:

1 UK

1 French

1 Belgium

1 German

1 Austrian-Hungarion

1 Russian

[Guest]

Well preahps the best way-would be a ratio to ratio comparision:

Take a regiment of each {4 Allied 2 Axis} which is roughly similiar and compare their marksmanship scores 1914 and in 1916:

1 UK

1 French

1 Belgium

1 German

1 Austrian-Hungarion

1 Russian

With the greatest respect, I think you are missing the point and need to read the thread in its entirety.

1. The key factor is musketry, not marksmanship.

2. Using a single battalion is statistically meaningless as a measure of an Army's aggregate skill. The British Army had over 100 battalions in the field in 1914. a 1% sample is not statistically robust.

3. Different nations used different weapons

4. Different nations had different musketry tests

5. 3 and 4 above mean that any comparison is meaningless.

MG

[dansparky]

yes given those reasons it would a comparison would not work. We are already having difficulty establishing how the British Army worked out there average scores. You would have to work out the average across each entire force before any comparsion could be made.

[The Ibis]

Great thread!

I've seen several mentions of Spencer Jones' 2012 book From Boer War to World War. Two years later, Jones published an article in the British Journal of Military History entitled 'Shooting Power': A Study of the Effectiveness of Boer and British Rifle Fire, 1899 – 1914, which is available online here: http://bjmh.org.uk/index.php/bjmh/article/viewFile/5/5. I doesn't look as though Jones intended to break any new ground with the article and instead it seems he was summarizing points previously made. Nonetheless, I might have missed something, and either way, I thought it might be of interest. The Abstract states:

The effectiveness of Boer rifle fire had a significant legacy on the development of British musketry standards. This would prompt improvements in training which would allow the infantry of the BEF to cause disproportionate casualties to their German adversaries in 1914. This paper charts the success of the Boer methods and explains how the British adapted to the increase in infantry rifle fire.

Jones - Boer and British Rifle Fire.pdf

[dansparky]

thanks so much for this upload

[Guest]

Great thread!

I've seen several mentions of Spencer Jones' 2012 book From Boer War to World War. Two years later, Jones published an article in the British Journal of Military History entitled 'Shooting Power': A Study of the Effectiveness of Boer and British Rifle Fire, 1899 1914, which is available online here: http://bjmh.org.uk/index.php/bjmh/article/viewFile/5/5. I doesn't look as though Jones intended to break any new ground with the article and instead it seems he was summarizing points previously made. Nonetheless, I might have missed something, and either way, I thought it might be of interest. The Abstract states:

An interesting article. It claims that the BEF's infantry inflicted a 'disproportionate number of casualties' upon the Germans. This is very challenging. How can anyone make this calculation? It is impossible to measure this. I would be delighted to be proven wrong.

Anyone? please?....MG

Edit. His arguments on the Boer war are equally challenging. HELP!!

[The Ibis]

An interesting article. It claims that the BEF's infantry inflicted a 'disproportionate number of casualties' upon the Germans. This is utter and complete nonsense. How can anyone make this calculation? It is impossible to measure this. I would be delighted to be proven wrong.

Anyone? please?....MG

Edit. His arguments on the Boer war are equally non-sensical. HELP!!

Hi Martin,

You flag a great point. He made no effort to compare casualties caused by the rifle fire of the belligerents in 1914 (to say nothing of more complex comparisons such as, for example the percentage of casualties caused by rifle fire when factoring in the amount of artillery/heavy weapons available, etc.). Not to say that it couldn't be done with the available data that is out there. But he didn't or at least produce it here.

Also, I'm hardly Mr. Language Person, but it seems to me that he is using the word 'disproportionate' incorrectly. As you note, Jones says: 'the infantry of the BEF to cause disproportionate casualties to their German adversaries in 1914.' This means that the BEF's rifle fire caused more or less German casualties than it should have caused. I think we can safely dismiss the idea that Jones believes the BEF's rifle fire caused less casualties than it should have. Which leaves us with the idea that the BEF's rifle fire caused more casualties than it should have. But I don't think Jones believes that, either.

Instead, Jones says:

The importance of this battlefield asset should not be underestimated. The BEF was a small, relatively fragile instrument, with comparatively light artillery support and a distinct absence of mortars, grenades and other weapons suitable for positional warfare.104 Lacking these assets, the British Army placed much reliance upon the tactical effectiveness of its infantry fire. The confidence was not misplaced and the impressive battlefield performance of the BEF in 1914 owes a great deal to, in the words of General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, the shooting power of our infantry.105

Because the British Army "placed much reliance upon the tactical effectiveness of its infantry fire," the logical reading of the article would be that it should been expected that BEF infantry fire would cause a significant number of German casualties. Therefore, unless the BEF's infantry did not cause a significant number of German casualties (which he seeming rejects) or caused a number of casualties all out of proportion to what anyone would have expected of an army intending to use rifle fire to cause a significant number of casualties (which he also does not say), Jones used the word 'disproportionate' incorrectly.

Or not ...

[Guest]

Great thread!

I've seen several mentions of Spencer Jones' 2012 book From Boer War to World War. Two years later, Jones published an article in the British Journal of Military History entitled 'Shooting Power': A Study of the Effectiveness of Boer and British Rifle Fire, 1899 1914, which is available online here: http://bjmh.org.uk/index.php/bjmh/article/viewFile/5/5. I doesn't look as though Jones intended to break any new ground with the article and instead it seems he was summarizing points previously made. Nonetheless, I might have missed something, and either way, I thought it might be of interest. The Abstract states:

It is an interesting article and covers a reasonable amount of what has been discussed on the thread. I feel in parts he confuses marksmanship with musketry.

I find the part on Boer 'marksmanship' interesting. Much of the Boers' skill was in field craft rather than being a good shot; the use of cover and snap shooting, judging distances accurately etc. These are broad skill sets, when combined have a compounding effect. I am struggling to think of an adversary that the British faced between the Crimean War and the Boer War that had developed modern weapons and training. It is interesting to see so many British Officers who considered British musketry and marksmanship was as good as the Boers. I sense if one wanted to be highly selective one could easily assemble enough evidence to support a theory either way. It is interesting however to see the Royal Commission agreeing that the Boer marksmanship was better despite some contradictory views.

He also intimates that British rapid fire was mistaken as MG fire, leaning heavily on the OH version of this story. This has been discussed on this thread earlier, but worth repeating; there is no evidence that any German mistook rapid fire for MGs. The quotes simply refer to the British having 'quantities of machine-guns' etc, which of course they did have.

The claim in the abstract that the British musketry inflicted a 'disproportionate' number of German casualties was not expanded on. How German casualties can be attributed to rifle fire rather than MG fire or shrapnel is interesting. I am not aware that the German Army kept data on the type of wounds in 1914, and the proportions. Given the British were, relative to the Germans, light on artillery and MGs, it would be no surprise if the data (if it indeed exists) shows a high proportion of gunshot wounds. The problem then extends to what the benchmark is supposed to be. This claim would be extremely difficult to prove in my view.

The British kept data on types of wound for certain periods, and if memory serves the proportion of wounds inflicted by gunfire is surprisingly low. I will revert with the data, but again it is meaningless without a benchmark.

One common error was repeated. He claims that the 'Mad minute' was the 'culmination' of the British musketry training. This is repeated again and again by a number of authors. The Table B tests clearly show it was not the culmination. In fact less than 6% of rounds were allotted to this and there were more tests that followed what was in fact a small part of the training. There were also individual tests and group tests that followed as well as judging distances.

I think there is a big challenge here; there is no doubt that British musketry and marksmanship improved after the Boer War. The data from the British Army's annual musketry tests shows almost universal, steady improvement between 1902 and 1914. The link between field craft, judging distances, snap shooting and a host of related skills was also improved markedly. The SMLE was a critical improvement too, however it is very difficult to prove (or disprove) that the results enabled the British Army to inflict a 'disproportionate' number of casualties.

I slightly fear that a small number of positive quotes by Germans have been used to substantiate this theory. I suspect if one bothered to dig deep enough one might find examples where Germans on occasion had a poor view of British musketry. The British diaries are peppered with examples of British Officers observing their own men shooting high etc. if the British saw this, one should not be surprised if on occasion some Germans did too.

The constant risk in the argument of superior British musketry is one of confirmation bias by authors; carefully selecting supporting evidence while discarding conflicting evidence. It is interesting that the same quotes and same false logic is recycled again; somehow the German observation that the British had machine guns gets twisted into the idea that the Germans believed rifle fire was MG fire.

Any mistakes are mine.

MG

[MartH]

Can I add I know of one instance in any German Official referring to one mistaken identification of machine gun fire (in this case from the trees) in the Episodes of the Western War covering the Action at Langemarck October 23rd 1914 with the Glosters. The Germans where the non conscripted university volunteers who had hardly any training, so it;s not surprising they could not differentiate rifle fire from machine gun fire, and most of them where cut down in the field where the car park is now.

[dansparky]

An interesting article. It claims that the BEF's infantry inflicted a 'disproportionate number of casualties' upon the Germans. This is very challenging. How can anyone make this calculation? It is impossible to measure this. I would be delighted to be proven wrong.

Anyone? please?....MG

Edit. His arguments on the Boer war are equally challenging. HELP!!

This is often quoted by historians although I do not think spencer says this in from Boer war to world war. He says they did exceedingly well against greater numbers(paraphrase). Zuber argues that actually the forces at engagement were not much different etc. So this highlights our first problem was there more or less of the germans (Zuber concedes that far greater german units in the gerneral area but these at the actual time of contact numbers were roughly equal, particularly at Mons)? Secondly, casualty returns present a problem. Casualty including (prisoners), during the retreat we would have lost more men to this than the germans. The bigger problem was however that German casualty returns covered a much larger amount of time. Thinking off the cuff, they were something like every two weeks or more and thus it is hard to tie them down to any particular time or engagement.

Edited 20 December , 2015 by dansparky

[dansparky]

Hi Martin,

You flag a great point. He made no effort to compare casualties caused by the rifle fire of the belligerents in 1914 (to say nothing of more complex comparisons such as, for example the percentage of casualties caused by rifle fire when factoring in the amount of artillery/heavy weapons available, etc.). Not to say that it couldn't be done with the available data that is out there. But he didn't or at least produce it here.

Also, I'm hardly Mr. Language Person, but it seems to me that he is using the word 'disproportionate' incorrectly. As you note, Jones says: 'the infantry of the BEF to cause disproportionate casualties to their German adversaries in 1914.' This means that the BEF's rifle fire caused more or less German casualties than it should have caused. I think we can safely dismiss the idea that Jones believes the BEF's rifle fire caused less casualties than it should have. Which leaves us with the idea that the BEF's rifle fire caused more casualties than it should have. But I don't think Jones believes that, either.

Instead, Jones says: Because the British Army "placed much reliance upon the tactical effectiveness of its infantry fire," the logical reading of the article would be that it should been expected that BEF infantry fire would cause a significant number of German casualties. Therefore, unless the BEF's infantry did not cause a significant number of German casualties (which he seeming rejects) or caused a number of casualties all out of proportion to what anyone would have expected of an army intending to use rifle fire to cause a significant number of casualties (which he also does not say), Jones used the word 'disproportionate' incorrectly.

Or not ...

What spencer refers to, is what was meant is a continious thread in British histories. It just means the Germans suffered greater percentage of casulties of their whole than we did. In proportion our's should have been higher because we were outnumbered (unless you believe Zuber, Hastings etc). So the fact that a smaller force inflicted higher loses in disproportionate. Does that make sense?

[dansparky]

The British History simply belives that if a smaller force could get away (unpursued), and witnesses saw many fall due to our accuracy. Then we must have inflicted terrible loses. Zuber believes they were simply hitting the dirt. My own opinion is Zuber may be right, but something held them up (not just HQ mistakes as Zuber argues). I think it may indicate that the Germans had a healthy respect for our Markmanship, so hit the dirt to escape its effect. In these instances though tropps are not reported to rise again in bounds, but this could be due to the fog of war.

[Guest]

What spencer refers to, is what was meant is a continious thread in British histories. It just means the Germans suffered greater percentage of casulties of their whole than we did. In proportion our's should have been higher because we were outnumbered (unless you believe Zuber, Hastings etc). So the fact that a smaller force inflicted higher loses in disproportionate. Does that make sense?

No. I don't understand this, particularly the first sentence.

Edit. How can anyone isolate the Germans fighting opposite the British or isolate British from Indian Army etc...The British were relieved by the French and vice versa on many occasions in 1914...so the German troops might be facing French, British, Indian Army troops in rotation...so I cant see how anyone can calculate how many Germans opposed the British. Even when we have set pieces such as Mons or Le Cateau, authors cant agree on the numbers facing each other or the number of casualties.With the massive ebb and flow of troops, long logistic tails etc I can't see how it is possible to calculate the numbers opposing each other. it id fraught with complexity. MG

[The Ibis]

No. I don't understand this, particularly the first sentence.

Edit. How can anyone isolate the Germans fighting opposite the British or isolate British from Indian Army etc...The British were relieved by the French and vice versa on many occasions in 1914...so the German troops might be facing French, British, Indian Army troops in rotation...so I cant see how anyone can calculate how many Germans opposed the British. Even when we have set pieces such as Mons or Le Cateau, authors cant agree on the numbers facing each other or the number of casualties.With the massive ebb and flow of troops, long logistic tails etc I can't see how it is possible to calculate the numbers opposing each other. it id fraught with complexity. MG

I read dansparky's response right before my flight took off and I thought about a response while I was flying to Tampa. I think I understood what dansparky was driving at, but your point about determining which Allied unit caused the German casualty (and we should also include the Belgians) occurred to me as well. Moreover, for a really comprehensive comparison of 1914, we would also need to consider rifle fire casualties in the battles between Germany and Austria-Hungary and Russia, as well as the A-H battles versus Serbia. I'm guessing here, but I suspect that the data for those engagements would be even more difficult to obtain.

[dansparky]

No. I don't understand this, particularly the first sentence.

Edit. How can anyone isolate the Germans fighting opposite the British or isolate British from Indian Army etc...The British were relieved by the French and vice versa on many occasions in 1914...so the German troops might be facing French, British, Indian Army troops in rotation...so I cant see how anyone can calculate how many Germans opposed the British. Even when we have set pieces such as Mons or Le Cateau, authors cant agree on the numbers facing each other or the number of casualties.With the massive ebb and flow of troops, long logistic tails etc I can't see how it is possible to calculate the numbers opposing each other. it id fraught with complexity. MG

what I meant was, a continuous thread in British Histories is that the British infantry inflicted much higher losses on the Germans which contributed to their inability to overrun us. The Official British History and publications that follow, state that we were outnumberd, something Zuber argues against. He documents that many of the units in the area, particularly at Mons were not active and that the biligerients were roughly equal.

[dansparky]

I read dansparky's response right before my flight took off and I thought about a response while I was flying to Tampa. I think I understood what dansparky was driving at, but your point about determining which Allied unit caused the German casualty (and we should also include the Belgians) occurred to me as well. Moreover, for a really comprehensive comparison of 1914, we would also need to consider rifle fire casualties in the battles between Germany and Austria-Hungary and Russia, as well as the A-H battles versus Serbia. I'm guessing here, but I suspect that the data for those engagements would be even more difficult to obtain.

Indeed, this data is difficult to ascertain, In Catastrophe by Max hastings he refers to Klucks casualty figures being slightly over 7,000 for a ten day period including mons and le cateau (2,863 were recorded for the entire month of August for 1st Army, which indicates many of the figures in the latter part of august made a percentage of September's loss) .

I have read somewhere else about german casualty figures being infrequent. I'm not to sure this broke down into, killed, wounded, prisoners. I think it did as a monthly figure. So with this in Mind, the difficulty in establishing loses where and when they occurred would mean, establishing the method of immobilising a combatant all the more difficult?

I can't remember where I read that infrequent reports on casualties presented a problem in establishing exactly how many losses were suffered.

Determing which allied unit caused what as well makes the calculation impossible.

On ocassion my posts may not make complete sense, this is due to study and my Dyslexia, i will try to be as clear as i can. :-)

[Guest]

Gents. In my experience arguments based on speculation of casualty exchange rates are on a hiding to nothing. Casualty analysis usually only works if we have the data..and in this case we simply don't. Rather than waste time speculating about this I think it is worth simply accepting it is an area than can not be substantiated.

The thread is about marksmanship, musketry and the mad minute. I understand that if authors speculate about casualties due to the alleged British superiority it is an area that one can be drawn into. I think in this instance it is merely going to descend into a never ending spiral of conjecture. It is noteworthy that the author(s) don't provide tangible references other than recycling the OH's rather imaginative analysis of German anecdotes.

MG

[dansparky]

I understand what you are saying, Martin. It is always an area where one must place additional focus as it is often used as an arguement that the British were either good or bad shots. However, I do agree that the casualty data is unreliable which renders it problamatic to our overiding question (it does become a bit of a guestimation). It is something though that Historians still use to substantuate their arguments. In addition, however, unreliable it is one piece of evidence that links possible performance to capabilities before the war.

Anymore luck on calculations for battalion averages?

[dansparky]

Which side of the argument to fall seems to be getting more complicated.. Musketry regs has not provided the full answer, no luck finding the kingsway scoring books yet :-(

[Muerrisch]

I hold no hope for Kingsway [or any other] scoring books, because they appear to be for the use of an individual, rather than a unit. Certainly my Gale & Polden equivalent sheds no light regarding the calculation of company or unit scores.

I suspect that the calculation is as simple as MG describes above.

Regarding the excellence or otherwise of British musketry, early in the war well-sited and well-led regular infantry and cavalry routinely defeated opposing infantry unless other factors weighed [primarily artillery, or outflanking/enfilade].

They did what it said on the tin.

[David Filsell]

Martin,

I would add range of firing and position selection to your list of Boer efficiencies, certainly I think that, as I have shown, range of shooting by the boers certainly influenced British army - until they came to "know different".

[Guest]

Martin,

I would add range of firing and position selection to your list of Boer efficiencies, certainly I think that, as I have shown, range of shooting by the boers certainly influenced British army - until they came to "know different".

I would agree. Thank you.

If one compares Table B 1905 with Table B 1909, (post # 315) the ranges for qualifying, instructional practices, classification practices and marksmen's practices varied considerably between the periods. In 1905 the test was conducted over considerably longer ranges, perhaps reflecting 'lessons' from the Boer War. It is notable that ranges were shortened between 1905 and 1909 as doctrine was tweaked. I have no idea why this would be the case but the 1905 Table B enshrines the lessons of the Boer War without a doubt. Why it should subsequently change is a small mystery and may well reflect the introduction of the SMLE post the 1905 Musketry Regulations.

MG

[David Filsell]

Martin,

As ever thanks for your response. It would be fascinating to know where Hythe figured in developing what I think was an unofficial doctrine of long range musketry and, hence, the use of forward slopes particularly vulnerable to artillery fire. I have not been able to find anything about its role.

[4thGordons]

I would agree. Thank you.

Why it should subsequently change is a small mystery and may well reflect the introduction of the SMLE post the 1905 Musketry Regulations.

MG

Just an observation. The ShtLE was introduced in 1902/3 (in MkI format) so prior to the 1905 regs. The ShtLE MkIII (with charger bridge replacing sliding charger on the bolt head) was approved in 1907.

Chris

[Guest]

Just an observation. The ShtLE was introduced in 1902/3 (in MkI format) so prior to the 1905 regs. The ShtLE MkIII (with charger bridge replacing sliding charger on the bolt head) was approved in 1907.

Chris

Thanks Chris...it makes sense. I had thought the roll-out of the SMLE Mk I across the British Army was later. My oversight.

I have no doubt the changes in the test related to the new weapon. As the Army began to use the weapon and provided feedback, there may have been tweaks to the training manual as well. There are a number of Regimental journals that provide reports on the annual musketry test by battalions during the inter-war period. The upgrade to the Mk III provided some adjustment and battalion musketry scores did not always improve in the first year. "Test and adjust" springs to mind. MG